VT
[2015] WASAT 147
•22 DECEMBER 2015
JURISDICTION : STATE ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL
ACT: GUARDIANSHIP AND ADMINISTRATION ACT 1990 (WA)
CITATION: VT [2015] WASAT 147
MEMBER: MR J MANSVELD (SENIOR MEMBER)
HEARD: 26 OCTOBER 2015
DELIVERED : 22 DECEMBER 2015
FILE NO/S: GAA 3257 of 2015
GAA 3359 of 2015
GAA 3851 of 2015
MATTER :VT
Ex Parte
Catchwords:
Guardianship and administration Administration Enduring power of attorney Conflict of interest Capacity Proper interest Something which requires an inquiry
Legislation:
Guardianship and Administration Act 1990 (WA), s 4, s 4(3), s 64, s 64(1)(a), s 97(1), s 108(1), s 108(1a), s 109, s 109(1)(a), s 109(1)(c)
Result:
The applications are dismissed
Summary of Tribunal's decision:
Sons of an elderly woman made applications for the appointment of an administrator of her estate, the revocation of an enduring power of attorney and an application to have the attorneys appointed under an enduring power of attorney file copies of all records and accounts of transactions made by them as attorneys.
The woman had been diagnosed with dementia and was residing in a nursing home.
The woman's estate was valued at approximately $5.5 million and included cash funds, shares, a loan account with a family trust, a refundable accommodation deposit with the nursing home and her share of a property owning partnership.
The sons had been concerned about the lack of information from the attorneys regarding the woman's estate, one of the sons claiming a right to information because he was the substitute attorney under the enduring power of attorney.
The sons were concerned by a purported conflict of interest between one of the attorneys and the woman's estate.
The sons were also concerned by the ability of the attorneys to manage the woman's estate, citing an investment decision made in 2008 which led to the woman incurring a loss.
One of the sons said that he had recently received information from the attorneys regarding the family trust such that if he received similar information in the future, he would not need further records and accounts to be filed.
The Tribunal found that the investment decision had been made by the woman when she was capable. She had acted contrary to the advice of her accountant.
The Tribunal found that the conflict of interest alleged to exist between one of the attorneys and the woman's estate was not in fact an issue, given that there had been a partnership between the attorney's husband and the woman's late spouse which ceased after the death of her spouse.
The Tribunal accepted the evidence of the attorneys that although the woman's estate was large, it was not a difficult estate to manage because agents were used for property management, and the expenditure concerning the woman's care was largely made by way of direct debit.
The Tribunal accepted the evidence of the woman's accountant that the attorneys were well equipped to continue to manage the woman's affairs with whom they spent considerable time, and were devoted to her care and wellbeing.
The applications were dismissed.
Category: B
Representation:
Counsel:
Ex Parte: N/A
Solicitors:
Ex Parte: N/A
Case(s) referred to in decision(s):
EW [2010] WASAT 91
REASONS FOR DECISION OF THE TRIBUNAL:
Introduction
This proceeding takes place in the Tribunal's jurisdiction under the Guardianship and Administration Act 1990 (WA) (GA Act) and concerns VT, an 89yearold woman who has been diagnosed with dementia and resides in an aged care facility.
The sons of VT, GT and JT, have made three applications under the GA Act. The applications are for the appointment of an administrator of the estate of VT, an application for revocation of an enduring power of attorney (EPA), and an application under s 109(1)(a) of the GA Act for an order requiring the attorneys under an EPA to file with the Tribunal and serve on the applicant a copy of all records and accounts kept by the attorneys of dealings and transactions made by them in connection with the EPA.
VT first executed an EPA on 24 February 2004 appointing her daughters, JG and PH as joint and several attorneys, and her son, GT as substitute attorney (2004 EPA). On 1 May 2013 she executed another EPA again appointing JG and PH as joint and several attorneys and GT as substitute attorney (2013 EPA).
The hearing was attended by GT, JT, JG, PH, other family members and a representative of the Public Advocate (Public Advocate).
The decision was reserved.
Decision of the Tribunal
I have decided to dismiss the applications. The following are the reasons for my decision.
The relevant legislation
The relevant provisions of the GA Act are as follows.
4. Principles stated
(1)In dealing with proceedings commenced under this Act the State Administrative Tribunal shall observe the principles set out in this section.
(2)The primary concern of the State Administrative Tribunal shall be the best interests of any represented person, or of a person in respect of whom an application is made.
