Vyas v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs

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FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA

(DIVISION 2)

Vyas v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2024] FedCFamC2G 1374

File number: MLG 3879 of 2019
Judgment of: JUDGE J YOUNG
Date of judgment: 11 December 2024
Catchwords: MIGRATION – extension of time application – applicant filed 1 day out of time – Temporary Business Entry (Class UC) (Temporary Work) (Skilled) (Subclass 457) visa – where Tribunal affirmed a decision of the first respondent to refuse to grant the visa – where applicant was not the subject of an approved nomination in accordance with cl 457.233(4)(a) of the Migration Regulations 1994 – where applicant conceded sole ground of review did not establish jurisdictional error – found grounds of substantive application are not reasonably arguable – application dismissed.
Legislation:

Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 359A, 476(1), 476A(3)(a), 477(1), 477(2)

Migration Regulations 1994 cll 457.233(4)(a), 457.321

Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021 (Cth) sch 2

Cases cited:

BTI15 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2022] FCAFC 49

MZABP v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2015) 242 FCR 585

Re Commonwealth of Australia; Ex Parte Marks [2000] HCA 67; 177 ALR 491

SZTRY v Minister for Immigration & Border Protection [2015] FCAFC 86

Division: Division 2 General Federal Law
Number of paragraphs: 56
Date of hearing: 11 November 2024
Place Melbourne
Solicitor for the Applicants: Self-represented litigants
Solicitor for the First Respondent: Ms Rath of Sparke Helmore
Second Respondent: Submitting appearance save as to costs

ORDERS

MLG 3879 of 2019

FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA (DIVISION 2)

BETWEEN:

ANANDKUMAR MAHENDRAKUMAR VYAS

First Applicant

HIRALBAHEN JASHVANTBHAI BHATT

Second Applicant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION, CITIZENSHIP, MIGRANT SERVICES AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS

First Respondent

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL

Second Respondent

ORDER MADE BY:

JUDGE J YOUNG

DATE OF ORDER:

11 DECEMBER 2024

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The Applicants have leave to amend the Application filed 7 November 2019 to seek a writ of mandamus directed to the Administrative Appeals Tribunal.

2.The Application filed on 7 November 2019 be dismissed.

3.The Applicants pay the First Respondent’s costs in the fixed amount of $5000.

Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry in the Court’s records.

Note: The Court may vary or set aside a judgment or order to remedy minor typographical or grammatical errors (r 17.05(2)(g) Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021 (Cth)), or to record a variation to the order pursuant to r 17.05 Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021 (Cth).

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

JUDGE J YOUNG

  1. Before the Court is an Application filed on 7 November 2019 for an extension of time under s 477(2) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (Act) in which to seek a judicial review of a decision of the second respondent (Tribunal) dated 2 October 2019. By that decision, the Tribunal affirmed a decision of a delegate…

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Details
Case
[2024] FedCFamC2G 1374
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The applicants, citizens of India and husband and wife, sought an extension of time to seek judicial review of a decision by the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (Tribunal) affirming a decision of the Minister's delegate to refuse their application for a Temporary Business Entry (Class UC) (Temporary Work) (Skilled) (Subclass 457) visa. The Tribunal Decision was made on 2 October 2019 and the applicants were required to file an Application for judicial review by 6 November 2019. However, the Application was not filed until 7 November 2019, one day after the expiry of the statutory timeframe. The applicants submitted that it was necessary in the interests of the administration of justice to extend time due to procedural fairness, as they believed the 35 days commenced from 7 October 2019, the date they received the Tribunal Decision, and that if the extension was not granted, it would jeopardise their future.

The Court noted that ignorance of, or misunderstanding as to, the statutory timeframe cannot provide an adequate explanation for the delay. The Court also noted that there is a public interest in ensuring that decisions of the Executive are made lawfully, and that there is a public interest in the finality of administrative decisions. However, the merits of the substantive grounds relied upon by the applicants are relevant to this. The Court accepted that a refusal to grant an extension of time would result in the applicants returning to their country of nationality, which would jeopardise their future. However, the Court found that the proposed ground of review could not succeed as no jurisdictional error had been identified by the applicants. The Court concluded that the Application was bound to fail and declined to extend time.

The Court ordered that the Applicants have leave to amend the Application filed 7 November 2019 to seek a writ of mandamus directed to the Administrative Appeals Tribunal, that the Application filed on 7 November 2019 be dismissed, and that the Applicants pay the First Respondent’s costs in the fixed amount of $5000.

