IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA )
1
| NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY | ) | N.S.W. No.8 of 1984 |
| ) |
| DIVISION | INDUSTRIAL | ) |
| N | - | B | : |
JUDITH WALKER
Applicant
m:
Respondents
ORDER
| JUDGE MAKING | ORDER: | Beaumont J. |
| WHERE MADE: | Sydney | |
| m: | 6 March 1984 |
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1. Fix 26 March 1984 for the final hearing of the proceeding.
2. Direct that the applicant file and serve points of claim on
|
3. Direct that the respondents file and serve points of defence
|
| 4. Upon | the | applicant | giving | the | usual | undertaking | as | to |
damages, order, until further order, in accordance with
-2-
| paragraphs 1 and 2 of | the interim orders sought in the Rule |
| to show cause | dated 1 March 1984. |
5. Reserve liberty to the respondents to apply on 24 hours’
|
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA )
)
| NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY 1 | N.S.W. No.8 oi 1984 |
)
| DIVISION | INDUSTRIAL | ) |
BETWEEN:
JUDITH W K E R
Applicant
m:
Respondents
| CORAM: Beaumont | J. |
| 6 March 1984 |
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
| This is an application | for | interlocutory injunctive |
| relief made in proceedings seeking orders under | s.141 of the |
| ! | Conciliation and Arbitration Act, | 1904. |
In the principal proceedings, the applicant challenges
| the validity of certain resolutions purportedly carried | by a |
| special general meeting | of the New South Wales Branch | of the |
Australian Insurance Employees Union. The applicant was, and
| claims | she | still | is, | the | secretary | of the | Branch | and | an |
| additional delegate | of the Branch to the Federal Executive | of the |
2.
Union. The respondents are all members of the Federal Executive.
The resolutions now challenged found the applicant guilty of a
| number | of | substantial breaches of the rules of the Union and |
| guilty of "gross misbehaviour" in | a number | of respects and then |
dismissed her from the two offices mentioned.
The applicant claims interim relief restraining the
respondents from acting on the resolutions now impugned pending
the final hearing of the principal proceedings. That hearing is
| fixed to commence on | 26 March 1984. |
| The applicant puts her case in | a number of ways but, in |
| the circumstances, | I need deal with one only of the arguments |
| advanced. In | her | principal affidavit, upon which she was not |
| cross-examined, the applicant conceded that, shortly after | 9 |
| January 1984, | she was given written notice of the terms of the |
| resolutions proposed to be put at the meeting | to be held on 24 |
| February. | She | also | said | that | at the | meeting, | there | was |
| distributed | to each person present | a lengthy booklet entitled |
| "Motions and Exhibits". The booklet, | as its title suggests, |
contained the motions proposed and copies of the documentary
material relied on in support of the resolutions intended to be
put. Although it would take some time to read the material which
| was considerable in volume, the applicant was given | a copy of the |
booklet only "shortly prior" to the commencement of the meeting.
| The | applicant says that, in the circumstances, she was not |
| afforded sufficient time in | which to prepare her defence, given |
3.
the lateness of delivery and size of the material used against
| her. She submits that the rules | of | natural justice were not |
| observed in this respect (see m v | Harradine C19753 25 F.L.R. |
336 at p.343). In my opinion, there is a serious question to be
tried in this regard (see Australian Coarse Grain Pool Ptv. Ltd.
| v Barlev Marketins Board of Oueensland C19823 | 46 A.L.R. 398). In |
the circumstances, it is not necessary to consider the other
arguments advanced on behalf of the applicant.
On the balance of convenience, prima facie at least, the
status quo should be preserved. However, the respondents submit
| that, by reason of the serious nature | of the charges made against |
the applicant, it is inappropriate that she continue to occupy
| the offices from which she | has now been dismissed. There is |
| force in the submission but | I | think that, in the main, it is met |
by expediting the final hearing, which I have now done. At the same time, it is appropriate that liberty be preserved to the respondents to apply on short notice to discharge the injunction
| I propose | to | grant | should | they | be advised | that | such | an |
application is necessary to protect the interests of the Union.
| ! | I rerh'fy that this and the 2 | preceding |
| pas- | QFe a true copy of the reasons for |
ju&fnwf herein of The Honourable
- .
, :. I L:s.:ce Beaumont.
| 3,ed | 6 V A , \?g$- |
- AGLC
- Walker, Judith v McLeod, K.H. [1984] FCA 40
- Case
- [1984] FCA 40
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The legal issues the court was required to decide were whether the applicant was afforded sufficient time to prepare her defence and whether the rules of natural justice were observed in this respect. The applicant argued that she was not given enough time to prepare her defence due to the lateness of delivery and the size of the material used against her. The court found that there was a serious question to be tried in this regard, and it was not necessary to consider the other arguments advanced on behalf of the applicant.
The court granted the application for interlocutory injunctive relief, subject to certain conditions. The court fixed the final hearing of the proceeding for 26 March 1984 and directed that the applicant file and serve points of claim on or before 13 March 1984. The court also directed that the respondents file and serve points of defence on or before 21 March 1984. The court granted an interim order, until further order, in accordance with paragraphs 1 and 2 of the interim orders sought in the Rule to show cause dated 1 March 1984. The court reserved liberty to the respondents to apply on 24 hours’ notice to vary or discharge the orders made in paragraph 4. The court emphasised that, on the balance of convenience, prima facie at least, the status quo should be preserved. However, the respondents submitted that, by reason of the serious nature of the charges made against the applicant, it was inappropriate that she continue to occupy the offices from which she had now been dismissed. The court thought that, in the main, it was met by expediting the final hearing, which it had now done. At the same time, it was appropriate that liberty be preserved to the respondents to apply on short notice to discharge the injunction the court proposed to grant should they be advised that such an application was necessary to protect the interests of the Union.
Orders
Orders of the court
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Background
Background to the litigation
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Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
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Decision
Reasons for decision
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Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
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