WACX v MIMIA

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FEDERAL MAGISTRATES COURT OF AUSTRALIA

WACX v MIMIA [2002] FMCA 75
MIGRATION – appeal from a decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal – whether the Tribunal erred in finding the applicant’s fear of persecution was not well founded

Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss.474, 483A

Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) s.39B

R v Hickman; ex parte Fox and Clinton (1945) 70 CLR 598
SAAD v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs [2002] FCA 206
SBAE v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2002] FCA 479
Turkan v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs [2002] FCA 397

Applicant: WACX
Respondent: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AND INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS
File No: WZ 59 of 2002
Delivered on: 10 May 2002
Delivered at: Sydney
Hearing Date: 30 April 2002
Judgment of: Raphael FM

REPRESENTATION

For the Applicant: Applicant in person
Counsel for the Respondent: Ms L Price
Solicitors for the Respondent: Blake Dawson Waldron

ORDERS

  1. The application be dismissed.

  2. The applicant pay the respondent’s costs pursuant to Part 21.10 of the Federal Magistrates Court Rules.

FEDERAL MAGISTRATES
COURT OF AUSTRALIA AT
SYDNEY

WZ 59 of 2002

WACX

Applicant

And

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AND INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS

Respondent

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

  1. In this matter the applicant seeks a review of the decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal constituted by R A Fordham made on 7 December 2001 affirming a decision not to grant a protection visa under Class XA Sub Class 785 or 866.

  2. The applicant entered Australia on 20 December 2000 as an unauthorised boat arrival and was not immigration cleared.  He is therefore unable to meet the requirements for the grant of a permanent Sub Class 866 (protection visa).  He was assessed in accordance with the criteria set out in the Migration Regulations for the grant of a visa of Sub Class 785 (temporary protection).  The application states that the applicant is aggrieved by the Tribunal’s decision because:

    “He is a person to whom Australian has protection obligations under the Convention and protocol relating to the status of refugees.”

  3. The grounds of his application are set out as follows:

    “1. Procedure that were required by the Migration Act to be observed in connection with the making of the decision were not observed.

    2.That the decision involved an error of law being an error of law involving an incorrect interpretation of the applicable law or an incorrect application of the person who made the decision.”

  4. The matter came before the Registrar of the Federal Court on 10 January 2002.  The Registrar made orders including the following:

    “1. The applicant to file and serve on or before 8 February 2002:

    (a)     An amended application giving particulars of any grounds of review; or

    (b) A written statement setting out the reasons why he considers the decision of the Refugee Tribunal as wrong; and

    (c)  Any affidavit upon which he intends to rely at the hearing of this matter.”

  5. The matter was transferred to the Federal Magistrates Court by order of Nicholson…

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Details
Case
[2002] FMCA 75
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The Federal Magistrates Court was tasked with deciding on the application by WACX against the Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (MIMIA). The applicant, WACX, sought judicial review of decisions made by the Minister concerning their immigration matters. The primary legal issues revolved around the interpretation and application of the privative clause in s.474 of the Migration Act, which seeks to make decisions final and conclusive, and the extent to which the court can review such decisions.

The court examined the nature of the privative clause in s.474, noting its interpretation by the High Court and subsequent discussions in the Federal Court and the Federal Magistrates Court. The court considered the approach of Mansfield J in previous cases, who held that the court should not revisit the merits of the Tribunal's findings unless there was a clear error that would entitle relief under s.39B of the Judiciary Act. However, the court also recognised alternative interpretations, such as that proposed by Heery J, which suggested that the court should first determine whether s.474 applies and, if it does, refrain from further assessment. The court concluded that there was no basis upon which it could find an error warranting relief under s.39B, and thus, s.474 effectively precluded further judicial review.

Based on its findings, the court dismissed the application and ordered that the applicant pay the respondent's costs in accordance with the Federal Magistrates Court Rules. This decision underscored the limited role of the court in reviewing decisions made under the privative clause of s.474 of the Migration Act.

Orders

Orders of the court

1.

The application be dismissed.

2.

The applicant pay the respondent’s costs pursuant to Part 21.10 of the Federal Magistrates Court Rules.

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

The jurisdiction of the Federal Magistrates Court in these matters is imposed by s.483(A) of the Migration Act. The jurisdiction which the court exercises is subject to s.474 of the Act which is found in Part 8 dealing with judicial review. Section 474 is the section which places into the Act the privative clause in the following form:474Decisions under Act are finali)A privative clause decision;(a) is final and conclusive; and(b) must not be challenged, appealed against, reviewed, quashed or called in question in any court; and(c) is not subject to prohibition, mandamus, injunction, declaration or certiorari in any court on any account. This clause was interpreted by the High Court in R v Hickman; ex-parte Fox and Clinton (1945) 70 CLR 598 and the implications of such a clause to decisions under the Migration Act have been the subject of several decisions in the Federal Court. There have also been decisions in this court. Mansfield J in SAAD v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2002] FCA 206 and SBAE v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2002] FCA 479 dealt with two cases in which the application for review before the court did not identify any grounds upon which the application was brought. He considered those cases on the basis that he would look first to see whether or not there was any matters which would give rise to relief under s.39B of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth). He said in SBEA at [17]:“The assessment of the merits of the applicant’s claims is fundamentally the function of the Tribunal. The court is not empowered to revisit findings made by the Tribunal, and to substitute its view of appropriate findings for those made by the Tribunal. That is not to indicate that, in this instance I have found different views about matters of fact upon which the Tribunal has made findings. I have not done so. That is not the court’s function. It is to indicate that, without error of the kind which would enliven a court’s powers under s.39B of the Judiciary Act, the sort of matters to which the applicant has referred as noted above do not entitle the court simply to revisit the determination of the Tribunal or set it aside.” His Honour would only consider the effect of s.474 of the Migration Act if he found there was an error on the part of the Tribunal which would enliven the entitlement to an order under s.39B. When he was unable to find such an issue in SAAD his Honour said at [23]:“Consequently, in my view, it is not necessary to address the application of s.474 in the particular circumstances.” This approach is not universal. In Turkan v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2002] FCA 397 Heery J said at [46]:“In my view, the correct approach is to first consider whether s.474 applies. If it does, the court need not. Indeed it should not, go any further. The court should not assess the case as if 474 did not exist and then only move to consider that section if satisfied that otherwise grounds are made out. Section 474 in its terms goes to the court’s jurisdiction and is to be applied at the threshold.”

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Full text does not contain this section.