Walker v Wakehurst Golf Club Ltd

[2013] NSWADT 295

Administrative Decisions Tribunal

New South Wales

Medium Neutral Citation:

Walker v Wakehurst Golf Club Ltd [2013] NSWADT 295

Hearing dates:

10 December 2013

Decision date:

20 December 2013

Jurisdiction:

Equal Opportunity Division

Before:

Magistrate N Hennessy, Deputy President

Decision:

1. The Respondent's application for the Applicant's complaints of sex discrimination to be summarily dismissed is refused.

2. The Applicant's application for costs is refused.

Catchwords:

ANTI-DISCRIMINATION - summary dismissal - registered clubs - sporting activity - scope of s 34A and s 38 of Anti-Discrimination Act 1977

Legislation Cited:

Administrative Decisions Tribunal Act 1997
Anti-Discrimination Act 1977
Interpretation Act 1987

Cases Cited:

Fricke v Corbett Research Pty Ltd [2004] NSWADT 128
Margan v University of Technology, Sydney [2003] NSWADTAP 65
Re Australian Federation of Construction Contractors; Ex parte Billing (1986) 68 ALR 416
Tullamore Bowling & Citizens Club v Lander [1984] 2 NSWLR 32

Category:

Interlocutory applications

Parties:

Susan Walker (Applicant)
Wakehurst Golf Club Ltd (Respondent)

Representation:

Counsel
Ms E Raper (Applicant)
Ms C Ronalds SC (Respondent)
Mary Cunningham (Applicant)
Phillip McLeod, Lawyer (Respondent)

File Number(s):

131032

reasons for decision

Introduction

1. Ms Walker, who is a member of Wakehurst Golf Club Ltd, complained that the Club had discriminated against her on the ground of sex and victimised her in breach of the Anti-Discrimination Act 1977 (AD Act). The Club has applied to the Tribunal for Ms Walker's complaints of sex discrimination (but not the complaint of victimisation) to be summarily dismissed prior to hearing. The basis for the Club's application is that the direct discrimination complaints are misconceived, lacking in substance or fail to disclose a contravention of the AD Act: AD Act, s 102 and s 92(1)(a)(i) and (ii).

1. The Club makes its application on two bases. The first is that Ms Walker's complaint under s 34A(2), relating to discrimination on the ground of sex by a registered club, cannot be substantiated because that section relates to entitlements of members of the club and does not "cover the playing of a game of golf". The second basis is that Ms Walker's complaint comes within the exemption in s 38 which allows a club to exclude men or women from participation in any single sex sporting activity.

Background

1. The Club hosts separate women's and men's golfing competitions on Saturdays. Ms Walker is not complaining about the fact that there are separate competitions for men and women. Her complaint is that the competitions are not comparable. In particular the men's competition offers certain prizes and awards that are not offered in the women's competition.

1. Ms Walker brings her complaints of sex discrimination under both the registered clubs provision (s 34A) and the 'goods and services' provision (s 33). Her goods and services complaint is that the Club breached s 33(1)(a) and (b) of the AD Act by refusing to provide her with the service of "scheduling, hosting and running gendered golf competitions on the weekend" or by providing that service on certain unfavourable terms. Section 33 states that:

33 Provision of goods and services

(1) It is unlawful for a person who provides, for payment or not, goods or services to discriminate against another person on the ground of sex:

(a) by refusing to provide the person with those goods or services, or

(b) in the terms on which he or she provides the person with those goods or services.

(2) Where a skill is commonly exercised in a different way in relation to men and women, a person does not contravene subsection (1) by exercising the skill in relation to men only, or women only, in accordance with the person's normal practice.

1. The second complaint under the registered clubs provision is that the Club breached s 34A(2)(a), (b) and (c) of the AD Act.

34A Registered clubs

(2) It is unlawful for a registered club to discriminate against a person who is a member of a registered club on the ground of sex:

(a) by denying the person access, or limiting the person's access, to any benefit provided by the registered club,

(b) by depriving the person of membership or varying the terms of the person's membership, or

(c) by subjecting the person to any other detriment.

1. The exception in s 38 applies to the whole of Part 3 of the AD Act relating to sex discrimination, including sections 33 and s 34A.

38 Sport

Nothing in this Part renders unlawful the exclusion of persons of the one sex from participation in any sporting activity not being the coaching of persons engaged in any sporting activity, the administration of any sporting activity or any prescribed sporting activity.

Principles of summary dismissal

1. The discretion to summarily dismiss a complaint is to be exercised with extreme caution: Fricke v Corbett Research Pty Ltd [2004] NSWADT 128 (29 June 2004) at [41] and [42]. The Tribunal must take the applicant's case at its highest and determine whether, on the basis of that evidence, he or she could possibly substantiate the complaint.

