WAAJ v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

WAAJ v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs [2002] FCA 23

MIGRATION - judicial review - Refugee Review Tribunal - no reviewable error disclosed - application dismissed - no question of principle

Judiciary Act 1903 s 39B
Migration Act 1958 (Cth) s 474

Walton v Philip Ruddock  [2001] FCA 1839
R v Hickman; Ex parte Fox and Clinton (1945) 70 CLR 598.

WAAJ v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
W496 OF 2001

FRENCH J
16 JANUARY 2002
PERTH

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

WESTERN AUSTRALIA DISTRICT REGISTRY

W496 OF 2001

BETWEEN:

WAAJ
APPLICANT

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
RESPONDENT

JUDGE:

FRENCH J

DATE OF ORDER:

16 JANUARY 2002

WHERE MADE:

PERTH

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.        The application be dismissed.

2.        The applicant pay the respondent's costs of the application.

Note:    Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

WESTERN AUSTRALIA DISTRICT REGISTRY

W496 OF 2001

BETWEEN:

WAAJ
APPLICANT

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
RESPONDENT

JUDGE:

FRENCH J

DATE:

16 JANUARY 2002

PLACE:

PERTH

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

  1. The applicant is a citizen of Iran and he arrived in Australia without travel documents on 25 March 2001.  He lodged an application for a protection visa on 7 July 2001.  That application was refused by a delegate of the Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs on 6 August 2001.  On 8 August, the applicant applied to the Refugee Review Tribunal ("the Tribunal") for a review of the delegate's decision.  On 25 September, the Tribunal affirmed the decision not to grant him a protection visa.  On 5 October, he applied to this Court seeking review of the decision of the Tribunal.

  2. The application which he filed is of the kind which was used under the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) as it stood before 2 October 2001. I am prepared, however, to treat this as an application for relief under s 39B of the Judiciary Act 1903 even though it is not in the appropriate form for that purpose. The decision of the Tribunal, which the applicant seeks to have set aside or quashed, is one of those decisions called a privative clause decision under the Act. Section 474 of the Act provides in the relevant parts:

    "474(1)  A privative clause decision:

    (a)is final and conclusive; and

    (b)must not be challenged, appealed against, reviewed, quashed or called in question in any court; and

    (c)is not subject to prohibition, mandamus, injunction, declaration or certiorari in any court on any account.

    (2)In this section:

    privative clause decision means a decision of an administrative character made, proposed to be made, or required to be made, as the case may be, under this Act or under a regulation or other instrument made under this Act (whether in the exercise of a discretion or not), other than a decision referred to in subsection (4) or (5).

    (3)  A reference in…

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Details
Case
[2002] FCA 23
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of WAAJ v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs, the applicant, WAAJ, sought to challenge a decision made by the Tribunal under the Migration Act 1958 (Cth). Despite the application being filed prior to the 2 October 2001 amendment, the court treated it as an application under section 39B of the Judiciary Act 1903, acknowledging the nature of the decision as a privative clause decision. Such decisions, as outlined in section 474 of the Act, are typically final and conclusive, barring any court from reviewing, appealing, or questioning them. However, section 39B of the Judiciary Act allows for limited circumstances where the court may still consider such challenges.

The primary legal issue the court had to decide was whether the exceptional circumstances outlined in section 39B of the Judiciary Act applied to permit the court to review the Tribunal's decision. The applicant, WAAJ, presented his case, claiming persecution based on his Shi'a faith and his relationship with a woman in Iran, which led to his arrest, torture, and interrogation. The court considered the applicant's submissions and the grounds for potential review as per the High Court's decision in R v Hickman; Ex parte Fox and Clinton, but ultimately concluded that the application could not succeed under the narrow interpretation of the court's jurisdiction.

The court's reasoning was grounded in the understanding that the privative clause in the Migration Act effectively bars judicial review of such decisions unless specific exceptional circumstances exist. The court found that, even interpreting the jurisdictional grounds widely, the applicant's case did not meet the threshold for review. Consequently, the application was dismissed, and the court ordered that the applicant pay the respondent's costs of the application.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The application be dismissed.

2. The applicant pay the respondent's costs of the application.

Background

Background to the litigation

The applicant in this case is an individual from Fars Province in Iran who practices the Shi'a faith. He worked as a butcher in his family's shop in Iran and entered into a sexual relationship with a woman who visited his shop. After about six weeks, he proposed to her, only to discover that she was the wife of a member of the Sepah Pasdaran. Both the applicant and the woman were arrested by the Basij. The applicant was subsequently tortured and interrogated about his relationship with the woman. The woman accused the applicant of forcing her into a sexual relationship. This sequence of events led to the applicant filing an application to challenge a decision of the Tribunal, which he seeks to have set aside or quashed.

