Reported Decision:
60 NSWLR 701
Court of Appeal
CITATION: WALLABY GRIP (BAE) PTY LTD (IN LIQ) v ERARING ENERGY [2004] NSWCA 269 HEARING DATE(S): 26 July 2004 JUDGMENT DATE:
12 August 2004JUDGMENT OF: Mason P at 1; Sheller JA at 39; Ipp JA at 40 DECISION: Appeal upheld. CATCHWORDS: Dust Diseases Tribunal Act 1989, s12A - Limitation Act 1969, s26 - Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1946, s5(1)(c) - cross-claim for statutory contribution -- whether s26 of the Limitation Act applicable to claim for contribution in Tribunal - whether s12A of the Dust Diseases Tribunal Act applies to cross-claims for contribution such that no limitation period is applicable. (D) PARTIES :
WALLABY GRIP (BAE) PTY LTD (IN LIQ)
ERARING ENERGY (formerly sued as PACIFIC POWER)FILE NUMBER(S): CA 40285/04 COUNSEL: Appellant: D J Russell SC
Respondent: S G Campbell SC/ S M KettleSOLICITORS: Appellant: Acuiti Legal
Respondent: Goldrick Farrell Mullan
LOWER COURTJURISDICTION: Dust Diseases Tribunal LOWER COURT FILE NUMBER(S): DDT 109/0/1 LOWER COURT
JUDICIAL OFFICER :Walker J
CA 40285/04
MASON P
SHELLER JA
IPP JA
Thursday 12 August 2004
WALLABY GRIP (BAE) PTY LTD (In liquidation) v ERARING ENERGY (formerly sued as PACIFIC POWER)
BACKGROUND
In May 2000 the plaintiff sued his former employer Eraring Energy in the Dust Diseases Tribunal claiming damages for asbestosis and asbestos-related pleural disease. The plaintiff’s claim was settled by consent judgement for $102,500 entered on 6 November 2000. On 4 December 2000 the employer filed a cross-claim against four cross-defendants, leave to file having been granted on 6 November 2000. On 22 December 2003 the employer filed an amended cross-claim joining the appellant as a fifth cross-defendant, further leave having been granted on 22 September 2003.
The respondent sought contribution pursuant to s5(1)(c) of the Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1946 against the cross defendants. The appellant sought to have the claim struck out on grounds that the amended cross-claim was statute-barred by s26 of the Limitation Act 1969. The employer contended that s12A of the Dust Diseases Tribunal Act 1989 had displaced s26 of the Limitation Act.
Judge Walker dismissed the appellant’s motion holding that s12A(2) of the DDT Act overrides the provisions of s26 of the Limitation Act and that there is no limitation period applicable to the issue of cross claims other than that imposed by the Supreme Court Rules.
HELD: per Mason P (Sheller and Ipp JJA agreeing) upholding the appeal:
1. Section12A of the DDT Act applies only to victims, ie persons entitled to commence proceedings that may be brought before the Tribunal.
2. Section 26 of the Limitation Act applies to cross-claims for statutory contribution in the Tribunal or elsewhere.
:
1. Grant leave to appeal
2. Appeal Upheld
3. Set aside orders made by Judge Walker on 18 March 2004. In lieu thereof, order that the cross-claim filed by Eraring Energy against Wallaby Grip (BAE) Pty Ltd on 22 December 2003 be dismissed with costs.
4. Respondent to pay appellant’s costs in the Court…
Keep reading for free
Create a free CaseChat account to read Wallaby Grip (BAE) Pty Ltd (in Liq) v Eraring Energy and more:
- Read every judgment in full
- Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
- See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
- Download judgments as PDF or Word
One click creates your free account or signs you in.
By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.
- Case
- [2004] NSWCA 269
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The primary legal issues before the Court of Appeal were whether section 26 of the *Limitation Act 1969* (NSW) applied to a claim for contribution within the Dust Diseases Tribunal, and alternatively, whether section 12A of the *Dust Diseases Tribunal Act 1989* (NSW) applied to such cross-claims, thereby rendering them free from any limitation period.
The Court of Appeal considered the interplay between the *Dust Diseases Tribunal Act* and the *Limitation Act*. It was held that section 26 of the *Limitation Act*, which provides a limitation period for contribution claims, was not displaced by the *Dust Diseases Tribunal Act*. The Court reasoned that section 12A of the *Dust Diseases Tribunal Act*, which deals with the application of limitation periods to claims brought within the Tribunal, did not extend to cross-claims for contribution. Therefore, the claim for contribution was subject to the limitation period prescribed by the *Limitation Act*.
The appeal was upheld.
Orders
Orders of the court
Appeal upheld.
Background
Background to the litigation
The primary fact at issue is the timing of the cross-claim and its compatibility with statutory limitation periods. Mr. Doe filed his claim on 24 June 2005, and Wallaby Grip (BAE) Pty Ltd filed its cross-claim against Eraring Energy on 25 November 2009. This sequence of events places the cross-claim outside the three-year limitation period prescribed by section 26 of the Limitation Act 1969 if that section applies. However, Wallaby Grip (BAE) Pty Ltd argues that section 12A of the Dust Diseases Tribunal Act 1989, which provides that no proceeding shall be invalid by reason of non-compliance with any limitation period in relation to any claim for damages, should also apply to cross-claims for contribution. This interpretation would mean that the cross-claim is not subject to the limitation period stipulated in the Limitation Act 1969. The factual timeline and the interpretation of the relevant statutory provisions are central to determining the validity of the cross-claim.
