FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA
(DIVISION 2)
Volkswagen Financial Services Pty Ltd v Alhwesh [2025] FedCFamC2G 485
File number: PEG 450 of 2024 Judgment of: JUDGE LADHAMS Date of judgment: 7 April 2025 Catchwords: CONSUMER LAW – application for orders under s 123 of the Personal Property Securities Act 2009 (Cth) to enter property to seize a vehicle the subject of a security interest registered on the Personal Property Securities Register Legislation: Personal Property Securities Act 2009 (Cth) ss 10, 12, 123, 206, 207 Cases cited: Riseley v Toyota Finance Australia Ltd [2021] FCA 1566
Senworth Capital Pty Ltd v Galleria SUV Pty Ltd [2022] NSWSC 1513
Volkswagen Financial Services Australia Pty Limited v Tate [2024] FedCFamC2G 491
Volkswagen Financial Services Pty Ltd v Glass Shop Perth Pty Ltd [2024] FedCFamC2G 537
Division: Division 2 General Federal Law Number of paragraphs: 21 Date of hearing: 4 April 2025 Place: Perth (via Microsoft Teams) Counsel for the Applicant: Mr J Falconer Solicitor for the Applicant: Wallmans Lawyers Respondent: The respondent appeared in person ORDERS
PEG 450 of 2024 FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA (DIVISION 2)
BETWEEN: VOLKSWAGEN FINANCIAL SERVICES AUSTRALIA PTY LTD ACN 097 071 460
Applicant
AND: MOHAMED ALHWESH
Respondent
ORDER MADE BY:
JUDGE LADHAMS
DATE OF ORDER:
4 APRIL 2025
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.Pursuant to Section 123(1) of the Personal Property Securities Act 2009 (Cth), the respondent and/or any party in possession of the Collateral, being a grey 2016 BMW M3 Sedan Motor Vehicle VIN: WBS8M920X05E22008, Engine Number: 01949649 and Registration Number: 1HTN594 (WA) (hereafter the Collateral), deliver, surrender and/or provide the location of the Collateral to the applicant and/or its agent.
2.The applicant and/or its duly authorised agent be permitted to enter onto, and remain at, and to take any and all reasonable step(s) in order to locate and take possession of the Collateral from the following premises:
a)X XXXXX XXX Lane, XXXXX XXXXX XXXX in the State of Western Australia;
b)XX XXXX XXXX Ramble, XXXXX XX XXXX in the State of Western Australia; and
c)any other premises in Australia over which the respondent has apparent control and at which the Collateral is reasonably believed to be located.
3.The respondent pay the applicant’s costs fixed in the sum of $4,060.00.
4.Reasons for these orders will be published from chambers at a later date.
Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry in the Court’s records.
Note: The Court may vary or set aside a judgment or order to remedy minor typographical or grammatical errors (r 17.05(2)(g) Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021 (Cth)), or to record a variation to the order pursuant to r 17.05 Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021 (Cth).
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
JUDGE LADHAMS:
INTRODUCTION
The applicant and respondent entered into a loan agreement for the purchase of a motor vehicle by the respondent. The motor vehicle is a grey 2016…
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- Case
- [2025] FedCFamC2G 485
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court considered whether it had the jurisdiction to make orders similar to those sought by the applicant. The court found that the PPS Act did not explicitly confer jurisdiction upon the Federal Circuit Court, but that the court had the power to make orders that followed from declarations that could have been made had they been sought. The court referred to previous cases which supported the making of such orders.
The court also considered whether the applicant was entitled to the orders under the PPS Act. The court found that the applicant was a secured party, the vehicle was collateral, the agreement was a security agreement, and the respondent was in default under the agreement. The court further found that the method by which the applicant sought to seize the collateral was permitted by law, and that the applicant could enter the premises to locate and take possession of the vehicle.
The court granted the orders sought by the applicant, with some minor modifications. The orders permitted the applicant to enter and remain on the premises to locate and take possession of the vehicle, as well as any other premises in Australia where the vehicle was reasonably believed to be located. The court emphasised that the orders did not require the applicant to make prior arrangements with the respondent, but that the applicant was free to contact the respondent or the respondent could proactively make arrangements with the applicant for the return of the vehicle.
The court made orders in the form set out in the attached order.
Orders
Orders of the court
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
I am satisfied that the present application relates to a ‘PPS matter’.Consideration of the application Based on the terms of s 123 of the PPS Act, I have considered whether the applicant is a ‘secured party’, whether the Collateral is ‘collateral’, whether the Agreement is a ‘security agreement’ and whether the respondent is in default under that Agreement. Having regard to the affidavit of Ms Coombe, including the partial copy of the Agreement annexed to that affidavit, I am satisfied that the Agreement is a ‘security agreement’ as defined in s 10 of the PPS Act and that the applicant has a ‘security interest’, as defined in s 12 of the PPS Act, in relation to the Collateral. I am also satisfied that the applicant is a ‘secured party’ within the meaning of s 10 of the PPS Act and that the Collateral falls within the definition of ‘collateral’ in s 10 of the PPS Act. I am satisfied based on the affidavit of Ms Coombe that the respondent has defaulted on his obligation under the Agreement to make repayments. It is also appropriate to consider whether the method by which the applicant wishes to seize the Collateral is one permitted by law. Section 123 of the PPS Act only authorises the seizure of collateral by methods permitted by law. The applicant seeks to be permitted to enter and remain on premises for the purpose of taking reasonable steps to locate and take possession of the Collateral. The address referred to in the application was an address recorded in the Agreement as being the address of the respondent. At the directions hearing on 4 April 2025, the respondent provided a further address, indicating that he now resides at that address and that is where the Collateral is located. The respondent confirmed that he agreed to those premises being included in the order and I am satisfied that is appropriate, on the basis of the representations of the respondent at the directions hearing. The applicant also sought to be able to enter ‘any other premises in Australia at which the Collateral is reasonably believed to be located’. At the hearing, the applicant’s lawyer agreed to the Court’s proposal to modify that to the form of order made, as indicated above. This addresses the caution of Fagan J in Senworth Capital Pty Ltd v Galleria SUV Pty Ltd [2022] NSWSC 1513 against the making of orders that may interfere with third parties’ rights or amount to trespass without joining the third parties as defendants. It is consistent with the approach taken by judges of this Court in some other cases, including Volkswagen Financial Services Australia Pty Limited v Tate [2024] FedCFamC2G 491 and Volkswagen Financial Services Pty Ltd v Glass Shop Perth Pty Ltd [2024] FedCFamC2G 537. The respondent indicated at the directions hearing that he wanted the applicant to contact him to make arrangements to enter the property to collect the Collateral. The applicant’s lawyer expressed some concerns at this. It has been explained to the respondent that the orders do not require the applicant to make prior arrangements with him. This, of course, does not prevent the applicant from contacting the respondent prior to entering the premises, nor does it prevent the respondent from proactively making arrangements with the applicant for the return of the Collateral.