WABD v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

WABD v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs
[2002] FCA 299

MIGRATION - application for extension of time in which to appeal – no point of principle.

WABD v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
W500 of 2001

CARR J
13 MARCH 2002
PERTH


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

WESTERN AUSTRLIA DISTRICT REGISTRY

W500 OF 2001

BETWEEN:

WABD
Applicant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
Respondent

JUDGE:

CARR J

DATE OF ORDER:

13 MARCH 2002

WHERE MADE:

PERTH

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.Leave is granted to the applicant WABD to file and serve by 25 March 2002 a notice of appeal from the judgment given on 17 January 2002 dismissing his application to review a decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal.

2.Costs of the application to extend time to appeal will be costs in the appeal.

Note:    Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

WESTERN AUSTRLIA DISTRICT REGISTRY

W500 OF 2001

BETWEEN:

WABD
Applicant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND
MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
Respondent

JUDGE:

CARR J

DATE:

13 MARCH 2002

PLACE:

PERTH

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

INTRODUCTION

  1. This is an application for an extension of time in which to file and serve a notice of appeal from a judgment of French J given on 17 January 2002.  On that date his Honour dismissed the applicant’s application for an order of review of a decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal affirming a decision of a delegate of the respondent to refuse the grant of a protection visa to the applicant. 

    FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

  2. On 17 January 2002 his Honour heard and dismissed the application.  The report of listing on the court file indicates that orders were made as follows:

    “1.      Application dismissed.

    2.       Applicant to pay respondent’s costs of the application.”

  3. In an affidavit filed in support of his application, the applicant says that he did not understand that the judge “reject my claims in hearing” and because of that was waiting for reasons.  The respondent disputes that assertion, but has not adduced any contrary evidence.  It would appear that his Honour’s reasons were published on or about 30 January 2002.  

  4. From the applicant’s affidavit it would appear that he received a copy of the reasons for judgment on 6 February 2002.  He swears that he filled in a form on 10 February 2002 and caused it to be faxed to the Court on 12 February 2002.  It is apparent (from correspondence on the Court file) that this form was a notice of appeal.  

  5. It is also clear from the papers before me that judgment was in fact given on 17 January 2002.  In those circumstances any notice of appeal had to be filed on or before 7 February 2002.  The applicant was thus 5 days out of time in lodging his notice of appeal.  But I take into account the fact that he did not receive the judge’s…

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Details
Case
[2002] FCA 299
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The applicant, WABD, sought an extension of time to file and serve a notice of appeal from a judgment dismissing an application for judicial review of a decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal. The court had to determine whether the applicant's failure to file the notice of appeal within the statutory time limit could be excused due to special circumstances. The legal issue was whether the court should exercise its discretion under Order 52 rule 15(2) of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 to allow the late filing of the notice of appeal. The applicant argued that he was unaware that the judge had dismissed his claims until he received the reasons for judgment, which were issued on 6 February 2002. He subsequently lodged a notice of appeal on 12 February 2002, five days after the deadline. The court considered the principles in Jess v Scott (1986) 12 FCR 187, emphasising that the discretion to relax procedural rules should not be governed by rigid rules. The court granted leave for the late filing, noting that the applicant was only three days out of time and that no prejudice to the respondent had been demonstrated. The court concluded that there was potential for significant injustice to the applicant if the late notice of appeal was not accepted.

The court granted the applicant leave to file and serve a notice of appeal by a specified date. Additionally, the costs of the application to extend the time to appeal were to be costs in the appeal. This decision reflects the court's careful consideration of the balance between procedural timeliness and the risk of injustice to the applicant, highlighting the importance of individual circumstances in exercising discretion under the Federal Court Rules.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. Leave is granted to the applicant WABD to file and serve by 25 March 2002 a notice of appeal from the judgment given on 17 January 2002 dismissing his application to review a decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal.

2. Costs of the application to extend time to appeal will be costs in the appeal.

Background

Background to the litigation

This is an application for an extension of time in which to file and serve a notice of appeal from a judgment of French J given on 17 January 2002. On that date his Honour dismissed the applicant’s application for an order of review of a decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal affirming a decision of a delegate of the respondent to refuse the grant of a protection visa to the applicant. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND On 17 January 2002 his Honour heard and dismissed the application. The report of listing on the court file indicates that orders were made as follows:“1. Application dismissed.2. Applicant to pay respondent’s costs of the application.” In an affidavit filed in support of his application, the applicant says that he did not understand that the judge “reject my claims in hearing” and because of that was waiting for reasons. The respondent disputes that assertion, but has not adduced any contrary evidence. It would appear that his Honour’s reasons were published on or about 30 January 2002. From the applicant’s affidavit it would appear that he received a copy of the reasons for judgment on 6 February 2002. He swears that he filled in a form on 10 February 2002 and caused it to be faxed to the Court on 12 February 2002. It is apparent (from correspondence on the Court file) that this form was a notice of appeal. It is also clear from the papers before me that judgment was in fact given on 17 January 2002. In those circumstances any notice of appeal had to be filed on or before 7 February 2002. The applicant was thus 5 days out of time in lodging his notice of appeal. But I take into account the fact that he did not receive the judge’s reasons until 6 February 2002 and then lodged a Notice of Appeal six days later. My jurisdiction to hear this application is conferred by s 25(2)(b) of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth). The applicable rule is Order 52 rule 15(2) which relevantly provides that a judge may, for special reasons, give leave to file and serve a notice of appeal, notwithstanding an applicant’s failure to file and serve a notice of appeal within the times referred to in Order 52 rule 15(1). It is customary to resort to the most useful decision of a Full Court of this Court in Jess v Scott (1986) 12 FCR 187 when deciding applications such as these. But, as the Full Court in that case was at pains to point out (at 196), a discretion to relax the requirements of general rules should not itself become entangled in a web of rules spun out of the Court’s discretionary decisions. Their Honours added: “Decisions are not authorities upon the facts but upon principles; the facts must be regarded as unique to the particular case.” In this matter I give very great weight to the fact that, in practical terms, (when one bears in mind the weekend 9/10 February 2002) the applicant was only three days out of time in lodging his notice of appeal and had only had possession of the Judge’s reasons for 6 days. No possible prejudice to the respondent has been demonstrated by the delay in lodging the notice of appeal. On the other hand, there is at least the potential of a great injustice to the applicant if there is any merit in his proposed appeal.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

CARR J

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: CARR J