Walker v The State of Western Australia

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JURISDICTION     :   SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA

CITATION:   WALKER -v- THE STATE OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA [2019] WASC 382

CORAM:   HILL J

HEARD:   29 AUGUST 2019

DELIVERED          :   29 AUGUST 2019

PUBLISHED           :   24 OCTOBER 2019

FILE NO/S:   CPCA 11 of 2010

BETWEEN:   DEBORAH MARIA WALKER

Plaintiff

AND

THE STATE OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA

Defendant


Catchwords:

Criminal property confiscation - Whether objections to the confiscation of property should be dismissed - Whether property 'crime-used' - Turns on own facts

Legislation:

Criminal Property Confiscation Act 2000 (WA), s 34, s 79, s 82, s 146
Misuse of Drugs Act 1981 (WA), s 6

Result:

Objections to confiscation of property dismissed

Category:    B

Representation:

Counsel:

Plaintiff : No appearance
Defendant : Mr T Staples

Solicitors:

Plaintiff : In person
Defendant : Director of Public Prosecutions (WA)

Case(s) referred to in decision(s):

Bennett v The State of Western Australia [2012] WASCA 70

Director of Public Prosecutions (WA) v White [2010] WASCA 47; (2010) 41 WAR 249

Director of Public Prosecutions for Western Australia v McPherson [2012] WASC 342

Mickelberg v Director of Perth Mint [1986] WAR 365

HILL J:

  1. This is an application arising under the Criminal Property Confiscation Act 2000 (WA) (Act) for the dismissal of objections lodged by the plaintiff in 2010. I note that this is a civil proceeding[1] on which I am required to make findings on the balance of probabilities.[2]

    [1] Criminal Property Confiscation Act 2000 (WA) s 102(1).

    [2] Criminal Property Confiscation Act s 102(2)(d).

  2. On 6 January 2010, the plaintiff was charged with one count of attempting to manufacture a prohibited drug, namely methylamphetamine, contrary to s 6(1)(b) of the Misuse of Drugs Act 1981 (WA).

  3. Two freezing notices were issued on the 7 January 2010 and 17 February 2010 respectively, pursuant to s 34(2) of the Act on the basis that there were reasonable grounds for suspecting the Property was crime‑used and/or crime‑derived property. Both notices froze the land at Lot 224 on Plan 20536 in Certificate of Title Volume 2040 Folio 774, commonly known as 4 Marmaduke Point Drive, Gnarabup (the Property). The plaintiff is the registered proprietor of the Property as joint tenant with John Graham Wheeler.[3]  Mr Wheeler was the estranged de facto partner of the plaintiff at the time of the offence and is now deceased.[4]

    [3] Affidavit of Bruce Robert Maxwell Wimbridge filed 19 June 2019, 'BRMW3'.

    [4] Affidavit of Bruce Robert Maxwell Wimbridge filed 19 June 2019, p 85.

  4. On 27 January 2010, the plaintiff filed an objection to one of the freezing notices issued in respect of the Property, pursuant to s 79 of the Act. On 14 April 2010, Registrar Powell ordered that the plaintiff's objection also stand as an objection to the second freezing notice issued.

  5. The objections can only succeed if the plaintiff can establish that it is more likely than not that the Property the subject of the freezing notices is not crime‑used.[5] This is because neither s 82(3) nor s 82(4) of the…

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Details
Case
[2019] WASC 382
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Walker v The State of Western Australia involved the State seeking to confiscate property that it alleged was used in the commission of a crime. The court was required to determine whether the objections raised by the defendant, Walker, to the confiscation of the property should be dismissed. The central issue was whether the property in question could be classified as 'crime-used' property, which would allow for its confiscation under the relevant legislation. The case hinged on the interpretation of the term 'crime-used' and the specific facts of the case.

The court examined the definition of 'crime-used' property, which encompasses property used in the commission of a crime or intended for use in the commission of a crime. It was necessary for the court to determine if the property in question met these criteria. The court considered the evidence presented by both parties, including the nature of the property, its use, and the circumstances surrounding its acquisition and ownership. The court was required to decide whether the property met the threshold for being deemed 'crime-used' and, therefore, subject to confiscation.

In reaching its decision, the court found that the property in question did not meet the criteria for being classified as 'crime-used' property. The evidence did not sufficiently establish that the property was used in the commission of a crime or was intended for use in the commission of a crime. The court emphasised that the determination of whether property is 'crime-used' must be based on the specific facts of each case. Given the lack of evidence to support the classification of the property as 'crime-used', the court dismissed the State's application for confiscation. Consequently, the objections raised by Walker were upheld.

The court ordered that the application for the confiscation of the property be dismissed and that the objections raised by Walker be upheld. The property in question was not to be subject to confiscation under the relevant legislation.

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