Von Schulz v Durrant

Case [2000] QCA 478


[2000] QCA 478

COURT OF APPEAL

WILLIAMS J
CULLINANE J
DOUGLAS J

Appeal No 8407 of 2000

KARL and THERESIA VON SCHULZ       Respondents (Appellants)

and

JILLIAN ELIZABETH DURRANT            Applicant (Respondent)

BRISBANE

..DATE 21/11/2000

JUDGMENT

WILLIAMS J: This is an application for leave to appeal pursuant to section 118 of the District Court Act 1967. The matter arises in a somewhat unusual way. The respondents Karl and Theresia Von Schulz were charged on complaint in the Magistrates Court that they failed to pay a parking fee. The matter was heard in the Magistrate Court, and the complainant was successful.

Mr and Mrs Von Schulz have always appeared on their own behalf.

The Von Schulzs appealed to the District Court pursuant to section 222 and the learned District Court Judge after hearing argument allowed the appeal and quashed the orders made on the complaint. It is clear from the reasons given by the learned District Court Judge that the proper construction of section 44B(3)(b) of the Traffic Act 1949 is of critical importance. It provides:

"A local government may install an official traffic sign applying to parking throughout a traffic area only if:

(a)the local law has declared the traffic area and defined its boundaries; and

(b)the sign is installed on the road at every road entry to the traffic area."

There was evidence before the Magistrate which satisfied her that both those requirements had been met. In the District Court the Judge was satisfied that the first of the particulars was established by the evidence but he adopted a particular view of what was meant by "road entry" and concluded that there was not a sign installed on one particular road entry namely Annerley Road. He therefore concluded that the local authority had not established the requirements of section 44B(3)(b). From his reasons it appears that he concluded that the sign had to be "installed on the road where the boundary of the traffic area crosses it". He did concede that questions of practicability may require the sign to be in a particular position, but otherwise he expressed the view that issues such as convenience did not necessarily equate with what is required by the Act.

Counsel for the local authority has submitted that the proper construction of the section, and a construction of the words "road entry" in accordance with dictionary meanings, would mean that the section was satisfied if the sign was within a reasonable distance of the boundary of the traffic area.  He also submitted that the Court should have regard to the purpose of the Act and that would mean that the sign could be appropriately placed in a location to ensure the best visibility to motorists.

In my view there is a question of law of some significance and importance to the local authority involved in this case. Without in any way indicating any decision on the merits, and the Court does not have at this stage a full record of the evidence before the tribunals below, I am of the view that the necessary requirements for the granting of leave pursuant to section 118 of the District Court Act have been made out.

It should be noted that the matter came on for hearing before a Magistrate on 9 November 1999. A decision was given on 18 November. There was then an application for a rehearing before a Magistrate on 13 December 1999 which was refused. There was then the appeal under section 222 of the District Court Act to the District Court Judge. This is a matter which is of particular significance to the local authority and that is why the hearing on the merits before the Court of Appeal is justified. In my view the grant of leave pursuant to section 118 should be conditional upon the applicant paying costs of the hearings in the Court of Appeal in any event.

The orders I would therefore propose are: grant leave to appeal to the Court of Appeal pursuant to section 118 of the District Court Act on condition that the appellant Jillian Elizabeth Durrant pay the costs of the hearings in the Court of Appeal in any event.

CULLINANE J:  I agree.

DOUGLAS J:  I agree.

WILLIAMS J:  The order of the Court will be as indicated. 
Mr Von Schulz, you will be notified when the matter is listed for hearing on the merits before the Court of Appeal.

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Details
AGLC
Von Schulz v Durrant [2000] QCA 478
Case
[2000] QCA 478
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The appeal in Von Schulz v Durrant, decided in the Queensland Court of Appeal, involved the respondents, Karl and Theresia Von Schulz, who had been found guilty of failing to pay a parking fee in the Magistrates Court. The case revolved around the interpretation of section 44B(3)(b) of the Traffic Act 1949, which concerns the installation of official traffic signs indicating parking regulations. The applicants, Jillian Elizabeth Durrant, sought leave to appeal the decision of the District Court, which had quashed the orders made in the Magistrates Court. The District Court's decision hinged on its interpretation of the term "road entry" in section 44B(3)(b), determining that the local authority had not fulfilled the requirements of the Act because a sign was not installed at every road entry to the traffic area. The applicants argued that the sign should have been placed within a reasonable distance of the boundary of the traffic area, considering the purpose of the Act and the need for visibility to motorists.

The legal issues before the Court of Appeal were primarily concerned with the interpretation of section 44B(3)(b) of the Traffic Act 1949 and the proper construction of the term "road entry." The Court needed to decide whether the term "road entry" should be interpreted literally, requiring the sign to be installed exactly at the boundary where the road meets the traffic area, or whether a more flexible interpretation could be adopted, taking into account practical considerations such as visibility and accessibility for motorists. Additionally, the Court had to consider whether the purpose of the Act supported a broader interpretation of where the sign could be installed.

The Court of Appeal, in granting leave to appeal, recognised the significance of the legal issue at hand, particularly for the local authority involved. Justice Williams, writing for the Court, noted that the proper construction of the statutory provision was of critical importance and that there was a question of law of significant importance. The Court acknowledged that while the matter did not involve a full record of evidence, the necessity for the local authority to clarify the interpretation of the Act was compelling. The Court concluded that the applicants had satisfied the necessary requirements for granting leave to appeal, conditional upon the payment of costs of the hearings in the Court of Appeal in any event.

The Court of Appeal granted leave to appeal pursuant to section 118 of the District Court Act, on the condition that the applicants pay the costs of the hearings in the Court of Appeal in any event. The decision highlights the importance of statutory interpretation in regulatory matters and the Court's willingness to consider appeals of significant importance to public authorities, particularly where statutory clarity is crucial for effective regulation.

Orders

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Background

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Evidence

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