WABS v MIMIA

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FEDERAL MAGISTRATES COURT OF AUSTRALIA

WABS v MIMIA [2002] FMCA 73
MIGRATION – appeal from a decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal – whether the Tribunal erred in finding the applicant’s fear of persecution was not well founded – “What if I am wrong?” test

Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss.474, 483A

Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) s.39B

Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs v Rajalingam [1999] FCA 719
R v Hickman; ex parte Fox and Clinton (1945) 70 CLR 598
SAAD v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs [2002] FCA 206
SBAE v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2002] FCA 479
Turkan v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs [2002] FCA 397

Applicant: WABS
Respondent: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AND INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS
File No: WZ 68 of 2002
Delivered on: 10 May 2002
Delivered at: Sydney
Hearing Date: 30 April 2002
Judgment of: Raphael FM

REPRESENTATION

For the Applicant: Applicant in person
Counsel for the Respondent: Ms L Price
Solicitors for the Respondent: Blake Dawson Waldron

ORDERS

  1. The application be dismissed.

  2. The applicant pay the respondent’s costs pursuant to Part 21.10 of the Federal Magistrates Court Rules.

FEDERAL MAGISTRATES
COURT OF AUSTRALIA AT
SYDNEY

WZ 68 of 2002

WABS

Applicant

And

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AND INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS

Respondent

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

  1. In this matter the applicant seeks a review of the decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal constituted by Kenneth Northwood made on 31 October 2001 affirming a decision not to grant a protection visa under Class XA Sub Class 785 or 866.

  2. The applicant entered Australia on 11 October 2000 as an unauthorised boat arrival and was not immigration cleared.  He is therefore unable to meet the requirements for the grant of a permanent Sub Class 866 (protection visa).  He was assessed in accordance with the criteria set out in the Migration Regulations for the grant of a visa of Sub Class 785 (temporary protection). 

  3. The grounds of his application are set out as follows:

    “1. As a Palestinian residing in Syria without any kind of protection or assistance. 

    2.I left Syria because I don’t feel free or safe not even protected.”

  4. The form of application continues:

    “B. Claim for Interlocutory Relief

    AND the applicant claims by way of interlocutory relief:

    1.   I have never received any protection or assistance from UNRWA.

    2.   I cannot go back to Syria because I have real fear of persecution.”

  5. The matter came before the Registrar of the Federal Court on 27 November 2001.  The Registrar made orders including the following:

    “2. The applicant to file and serve on or before 4 January 2002:

    (a) an amended application giving particulars of any grounds of review; or

    (b) a written statement setting out the reasons why he considers the decision of the Refugee Tribunal is wrong; and

    (c) any affidavit upon which he intends to rely at the hearing of this matter.”

  6. The matter was transferred to the Federal Magistrates Court by order of RD Nicholson…

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Details
Case
[2002] FMCA 73
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The Federal Magistrates Court considered an application for review of decisions made by the Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs under the Migration Act 1958 (Cth). The applicant sought to challenge the finality of decisions made by the Minister, arguing that the privative clause in section 474 of the Act should not apply to their case. The court was required to determine whether the privative clause in section 474 of the Migration Act precluded the court from reviewing the decisions made by the Minister. This involved examining the scope of the court's jurisdiction under section 474 and whether any grounds for review existed that could potentially circumvent the privative clause.

The court found that the privative clause in section 474 of the Migration Act was applicable and that it precluded the court from reviewing the decisions made by the Minister. The court noted that the High Court in R v Hickman; ex parte Fox and Clinton had interpreted such clauses to be absolute and conclusive, and that the Federal Court had consistently held that the privative clause in the Migration Act operated to prevent judicial review. The court also considered the differing approaches taken by various judges in the Federal Court regarding the application of section 474. While some judges had considered the merits of the case before applying section 474, others had applied the clause at the threshold.

Ultimately, the court dismissed the application for review and held that the privative clause in section 474 of the Migration Act precluded the court from reviewing the decisions made by the Minister. The applicant was ordered to pay the respondent’s costs in accordance with the Federal Magistrates Court Rules. The court’s decision reinforced the principle that the privative clause in section 474 of the Migration Act operates to prevent judicial review of decisions made by the Minister.

Orders

Orders of the court

1.

The application be dismissed.

2.

The applicant pay the respondent’s costs pursuant to Part 21.10 of the Federal Magistrates Court Rules.

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

The jurisdiction of the Federal Magistrates Court in these matters is imposed by s.483(A) of the Migration Act. The jurisdiction which the court exercises is subject to s.474 of the Act which is found in Part 8 dealing with judicial review. Section 474 is the section which places into the Act the privative clause in the following form:474Decisions under Act are finali)A privative clause decision;(a) is final and conclusive; and(b) must not be challenged, appealed against, reviewed, quashed or called in question in any court; and(c) is not subject to prohibition, mandamus, injunction, declaration or certiorari in any court on any account. This clause was interpreted by the High Court in R v Hickman; ex-parte Fox and Clinton (1945) 70 CLR 598 and the implications of such a clause to decisions under the Migration Act have been the subject of several decisions in the Federal Court. There have also been decisions in this court. Mansfield J in SAAD v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2002] FCA 206 and SBAE v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2002] FCA 479 dealt with two cases in which the application for review before the court did not identify any grounds upon which the application was brought. He considered those cases on the basis that he would look first to see whether or not there was any matters which would give rise to relief under s.39B of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth). He said in SBEA at [17]:“The assessment of the merits of the applicant’s claims is fundamentally the function of the Tribunal. The court is not empowered to revisit findings made by the Tribunal, and to substitute its view of appropriate findings for those made by the Tribunal. That is not to indicate that, in this instance I have found different views about matters of fact upon which the Tribunal has made findings. I have not done so. That is not the court’s function. It is to indicate that, without error of the kind which would enliven a court’s powers under s.39B of the Judiciary Act, the sort of matters to which the applicant has referred as noted above do not entitle the court simply to revisit the determination of the Tribunal or set it aside.” His Honour would only consider the effect of s.474 of the Migration Act if he found there was an error on the part of the Tribunal which would enliven the entitlement to an order under s.39B. When he was unable to find such an issue in SAAD his Honour said at [23]:“Consequently, in my view, it is not necessary to address the application of s.474 in the particular circumstances.” This approach is not universal. In Turkan v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2002] FCA 397 Heery J said at [46]:“In my view, the correct approach is to first consider whether s.474 applies. If it does, the court need not. Indeed it should not, go any further. The court should not assess the case as if 474 did not exist and then only move to consider that section if satisfied that otherwise grounds are made out. Section 474 in its terms goes to the court’s jurisdiction and is to be applied at the threshold.”

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Full text does not contain this section.