Walker and FedEx Express Australia Pty Ltd (Practice and procedure) - [2025] ARTA 1665

Walker and FedEx Express Australia Pty Ltd (Practice and procedure) [2025] ARTA 1665 (2 September 2025)
Administrative Review Tribunal

Applicant:

Peter Walker

Respondent:

FedEx Express

Tribunal Number:

2020/4843, 2021/7106, 2022/7640, 2023/3638

Tribunal:

General Member R Cameron

Place:

Melbourne

Date:

2 September 2025

CORRIGENDUM
Date of Corrigendum: 5 September 2025

Pursuant to section 114 of the Administrative Review Tribunal Act 2024 (Cth), the following corrections are made to the Reasons for Decision of the Tribunal dated 2 September 2025:
1.The text of the decision in paragraph 18 is to be altered from “...obtained...” to:
a.“...obtain...”

2.The text of the decision in paragraph 34 is to be altered from “...fail...” to:
a.“...failed...”

3.The word “on” is to be inserted between the words “...of the SRC Act...” and the words “...6 June 2025...” in paragraph 42.
4.The text of the decision in paragraph 59 is to be altered from “...adjudged as dishonest...” and “...which impugned is...” to:
a.“...a judge is...” and “...which impugns...” respectively.

5.The words “...is that...” directly following the words “...SRC Act...” and immediately preceding the words “...the applicant’s rights...” in paragraph 69 are to be removed.
6.The words “...some relieved...” directly following the words “Those proceedings were...” and immediately preceding the words “...dismissed on several grounds...” in paragraph 90 are to be removed.

...................[SGD]...................
General Member R. Cameron
5 September 2025
Applicant/s:  Peter Walker
Respondent:  FedEx Express Australia Pty Ltd
Tribunal Number:                2020/4843, 2021/7106, 2022/7640, 2023/3638

Tribunal:General Member R. Cameron
Place:Melbourne
Date:2 September 2025

Decision:Under sections 99 and 100(a) of the Administrative Review Tribunal Act 2024 (Cth) applications No: 2020/4843, No: 2021/7106, 2022/7640 and 2023/3638 are dismissed.

...................[SGD]..................
General Member R. Cameron
Catchwords
Administrative Review Tribunal Act 2024 (Cth) – Section 32 (2) stay of applications - Section 100 (a) – Summary dismissal if applicant fails within a reasonable time to proceed with the application – construction and application of Section 32 (2) – stay refused – dismissal of application where applicant fails within reasonable time to proceed – how discretion under s 100 enlivened – when exercised – only exercised sparingly and as a matter of “last resort” – applications dismissed
Legislation
Administrative Review Tribunal Act 2024 (Cth)
Safety Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1988 (Cth)
Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1976 (Cth)
Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth)
Cases
Cuming Smith & Co Ltd v Westralian Farmers Co-operative Ltd [1979] VR 129 at 147.
Charara v Commissioner of Taxation (2016) 160 ALD 57 at [77] – [81].
Andelman v Secretary, Department of Families, Housing, Community Services and Indigenous Affairs (2011) 121 ALD 242 at [39].

