Walker, Judith v McLeod, K.H.

Case [1984] FCA 40


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA )

1

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

)

N.S.W. No.8 of 1984

)

DIVISION

INDUSTRIAL

)

N

-

B

:

JUDITH WALKER

Applicant

m:

Respondents

ORDER

JUDGE MAKING

ORDER:

Beaumont J.

WHERE MADE:

Sydney

m:

6 March 1984

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1. Fix 26 March 1984 for the final hearing of the proceeding.

2. Direct that the applicant file and serve points of claim on

or before 13 March

1984.

3. Direct that the respondents file and serve points of defence

on or before

21 March 1984.

4. Upon

the

applicant

giving

the

usual

undertaking

as

to

damages, order, until further order, in accordance with

-2-

paragraphs 1 and 2 of

the interim orders sought in the Rule

to show cause

dated 1 March 1984.

5. Reserve liberty to the respondents to apply on 24 hours’

notice to vary or discharge the orders made in paragraph

4.

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA )

)

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY 1

N.S.W. No.8 oi 1984

)

DIVISION

INDUSTRIAL

)

BETWEEN:

JUDITH W K E R

Applicant

m:

Respondents

CORAM: Beaumont

J.

6 March 1984

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

This is an application

for

interlocutory injunctive

relief made in proceedings seeking orders under

s.141 of the

!

Conciliation and Arbitration Act,

1904.

In the principal proceedings, the applicant challenges

the validity of certain resolutions purportedly carried

by a

special general meeting

of the New South Wales Branch

of the

Australian Insurance Employees Union. The applicant was, and

claims

she

still

is,

the

secretary

of the

Branch

and

an

additional delegate

of the Branch to the Federal Executive

of the

2.

Union. The respondents are all members of the Federal Executive.

The resolutions now challenged found the applicant guilty of a

number

of

substantial breaches of the rules of the Union and

guilty of "gross misbehaviour" in

a number

of respects and then

dismissed her from the two offices mentioned.

The applicant claims interim relief restraining the

respondents from acting on the resolutions now impugned pending

the final hearing of the principal proceedings. That hearing is

fixed to commence on

26 March 1984.

The applicant puts her case in

a number of ways but, in

the circumstances,

I need deal with one only of the arguments

advanced. In

her

principal affidavit, upon which she was not

cross-examined, the applicant conceded that, shortly after

9

January 1984,

she was given written notice of the terms of the

resolutions proposed to be put at the meeting

to be held on 24

February.

She

also

said

that

at the

meeting,

there

was

distributed

to each person present

a lengthy booklet entitled

"Motions and Exhibits". The booklet,

as its title suggests,

contained the motions proposed and copies of the documentary

material relied on in support of the resolutions intended to be

put. Although it would take some time to read the material which

was considerable in volume, the applicant was given

a copy of the

booklet only "shortly prior" to the commencement of the meeting.

The

applicant says that, in the circumstances, she was not

afforded sufficient time in

which to prepare her defence, given

3.

the lateness of delivery and size of the material used against

her. She submits that the rules

of

natural justice were not

observed in this respect (see m v

Harradine C19753 25 F.L.R.

336 at p.343). In my opinion, there is a serious question to be

tried in this regard (see Australian Coarse Grain Pool Ptv. Ltd.

v Barlev Marketins Board of Oueensland C19823

46 A.L.R. 398). In

the circumstances, it is not necessary to consider the other

arguments advanced on behalf of the applicant.

On the balance of convenience, prima facie at least, the

status quo should be preserved. However, the respondents submit

that, by reason of the serious nature

of the charges made against

the applicant, it is inappropriate that she continue to occupy

the offices from which she

has now been dismissed. There is

force in the submission but

I

think that, in the main, it is met

by expediting the final hearing, which I have now done. At the same time, it is appropriate that liberty be preserved to the respondents to apply on short notice to discharge the injunction

I propose

to

grant

should

they

be advised

that

such

an

application is necessary to protect the interests of the Union.

!

I rerh'fy that this and the 2

preceding

pas-

QFe a true copy of the reasons for

ju&fnwf herein of The Honourable

- .

, :. I L:s.:ce Beaumont.

3,ed

6 V A , \?g$-

Details
AGLC
Walker, Judith v McLeod, K.H. [1984] FCA 40
Case
[1984] FCA 40
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the Federal Court of Australia, Judith Walker applied for interlocutory injunctive relief against K.H. McLeod and others. The application was made in proceedings seeking orders under Section 141 of the Conciliation and Arbitration Act, 1904. Walker, who was the secretary of the New South Wales Branch of the Australian Insurance Employees Union and an additional delegate to the Federal Executive of the Union, challenged the validity of certain resolutions purportedly carried by a special general meeting of the Union. The resolutions found Walker guilty of substantial breaches of the rules of the Union and gross misbehaviour, and dismissed her from her offices.

The legal issues the court was required to decide were whether the applicant was afforded sufficient time to prepare her defence and whether the rules of natural justice were observed in this respect. The applicant argued that she was not given enough time to prepare her defence due to the lateness of delivery and the size of the material used against her. The court found that there was a serious question to be tried in this regard, and it was not necessary to consider the other arguments advanced on behalf of the applicant.

The court granted the application for interlocutory injunctive relief, subject to certain conditions. The court fixed the final hearing of the proceeding for 26 March 1984 and directed that the applicant file and serve points of claim on or before 13 March 1984. The court also directed that the respondents file and serve points of defence on or before 21 March 1984. The court granted an interim order, until further order, in accordance with paragraphs 1 and 2 of the interim orders sought in the Rule to show cause dated 1 March 1984. The court reserved liberty to the respondents to apply on 24 hours’ notice to vary or discharge the orders made in paragraph 4. The court emphasised that, on the balance of convenience, prima facie at least, the status quo should be preserved. However, the respondents submitted that, by reason of the serious nature of the charges made against the applicant, it was inappropriate that she continue to occupy the offices from which she had now been dismissed. The court thought that, in the main, it was met by expediting the final hearing, which it had now done. At the same time, it was appropriate that liberty be preserved to the respondents to apply on short notice to discharge the injunction the court proposed to grant should they be advised that such an application was necessary to protect the interests of the Union.

Orders

Orders of the court

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Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

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Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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