VSAF v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

VSAF v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs
[2004] FCA 1270

MIGRATION – visa – protection visa – applicant sought to postpone tribunal hearing and did not attend – tribunal did not advise whether hearing rescheduled – subsequently affirmed decision to refuse visa – did not make findings of fact on applicant’s claims – referred in reasons to matters about which it would have liked further information – whether tribunal performed duty to review decision of delegate

MIGRATION – tribunal – jurisdictional error – form of relief when tribunal not a party

Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) s 21
Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) s 39B
Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 5(1), 36, 65, 414(1), 415(1), 415(2), 415(3), 425, 426A, 424(2), 424(3), 441A
Federal Court Rules O 80

Convention relating to the Status of Refugees done at Geneva on 28 July 1951, as amended by the Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees done at New York on 31 January 1967

VSAF OF 2003, VSAG OF 2003 AND VSAH OF 2003 v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AND INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS
V 651 of 2003

GRAY J
6 OCTOBER 2004
MELBOURNE

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

VICTORIA DISTRICT REGISTRY

V 651 of 2003

BETWEEN:

VSAF OF 2003
FIRST APPLICANT

VSAG OF 2003
SECOND APPLICANT

VSAH OF 2003
THIRD APPLICANT

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AND INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS
RESPONDENT

JUDGE:

GRAY J

DATE OF ORDER:

6 OCTOBER 2004

WHERE MADE:

MELBOURNE

THE COURT DECLARES THAT the decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal, made on 19 June 2003, affirming a decision not to grant protection visas to the applicants, is void and of no effect.

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.        Liberty to apply be reserved.

2.        The respondent pay the applicants’ costs of the proceeding.

Note:    Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

VICTORIA DISTRICT REGISTRY

V 651 of 2003

BETWEEN:

VSAF OF 2003
FIRST APPLICANT

VSAG OF 2003
SECOND APPLICANT

VSAH OF 2003
THIRD APPLICANT

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AND INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS
RESPONDENT

JUDGE:

GRAY J

DATE:

6 OCTOBER 2004

PLACE:

MELBOURNE

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

The nature and history of the proceeding

  1. The central issue in this proceeding is the nature of the duty of the Refugee Review Tribunal (‘the Tribunal’) when the applicant in a review before it fails to attend the Tribunal’s hearing. 

  2. The applicants are husband and wife and their daughter.  They are citizens of Fiji, of Indian ethnic origin.  On 25 November 2002, they arrived in Australia.  On 24 December 2002, they lodged a joint application for protection visas.  On 30 January 2003, a delegate of the respondent, the Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (‘the Minister’), made a decision refusing to grant a protection visa to any of the applicants.  On 24 February 2003, the applicants applied to the Tribunal for review of that decision.

  3. By s 36 of…

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Details
Case
[2004] FCA 1270
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of VSAF v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs involved applicants seeking a protection visa in Australia. The applicants, consisting of a first applicant and his daughter and partner, argued that the Tribunal's decision to proceed with their visa application in their absence was unlawful. The applicants contended that they had valid reasons for not attending the hearing, including the first applicant's intention to travel to Sydney for a family funeral. The Minister, however, argued that the Tribunal was entitled to make a decision without the applicants' presence, as they were duly notified of the hearing and failed to provide any evidence for their absence.

The central legal issue in the case was whether the Tribunal had the authority to proceed with the applicants' visa application in their absence under Section 426A of the Migration Act. This section permits the Tribunal to make a decision without further action if the applicant does not appear at the scheduled hearing. The applicants argued that the Tribunal's decision was flawed as they had informed the Tribunal of their inability to attend the hearing, and the Tribunal's request for further evidence was unreasonable. The Minister maintained that the Tribunal's decision was valid, given the applicants' failure to provide any supporting evidence for their absence.

The court found that the Tribunal was indeed entitled to make a decision without the applicants' presence. The applicants were duly notified of the hearing and the consequences of not attending, and they did not provide any evidence to support their inability to attend. The court noted that the applicants had ample opportunity to contact the Tribunal and provide reasons for their non-attendance, but they failed to do so. The court held that the Tribunal's decision was in accordance with the law, and there was no merit in the applicants' argument that the Tribunal should have postponed the hearing or delayed its decision.

Accordingly, the court dismissed the applicants' appeal and upheld the Tribunal's decision. The Minister was ordered to pay the applicants' costs of the proceeding, and liberty to apply was reserved. The court's decision underscored the importance of applicants attending their scheduled hearings and providing evidence to support their inability to attend, as failure to do so may result in the Tribunal making a decision in their absence.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. Liberty to apply be reserved.