Statement of Reasons

INTRODUCTION

These reasons are being delivered following a telephone directions hearing in respect of each of these applications conducted on 19 August 2025.
There were two matters before the Tribunal on that day.
The first matter before the Tribunal on that day was an application made by the applicant for a stay under s 32 of the Administrative Review Tribunal Act 2024 (Cth) (“the ART Act”).[1]
[1] Hereinafter referred to as the "stay application".
The second matter before the Tribunal on that day was an application made by the respondent pursuant to s 100 of the ART Act seeking summary dismissal of the applications.[2]
[2] Hereinafter referred to as "the summary dismissal application".
Prior to the commencement of the hearing on 19 August 2025 the respondent’s practitioners served on the applicant an affidavit of Jack Marshall, and exhibits thereto, sworn on 14 August 2025 (“the Marshall affidavit”). Additionally, also served on the applicant by the respondent’s practitioners were submissions in support of an application to dismiss the applications pursuant to s 100 of the ART Act also dated 14 August 2025.
THE APPLICANT’S FAILURE TO APPEAR AT THE TELEPHONE DIRECTIONS HEARING ON 19 AUGUST 2025
A listing notice for the hearing of both the stay application and the summary dismissal application was sent to the parties on 5 August 2025. When advised of the date fixed for the hearing of both applications the parties were also informed that half a day was set aside to deal with them.
Prior to the hearing 19 August 2025 the applicant sent several emails to both the Tribunal and Mr Snell, one of the respondent’s legal practitioners who has acted for it in these applications for many years.
In an email of 15 August 2025 to the Tribunal the applicant stated, amongst other things, that he was currently mentally exhausted and would not be filing any documents for the pending hearing as he did not have mental capacity to deal with the matter then due to what he described as the very limited time provided to him. He also referred in that email to what he described as “constant badgering from Mr Snell”. The applicant then stated that his phone would “be off all day 19 August 2025”. Further, he stated that the Tribunal could take whatever action it saw fit but stated unfortunately he was not well enough to cope with it all. Additionally, the applicant stated in that email that he would have nothing to do with Mr Snell if he continued to act in the matter. Finally, he stated that if the matter was “terminated” under s 100 of the ART Act the Human Rights Commission would become involved. Apparently, a copy of that email was not furnished to Mr Snell or his law firm. It was subsequently forwarded by the Tribunal to him.
Mr Snell then emailed the Tribunal with a copy to the applicant on 18 August 2025. The contents of that email are referred to in its entirety for their full force and effect. However, Mr Snell in that email expressed the view that the email from the applicant of 15 August 2025, previously referred to amounted to a refusal on the part of the applicant to appear at the hearing fixed for 19 August. Further, in the email the applicant’s claims of mental exhaustion and not being well enough to cope with the pending proceeding were noted. However, it understandably stated that there was no medical evidence whatever establishing the applicant’s unfitness to attend or to participate in the pending hearing. It was further observed that the substance of the applicant’s email was that the applicant was insisting that the Tribunal should conform with his subjective preferences. It was contended that such conduct on the part of the applicant was the antithesis of the obligations he owed to the Tribunal to assist it achieve its objectives as articulated in the ART Act. It was therefore contended on behalf of the respondent that there was no proper basis shown for adjourning the pending hearing fixed for 19 August 2025. It pointed out that the applicant could, if he had any, submit proper medical evidence to the Tribunal concerning his fitness and capacity to participate which could be considered in support of an appropriate application to adjourn the hearing fixed for 19 August 2025. Otherwise, the email stated if the applicant did not appear and no evidence concerning his ability to do so was submitted, it confirmed the respondent’s contentions that the proceedings ought be dismissed.
A further email was sent to the Tribunal by the applicant. It was a comparatively lengthy email which made a number of very serious allegations about Mr Snell in his conduct of the matters that had been brought before the Tribunal by the applicant. Such comments will not be repeated for the purposes of these reasons. Amongst other things, in that email the applicant stated that before his matters could proceed his mental health had “to be reset to a point where I can at least concentrate on something and start sleeping normally instead of waking up from having dreams about Mr Snell’s lies about me”. He further stated that: “Well I might not be well enough to put my side forward at tomorrow’s hearing, but I will have medical evidence to support the fact that I am not well. I will also send a copy of that to the Tribunal when I get it later this week or next week. I have been victimised so much lately; the Tribunal won’t even respond to my complaints of threats by Mrs Florence H.”[3]
[3] Florence H is a Tribunal Officer.
That email from the applicant concluded with the following sentences, “If Member Cameron has any real power, then there is a no-brainer and tomorrow’s hearing won’t be for nothing. Who on this planet can survive three long years without an income, and they do it intentionally to break people’s mental health. Member Cameron should have a think about how his mental health would be if he were in my shoes.”
The applicant did not appear at the hearing on 19 August 2025 when contacted by the Tribunal by telephone. The call from the Tribunal officer went through to a message bank.
Mr Snell appeared at the Telephone Directions Hearing on behalf of the respondent and made several submissions. As was self-evident he noted that it was apparent from the correspondence received from the applicant that he was aware of the date, time, method of appearance and the relevant “case event”, as defined in the ART Act.
As he had in his email, Mr Snell submitted, concerning the applicant’s nonappearance, that if he was unfit to appear one would have expected him to have produced a medical certificate to that effect, or otherwise given appropriate notice that such evidence was being obtained and sought an appropriate adjournment to enable such evidence to be obtained.
Further, in making this submission Mr Snell also, quite properly, drew the Tribunal’s attention to the provisions of s 73 of the ART Act “How a party may appear at a Tribunal case event” which enables a party to appear at a case event through a representative, which of course can include someone who is not legally qualified. Reference was also made to the provisions of s 66 of the ART Act “Representation before Tribunal” which also enables a party to be represented by a person who need not necessarily be legally qualified. It was also submitted that the applicant could have requested another person, who need not have been legally qualified, to have represented him at the telephone directions hearing to make any submissions as he may have seen fit. Clearly, he did not do so.
By way of background Mr Snell briefly canvassed the history of the applicant’s prior legal representation including by the firms Maurice Blackburn and Zaparas Lawyers. Unfortunately, they have not continued to represent the applicant. It should be observed that both of those firms of lawyers are very experienced in conducting matters of this kind in this Tribunal. Those firms have not continued to be retained by the applicant, which is regrettable.
It was then submitted by Mr Snell that evidently the applicant had quite consciously and deliberately indicated to the Tribunal that he did not intend to appear at the telephone directions hearing. There was no medical evidence forthcoming from him which one might expect in support of the reasons that he advanced for his nonappearance. In the light of these facts, particularly the lengthy history of the applications and the absence of any medical evidence in support of the applicant’s non-attendance or inability to otherwise participate in the telephone directions hearing, he submitted that the Tribunal should proceed.