(3)Every person shall be presumed to be capable of
(a)looking after his own health and safety;
(b)making reasonable judgments in respect of matters relating to his person;
(c)managing his own affairs; and
(d)making reasonable judgments in respect of matters relating to his estate,
until the contrary is proved to the satisfaction of the State Administrative Tribunal.
(4)A guardianship or administration order shall not be made if the needs of the person in respect of whom an application for such an order is made could, in the opinion of the State Administrative Tribunal, be met by other means less restrictive of the person's freedom of decision and action.
(5)A plenary guardian shall not be appointed under section 43(1) or (2a) if the appointment of a limited guardian under that section would be sufficient, in the opinion of the State Administrative Tribunal, to meet the needs of the person in respect of whom the application is made.
(6)An order appointing a limited guardian or an administrator for a person shall be in terms that, in the opinion of the State Administrative Tribunal, impose the least restrictions possible in the circumstances on the person's freedom of decision and action.
(7)In considering any matter relating to a represented person or a person in respect of whom an application is made the State Administrative Tribunal shall, as far as possible, seek to ascertain the views and wishes of the person concerned as expressed, in whatever manner, at the time, or as gathered from the person's previous actions.
64. Making of administration order
(1)Subject to section 4, where the State Administrative Tribunal is satisfied that a person in respect of whom an application for an administration order is made under section 40
(a)is unable, by reason of a mental disability, to make reasonable judgments in respect of matters relating to all or any part of his estate; and
(b)is in need of an administrator of his estate,
the Tribunal may by order declare the person to be in need of an administrator of his estate, and if it does so shall appoint
(c) a person to be the administrator; or
(d) persons to be joint administrators,
as the case may require, of the estate of the person in respect of whom the application is made.
(2)Where under subsection (1) the State Administrative Tribunal declares that a person is in need of an administrator of his estate, it shall declare the matter or matters set out in paragraph (a) of that subsection of which it is satisfied.
(3)An appointment under subsection (1)
(a)may be made subject to such conditions and restrictions as the State Administrative Tribunal thinks fit;
(b)may, subject to section 51 of the Public Trustee Act 1941, include requirements as to the giving of security to the executive officer and the manner in which it is to be given.
109. On application State Administrative Tribunal may intervene
(1)A person who has, in the opinion of the State Administrative Tribunal, a proper interest in the matter may apply to the Tribunal for an order
(a)requiring the donee of an enduring power of attorney to file with the Tribunal and serve on the applicant a copy of all records and accounts kept by the donee of dealings and transactions made by him in connection with the power;
(b)requiring such records and accounts to be audited by an auditor appointed by the Tribunal and requiring a copy of the report of the auditor to be furnished to the Tribunal and the applicant for the order; or
(c)revoking or varying the terms of an enduring power of attorney, appointing a substitute donee of the power or confirming that a person appointed to be the substitute donee of the power has become the donee.
(2)The donee of an enduring power of attorney may apply to the State Administrative Tribunal
(a)for an order referred to in subsection (1)(c); or
(b)for directions as to matters connected with the exercise of the power or the construction of its terms.
(3)The State Administrative Tribunal may, upon an application under this section or upon receiving a report of a donee's bankruptcy under section 107(1)(d)
(a)make an order referred to in subsection (1) or (2); or
(b)make such other order as to the exercise of the power or the construction of its terms as the Tribunal thinks fit.
(4)An order under this section may be made subject to such terms and conditions as the State Administrative Tribunal thinks fit.
(5)In relation to an enduring power of attorney recognised by the State Administrative Tribunal under section 104A, an order under this section is limited to the donor's estate within Western Australia.
The question of VT's capacity
The Tribunal has reports from two general practitioners (GPs) and from the care manager of the nursing home in which VT resides.
One GP had attended to VT for 10 years but has not done so since March 2014. In his report the GP states that from about 2011 VT suffered from paranoid delusions relating to her sense of smell, had a stroke in 2013, and in a Mini Mental State Examination conducted in 2014, scored 19/30 which the GP states indicated significant mental impairment.
The current GP who has attended to VT for one and a half years states that she has been diagnosed with Alzheimer's dementia and is wholly incapable of making her own personal and financial decisions.
The care manager states that VT appears confused most of the time and is only able to follow simple instructions. VT is reported as being disoriented to time and place and requires constant supervision, redirection and guidance.
The parties in the proceeding do not dispute the evidence of the GPs or the care manager.
I am satisfied on the evidence that VT is a person for whom an administration order could be made in that she is unable, by reason of a mental disability (dementia), to make reasonable judgments in respect of matters relating to all of her estate: s 64(1)(a) of the GA Act.
