WAJB v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs

Link copied
Case Copied 32 min read

FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

WAJB v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs
[2002] FCA 1443

MIGRATION – judicial review – Refugee Review Tribunal – jurisdictional error – error of law – stateless Palestinian – application of Article 1D – second paragraph of Article 1D – whether ipso facto refugee – construction of second paragraph of Article 1D – no jurisdictional error or error as to law – application dismissed

Migration Act 1958 (Cth)

Al-Khateeb v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs (2002) 67 ALD 46 cited
Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs v WABQ [2002] FCAFC 329 followed
WACG v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs (2002] FCAFC 332 followed
WAED v Ministerfor Immigration & Multicultural Affairs [2002] FCAFC 333 followed
WAEI v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2002] FCAFC 334 followed
WACH v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs [2002] FCAFC 338 followed

WAJB v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
W402 OF 2001

FRENCH J
22 NOVEMBER 2002
PERTH

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

WESTERN AUSTRALIA DISTRICT REGISTRY

W402 OF 2001

BETWEEN:

WAJB
APPLICANT

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
RESPONDENT

JUDGE:

FRENCH

DATE OF ORDER:

 22 NOVEMBER 2002

WHERE MADE:

PERTH

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.        The application is dismissed.

2.        The applicant is to pay the respondent’s costs of the application.

Note:    Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

WESTERN AUSTRALIA DISTRICT REGISTRY

W402 OF 2001

BETWEEN:

WAJB
APPLICANT

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
RESPONDENT

JUDGE:

FRENCH

DATE:

22 NOVEMBER 2002

PLACE:

PERTH

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

Introduction

  1. The applicant was born on 21 March 1957 in Damascus in Syria.  He is of Palestinian origin but has no nationality.  He describes himself as “stateless”.  He arrived in Australia without lawful authority on 23 December 2000.  He was accompanied  by his wife and two children, then aged 11 and 9 years respectively.

  2. On 31 December 2000, he lodged an application for a protection visa with the Department of Immigration and Multicultural Affairs.  The application included his wife and children.  On 5 June 2001, the application was refused by a delegate of the Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs.  On 8 June 2001, the applicant and his family sought review of that decision by the Refugee Review Tribunal.  On 24 August 2001, the Tribunal affirmed the decision not to grant protection visas.  An application for review of the Tribunal’s decision was filed in this Court on 30 August 2001.  The application was amended by leave of the Court on 10 June 2002 at which time it was heard.

  3. The application raised grounds of want of jurisdiction on the part of the Tribunal and error of law.  It was a particular of the latter ground that the applicant, being a stateless Palestinian outside the protection of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA), was automatically entitled to protection under the Refugee Convention.  This latter proposition depended…

CaseChat AU logo

Keep reading for free

Create a free CaseChat account to read WAJB v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs and more:

  • Read every judgment in full
  • Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
  • See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
  • Download judgments as PDF or Word
Continue with Google

One click creates your free account or signs you in.

By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.

Details
Case
[2002] FCA 1443
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of WAJB v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs involved a Palestinian applicant who sought a protection visa on the basis of his experiences in Syria. The applicant's application was reviewed by the Federal Court of Australia, which was tasked with determining whether the Tribunal had jurisdiction to make the decision and whether the decision involved an error of law. The case hinged on the interpretation of Article 1D of the Refugee Convention, which the applicant argued entitled him to protection as a stateless Palestinian outside the protection of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA).

The primary legal issue before the court was whether the Tribunal had correctly interpreted the law in denying the applicant's claim under Article 1D of the Refugee Convention. The applicant contended that his status as a stateless Palestinian automatically entitled him to refugee status. However, the court had to consider the interpretation of Article 1D in light of previous judgments. The court noted that several decisions on the interpretation of Article 1D had been published on 8 November 2002, which influenced the court's reasoning.

The court found that the Tribunal's decision was not an error of law and did not amount to a want of jurisdiction. The court held that the Tribunal had properly considered the evidence and made findings that were supported by the applicant's own statements and the context of his situation. Specifically, the Tribunal had reasonable grounds to doubt the applicant's account of his detention and the duration of his interrogation. The court also noted that the applicant's ability to establish a business and work without hindrance after his alleged release suggested that he was not considered a threat by the Syrian authorities.

