WADD v MIMIA

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FEDERAL MAGISTRATES COURT OF AUSTRALIA

WADD v MIMIA [2002] FMCA 74
MIGRATION – appeal from a decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal – whether the Tribunal erred in finding the applicant’s fear of persecution was not well founded

Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss.474, 483A

Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) s.39B

R v Hickman; ex parte Fox and Clinton (1945) 70 CLR 598
SAAD v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs [2002] FCA 206
SBAE v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2002] FCA 479
Turkan v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs [2002] FCA 397

Applicant: WADD
Respondent: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AND INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS
File No: WZ 61 of 2002
Delivered on: 10 May 2002
Delivered at: Sydney
Hearing Date: 30 April 2002
Judgment of: Raphael FM

REPRESENTATION

For the Applicant: Applicant in person
Counsel for the Respondent: Mr M Ritter
Solicitors for the Respondent: Australian Government Solicitor

ORDERS

  1. The application be dismissed.

  2. The applicant pay the respondent’s costs pursuant to Part 21.10 of the Federal Magistrates Court Rules.

FEDERAL MAGISTRATES
COURT OF AUSTRALIA AT
SYDNEY

WZ 61 of 2002

WADD

Applicant

And

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AND INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS

Respondent

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

  1. In this matter the applicant seeks a review of the decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal constituted by Mr Andrew Jacovides made on 14 December 2001 affirming a decision not to grant a protection visa under Class XA Sub Class 785 or 866.

  2. The applicant arrived in Australia on 14 November 2000 as an unauthorised boat arrival and was not immigration cleared.  He is therefore unable to meet the requirements for a permanent sub-class 866 (protection visa).  He was assessed in accordance with the criteria set out in the Migration Regulations for the grant of a visa of sub-class 785 (temporary protection).  The applicant filed two applications numbered W578 and W579 of 2001 in the Federal Court.  Both applications appeared to seek review of the decision referred to above. 

  3. On 15 January 2002 Deputy District Registrar Rayney ordered that the proceedings be consolidated and thereafter referred to as W578 of 2001.  On 10 April 2002 RD Nicholson J transferred the application to the Federal Magistrates Court. 

  4. The application states that the applicant is aggrieved by the Tribunal’s decision because:

    “The RRT’s decision is [illegible] [illegible] no justice was performed concerning my case there are some people (Afghanis) who are granted protection visa meanwhile but I am refused.”

  5. The grounds of the application are set out as follows:

    “I am an Afghani asylum seeker in Australian Detention Centre.  Because I was convicted talking with a woman on the street I was detained for 2 months and besides I [illegible] [illegible] and belonged to Tajike ethnic.  I was under persecution at the time of Taliban regime and now my life is in danger because of my wealth.

  6. The matter came before the Registrar of the Federal Court on 15 January 2002.  The Registrar made orders including the following:

    “2. The applicant to…

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Details
Case
[2002] FMCA 74
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The Federal Magistrates Court presided over a case involving WADD, the applicant, and MIMIA, the respondent. The crux of the dispute revolved around the interpretation and application of a privative clause within the Migration Act, specifically section 474, which effectively precludes judicial review of certain decisions made under the Act. The court's role was to determine whether the privative clause applied to bar the applicant's challenge to a decision made under the Act.

The legal issues at hand centred on the scope and application of section 474 of the Migration Act. The court had to consider whether this privative clause rendered the Tribunal's decision beyond judicial review, and if so, whether the court could assess the merits of the applicant's claims despite this clause. The court also needed to evaluate whether there were any jurisdictional errors or other grounds that might allow for judicial intervention under section 39B of the Judiciary Act.

The court, in examining the matter, noted the established legal framework concerning privative clauses as interpreted by the High Court and subsequent decisions in the Federal Court and the Federal Magistrates Court itself. Mansfield J's approach in previous cases was contrasted with Heery J's perspective, highlighting the differing judicial attitudes towards the application of section 474. Ultimately, the court found no jurisdictional error warranting review under section 39B and concluded that section 474 precluded any further judicial scrutiny of the Tribunal's decision.

The court dismissed the application and ordered the applicant to pay the respondent's costs in accordance with Part 21.10 of the Federal Magistrates Court Rules.

Orders

Orders of the court

1.

The application be dismissed.

2.

The applicant pay the respondent’s costs pursuant to Part 21.10 of the Federal Magistrates Court Rules.

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

The jurisdiction of the Federal Magistrates Court in these matters is imposed by s.483(A) of the Migration Act. The jurisdiction which the court exercises is subject to s.474 of the Act which is found in Part 8 dealing with judicial review. Section 474 is the section which places into the Act the privative clause in the following form:474Decisions under Act are finali)A privative clause decision;(a) is final and conclusive; and(b) must not be challenged, appealed against, reviewed, quashed or called in question in any court; and(c) is not subject to prohibition, mandamus, injunction, declaration or certiorari in any court on any account. This clause was interpreted by the High Court in R v Hickman; ex-parte Fox and Clinton (1945) 70 CLR 598 and the implications of such a clause to decisions under the Migration Act have been the subject of several decisions in the Federal Court. There have also been decisions in this court. Mansfield J in SAAD v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2002] FCA 206 and SBAE v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2002] FCA 479 dealt with two cases in which the application for review before the court did not identify any grounds upon which the application was brought. He considered those cases on the basis that he would look first to see whether or not there was any matters which would give rise to relief under s.39B of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth). He said in SBEA at [17]:“The assessment of the merits of the applicant’s claims is fundamentally the function of the Tribunal. The court is not empowered to revisit findings made by the Tribunal, and to substitute its view of appropriate findings for those made by the Tribunal. That is not to indicate that, in this instance I have found different views about matters of fact upon which the Tribunal has made findings. I have not done so. That is not the court’s function. It is to indicate that, without error of the kind which would enliven a court’s powers under s.39B of the Judiciary Act, the sort of matters to which the applicant has referred as noted above do not entitle the court simply to revisit the determination of the Tribunal or set it aside.” His Honour would only consider the effect of s.474 of the Migration Act if he found there was an error on the part of the Tribunal which would enliven the entitlement to an order under s.39B. When he was unable to find such an issue in SAAD his Honour said at [23]:“Consequently, in my view, it is not necessary to address the application of s.474 in the particular circumstances.” This approach is not universal. In Turkan v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2002] FCA 397 Heery J said at [46]:“In my view, the correct approach is to first consider whether s.474 applies. If it does, the court need not. Indeed it should not, go any further. The court should not assess the case as if 474 did not exist and then only move to consider that section if satisfied that otherwise grounds are made out. Section 474 in its terms goes to the court’s jurisdiction and is to be applied at the threshold.”

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Full text does not contain this section.