Evidence and submissions
GT, son of VT and applicant
GT states that about 18 months ago he was contacted by his brother, JT, who made certain allegations about his sisters, JG and PH. He had not spoken with JT for many years.
GT states that JT was due to have an operation and was going to need emotional and financial support. GT says he contacted JG and asked that JT be given financial assistance. He concluded from the conversation that JG did not express much care or concern for JT.
GT states that very little happened until he made the applications to the Tribunal after which he and JT received a distribution from the family trust (family trust) which was greater than that received in previous years.
GT submits that JG, as attorney for VT, is in a position of a conflict of interest. He states that JG and her family are in the trotting industry and that his late father participated with them for 25 years prior to his death. GT states that when his father died, VT declined to continue the arrangement with JG, and not long after, VT complained that a family member was threatening her. GT states that he subsequently determined that it was JG's husband.
GT states that JG and her family tried to keep VT involved in the financial arrangements concerning their trotting interests but did not ultimately succeed because of his brother's intervention. When asked what the current conflict of interest might be, GT states that because the arrangement was stopped there likely is no current benefit to JG which would lead to a conflict of interest in the management of the financial affairs of VT.
GT submits that it is in the best interests of JG and PH as attorneys to preclude him and JT from any of the decisionmaking regarding VT's financial affairs. He says that he received legal advice that he is entitled to information about VT's estate because of his status as substitute attorney under both the 2004 EPA and the 2013 EPA executed by VT.
GT states that since the applications were made to the Tribunal he has received information and financial accounts from JG concerning VT's estate. He says he cannot understand why that information has not been provided to him in previous years.
When asked whether if the information he received this year continued in future years that would satisfy what he was trying to achieve by way of the application under s 109(1)(a) of the GA Act, GT responded in the affirmative.
GT submits that the Public Trustee should be appointed administrator of the estate of VT. He gives three principal reasons why he considers the appointment would be in VT's best interests. Firstly, he states that there is hardly any communication with the attorneys and until this year very little information has been provided about VT's estate. Secondly, if the Public Trustee were appointed, the management of VT's estate would be more transparent than the current arrangement. Thirdly, GT submits that the attorneys and VT lost a significant amount of money from VT's estate because of a poor investment decision around 2008 (investment decision).
GT says he is also concerned that JT has not received specific funds to assist him with his medical expenses.
GT acknowledges that he signed the statements of acceptance of both the 2004 EPA and the 2013 EPA even though with regard to the 2013 EPA, VT 'had mental issues at that period' (T:8; 26.10.15).
JT, son of VT and applicant
JT states that there is 'so much hatred in this family now that it's irreparable' (T:26; 26.10.15).
JT states that there is no communication at all with anyone in the family and that there have also been threats of violence made to GT.
JT submits that much damage in the family relationships occurred as a consequence of the investment decision about which he says he was always opposed.
JT submits that there is no one within the family with sufficient financial acumen to manage VT's estate.
JT supports the appointment of the Public Trustee as administrator of the estate of VT. He states that he wants JG removed from a position of authority 'because of the lies and deception she has done to me and it's not acceptable' (T:27; 26.10.15).
JG, daughter of VT and her attorney
JG filed with the Tribunal a statement of VT's assets and liabilities and of her regular income and expenses.
JG states there are two properties in which VT has an interest. One of the properties, a commercial centre, is owned by the family trust and the other a commercial property is one in which VT has a 27% share of a partnership with partners outside of the family (partnership).
JG states that VT's estate is valued at approximately $5.5 million and includes cash funds, shares, a loan account with the family trust, a refundable accommodation deposit with the nursing home, and her share of the partnership. At the time of filing the statement of assets and liabilities VT had a current income tax liability of approximately $25,000. VT's regular income is well in excess of her usual expenditure.
JG states that the information provided to GT this year concerned the family trust and not the partnership because she says the latter is VT's personal business. She says that she would be prepared to provide yearly information concerning the family trust to GT.
JG states that the management of VT's estate is very straightforward. The property owned by the family trust is managed by an agent who organises the leases and rentals. A cheque for rental income is received monthly. JG states that she makes decisions about repairs and maintenance to the property or signing new leases. Income from the partnership is credited directly into VT's bank account.
JG states that VT's accountant (accountant), completes yearly income tax returns and other financial reporting requirements. She states that most of VT's personal expenditure is paid by way of a direct debit arrangement including her nursing home fees and pharmacy fees.