1. In Margan v University of Technology, Sydney [2003] NSWADTAP 65 the Appeal Panel set out the scope of the summary dismissal power in relation to s 111, the former summary dismissal provision of the AD Act. A [10] the Appeal Panel discussed set out the law where it is submitted that the complaint does not disclose a contravention of the AD Act because, for example, of the operation of an exemption:

10 The failure of the complaint to disclose a contravention of the Act is analogous to the inherent and/or statutory power of courts to dismiss proceedings when the pleadings fail to show a reasonable cause of action. For example, Part 13, rule 5 of the Supreme Court Rules 1970 allows the Court to stay or dismiss proceedings where no reasonable cause of action is disclosed. The rule gives the Court a discretionary power to dismiss the plaintiff's case when it is so weak that to permit the proceedings to go to trial would be futile: Peter Kent Developments Pty Ltd v Australia & New Zealand Banking Group Ltd (SC (NSW), Hunt J, 6 May 1980, unreported). Ritchie's Supreme Court Procedure NSW (Peter Taylor SC ed, Butterworths 1984) notes at 2325 that "The test to be applied has variously been described as whether the matter is `so obviously untenable that it cannot possibly succeed', `manifestly groundless', `so manifestly faulty that it does not admit of argument', one which `the court is satisfied cannot succeed', one where under no possibility can there be a good cause of action'", or one which `would involve useless expense' (General Steel Industries Inc v Commissioner for Railways (NSW) [1964] HCA 69; (1964) 112 CLR 125 at 129; Pannizutti v Trask (1987) 10 NSWLR 531 at 536; Rajski v Powell (1987) 11 NSWLR 522 at 524; Brimson v Rocla Concrete Pipes Ltd [1982] 2 NSWLR 937 at 942.

Complaint under s 34A - registered clubs

1. The Club's first submission is that s 34A(2) does not cover the playing of the game of golf. The sole focus of that provision is on categories of membership. According to the respondent, the way the Club organises its competitions is a matter for the Club. As long as the capacity to vote and run for the board is gender neutral, then the AD Act has no application.

1. On 1 June 1981, the AD Act was amended to make certain conduct by registered clubs unlawful. When introducing the amendments the then Premier, Mr Wran QC, discussed the effect of the amendments on rules about membership of clubs and access to facilities. He went on to say that the amendments do not affect games like golf and bowls being played according to different rules for men and women. The then Premier then tabled a Guide to the amendments. While the Guide has no legislative status it is a type of 'extrinsic material' under s 34(2)(e) of the Interpretation Act 1987 (Interpretation Act) and can be taken into account in certain circumstances.

1. The Guide states, in part, that the amendments, "will not affect sporting activities or competitions organized for persons of the one sex." The Guide goes on to state, in relation to golf clubs, that ". . . if full members of both sexes desired to take part in weekend play then the club would have to allocate a fair and reasonable period of time for full members of both sexes to use the course."

1. Ms Ronalds SC submitted that the use of extrinsic material, such as Second Reading Speeches and the Guide is warranted in this case. Ms Raper, representing Ms Walker, disagreed.

1. Section 34 of the Interpretation Act governs the use of extrinsic material. Where the provision under consideration is clear, extrinsic material may only be used to confirm the ordinary meaning: Pearce DC & Geddes RS, Statutory Interpretation in Australia (7th ed) at [3.17] and Re Australian Federation of Construction Contractors; Ex parte Billing (1986) 68 ALR 416 at 420.

1. The ordinary meaning is clear in this case. Section 34A applies to members and those who wish to be members of registered clubs. It is a broad provision which makes certain conduct unlawful including by denying the person access, or limiting the person's access, to any benefit provided by the registered club and subjecting a member to "any other detriment". There is no basis for concluding that a benefit or detriment cannot relate to the type and level of prizes or awards available when participating in sporting activities. Indeed, s 34A(4) addresses the situation separate benefits are provided to men and women:

(4) Nothing in subsection (1) (paragraph (a) excepted) or subsection (2) renders unlawful discrimination by a registered club against a person on the ground of sex if the discrimination occurs in relation to the use or enjoyment of any benefit provided by the registered club where:

(a) it is not practicable for the benefit to be used or enjoyed:

(i) simultaneously, or

(ii) to the same extent,

by both men and women, and

(b) either:

(i) the same, or an equivalent, benefit is provided for the use of men and women separately from each other, or

(ii) men and women are each entitled to a fair and reasonable proportion of the use and enjoyment of the benefit.

(5) In determining any matter relating to the application of subsection (4), regard shall be had to:

(a) the purposes for which the registered club is established,

(b) the membership of the registered club, including any class or type of membership,

(c) the nature of the benefits provided by the registered club,

(d) the opportunities for the use and enjoyment of those benefits by men and women, and

(e) any other relevant circumstance.