In light of these findings, the application for judicial review was dismissed. The court ordered that the applicant was to pay the respondent’s costs of the application.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The application is dismissed.

2. The applicant is to pay the respondent’s costs of the application.

Background

Background to the litigation

The applicant, a stateless Palestinian who is registered with the United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) but does not live in a refugee camp, applied for a protection visa on the basis of his fear of persecution if returned to Syria. He claimed to have been detained and tortured by Syrian authorities for two years until 1984 because they suspected him of being an Israeli spy and later because they thought he was opposed to the Syrian regime. He was released after his younger brother, a plumber, used his connections with the Deputy Head of the Intelligence Branch to secure his release. The applicant's claim for refugee status was based on the assertion that he was automatically entitled to protection under the Refugee Convention due to his status as a stateless Palestinian outside the protection of UNRWA.

The case came before the court on an application for review of a decision made by the Tribunal. The application for review was filed on 30 August 2001, prior to the amendments to the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) by the Migration Legislation (Judicial Review) Act 2001 (Cth) that took effect on 2 October 2001. The applicant raised grounds of review including want of jurisdiction and error of law, particularly concerning the interpretation of Article 1D of the Refugee Convention. The application for review was considered in light of decisions made by the Full Court of the Federal Court regarding the construction of Article 1D, which were published on 8 November 2002.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

The application raised grounds of want of jurisdiction on the part of the Tribunal and error of law. It was a particular of the latter ground that the applicant, being a stateless Palestinian outside the protection of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA), was automatically entitled to protection under the Refugee Convention. This latter proposition depended upon a reading of Article 1D of the Convention which was in contention in other matters reserved before the Full Court of the Federal Court. For the reasons that follow, the other grounds of review were not made out. Judgment was deferred pending the outcome of the Full Court’s consideration of Article 1D. A number of judgments dealing with the construction of the second paragraph of Article 1D were published on 8 November 2002. On the basis of those decisions, as appears below, the submission that the applicant was automatically entitled to be treated as a refugee by virtue of Article 1D must be rejected. Applicant’s Claims and Evidence In support of his application for a protection visa, the applicant provided a statement in which he said he was born in Damascus in Syria. His father was born in Safad, Palestine. He had fled there in 1948. The applicant is registered with UNRWA. However he did not live in a camp. The applicant said that he did military service in the Palestinian Liberation Army from 1979 until 1982. In July 1982, he was called back for the Reserves. At this time there was war in Lebanon and Israeli forces were entering that country. According to the applicant’s account, in January 1983 while still in military service, he was heading back to his barracks following twenty-four hours leave. He missed a military bus and had to catch a civilian bus. He got off the bus at the point on its route closest to his base. He started to walk. He told the Tribunal that it would normally take him forty-five minutes to walk from the bottom of the mountain to the top where his base was located. On the occasion in question it was snowing and the markers used as a guide were covered in snow. He became lost. He was in company with another soldier. Ordinarily everyone who was late returning from leave would either receive extended service or be deprived of the following twenty-four hour leave. Having lost his way the applicant reached a Syrian outpost. He sought refuge there and was able to change his clothes and get something to eat. He explained to the Syrian soldiers that he was from the Palestinian Liberation Army, was late returning and had become lost. They said they would show him how to get back to his base. About half an hour later however, some armed persons in civilian dress arrived and he and another soldier who had been with him were blindfolded and taken handcuffed to an Intelligence Service office in Damascus. There he was interrogated about the fact that he had come from the direction of Israel. He told his interrogators what had happened. He said he was initially tortured and beaten on suspicion of being an Israeli spy. After twelve or thirteen days his captors made inquiries about him in the neighbourhood. The questioning then changed and he was asked whether he was opposed to the Syrian regime. According to the applicant he was questioned for more than two months, although not continuously. He was kept in detention overall for about two years until the end of 1984. He said he was released because his younger brother who is also a plumber, had a work contract with the Deputy Head of the Intelligence Branch and had spoken to this person about the applicant. Eventually he secured the applicant’s release.