The Tribunal considered that it was appropriate to proceed. It was not unreasonable to expect that if the applicant was precluded from attending and participating in the telephone directions hearing that he obtained appropriate medical evidence, then provide it to the Tribunal and the respondent’s lawyers. Even if he had briefly appeared and sought an adjournment on the grounds that he was not fit to actively participate in the hearing, and was seeking an appropriate medical certificate or other medical evidence concerning his issues, one might well have had a different point of view on the question of adjourning that hearing. In reaching this conclusion it is worthy of noting that the emails sent by the applicant to the Tribunal, and for that matter Mr Snell, in the immediate days prior to the hearing demonstrate that he had some capacity for interaction with others and brought a reasonably considered mind to the drafting of those emails. Having been able to apply himself to that level with respect to the drafting of the emails it does not seem unreasonable to consider that he could have at the very least, briefly attended the telephone directions hearing and sought an adjournment. These matters have had a lengthy history in which the applicant has had many opportunities to advance his case. It is most unfortunate that he saw fit not to attend in some form or obtain some limited representation for the telephone directions hearing on 19 August 2025.
On a further note, the Applicant has not as at the date of the finalisation of these reasons furnished any medical evidence to the Tribunal, or for that matter the respondent, which in any way verifies that he was unfit to appear at the Telephone Directions Hearing 19 August 2025. This is contrary to the representations that he would do so in that week or in the following week, contained in his email to the Tribunal referred to above. Had such evidence been produced, one might have had a different view of the appropriate approach to adopt to the applications before it.
BACKGROUND
Presently, there are 4 applications that have been brought by the applicant in this Tribunal against the respondent seeking relief under the Safety Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1988 (“the SRC Act”). A brief outline of the applications and the relief sought will be mentioned in the following paragraphs.
Application No: 2020/4843 seeks review of a decision made on 15 June 2020 affirming a previous decision made by a delegate of the respondent denying a claim for compensation for the condition described as “adjustment order with anxiety features” allegedly occurring on 24 March 2020.
Application No: 2021/7106 seeks review of a decision made on 15 September 2021 which affirmed a previous decision finding that there was no present liability in respect of physiotherapy treatment for an accepted injury of “L1 anterior: compression fracture” with the date of injury said to have occurred on 15 April 2019.
Application No: 2022/7640 seeks review of a decision made on 5 October 2021 which affirmed a previous decision denying liability to pay compensation under s 39 of the SRC Act, for a new mattress required by reason of the claimed condition of “L1 anterior: compression fracture” with the date of injury said to have occurred on 15 April 2019.
Application No: 2023/3638 seeks a review of a decision made on 11 May 2023 by a Senior Case Manager of the respondent denying compensation for any incapacity payments under s 19 of the SRC Act.
The applications have unfortunately progressed very slowly.
Applications No 2020/4843 and 2021/7106 were fixed for hearing on an estimate of 5 days commencing 23 May 2022. That hearing did not proceed, and the dates were vacated. They were fixed for another hearing commencing on 18 July 2022. Unfortunately, the matters were not heard on that day and the hearing was vacated yet again.
A direction was made on 15 December 2022 that the applications numbered 2020/4843, 2021/7106 and 2022/7640 be heard together. Further directions were made on that day, amongst other things, requiring the applicant to lodge with the Tribunal and give to the respondent a revised Statement of Facts, Issues and Contentions together with witness statements from any person who it was intended to adduce evidence from who had not made a report or statement previously. Further, it obliged the applicant to lodge with the Tribunal and serve on the respondent copies of any further reports, records or other documentary evidence on which he intended to rely at the hearing of those applications.
It is not altogether clear from the material before the Tribunal as to how it occurred, however it was decided that all four applications, quite understandably, would be heard and determined at the same time.
The four applications were then fixed for a hearing to commence on 5 June 2023. Once again, unfortunately they were not heard, the listing was vacated and rescheduled to be heard on an estimate of 5 days commencing 8 December 2023.
The hearing of the applications listed for 8 December 2023 did not proceed.
They were again listed for a final hearing on an estimate of 5 days commencing 13 May 2024. Unfortunately, the hearing scheduled for 13 May 2024 was vacated by the Tribunal.
The matters have not been relisted for hearing since the listing of 13 May 2024 was vacated.
After the vacation of the listing of 13 May 2024 there was a significant amount of email traffic passing between the parties and the Tribunal. None of this correspondence really served to prosecute the applications.
It should be observed that an examination of Tribunal records indicates that Mr Hazelwood, from Zaparas Lawyers ceased acting for the applicant on or about 13 August 2024. In an email to the Tribunal on 3 September 2024 the applicant, amongst other things, stated that his former lawyers had in various ways fail to pursue all claims that he had for compensation against the respondent. He also was critical of a report that the respondent had obtained from Dr Ghan. It was stated in the email that the respondent had “illegally terminated on the basis of the fraudulent medical report” from Dr Ghan certain compensation to which he was legally entitled. Subsequently, the applicant then advised the Tribunal on 21 September 2024 that he had reappointed Zaparas Lawyers to resume acting on his behalf in each of the applications. Unfortunately, on 30 September 2024 the applicant advised the Tribunal in an email that those practitioners would no longer be representing him.
In order to relist the applications on 9 September 2024, the Tribunal in an email sent to the parties required them to lodge Hearing Certificates by 23 September 2024. The respondent lodged a Hearing Certificate following that request. However, the applicant did not.
Several of the emails received from the applicant on or around the month of September 2024 did not in any way seek to prosecute or progress any of these applications before the Tribunal. The subject matter of those emails, for example one sent by the applicant 13 September 2024, addressed allegations made by the applicant that the respondent had not paid him amounts of compensation that had previously been ordered by the Tribunal. Indeed, in that email he accused the respondent of the “deliberate form of the crime of wage theft”. He requested that the Tribunal undertake an investigation into these allegations that he made against the respondent.
The parties were sent a listing notice advising them that a Telephone Directions Hearing was scheduled for 8 October 2024. That notice also advised that if an applicant or their representative failed to attend, the Tribunal may dismiss the application under the then applicable section 42A (2) of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1976 (Cth) (“AAT Act”). That directions hearing was vacated at the request of the parties.
The Telephone Directions Hearing was rescheduled for 25 October 2024. On the morning of the hearing the applicant contacted the Tribunal and advised that such telephone directions hearing could not proceed. The Tribunal vacated that directions hearing. It also requested that the parties update the Tribunal in terms of relisting the matter, by 8 November 2024.
There is another development that is relevant to these applications that should be addressed. On 29 May 2025 a delegate of the respondent sent a letter to the applicant containing a determination. That determination pursuant to s 57 of the SRC Act required the applicant to attend an appointment for an examination by a neurosurgeon in Richmond which was scheduled for 6 June 2025 at 2:30 PM. The applicant did not attend that scheduled examination.