Orders

Orders of the court

MLG 3879 of 2019

FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA (DIVISION 2)

BETWEEN:

ANANDKUMAR MAHENDRAKUMAR VYAS

First Applicant

HIRALBAHEN JASHVANTBHAI BHATT

Second Applicant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION, CITIZENSHIP, MIGRANT SERVICES AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS

First Respondent

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL

Second Respondent

ORDER MADE BY:

JUDGE J YOUNG

DATE OF ORDER:

11 DECEMBER 2024

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1. The Applicants have leave to amend the Application filed 7 November 2019 to seek a writ of mandamus directed to the Administrative Appeals Tribunal.

2. The Application filed on 7 November 2019 be dismissed.

3. The Applicants pay the First Respondent’s costs in the fixed amount of $5000.

Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry in the Court’s records.

Note: The Court may vary or set aside a judgment or order to remedy minor typographical or grammatical errors (r 17.05(2)(g) Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021 (Cth)), or to record a variation to the order pursuant to r 17.05 Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021 (Cth).

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

JUDGE J YOUNG

1.

Before the Court is an Application filed on 7 November 2019 for an extension of time under s 477(2) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (Act) in which to seek a judicial review of a decision of the second respondent (Tribunal) dated 2 October 2019. By that decision, the Tribunal affirmed a decision of a delegate (Delegate) of the first respondent (Minister) to refuse to grant the applicants a Temporary Business Entry (Class UC) (Temporary Work) (Skilled) (Subclass 457) visa (Visa).

CONTEXT

2.

The applicants are citizens of India. The first and second applicants are husband and wife, respectively.

3.

On 1 December 2016 the first applicant (Applicant) applied for the Visa. The second applicant was included in the Visa application as a dependent of the Applicant. In the Visa application, the applicants’ nominated a migration agent as their authorised recipient and provided the email address gration agent as their authorised recipient and provided the email address

4.

On 20 July 2017, the Department of Immigration and Border Protection (Department) emailed the applicants’ migration agent inviting the applicants to comment on adverse information received in relation to the Visa application. The Department advised that the applicants’ Proposed Sponsor did not have an approved nomination and as such, the applicants’ Visa application was unlikely to succeed. The applicants did not provide a response to the Department.

5.

On 29 August 2017, the Delegate refused to grant the applicants’ the Visa.

6.

On 14 September 2017, the applicants applied to the Tribunal for review of the Delegate’s decision.

7.

On 19 August 2019, pursuant to s 359A of the Act, the Tribunal emailed the Applicant inviting the applicants to comment on Department records which indicated the Applicant was not the subject of an approved nomination by a standard business sponsor and that on 14 August 2019, the Tribunal had affirmed a decision of a delegate to refuse the nomination of the Proposed Sponsor (s 359A Letter). The invitation was sent pursuant to s 359A of the Act which relevantly provides (as in force at the time):

(1) Subject to subsections (2) and (3), the Tribunal must:

(a) give to the applicant, in the way that the Tribunal considers appropriate in the circumstances, clear particulars of any information that the Tribunal considers would be the reason, or a part of the reason, for affirming the decision that is under review; and

(b) ensure, as far as is reasonably practicable, that the applicant understands why it is relevant to the review, and the consequences of it being relied on in affirming the decision that is under review; and

(c) invite the applicant to comment on or respond to it.

8.

The s 359A Letter further informed the applicants’ that if the Applicant held an approved nomination which has ceased at the time of the Tribunal decision, or a nomination of an occupation has never been approved, the Applicant will not meet the criterion in cl 457.233(4)(a) of the Migration Regulations 1994 (Regulations), which is a mandatory criterion of the Visa. Clause 457.233(4)(a) of the Regulations at the relevant time provided as follows:

(4) The applicant meets the requirements of this subclause if:

(a) each of the following applies:

(i) a nomination of an occupation in relation to the applicant has been approved under section 140GB of the Act;

(ii) the nomination was made by a person who was a standard business sponsor at the time the nomination was approved;

(iii) the approval of the nomination has not ceased as provided for in regulation 2.75; and

(aa) …the nominated occupation is specified in an instrument in writing for paragraph 2.72(10)(a) or (aa) that is in effect

9.

On 30 August 2019, the Applicant provided a response to the s 359A Letter. In his response, the Applicant submitted that he had ceased employment with the Proposed Sponsor due to the nomination refusal and that he had been working part time as a baker with Coles, but that Coles were unable to provide sponsorship. The Applicant informed the Tribunal he had been living in Australia with his wife and daughter for 11 years. The Applicant requested the Tribunal reconsider his Visa application as he did everything required for the grant of the Visa at the time of the application.

10.

On 2 September 2019, the Tribunal emailed the Applicant inviting the applicants to attend an in-person hearing on 2 October 2019 at 8.30am.

11.

On 2 October 2019, the applicants attended the hearing before the Tribunal and the Applicant gave evidence. The second applicant did not give evidence and the employer, Nehal Shah, was present as a witness.

12.

At the hearing on 2 October 2010, the Tribunal delivered an oral decision affirming the decision of the Delegate to refuse to grant the applicants the Visa.