As regards the allegation of the conflict of interest, JG states that her husband trains horses. She says that when her father was alive he would purchase horses and her husband would train them in partnership with her father. JG states that when her father died the partnership ended because VT had no interest in continuing with the arrangement. JG says that her family continues to be involved in owning horses but that there is no connection with VT.
JG states that the context of the investment decision around 2008 was a concern of VT that she was paying too much income tax. She states that VT entered into the investment decision against the advice of her accountant and losses were sustained. JG states that the accountant was able to negotiate with the company the subject of the investment decision such that the overall losses were reduced.
JG states that VT was capable at the time of making the investment decision.
JG states that the 2004 EPA was made after the death of her father. The document was rejected by the Registrar of Titles at the time VT was admitted to the nursing home and her family home was in the process of being sold. She says that the decision of the Registrar of Titles came at an awkward time, given the family home had been sold, and a new EPA was needed quickly. She received assistance from the office of the Registrar of Titles to have VT execute a new enduring power of attorney. JG states that the 2013 EPA was executed on 1 May 2013, the document being witnessed by a registered nurse and the care coordinator of the nursing home. This instrument was accepted by the Registrar of Titles.
JG states that she first started to use the 2004 EPA from about September 2012. She states that VT had suffered a fall and had to be admitted to hospital. JG states that she consulted with VT about decisions that needed to be made, but for a time, VT could not write; however, this improved over time.
JG states that VT later suffered a stroke where she lost some of her language skills and had a compromised left side of her body which made walking difficult. However, over a period of about three months, she improved so that these impairments 'seemed to disappear' (T:31; 26.10.15).
JG states that VT's main issue at that time was mainly physical in nature, and also the psychosis associated with her sense of smell. She submits that VT was capable of executing the 2013 EPA. She states:
[VT] was nowhere near the dementia she has at this stage. She was okay.
(T:30; 26.10.15)
PH, daughter of VT and her attorney
PH states that she fully supports JG in her management of VT's estate.
PH states that GT has made numerous visits to JG's home to view documents and has also been to the accountant's office for the same reason.
PH states that advice is sought from the accountant when necessary and, in respect to the request for funds for JT, advice was obtained from a lawyer.
PH states that she and JG were present at the time VT made the investment decision and she remembers the accountant advising against it. PH states that VT's income tax was very high at the time.
PH states that she and JG may have been witnesses to the documentation of the investment decision.
The accountant
The accountant filed a statutory declaration with the Tribunal and also gave oral evidence.
Relevantly, in his statutory declaration, the accountant states that he is a qualified chartered accountant and has been in practice as a principal since 1963. He states that over the past 12 years, VT has gradually passed management of her financial affairs into the hands of her two daughters and executed the 2004 EPA which was activated on 20 September 2012.
The accountant submits that in his opinion, JG and PH are well equipped to continue to manage the affairs of VT with whom they spend considerable time, and are devoted to her care and wellbeing.
In his oral evidence, the accountant states:
Well, the thrust of it is that I have been associated with the [family], firstly through the late [spouse of VT], probably since 1975. I was a good friend of [the spouse of VT] saw him quite regularly. He would bring in his figures and I would do his tax returns. After he passed away, his wife, [VT] did the books. She kept, I have to say, much better books than [the spouse of VT]. And they came in and I really did a simple tax return for her, which was really just a list of her income.
For the [family trust] being a trust, it required financial statements both of the trust and the trustee company, … which I did also. And for many years after [the spouse of VT's] passing, the income was discretionary. I would talk to the allocation of the income was discretionary. I would talk to [VT], and she took it. And it was substantial and added to her other income. She did, as has been indicated, pay a lot of tax.
Probably I forget how many years ago, but from time to time [VT] used to say, 'I don't really need all this money, … I'm not sure whether to give it to the family or not.' She started I can't remember the exact date, but maybe it's four or five years ago that she made a gift to each of the family members. Maybe it was 20 or 30 thousand dollars. That was out of her accumulated sorry, out of the accumulated profits of the trust.
…
In later times, I knew she wasn't that well, but, to me, I had a good what I thought coherent conversations with her and I got the impression that was probably three years ago that she wanted to start distributing income from the family trust to the family, which we did, and a quarter of the net income of the trust is now distributed a quarter to each of the children. I think we've been doing that either two or three years.
As to the books now, [VT] doesn't do them now. [JG] does them. She brings them in and they, I have to say probably even better condition than both her father and mother. So the books are well kept. I get all the information I need and that is, I guess, the body of what I say in the statutory declaration other than I think they are both quite outstanding and decent people with my impression is they care very much for their mother.