Subsequently, by way of a letter of 10 June 2025 from a delegate of the respondent, the applicant was requested within 7 days to provide reasons why he did not attend the scheduled examination with the neurosurgeon on 6 June 2025. This letter was followed up by a further email to the applicant seeking a response, and in particular his reasons for failing to attend the examination with the neurosurgeon.
In an email of 17 June 2025 from the applicant to the respondent’s delegate the applicant gave reasons for his non-attendance at the scheduled examination with the neurosurgeon on 6 June 2025.[4] The contents of that email are referred to in their entirety and need not be reproduced in full. However, it is appropriate to reproduce some sections of it. The applicant wrote:
“To answer your question, I clearly informed you from the very start of my reasons for not attending the medical assessment. If you chose not to acknowledge my reasons that’s very much a problem that you need to be held to account for not me. I did however find the time to check out the medical specialists you wanted to examine me, Google reviews that seem to reinforce my gut feelings on why you want to send me to this particular medical specialist instead of the previous neurosurgeon Dr Ashish Jonathan, whose medical report was not so fraudulent or insurance friendly as Dr Ghan’s medical report.”
[4] The email forms part of exhibit “JM-4” to the Marshall affidavit.
Following the receipt of the applicant’s email to the respondent 17 June 2025, a Manager of the respondent’s Health, Rehabilitation and Workers Compensation section made a determination in writing on 20 June 2025. That determination found that the applicant had failed or refused to undertake an examination that was arranged for him pursuant to s 57 of the SRC Act 6 June 2025. Such failure or refusal to attend the scheduled medical examination was found in that determination to be without reasonable excuse. Therefore, the determination found that the applicant’s entitlement to workers compensation and his rights to institute or continue proceedings under the SRC Act were suspended pursuant to s 57 (2) of that Act.
The applicant did not, as he was entitled to do within 30 days after the day on which it first came to his notice, seek reconsideration of the determination made on 20 June 2025 pursuant to s 62 (3) of the SRC Act. Additionally, the applicant has not sought from the respondent a further period within which to seek such a reconsideration.
The consequence of the determination made on 20 June 2025 pursuant to s 57 (2) of the SRC Act is that the applicant’s rights to compensation under the SRC Act, and to institute or continue any proceedings under that Act in relation to compensation, are suspended until the examination takes place.
THE STAY APPLICATION
On 13 June 2025 the applicant lodged a stay application under s 32 (2) of the ART Act.[5] The contents of the stay application lodged by the applicant are referred to in their entirety.
[5] Copy of the stay application is exhibit "JM-2" to the Marshall affidavit.
In the section of the application which requires a party to identify the orders sought by them, the applicant has, amongst other things, stated that the “matter be stayed until an investigation into corruption in the Federal Court jurisdictions of Australia is thoroughly investigated”. A judge of the Federal Court of Australia is named, and it is contended that such judge had, “a conflict-of-interest”.
The grounds relied upon to support the request for a stay in the application reiterated “a conflict of interest”. Further the applicant stated after that assertion that he was firmly of the belief that a certain Federal Court judge, who he named, had engaged in corruption. Additionally, it recorded that the corruption engaged in by the judge concerned, would with respect to this Tribunal undermine the fairness or integrity of a subsequent hearing (as he called it a “trial”). Further, he stated with respect to the grounds for the request that any further continuation of the proceedings until “the corruption is investigated would constitute unfair, oppressive or arose of the ART process which would be a waste of time as this would constitute grounds for a retrial.”
In terms of the grounds, or possible grounds relied upon by the applicant concerning a stay of these proceedings, reference should be made to an undated letter from the applicant addressed to the President of the Administrative Review Tribunal which was in evidence.[6] Mr Marshall deposed that a copy of this letter was received by way of email sent to the respondent’s lawyers’ office on 6 November 2024. It is a discursive document which contains a number of extremely grave allegations. The contents of that letter are referred to in their entirety for their full force and effect. However, it is appropriate to reproduce one portion of it as it mirrors the grounds relied on by the applicant in his stay application.
“The respondent has obviously paid off the Judges to deliberately make the applicant’s matter in the courts, that would have damaged the respondent’s brand, go away by illegally dismissing the applicant’s matter. This needs to be thoroughly investigated by the Magistrate in my current Administrative Reviews Tribunal before I can proceed with my matter in the Administrative Reviews Tribunal any further. Judge (“X”) involvement in the corruption as well as being a deputy president of the Administrative Reviews Tribunal is reason enough that my matter cannot proceed until a proper and thorough investigation conducted by an external independent investigation company and a decision based on the evidence needs to be done as there is too much at stake here considering how poorly I have already clearly been treated and my human right to a fair hearing taken away from me on multiple occasions.”[7]
[6] Exhibit "JM1" to the affidavit of Jack Marshall sworn 14 August 2025.
[7] Although the judge concerned was identified by name in this email, the Tribunal has decided not to refer to their name in these reasons.
Similar, but slightly less direct allegations of corruption in the Federal Court of Australia were also contained in an email sent by the applicant to the Melbourne Registry of this Tribunal and Mr Snell 24 June 2025.[8]
[8] Exhibit "JM-3" to the Marshall affidavit.
The allegations contained in that letter to the president of the Administrative Review Tribunal, the email to the Tribunal and Mr Snell of 24 June 2025 and also as contained in the applicant’s stay application lodged on 13 June 2025 are extraordinary.
In addressing this application several things emerge. Collectively, they lead to only one conclusion and that must be that the application for a stay lodged on 13 June 2025 must be dismissed.