TRIBUNAL DECISION

13.

The Tribunal issued its statement of decision and reasons on 7 October 2019 (Tribunal Decision).

14.

At paragraph [7] of the Tribunal Decision, the Tribunal identified that the issue was whether the Applicant satisfied the requirements of cl 457.223(4)(a) of the Regulations. The Tribunal stated that this clause required there to be an approved nomination of an occupation relating to the Applicant by a standard business sponsor that had not ceased.

15.

At paragraph [8] of the Tribunal Decision, the Tribunal noted that the applicants were advised on 20 July 2017 that the Proposed Sponsor did not have an approved nomination for the Applicant.

16.

At paragraphs [9] – [11] of the Tribunal Decision, the Tribunal summarised the contents of the s 359A Letter and the Applicant’s response.

17.

At paragraph [13] of the Tribunal Decision, the Tribunal noted that the Applicant agreed that he was not the subject of an approved nomination and that he had ceased working for the Proposed Sponsor in December 2017 before it closed in June or July 2018.

18.

At paragraph [14] of the Tribunal Decision, the Tribunal found that a period of 21 months had passed since the Applicant had ceased working for the Proposed Sponsor and considered this to be a very adequate period in which the Applicant could have sought another sponsor to lodge a valid nomination in respect of him.

19.

At paragraph [16] of the Tribunal Decision, the Tribunal found the Applicant did not satisfy cl 457.223(4)(a) of the Regulations as there was no relevant nomination in relation to the Applicant by a standard business sponsor.

20.

At paragraph [17], the Tribunal found that as the Applicant had not satisfied the primary criteria of cl 457.223(4)(a), the second applicant did not satisfy cl 457.321 of the Regulations.

21.

Accordingly, the Tribunal affirmed the Delegate’s decision not to grant the applicants the Visa.

APPLICATION FOR AN EXTENSION OF TIME

22.

At the hearing of this matter before the Court, the Applicant appeared on his own behalf and on the behalf of the second applicant. The second applicant also addressed the Court.

Was the Application filed late?

23.

Section 477(1) of the Act requires that an application to this Court be made within 35 days of the date of the migration decision.

24.

The Tribunal Decision was made on 2 October 2019. An application for judicial review of that decision in this Court was required to be filed by 6 November 2019. The Application for judicial review was not filed until 7 November 2019.

25.

Accordingly, the Application was made one (1) day after the expiry of the statutory timeframe.

Should the Court be satisfied to make an order extending time?

26.

Section 477(2) of the Act allows the Court to grant an extension of the 35-day period within which an Application must be made if the Court is satisfied that it is necessary in the interests of the administration of justice to make such an Order.

27.

The Act does not specify any criteria which must be satisfied to establish that it is in “the interests of the administration of justice” to grant an extension.

28.

The principles regarding an application under s 477(2) were considered in BTI15 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2022] FCAFC 49. In that decision, Jagot and Halley JJ found that the Court has an obligation “to evaluate all of the relevant circumstances and to decide if the Court is satisfied that the extension of time is necessary in the interests of the administration of justice”. Further, they identified that whilst the matters to which regard may be had are not expressly confined by the Act, the following are usually relevant when considering an extension of time – although it is noted that this list is not exhaustive:

(1) the extent of the delay and the explanation for it;

(2) any prejudice to the respondent if an extension were granted;

(3) the impact on the applicant if the time was not extended;

(4) the interests of the public at large; and

(5) the merits of the substantive Application.

29.

In the Application filed 7 November 2019, the applicants stated the following with respect to why they say it is necessary in the interests of the administration of justice to extend time (without alteration):

I have been notified by the Tribunal on 7th October 2019. As per the guideline I am eligible to apply within 35 days from the date of notification. I would like the extension on the grounds of procedural fairness. It was beyond my control that Tribunal took the decision on 2nd October but notified only on 7th of October. If my application is not accepted, it will jeopardize my and my family’s future.

Delay and explanation

30.

The Applicant submitted that the reason for the late filing of the Application was that the Tribunal made its decision of 2 October 2019 but notified him “only on 7 October 2019”. At the hearing, the Applicant submitted that he misunderstood the timeframe and believed the 35 days commenced from 7 October 2019 being the date he received the Tribunal Decision.

31.

Firstly, I am unable to see how notification by the Tribunal of the decision five days after it was made in any way precluded the Application from being made within the statutory time frame. Secondly, ignorance of, or misunderstanding as to, the statutory timeframe cannot provide an adequate explanation for the delay. Whilst the delay is of a very short duration, I do not consider the Applicant has provided an adequate explanation for the delay.

32.

This weighs against the grant of an extension of time.

Prejudice

33.

Given the very short delay in filing I do not consider that the Minister will suffer any particular prejudice, other than as to costs, if an extension of time were granted.