(T:3637; 26.10.15)
The accountant agrees with JG that the management of the estate is now relatively straightforward.
Regarding the investment decision, the accountant states that VT consulted with him and that he advised against it. He states that he considered her capable of making the investment decision but perhaps, in respect of that transaction, she was financially naive given her wish to reduce her income tax.
The accountant states that he negotiated with the company the subject of the investment decision and was able to have the company mitigate the loss suffered by VT which, nonetheless, was still substantial but this was in the context of her being 'quite a wealthy lady' (T:39; 26.10.15).
The Public Advocate
The applications were referred to the Public Advocate pursuant to s 97(1) of the GA Act. The Public Advocate provided a report to the Tribunal and attended the hearing.
Whilst expressing some surprise at the decision of the attorneys (JG and PH) to not make specific funds available for JT's medical needs, the Public Advocate submits as follows:
… I don't believe the submission in summation really has been demonstrated today to consider that the enduring power of attorney is not working in [VT's] best interest. I find it difficult to find a significant reason for an administrator to be appointed. As long as the information can continue to be supplied to family members, it is up to family members, then to seek their own independent advice on that information that they have.
And if they have any concerns regarding those annual accounts that had been provided, they then are at liberty to bring this back to the [T]ribunal to make further applications. So therefore I'm really unable to see that there is the need to change the present financial management, or to support an administration order being made.
(T:44; 26.10.15)
The decision of the Tribunal
I will deal firstly with the application made under s 109(1)(a) of the GA Act concerning the 2004 EPA and the 2013 EPA.
I am satisfied that the applicants (GT and JT) have a proper interest in the matter. GT was nominated by VT to be the substitute attorney and accepted that role. I am satisfied that the applicants do not have a 'frivolous or vexatious or merely prurient' interest in making the application: EW [2010] WASAT 91 (EW) at [28]. Questions have been raised concerning a perceived conflict of interest of the attorneys and whether the attorneys have the financial ability to manage VT's estate, with reference having been made to the outcome of the investment decision.
I am not convinced that simply by virtue of his position as substitute attorney this necessarily gives GT a right to the information that the attorneys have at their disposal on an ongoing basis, given that a substitute's role only comes into force on the happening of the events or circumstances stipulated in the EPA, and only at that time could the substitute attorney expect to be given the complete set of records.
The question before the Tribunal is whether the applicants can convince me that, in the conduct of the attorneys under the 2004 EPA and 2013 EPA, there is 'something which requires an inquiry': EW at [101].
GT has conceded that the alleged conflict of interest he raised regarding the trotting interests of JG and her family and the estate of VT does not exist because the arrangement which was in the form of a partnership between JG's spouse and VT's spouse was stopped by VT upon the death of her spouse.
As regards to the investment decision, I accept the evidence of the accountant, who brings an independent mind to bear on this matter, that it was VT who made the final decision to act contrary to his advice and embark on the investment decision which led to a loss to her estate. The evidence of JG and PH, which I also accept, was that they had knowledge of the investment decision through their close involvement with VT but that the decision was ultimately hers. The applicants did not produce any medical evidence to suggest that VT was not capable at the time of her making the investment decision.
As to the information made available to the applicants by the attorneys, the evidence of GT is that if he continues to receive the same information in future years that he received in 2015 (concerning the family trust), then he would not require additional records.
The submission of JT that the attorneys do not have the financial skills to manage the estate of VT I will deal with in my determination of the application for an administration order (see below).
I am not satisfied on the evidence that I should exercise my discretion to make an order requiring the attorneys to file all the records and accounts made in respect of dealings made by them under the 2004 EPA and 2013 EPA. It seems to me that the main grievance of GT is that he has not been given sufficient information about VT's estate and this has led him to conjecture on what the attorneys have done and are doing in the management of the estate, including the investment decision that was made in 2008.
It is unfortunate when families fracture and as a consequence do not communicate about matters of importance. This is particularly so in situations such as in the matter before me where the person (VT) has lost capacity and can no longer mediate the disagreements and mistrust between her children. However, a lack of communication cannot of itself be sufficient reason for the Tribunal to make an order under s 109(1)(a) of the GA Act in a situation where VT has given clear authority to JG and PH to manage her estate and has placed no restriction on that management. There is no inherent obligation for an attorney to disclose information in the way the applicants are seeking and, in any case, VT gave no direction in the either of the 2004 EPA or the 2013 EPA for information to be shared.