The matter came before the court as an application by the applicant to challenge a decision made by the Tribunal. The application was filed under the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) before 2 October 2001. Although the application was not in the appropriate form for relief under s 39B of the Judiciary Act 1903, the court treated it as such. The Tribunal's decision, which the applicant sought to challenge, was a privative clause decision under the Migration Act 1958 (Cth). Despite the privative clause provision, the court retains jurisdiction under s 39B of the Judiciary Act to consider challenges to such decisions in certain exceptional cases. The court dismissed the application and ordered the applicant to pay the respondent's costs.

Decision

Reasons for decision

FRENCH J
The application which he filed is of the kind which was used under the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) as it stood before 2 October 2001. I am prepared, however, to treat this as an application for relief under s 39B of the Judiciary Act 1903 even though it is not in the appropriate form for that purpose. The decision of the Tribunal, which the applicant seeks to have set aside or quashed, is one of those decisions called a privative clause decision under the Act. Section 474 of the Act provides in the relevant parts: "474(1) A privative clause decision: (a)is final and conclusive; and (b)must not be challenged, appealed against, reviewed, quashed or called in question in any court; and (c)is not subject to prohibition, mandamus, injunction, declaration or certiorari in any court on any account.(2)In this section: privative clause decision means a decision of an administrative character made, proposed to be made, or required to be made, as the case may be, under this Act or under a regulation or other instrument made under this Act (whether in the exercise of a discretion or not), other than a decision referred to in subsection (4) or (5).(3) A reference in this section to a decision includes a reference to the following: (a)granting, making, suspending, cancelling, revoking or refusing to make an order or determination; (b)granting, giving, suspending, cancelling, revoking or refusing to give a certificate, direction, approval, consent or permission (including a visa); ...(i)a decision on review of a decision, irrespective of whether the decision on review is taken under this Act or a regulation or other instrument under this Act, or under another Act; (j)a failure or refusal to make a decision....(5) The regulations may specify that a decision, or a decision included in a class of decisions, under this Act, or under regulations or another instrument under this Act, is not a privative clause decision." In spite of that provision, the Court does have jurisdiction under s 39B of the Judiciary Act to consider challenges to the decision of the Tribunal in certain exceptional cases. It is not necessary here to set out in detail the basis upon which the Court may exercise that jurisdiction. Indeed, there may be some debate about whether those bases are wider or narrower than the grounds that existed before in certain respects - Walton v Philip Ruddock [2001] FCA 1839. This depends upon the application of the decision of the High Court in R v Hickman; Ex parte Fox and Clinton (1945) 70 CLR 598. However, in my opinion, whether the jurisdiction that remains in the Court is interpreted widely or narrowly, this application cannot succeed. In his submissions to the Tribunal, the applicant said that he is of the Shi'a faith from Fars Province in Iran. He worked in Iran as a butcher in his family's shop. He described in his submission a number of events which resulted in him entering into a sexual relationship with a woman who had visited his shop. His relationship with the woman progressed over a period of about six weeks. He said that he asked her to marry him. It turned out, however, that she was in fact the wife of a member of the Sepah Pasdaran. He and the woman were arrested by the Basij and he was tortured and interrogated about his relationship with her. He claims that he said he was not aware that she was married. According to the applicant's story, the woman told the Basij that he had forced her to have sex with him.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: FRENCH J

The court acknowledged that the application was not in the appropriate form for a s 39B application under the Judiciary Act, but it treated the application as such for the purposes of determining its jurisdiction. The court examined the relevant provisions of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth), specifically s 474, which outlines that a privative clause decision is final and conclusive and cannot be challenged in any court. Despite this, the court recognised that there are exceptional cases where it can exercise its jurisdiction under s 39B of the Judiciary Act to consider such challenges. This was based on the principles established in the High Court decision in R v Hickman; Ex parte Fox and Clinton (1945) 70 CLR 598. The court, however, found that the application could not succeed on the facts presented, as it did not meet the criteria for exceptional circumstances that would allow the court to intervene. The applicant's claims, including his allegations of torture and the circumstances surrounding his relationship, did not provide sufficient grounds for the court to set aside or quash the Tribunal's decision. The court therefore dismissed the application and ordered the applicant to pay the respondent's costs of the application.