34.

However, the mere absence of prejudice is not sufficient to justify a finding in favour of an extension of the time for filing: SZTRY v Minister for Immigration & Border Protection [2015] FCAFC 86 at [6].

35.

I consider this to be a neutral consideration.

Public interest and impact on the applicants

36.

The Applicant contends that if the application for an extension of time is not accepted by the Court, “it will jeopardize my and my family’s future”.

37.

There is a public interest in ensuring that decisions of the Executive are made lawfully. The merits of the substantive grounds relied upon by the applicants, which are considered below, will of course be relevant to this.

38.

It has also been recognised that there is a public interest in the finality of administrative decisions: Re Commonwealth of Australia; Ex Parte Marks [2000] HCA 67; 177 ALR 491 at [15]-[17].

39.

As to the impact upon the applicants, if the extension of time is refused then the Tribunal’s decision will stand. Although an alternative route of review might be available, under s 476A(3)(a) of the Act the refusal of an explanation for an extension of time forecloses any right of appeal: MZABP v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2015) 242 FCR 585, at [65].

40.

I accept that a refusal to grant an extension of time would result in the applicants returning to their country of nationality. The Applicant has lived in Australia for 11 years and his daughter was born here. In those circumstances, I accept the Applicant’s submission that returning to India would jeopardise his and his family’s future.

41.

This weighs in favour of the grant of an extension of time.

Merits of the substantive application

42.

While the discretion of the Court is broad, the Court should not permit an application to proceed if it is bound to fail, and should accordingly decline to extend time.

43.

The substantive Application provides one ground of review as follows (without amendment):

My application was refused on the ground of that my nomination for 457 visa was not approved. I had applied for 457 visa based on the nomination which was lodged by the nominator. He subsequently withdrew his nominate which is beyond my control. Now I have another employer who is wiling to nominate me for 452 visa. I am (undecipherable) for me procedural fairness and give me an opportunity to get nomination known (undecipherable) employer. Thank you.

44.

The Minister contends that the proposed ground of review cannot succeed as no jurisdictional error has been identified by the applicants.

45.

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

JUDGE J
At the hearing on 2 October 2010, the Tribunal delivered an oral decision affirming the decision of the Delegate to refuse to grant the applicants the Visa. TRIBUNAL DECISION The Tribunal issued its statement of decision and reasons on 7 October 2019 (Tribunal Decision). At paragraph [7] of the Tribunal Decision, the Tribunal identified that the issue was whether the Applicant satisfied the requirements of cl 457.223(4)(a) of the Regulations. The Tribunal stated that this clause required there to be an approved nomination of an occupation relating to the Applicant by a standard business sponsor that had not ceased. At paragraph [8] of the Tribunal Decision, the Tribunal noted that the applicants were advised on 20 July 2017 that the Proposed Sponsor did not have an approved nomination for the Applicant. At paragraphs [9] – [11] of the Tribunal Decision, the Tribunal summarised the contents of the s 359A Letter and the Applicant’s response. At paragraph [13] of the Tribunal Decision, the Tribunal noted that the Applicant agreed that he was not the subject of an approved nomination and that he had ceased working for the Proposed Sponsor in December 2017 before it closed in June or July 2018. At paragraph [14] of the Tribunal Decision, the Tribunal found that a period of 21 months had passed since the Applicant had ceased working for the Proposed Sponsor and considered this to be a very adequate period in which the Applicant could have sought another sponsor to lodge a valid nomination in respect of him. At paragraph [16] of the Tribunal Decision, the Tribunal found the Applicant did not satisfy cl 457.223(4)(a) of the Regulations as there was no relevant nomination in relation to the Applicant by a standard business sponsor. At paragraph [17], the Tribunal found that as the Applicant had not satisfied the primary criteria of cl 457.223(4)(a), the second applicant did not satisfy cl 457.321 of the Regulations. Accordingly, the Tribunal affirmed the Delegate’s decision not to grant the applicants the Visa.APPLICATION FOR AN EXTENSION OF TIME At the hearing of this matter before the Court, the Applicant appeared on his own behalf and on the behalf of the second applicant. The second applicant also addressed the Court.Was the Application filed late? Section 477(1) of the Act requires that an application to this Court be made within 35 days of the date of the migration decision. The Tribunal Decision was made on 2 October 2019. An application for judicial review of that decision in this Court was required to be filed by 6 November 2019. The Application for judicial review was not filed until 7 November 2019. Accordingly, the Application was made one (1) day after the expiry of the statutory timeframe.Should the Court be satisfied to make an order extending time? Section 477(2) of the Act allows the Court to grant an extension of the 35-day period within which an Application must be made if the Court is satisfied that it is necessary in the interests of the administration of justice to make such an Order.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: JUDGE J

Full text does not contain this section.