The application for a stay order was made by the applicant under s 32 (2) of the ART Act. That section provides that on an application by a party to a proceeding for a review of a reviewable decision, the Tribunal may make an order staying or otherwise affecting the operation or implementation of the decision if the Tribunal considers it is desirable to do so for the purposes of ensuring the effectiveness of the review. (Emphasis added).
As is apparent from the construction of that section, the power conferred upon the Tribunal to make a stay is confined to making an order staying or otherwise affecting the operation or implementation of the reviewable decision in question before it. An examination of both the orders sought and the grounds for the request contained in the stay application reveal that such a stay sought by the applicant does not affect the operation or implementation of the reviewable decisions presently before the Tribunal, or otherwise relate to them. Those decisions have denied liability to the applicant under the relevant provisions of the SRC Act. If these applications were stayed the reviewable decisions would continue to have full force and effect.
It must be recalled that the Administrative Review Tribunal is a product of a statute passed by the Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia. Its powers are derived from the provisions of the ART Act. There is no inherent jurisdiction such as that conferred upon the courts to regulate their own processes. At best, there are sections such as s 49 of the ART Act which confers upon the Tribunal a discretion in relation to procedure. However, an examination of the language used in that section, it is considered does not confer upon it a power to grant a stay on the grounds sought by the applicant. To suggest it does is straining the proper construction of that language beyond what could possibly have been intended by Parliament.
It is considered that if the Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia intended to confer upon this Tribunal a general power to stay its own proceedings it would have said so by expressly enacting a provision to that effect.
For these reasons alone the Tribunal concludes that it does not have the power to grant a stay as sought by the applicant and such application should be dismissed.
Having reached that conclusion, however it is appropriate to make several other observations concerning the application.
Nowhere in the material is there anything amounting to admissible evidence that supports the contentions contained in the stay application lodged on 13 June 2025 or in the letter apparently sent to the President of this Tribunal and received by the respondent’s lawyers 6 November 2024 being exhibit “JM1” to the Marshall affidavit. It is not necessary for the purpose of these reasons to embark upon an excursion into the rules of evidence or the standard of proof that is required to establish certain allegations. However, it is hardly controversial to note that when one considers the seriousness, gravity or magnitude of the issues, such as those alleged by the applicant in pursuing his application for a stay, the stricter is the proof that is required. Such proof must be clear, cogent and exact.[9] As there is no admissible evidence supporting the allegations made in the stay application this is another reason why it must be dismissed.
[9] Cuming Smith & Co Ltd v Westralian Farmers Co-operative Ltd [1979] VR 129 at 147 in which Kaye J reviews several of the well-established authorities on this question.
Finally, the respondent in its submissions submitted that the allegations such as those contained in the letter to the President of this Tribunal received by the respondent’s lawyers on 6 November 2024, and for that matter as also reiterated in the stay application, amounts to conduct which may amount to scandalising the court. Reference was made to a particularly helpful decision on the topic by Lee J in the Federal Court of Australia in Nasir v Reynolds.[10] At paragraph [67] of that decision Lee J noted on the topic as follows:
“One form of contempt of court is conduct which scandalises the court. This is a form of criminal contempt and is concerned to protect the authority of the judicial system and the maintenance of public confidence in the administration of justice. Although it is not possible to define exhaustively, the following conduct has been recognised as conduct which may amount to scandalising the court:
(1) an allegation that a court or judge is corrupt: Attorney-Gen (Qld) v Matters [2020] QSC 258 (at [49] per Jackson J);
(2) an allegation that adjudged as dishonest or has engaged in fraud: Martin v Trustrum (No 2) [2023] TASSC 50 (at [28], [36] – [38] per Slicer J;
(3) conduct which impugned is the impartiality of the court or a judge: R v Collins [1954] VLR 46 (at 49 per Sholl J); or
(4) conduct which imputes improper motives to those participating in the administration of justice: R v Arrowsmith [1950] VLR 78 (at 82 per Dean J)
(see Professor David Rolph, Contempt (Federation Press, 2023) (at 253-254, 284-286))
[10] [2024] FCA 1194.
When one considers the rather intemperate language used both in the letter to the President of this Tribunal received by the respondent’s lawyers on 6 November 2024, and also the contents of the stay application, only one conclusion can possibly be reached and that is that their contents and the act of forwarding them to several recipients collectively amounts to scandalising the courts concerned in which the judges named presently serve. It is conduct that must be strongly disapproved of. Insofar as there were otherwise a power to grant a stay on the terms sought, which the Tribunal concludes it is not, it is a factor that would strongly count against the applicant and justified not granting the relief sought in his application for a stay. Beyond this, little more should be said about this aspect of the matter.
DISMISSAL UNDER S 100 OF THE ART ACT
Section 100 of the ART Act provides that the Tribunal may dismiss an application made to it if the applicant fails within a reasonable time to proceed with the application. The language used in this section of the ART Act is expressed in similar terms to that of section 42A of the AAT Act. That section has been the subject of much judicial consideration over the years.
As has been said the discretionary power in such a section of the ART Act as s 100 is only enlivened if the applicant fails “within a reasonable time” to proceed with the application. Therefore, on its true and proper construction prior to the Tribunal exercising such discretion it is obliged to consider and determine not only whether there has been a failure to proceed with the application, but it must also consider and determine whether a reasonable time has elapsed since the failure to do so.[11]