1. In any case, the extrinsic material does not suggest otherwise. The Guide says that the amendments, "will not affect sporting activities or competitions organized for persons of the one sex." A club is obliged to "allocate a fair and reasonable period of time for full members of both sexes to use the course." It follows from that comment that s 34A does not exclude the Club being equitable in terms of prizes and awards for competitions for both men and women.

1. Contrary to the Club's submission, s 34A does not relate exclusively to categories of membership. It also includes denying or limiting a person's access to any benefit provided by the Club and subjecting a member to "any other detriment". One of the benefits provided by the Club is access to golfing competitions and to the prizes awarded in those competitions. For that reason I do not accept the Club's submission that the way the Club organises its golf competitions is solely a matter for the Club. The Club's application to summarily dismiss Ms Walker's complaint on the basis that it does not come within the terms of s 34A is refused.

Exemption in s 38

1. The second basis on which the respondent applied for the complaints of sex discrimination to be dismissed was that s 38 provides an exemption in relation to Ms Walker's complaints under both s 33 and s 34A.

1. The three critical terms in s 38 are "sporting activity", "participation in" and "exclusion". There is no dispute that golf is a sporting activity and that many golfing competitions include the awarding of medals and prizes.

1. Participation is defined in the Macquarie Dictionary, 6th edition at p 1217 relevantly as:

The act of fact of participating, a taking part, as in some action or attempt.

1. The phrase "participation in any sporting activity" in this case means the participation in a gendered golf competition. The Club accepts that when playing competition golf on a Saturday, Ms Walker is 'participating in' a sporting activity.

1. The third term is "exclusion" which is defined in the Macquarie Dictionary relevantly as:

To shut or keep out; prevent the entrance of; to shut out from consideration, privilege, etc; to expel and keep out; thrust out; eject.

1. Both parties agree that s 38 authorises separate sporting competitions for men and women. As Samuels JA stated in Tullamore Bowling & Citizens Club v Lander [1984] 2 NSWLR 32 at 39, ". . . the existence of distinct competitions at any level of organization does not represent a discriminatory practice."

1. For the exemption in s 38 to apply, the discrimination must involve the exclusion of men or women from participation in any sporting activity. The exemption can only apply to the exclusion from a sporting activity which the other sex only is participating in. It is not a blanket exemption that allows the Club to discriminate against members of one sex in relation to the benefits or services it provides such as the scheduling, hosting or running of golf games. It merely allows the Club to exclude members of one sex from participating in the single sex sporting competition of the other sex.

1. The ordinary meaning of s 38 is consistent with the principle of statutory construction that the interpretation of a provision must promote the purpose or object underlying the Act: Interpretation Act, s 33. Section 38 was in the AD Act as originally enacted. Since then, other sporting exemptions have been added in relation to other grounds of discrimination such as race, transgender and disability. Each exemption is tailored to the particular attribute concerned. That fact suggests that the Club's broad interpretation of s 38 is not correct.

1. Ms Raper, representing Ms Walker, submitted that s 38 merely allows the Club to have separate golfing competitions for men and women. If the exemption was intended to be wider than that, the legislature would have framed the exemption more broadly. For example, s 22, which is the sporting exception for race discrimination, states that:

Nothing in this Part applies to or in respect of anything done on the grounds of a person's nationality or place of birth or length of time for which the person has been resident in a particular place or area:

(a) in selecting one or more persons to represent a place or an area in any sport or game, or

(b) in pursuance of the rules of any competition in so far as they relate to eligibility to compete in any sport or game.

1. Ms Walker has not been excluded from participating in any sporting activity. Her complaint is that she has not been given equal or comparable access to the competition or to the benefits associated with the competition. The Club's application to summarily dismiss Ms Walker's complaint on the basis that the Club's conduct comes within s 38 of the AD Act is refused.

Costs

1. Ms Raper applied for costs because the applicability of s 38 should have been determined at the hearing, not by way of an interlocutory strike out application. If that had been done, significant costs would have been saved.

1. The general rule is that each party pays their own costs: Administrative Decisions Tribunal Act 1997, s 88(1). The Tribunal may make an award of costs only if it is satisfied that it is fair to do so having regard to certain matters listed in s 88(1A) including any matter that it considers relevant.

1. I am not satisfied that it is fair to award costs in this case. It is appropriate for a respondent to apply for summary dismissal after the applicant's Points of Claim and evidence have been filed in cases where the respondent is submitting that a complaint does not disclose a contravention of the AD Act: Margan supra at [15].

Orders

1. The Respondent's application for the Applicant's complaints of sex discrimination to be summarily dismissed is refused.

2. The Applicant's application for costs is refused.

Decision last updated: 08 January 2014