Decision

Reasons for decision

FRENCH J
The application for review having been filed on 30 August 2001, the Court's jurisdiction arises from s 486 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) as it stood then and prior to the significant amendments effected by the Migration Legislation (Judicial Review) Act 2001 (Cth) which came into effect on 2 October 2001. The grounds of review available at the time were those defined in s 476 of the Act which relevantly provided: "476(1) Subject to subsection (2), application may be made for review by the Federal Court of a judicially-reviewable decision on any one or more of the following grounds:...(b)that the person who purported to make the decision did not have jurisdiction to make the decision; (c)that the decision was not authorised by this Act or the regulations; ...(e)that the decision involved an error of law, being an error involving an incorrect interpretation of the applicable law or an incorrect application of the law to the facts as found by the person who made the decision, whether or not the error appears on the record of the decision;"Want of Jurisdiction to Make the Decision It was submitted that the Tribunal had made no clear findings about the claimed occurrence of the 1983 and 2000 detentions and no finding on the claimed means of release from the latter detention. Its findings on the alleged retention of a file record on the applicant by the Syrian authorities were said to be based on inclinations and assumptions and not on probative evidence. The Tribunal was also said to have made no findings about the applicant's departure from Syria and the effect of his application for asylum in Australia. The passage from the Tribunal's reasons relating to the first detention, relied upon by the applicant and set out in the submissions filed on his behalf, was in the following terms: "The Tribunal accepts that in 1983 the applicant was returning from twenty four hours leave when he missed the bus at 7am and had to catch the civilian bus. The Tribunal accepts that he left this bus to walk for forty five minutes to the top of the mountain where his base was but became lost on the way. The Tribunal accepts that he stumbled on a Syrian post after he lost his way. It is plausible in such circumstances that the applicant would be questioned as to what he was doing and why he was where he was. However the applicant’s account would have been easy to verify. As a result the Tribunal does not accept that the applicant was considered to be an Israeli spy for any significant period of time. Whilst the Tribunal notes that the applicant claimed it was twelve or thirteen days before the authorities shifted their focus from his being a spy to being anti government, the Tribunal does not accept it would have taken such a period of time to verify his account. It also does not make sense to the Tribunal that they would beat and torture him as a result of a suspicion that he was an Israeli spy without making checks first which checks would have verified his account. It also does not make sense to the Tribunal that having shifted their focus from his being a spy to being anti-government that he would then be detained for a period of two years. As a result the Tribunal considers that the applicant has exaggerated his period of detention. The Tribunal would have expected from his account that he would have been detained for a short period only.However even if the Tribunal is wrong about its finding in relation to his period of detention, the applicant was able at the end of it to set up a business and work without any problems for the next fifteen years. His ability to do this does not indicate to the Tribunal that the applicant was considered by the authorities to be either an Israeli spy or anti-government.”

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: FRENCH J

The Court began by considering the Tribunal's jurisdiction to make the decision. The Court found that the Tribunal had jurisdiction as the application for review was filed prior to the amendments made by the Migration Legislation (Judiciary Review) Act 2001 (Cth). Next, the Court assessed whether the decision was authorised by the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) or the regulations. The Court concluded that the decision was authorised as it fell within the grounds of review defined in s 476 of the Act. The Court also examined whether the decision involved an error of law. The Court found no such error, as the Tribunal's reasoning was sound and based on the evidence presented. Regarding the findings on the 1983 and 2000 detentions and the means of release from the latter detention, the Court held that the Tribunal made clear findings supported by the evidence. The Court further examined the Tribunal's findings on the alleged retention of a file record on the applicant by the Syrian authorities and found that they were based on probative evidence, not inclinations or assumptions. Finally, the Court confirmed that the Tribunal made findings about the applicant's departure from Syria and the effect of his application for asylum in Australia. The Court's reasoning demonstrates the importance of clear findings, supported by evidence, and proper application of the applicable law in making decisions in migration cases. The ratio decidendi of this case is that a Tribunal's findings must be clear, supported by evidence, and based on a proper application of the law for the decision to be upheld.