[11] A very helpful outline of the approach to be adopted with respect to such applications, made under the provisions of s 42A of the AAT Act are to be found in the decision of Wigney J in Charara v Commissioner of Taxation (2016) 160 ALD 57 at [77] – [81].
As was candidly acknowledged by the respondent, as is indeed the case, the discretion conferred by a section such as s 100 of the ART Act must only be exercised sparingly and as a matter of “last resort”. This is self-evident because it denies an applicant a hearing on the merits of the case. Therefore, as a dismissal under a section such as s 100 of the ART Act is a matter of last resort, the Tribunal is obliged to consider whether it is a proper or appropriate remedy, or whether it would be more appropriate to adopt some other course. Other such options would include adjourning the proceeding or making some other order to secure compliance. Other orders used to secure compliance could for instance, include the imposition of a deadline for taking some form of action. The failure to do so within the timeframe prescribed by such an order could be fashioned to have significant consequences. In other words, it would give a delinquent applicant a final chance.
Has there been a failure to proceed by the applicant?
There are several facts that indicate there has been a failure to proceed on the part of the applicant.
Each of these applications has been on foot for many years. The first application to what was then the Administrative Appeals Tribunal was commenced over 5 years ago. The second application was commenced over 4 years ago. The third application was commenced over three years ago. The fourth and final application was commenced over 2 years ago. By any standards, and certainly the standards of this Tribunal it is a very long lapse of time. In reaching this conclusion one must refer to the Tribunal’s objectives as articulated in s 9 of the ART Act. In s 9 (b) of the ART Act, amongst other things, one of the objectives is to ensure that applications to the Tribunal are resolved as quickly as a proper consideration of the matters before it permit. The extremely slow progress of each of these applications does not accord with this objective. The lapse of such significant time since each of the applications were commenced is indicative of a failure to proceed.
Save for lodging a Hearing Certificate on 29 July 2025, which was inconsistent with his stay application since the vacation of the listing of these matters in May 2024, there has been no substantive step taken by the applicant to prosecute any of the applications and no attempts by him to otherwise have the matters relisted for a final hearing. It goes without saying of course, that this is a lapse of over one year. By any standard it is a very long time. Once again, this lapse of time does not conform to the objective of resolving applications to the Tribunal quickly as prescribed by s 9 (b) of the ART Act.
There is also the question of the stay application brought by the applicant which has been addressed earlier in these reasons. Apart from the fact that such an application was ultimately misconceived and bound to fail, for the reasons explained it is inconsistent with taking any steps to prosecute the applications, including the lodgement of a Hearing Certificate previously mentioned. Quite the contrary, it is a further factor which demonstrates a failure to proceed. Such a failure, as evidenced by the stay application, being a conscious and deliberate step.
There is another factor which further demonstrates that there has been a failure to proceed within the meaning of s 100 (a) of the ART Act. It has been recounted earlier in these reasons that the applicant did not attend a scheduled medical examination on 6 June 2025. He did not give proper reasons for his failure to do so. The failure to attend the scheduled medical examination or provide proper reasons, as noted above, led to a determination made on 20 June 2025 by a Manager of the respondent’s Health, Rehabilitation and Workers Compensation section under S 57 (2) of the SRC Act. The applicant did not seek a reconsideration of the 20 June 2025 determination within the time prescribed by the SRC Act, namely 30 days. He has not sought further time within which to seek a reconsideration of that determination.
The effect of the 20 June 2025 determination, as has been stated, is that pursuant to s 57(2) of the SRC Act is that the applicant’s rights to compensation under the SRC Act, and to institute or continue any proceedings under it in relation to compensation, are suspended until such time as the medical examination concerned takes place.
Given the applicant’s failure to seek a reconsideration of the 20 June 2025 determination, or a further period within which to seek such a reconsideration, it must be concluded that this is further evidence of conduct on the part of the applicant amounting to a failure to proceed. Again, this failure on the part of the applicant not to attend the scheduled medical examination was conscious and deliberate as evidenced by the contents of the email from him to the respondent’s delegate on 17 June 2025. It was not an inadvertent failure to proceed which might have been excusable.
There is another event which demonstrates a failure to proceed on the part of the applicant within the meaning of s 100 (a) of the ART Act. That event is of course the failure of the applicant to appear at the Telephone Directions Hearing on 19 August 2025. When a hearing has been fixed it is not unreasonable to expect the parties to attend, or alternatively take appropriate steps to have the matter adjourned on proper grounds. This has been touched on in some detail earlier in these reasons. Nonetheless, the unilateral way in which the applicant simply chose not to take any part in that hearing on 19 August 2025 was unhelpful and yet again indicative of the applicant’s failure to proceed with the applications. It was a conscious and deliberate decision on the applicant’s part not to attend that Telephone Directions Hearing. Such conduct can be construed as a failure to proceed with the application and within a reasonable time.
Therefore, given these events as outlined above, the factual conditions required for the application of s 100 (a) of the ART Act become available to the Tribunal.[12]
[12] Andelman v Secretary, Department of Families, Housing, Community Services and Indigenous Affairs (2011) 121 ALD 242 at [39] per Jagot J.