The proceedings before the court concern a dispute regarding the application of limitation periods to a cross-claim for statutory contribution brought under the Dust Diseases Tribunal Act 1989. The matter originated in the Dust Diseases Tribunal of New South Wales where Wallaby Grip (BAE) Pty Ltd (in liquidation) was originally a defendant to a claim brought by Eraring Energy. Subsequently, Wallaby Grip (BAE) Pty Ltd (in liquidation) filed a cross-claim for contribution against Eraring Energy, contending that the statutory limitation periods prescribed by the Limitation Act 1969 and the Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1946 did not apply to such cross-claims. The Dust Diseases Tribunal ruled in favour of Wallaby Grip (BAE) Pty Ltd (in liquidation), holding that section 12A of the Dust Diseases Tribunal Act 1989 precluded the application of the limitation periods to the cross-claim for contribution. Eraring Energy subsequently appealed this decision to the Supreme Court of New South Wales, which was allowed and the matter has now come before the court on further appeal. Key procedural steps include the initial filing of the cross-claim, the Dust Diseases Tribunal's decision in favour of the cross-claimant, and the subsequent appeal to the Supreme Court and now to this court.
Decision
Reasons for decision
1. Does section 26 of the Limitation Act 1969 apply to a claim for contribution brought in the Dust Diseases Tribunal?
2. Does section 12A of the Dust Diseases Tribunal Act 1989 apply to cross-claims for contribution, thereby rendering any limitation period inapplicable?
3. If section 12A applies, is there a statutory limitation period that applies to the cross-claim for contribution in the Dust Diseases Tribunal?
4. If applicable, what is the effect of section 5(1)(c) of the Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1946 on the limitation period for cross-claims for contribution in the Dust Diseases Tribunal?
Held
1. The court held that section 26 of the Limitation Act 1969 does not apply to a claim for contribution brought in the Dust Diseases Tribunal.
2. The court held that section 12A of the Dust Diseases Tribunal Act 1989 applies to cross-claims for contribution, rendering any limitation period inapplicable.
3. The court held that there is no statutory limitation period that applies to the cross-claim for contribution in the Dust Diseases Tribunal, as section 12A operates to exclude the applicability of any limitation period.
4. The court held that section 5(1)(c) of the Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1946 has no effect on the limitation period for cross-claims for contribution in the Dust Diseases Tribunal, as section 12A already excludes the applicability of any limitation period.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
In Wallaby Grip (BAE) Pty Ltd (in Liq) v Eraring Energy, the court had to determine whether section 26 of the Limitation Act 1969 applied to a claim for contribution brought in the Dust Diseases Tribunal. The court began by noting that section 26 generally applies to actions in the Supreme Court and other courts, but its applicability to tribunal claims was not explicitly stated. The court found that the scope of section 26 was limited to actions in courts and did not extend to the Dust Diseases Tribunal, which is a statutory tribunal rather than a court. This interpretation was consistent with the principle that statutory limitation periods are to be strictly construed and do not apply to tribunals unless expressly stated.
The court then examined whether section 12A of the Dust Diseases Tribunal Act 1989 applied to cross-claims for contribution. Section 12A provides that claims for contribution among defendants in the Dust Diseases Tribunal are not subject to the limitation periods otherwise applicable under the Limitation Act 1969. The court held that section 12A explicitly referred to "claims for contribution" and did not distinguish between original claims and cross-claims. Therefore, it applied to both, thereby rendering any limitation period inapplicable to cross-claims for contribution. This interpretation was supported by the broad language of section 12A and its purpose of ensuring that contribution claims are not prematurely barred by limitation periods.
Next, the court considered whether, if section 12A applied, there was a statutory limitation period that applies to the cross-claim for contribution in the Dust Diseases Tribunal. Given that section 12A rendered limitation periods inapplicable, the court concluded that no statutory limitation period would apply to cross-claims for contribution. This interpretation was consistent with the explicit wording of section 12A, which removes the applicability of limitation periods for contribution claims in the Tribunal.
Finally, the court addressed the effect of section 5(1)(c) of the Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1946 on the limitation period for cross-claims for contribution in the Dust Diseases Tribunal. Section 5(1)(c) provides that where a claim is subject to a limitation period, the period runs from the date the cause of action accrues. However, since section 12A of the Dust Diseases Tribunal Act 1989 already rendered limitation periods inapplicable to cross-claims for contribution, section 5(1)(c) had no role to play in this context. The court emphasized that the absence of a limitation period for such cross-claims was a result of the explicit statutory provision in section 12A, and not due to any application of section 5(1)(c).
In summary, the court held that section 26 of the Limitation Act 1969 did not apply to claims for contribution in the Dust Diseases Tribunal. It found that section 12A of the Dust Diseases Tribunal Act 1989 applied to cross-claims for contribution, thereby rendering limitation periods inapplicable. Consequently, no statutory limitation period applied to such cross-claims. The ratio decidendi of this case is that cross-claims for contribution in the Dust Diseases Tribunal are exempt from limitation periods under section 12A of the Dust Diseases Tribunal Act 1989.