The particular concerns of the applicants regarding the 2004 EPA and the 2013 EPA, have in my view received an adequate response and do not, individually or when taken together, convince me that an order should be made.
I therefore dismiss the application made under s 109(1)(a) of the GA Act.
The applicants submit that the management of the estate of VT should take place under the authority of an administration order rather than the 2013 EPA, and that the Public Trustee should be appointed administrator of VT's estate.
I accept the evidence of the accountant as to the character and abilities of the attorneys. He is a highly experienced professional and has been involved in the financial affairs of VT (and her late spouse) for many years. He is a credible witness and the applicants did not provide evidence which put in any doubt his independence in assessing the skills and honesty of the attorneys, at least as to the production of the material he requires for income taxation work and other reporting requirements.
I also accept the evidence of JG that despite the substantial size of VT's estate, its management is relatively straightforward as, to a large extent, the attorneys rely on professionals which in my view is the appropriately cautious way to deal with matters outside of their direct area of expertise.
In his evidence, JG raises a concern about the mental state of VT when she executed the 2013 EPA. The Tribunal does not have the jurisdiction to make a declaration as to the validity of an EPA, but if there is sufficient probative evidence to put in doubt the safety of continuing with the 2013 EPA, it can be revoked in favour of an administration order.
In the case of VT, this can be done pursuant to the application made under s 109(1)(c) of the GA Act or pursuant to s 108(1) and s 108(1a) of the GA Act.
There is no direct medical evidence on point, other than the GP stating in his report that in 2011, VT was diagnosed with a delusional disorder centred on her sense of smell and in 2013 she suffered a stroke. The GP report does not contain an assessment as to the immediate and ongoing impact of the stroke on VT's capacity or to what extent, if any, the delusional disorder affected her decisionmaking. JG's evidence (and the evidence of the accountant) is that the 2004 EPA began to be used by the attorneys in September 2012, in particular by JG because VT was physically restricted at that time. JG's evidence is that she believed VT was capable of executing the 2013 EPA.
The evidence of the accountant is that at least as recently as three years ago he was in discussion with VT about the distribution of the net income of the family trust.
I note that the 2013 EPA was witnessed by a registered nurse and the care manager of the nursing home in which VT resides. I infer from that fact that the witnesses would have taken an interest to ensure that VT understood the documents she signed.
Despite the concern raised by GT about the capacity of VT to execute the 2013 EPA, he acknowledges that he signed the statement of acceptance, from which I infer that at the time of signing, he was not so concerned about VT's mental state such that he had a belief she could not understand the document.
When I take all of this into account, together with the statutory presumption of capacity (s 4(3) of the GA Act), I am not satisfied that I should interfere with the 2013 EPA by the making of an administration order.
I am satisfied that the attorneys have conducted themselves appropriately in the management of VT's estate and, in keeping with the express wishes of VT contained in both the 2004 EPA and 2013 EPA, should be permitted to continue to do so.
I therefore dismiss the application under s 109(1)(c) of the GA Act for revocation of the 2013 EPA, but to ensure certainty in the decisionmaking, I consider it in VT's best interests that I revoke the 2004 EPA.
I dismiss the application for an administration order.
Orders
The Tribunal makes the following orders:
GAA 3257 of 2015
On an application by [GT] and [JT] (the applicants) under s 109(1)(c) of the Guardianship and Administration Act 1990 (WA) for orders concerning an enduring power of attorney made by [VT] (the donor) on 24 February 2004 and an enduring power of attorney made on 1 May 2013 appointing [JG] and [PH] her attorneys, heard by Senior Member J Mansveld it is on 22 December 2015 ordered that:
1.The enduring power of attorney made on 24 February 2004 is revoked.
GAA 3359 of 2015
On an application for the appointment of an administrator for [VT], heard before Senior Member J Mansveld on 26 October 2015, the Tribunal orders that:
1.The administration application is dismissed.
GAA 3851 of 2015
On an application by [GT] and [JT] (the applicants) under s 109(1)(a) of the Guardianship and Administration Act 1990 (WA) concerning an enduring power of attorney made by [VT] on 24 February 2004 and an enduring power of attorney made on 1 May 2013 appointing [JG] and [PH] her attorneys, heard by Senior Member J Mansveld on 26 October 2015, the Tribunal orders that:
1.The application is dismissed.
I certify that this and the preceding [81] paragraphs comprise the reasons for decision of the State Administrative Tribunal.
___________________________________
MR J MANSVELD, SENIOR MEMBER