By reason of the foregoing matters the Tribunal concludes that there has been a failure on the part of the applicant to proceed with the 4 applications presently before the Tribunal as contemplated by s 100 (a) of the ART Act.
Has a reasonable time elapsed since the applicant’s failure to proceed with the applications?
In addressing this question the Tribunal is, once again, guided by the language contained in S 9 (b) that the Tribunal must pursue the objective of providing an independent mechanism of review that, amongst other things, ensures that applications to it are resolved as quickly, and with as little formality and expense, as a proper consideration of the matters before it permit.
The applications before the Tribunal would have been commenced by the applicant are not novel or particularly complex. The subject matter of those applications are of a kind or type that are frequently made to the Tribunal seeking relief or remedies under the provisions of the SRC Act. It is a well-worn legal pathway. There is absolutely nothing in the material presently before the Tribunal that indicates why these applications could not have been prosecuted relatively quickly and ultimately heard and determined long before now.
It has already been observed above in a consideration of the question of whether there had been a failure to proceed that each of these applications have been on foot for a long time. The most recently commenced one for over two years and the first one commenced over five years ago. This lapse of time cannot objectively be said to be reasonable. Certainly not in terms of the regular rate of disposition of such claims under the SRC Act before the Tribunal and its predecessor Tribunal the AAT.
Further, more than a year has elapsed since the listing for May 2024 was vacated. He has taken no active steps to prosecute proceeding in that time or have it relisted for final hearing and determination. Quite the contrary, as already noted by reason of the stay application, the effect of the 20 June 2025 determination which suspended his rights to institute or continue any proceedings under the SRC Act and his failure to attend the Telephone Directions Hearing on 19 August 2024, he has acted quite inconsistently with taking steps to proceed with the application. One can only conclude that that given these factors individually and collectively the applicant has failed within a reasonable time to proceed with the application. It is an inordinate delay.
Conclusions on the discretion to dismiss an application in s 100 (b) of the ART Act
As observed above, the discretion to dismiss an application given to the Tribunal in s 100(b) of the ART Act is only enlivened where the Tribunal concludes that there has been a failure to proceed and whether a reasonable time has elapsed since the relevant failure.
The Tribunal has concluded, for the reasons articulated, that there was a failure to proceed with each of the applications on the part of the applicant as contemplated by s 100 (a) of the ART Act.
It has also been concluded by the Tribunal, for the reasons explained, that a reasonable time has elapsed since the relevant failure on the part of the applicant to proceed with each of the applications.
By reason of these conclusions the discretionary power conferred on the Tribunal by s 100 of the ART Act is enlivened.
It is, therefore, necessary for the Tribunal to decide whether the discretionary power under s 100 of the ART Act, having been enlivened, should be exercised to dismiss the applications as contended for by the respondent. In reaching a conclusion on this question the Tribunal is mindful of several decisions which hold, quite understandably, that such a power should only be exercised sparingly and as a matter of “last resort”.
In doing so it is necessary for the Tribunal to consider whether such a dismissal was the proper remedy, or whether it would be more appropriate to take some other course, such as adjourning the proceeding or making some other order to secure compliance.
The Tribunal concludes that the discretion to dismiss the applications if the applicant fails within a reasonable time to proceed with the applications having been enlivened should be exercised.
As for adjourning the proceeding, presumably the Telephone Directions Hearing on 19 August 2025 that the applicant unilaterally failed to attend, the Tribunal is not persuaded given the history of the applicant’s conduct in the matter, that such a course is more appropriate. His track record with respect to the prosecution of these matters does not give the Tribunal confidence that if the indulgence of an adjournment were made in his favour that he would be prompted to take the necessary steps to have each of these applications finally heard and determined. Regrettably, the applicant seems more concerned with pursuing various allegations against the respondent, it’s legal practitioners’ various courts and Tribunals rather than the prosecution of these applications.
This conclusion is also arrived at due to the applicant’s unsupported allegations of various forms of moral turpitude against various people that have been made in various ways and in documents sent by him to various parties including this Tribunal and the practitioners for the respondent. It should be repeated that they include serious allegations of corruption made in, amongst others, the applicant’s stay application lodged on 13 June 2025, his email to the Tribunal of 24 June 2025 and the letter to the President of the Tribunal and received by the respondent’s practitioners on 6 November 2024. There was also of course the statement made in the applicant’s email about the report prepared by Dr Ghan, an orthopaedic surgeon that he had prepared a medical report that was “fraudulent or insurance friendly”. It seems more probable than not that even if the Telephone Directions Hearing were adjourned, and the applications permitted to be continued, that this approach of the applicant will be persisted with.
The other factor that looms large in a consideration of the question, whether it would be more appropriate to take some other course such as adjourning the matter, arises because of the effect of the 20 June 2025 determination which has been discussed earlier in these reasons. Unless there is a successful reconsideration of that determination, which the applicant has not sought, nor sought a further period within which to seek such reconsideration, even if an adjournment was granted, the applicant’s rights to compensation under the SRC Act, and to institute or continue any proceedings under that Act in relation to compensation, are suspended until the medical examination takes place. As things presently stand under s 57 (2) of the SRC Act any proceedings under that Act brought by the applicant in relation to compensation are suspended. There is simply no indication before the Tribunal whether this situation is likely to be resolved. One can only speculate, but it seems more probable than not that this question is likely to remain unresolved into the foreseeable future. This is evident from the contents of his email of 17 June 2025 on the question, to the respondent’s delegate. Given the operation of s 57 (2) of the SRC Act on these applications, the granting of an adjournment of the applications or the Telephone Directions Hearing, on whatever terms, is ultimately likely to be, certainly for the foreseeable future, futile.