2. The respondent pay the applicants’ costs of the proceeding.

Background

Background to the litigation

Section 426A of the Migration Act provides:‘(1) If the applicant:(a) is invited under section 425 to appear before the Tribunal; and(b) does not appear before the Tribunal on the day on which, or atthe time and place at which, the applicant is scheduled toappear;the Tribunal may make a decision on the review without taking anyfurther action to allow or enable the applicant to appear before it.(2) This section does not prevent the Tribunal from rescheduling theapplicant’s appearance before it, or from delaying its decision on thereview in order to enable the applicant’s appearance before it asrescheduled.’The facts The Tribunal had before it documents, which included the original protection visa application and the record of the decision of the Minister’s delegate. It also had the application to the Tribunal and an accompanying statement of the first applicant. By letter dated 15 April 2003, in accordance with s 425 of the Migration Act, the Tribunal advised the first applicant:‘The Tribunal has considered the material before it in relation to your application but is unable to make a decision in your favour on this information alone.’ The letter proceeded to invite the applicants to a hearing of the Tribunal to give oral evidence and present arguments in support of their claims. The hearing was fixed for 11 June 2003 at 2.00 pm. The letter also advised:‘The Tribunal will only change this hearing date for good reasons. If you think you might be unable to attend the hearing, you must contact the Tribunal immediately. If you do not attend the hearing and the Tribunal does not postpone the hearing, it can make a decision on your case without further notice.’ In its reasons for decision, the Tribunal recorded relevant events as follows:‘On 15 April 2003 the Tribunal wrote to the applicants, by letter addressed to [the first applicant], advising that it had considered all the material before it relating to their application but it was unable to make a favourable decision on that information alone. The Tribunal invited the applicants to give oral evidence and present arguments at a hearing on 11 June 2003. They were advised that if they did not attend the hearing and a postponement was not granted, the Tribunal may make a decision on their case without further notice. No response was received on the appropriate “Response to Hearing Form”. On 10 June [the first applicant] contacted the Tribunal by telephone indicating that he wished to cancel his hearing the following day because he was flying to Sydney to attend the funeral of his cousin. The Tribunal asked the applicant to provide some evidence of the reason of his inability to attend by c.o.b. on 12 June 2003. To date no information at all has been received by the Tribunal from the applicant. The applicants did not appear before the Tribunal on the day and at the time and place at which they were scheduled to appear. In these circumstances, and pursuant to s.426A of the Act, the Tribunal has decided to make its decision on the review without taking any further action to enable the applicants to appear before it.’The first applicant’s claims

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

GRAY J
Under the heading ‘Findings and Reasons’, the Tribunal first found the first applicant to be male, a citizen of Fiji, of Indian ethnic origin and of the Hindu religion. It referred to his arrival in Australia, and his two previous trips to Australia. It referred to his Fijian passport and to the fact that he had travelled to Thailand in July 2002. The Tribunal then said:‘It is common ground that there is a certain amount of discrimination against Indo-Fijians in Fiji and that this has tended to increase when there have been crises in the country. This is exemplified in the information above about these issues during the coups which have occurred in Fiji since 1987. Given this situation, the Tribunal needs to consider whether the treatment complained of by the applicant, if it took place, amounted not simply to discrimination but constituted serious harm so as to be regarded as Convention persecution, this is assuming that the harm suffered was for one of the reasons contemplated by the Convention.In the present case, on the available evidence, the Tribunal cannot determine its facts with confidence. The applicant’s claims are vague: relevant details such as time and place of the alleged harm as well as the circumstances of some of the incidents are not provided. The Tribunal is unable to establish, for example, the level of the applicant’s involvement in the Fijian Labour Party even though there are few documented instances of labour party people being harmed, and this even during the election campaign of 1999. The Tribunal would have liked to explore with the applicant the relationship between his work for the party and the detentions.Similarly the Tribunal cannot form a clear picture of the situation regarding the applicant’s work in the bank which he claims caused him to suffer torture and humiliation; the alleged treatment because of his duties as a bailiff does not sit well with the fact that he worked in that capacity, it seems, from December 1997 to November 2002.The Tribunal also would have liked to explore the reasons why the applicant who travelled to Australia twice before and during the period when he alleges he was mistreated, did not apply for protection on one of the previous occasions. This behaviour would indicate that at least the extent of his fear of persecution needs to be questioned.In relation to his claims that he made reports to the police a number of times to no avail, the Tribunal refers to a DFAT document dated 14 August 2002, dealing with Indo-Fijians (CX66594) which states inter alia:An Indo-Fijian citizen who has a complaint against a police officercan take the matter up with the Department of Internal Affairs in theFiji Police Force which will investigate the complaint. The matter can also be taken up with the Fiji Human Rights Commission or the Ombudsman’s office if the complainant feels that the Internal AffairsDepartment’s investigations are not sufficient. None of these servicesrequire payment by the complainant.The applicant does not report any attempts to seek redress of the alleged treatment of his complaints, yet he is a person who has worked in a number of solicitor’s offices and is involved in a quasi-legal area in his job; the Tribunal would have liked to also explore this issue with the applicant.Given that the applicant was put on notice that a decision favourable to him could not be made on the information currently before the Tribunal and that he did not attend the hearing or provide evidence for his non –attendance [sic] as requested, on the basis of the evidence before it, the Tribunal finds that he [sic] applicant does not have a well founded fear of persecution for any Convention reasons should he return to Fiji.CONCLUSIONHaving considered the evidence as a whole, the Tribunal is not satisfied that the first named applicant is a person to whom Australia has protection obligations under the Refugees Convention as amended by the Refugees Protocol. Therefore the first named applicant does not satisfy the criterion set out in s.36(2)(a) of the Act for a protection visa.No specific Convention claims were made by or on behalf of the applicant daughter and partner. The fate of their application therefore depends on the outcome of the first named applicant’s application. As the first named applicant cannot be granted a protection visa, it follows that the applicant daughter and partner cannot satisfy the alternative criterion set out in s.36(2)(b) of the Act and cannot be granted a protection visa.’The applicants’ case

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: GRAY J

Full text does not contain this section.