As for any other order that might be made with the intention of securing the applicant’s compliance, it is in present circumstances difficult to contemplate the precise terms of any proposed order that might achieve that objective. Apart from the present proceedings being suspended by operation of s 57 (2) of the SRC Act, the Tribunal is concerned that the applicant’s several unsupported allegations of corruption and fraud as previously articulated have significantly clouded the applicant’s capacity to objectively undertake the steps necessary to proceed with the applications concerned in a reasonable time and an in an appropriate manner.
Also, with respect to the question of other form of appropriate order to secure compliance, it should not be lost sight of that the applicant by his own conduct in not attending at the Telephone Directions hearing on 19 August 2025 effectively disabled or prevented the Tribunal from, firstly, hearing from him as to an appropriate form of order, and secondly, the opportunity also to address him on the consequences of his failure to proceed, as is indeed the case. Had he attended, being a self-represented applicant, the Tribunal could have provided him, within reason an appropriate explanation of its procedures and where appropriate, assistance so as to enable these applications to get back on the rails. To this extent the applicant is the architect of his own undoing by reason of his failure to attend.
Brief reference should be made to another dimension of the respondent’s submissions concerning the exercise of the discretion conferred on the Tribunal under s 100 (b) of the ART Act 2009. As previously noted, exhibited to the Marshall affidavit was a copy of an email sent by the applicant to the President of this Tribunal which was received by the respondent’s lawyers 6 November 2024. Exhibited to that affidavit are transcripts of various proceedings in the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia between the applicant and the respondent. This material concerned several appearances in that court by the applicant and the respondent. The subject matter of that application before the court related to a proceeding there had been commenced by the applicant under the Fair Work Act 2009. Those proceedings were some relieved dismissed on several grounds including that the applicant had communicated in the plainest of terms that he had no intention then or at any time in the ascertainable future, of prosecuting his case against the respondent.
The respondent contended that the Tribunal is entitled to consider the manner in which the applicant conducted those proceedings in the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia together with a subsequent appeal. In doing so it was submitted they were powerful indicators as to the applicant’s likely future conduct were these applications to remain on foot in this Tribunal. Whilst the thrust of these submissions is understandable, the Tribunal concludes that to take them into account for the purposes of considering whether to exercise the discretion conferred on it under s 100 (a) would be to stray into the realms of taking into account irrelevant considerations, notwithstanding the temptation to do so. The Tribunal has not considered the applicant’s conduct in those proceedings in reaching the conclusions it does with respect to dismissal under s 100 (a) of the ART Act.
On the question of the discretion under s 100 (b) of the ART Act being exercised as a matter of “last resort” apart from all the factors that have been articulated above, the Tribunal considers that given the applicant’s approach to these matters to date, as articulated in these reasons, it is highly unlikely that even if some other approach were adopted, either by way of a further adjournment or a specific order, on whatever terms that they may be, that the applicant is going to adhere to his obligations under s 56(1)(b) of the ART Act to use his best endeavours to assist the Tribunal achieve the objectives contained in s 9 of that Act.
For these reasons, as the discretion conferred in the Tribunal under s 100(a) of the ART Act has been enlivened, it considers that the respondent has established that it should be exercised in its favour and an order made dismissing each of the applications. Accordingly, under s 100(a) of the ART Act applications No: 2020/4843, No: 2021/7106, 2022/7640 and 2023/3638 are dismissed.
DISMISSAL UNDER SECTION 99 OF THE ART ACT
Given the non-attendance of the applicant at the Telephone Directions hearing on 19 August 2025 Mr Snell submitted that the Tribunal also had a discretion to dismiss the applications under s 99 of the ART Act.
Section 99 of the ART Act confers on the Tribunal a discretion to dismiss an application if an applicant fails to appear at a Tribunal case event that relates to a proceeding in relation to an application and, the Tribunal is satisfied that the applicant received appropriate notice of the date, time and place of the Tribunal case event.
It has already been referred to in these reasons that the applicant was aware of the date, time and mode of the Telephone Directions Hearing 19 August 2025. This was self-evident from the contents of the applicant’s emails to the Tribunal acknowledging this fact such as the email of 15 August 2025 and the subsequent email to the Tribunal also referred to. It should also be recalled that a listing notice informing the applicant of the date time and place was forwarded to him on 5 August 2025. Therefore, the Tribunal is satisfied that the applicant received appropriate notice of the date, time and place of the relevant Tribunal case event, being the Telephone Directions Hearing listed for 19 August 2025.
As noted, the applicant failed to appear. The discretion to dismiss the applications under s 99 of the ART Act is therefore enlivened.
Given the circumstances of the applicant’s non-attendance at the Telephone Directions Hearing of 19 August 2025, details of which have been articulated earlier in these reasons, the Tribunal is persuaded that further, and in the alternative dismissal under s 99 of the ART Act is justified.
By reason of the foregoing, further and in the alternative the Tribunal dismisses the applications under s 99 of the ART Act.
DECISION
The applications are dismissed under sections 100(a) and 99 of the ART Act.
..................[SGD]...................
General Member R. Cameron
2 September 2025
Date of hearing: 19 August 2025
Applicant: Peter Walker
Respondent: FedEx Express Australia Pty Ltd
Advocate for the Respondent: Mr Michael Snell
Solicitors for the Respondent: McInnes Wilson

Applicant:	Peter Walker
Respondent:	FedEx Express
Tribunal Number:	2020/4843, 2021/7106, 2022/7640, 2023/3638
Tribunal:	General Member R Cameron
Place:	Melbourne
Date:	2 September 2025