Vincentia Sth Pty Ltd v Commissioner for Act Revenue (Administrative Review)

[2017] ACAT 26

ACT CIVIL & ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL

VINCENTIA STH PTY LTD v COMMISSIONER FOR ACT REVENUE (Administrative Review) [2017] ACAT 26

AT 59/2016

Catchwords:ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW – prescribed date when land became rateable – meaning of Commonwealth land under section 8 of the Rates Act 2004 – whether land exempted as rateable prior to first lease over the land – land became rateable upon first lease over the land

Legislation cited:      ACT Planning and Land Management Act 1988 (Cth) ss 27, 28, 29

Commonwealth of Australian Constitution Act (Cth) s 125
Legislation Act2001 ss 5, 155, 156
Rates Act 2004 ss 6, 8

Subordinate

Legislation cited:      Planning and Development (Technical Amendment – Rezoning of FUA) Plan Variation 2015 (No1), Variation No 2014-22, 22 June 2015

Variation to the Plan No 281, Molonglo and North Weston, August 2008

Cases cited:Amalgamated Society of Engineers v Adelaide Steamship Co Ltd (the engineer’s case) (1920) 28 CLR 129

C and J Clark Ltd v Inland Revenue Commissioners [1973] 1 WLR 905
Commonwealth v Baume (1905) 2 CLR 405
Deputy Commissioner of Taxation (NSW) v Mutton (1988) 12 NSWLR 104
Grey v Pearson (1857) 6 HLC 61
Harding v Coburn [1976] 2 NZLR 577
Junstamp Pty Ltd and Ors v Commissioner for ACT Revenue [2013] ACAT 50
Minister for Resources v Dover Fisheries Pty Ltd (1993) 43 FCR 565
Qantas Airways Ltd v Chief Commissioner of State Revenue [2008] NSWSC 1049
Sherritt Gordon Mines Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation [1977] VR 342

List of

Texts/Papers cited:   D C Pearce and R S Geddes, Statutory Interpretation in Australia (Lexis Nexis, 8^th Ed, 2014)

Tribunal:  Senior Member L Beacroft

Date of Orders:  11 April 2017

Date of Reasons for Decision:         11 April 2017

AUSTRALIAN CAPITAL TERRITORY  )

CIVIL & ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL       )          AT 59/2016

BETWEEN:

VINCENTIA STH PTY LTD

Applicant

AND:

COMMISSIONER FOR ACT REVENUE

Respondent

TRIBUNAL:Senior Member L Beacroft

Senior Member D Lovell

DATE:11 April 2017

ORDER

The Tribunal orders that:

1.       The decision under review is confirmed.

………………………………..

Senior Member L Beacroft

Delivered for and on behalf of the Tribunal

REASONS FOR DECISION

1.       In summary, Vincentia Sth Pty Ltd (the applicant) seeks review of a decision by ACT Revenue (the respondent) to disallow the applicant’s objection to a determination of the unimproved value (UV) of the applicant’s land at block 14, section 98 Weston ACT (the land). The reasons below explain why the ACT Civil and Administrative Tribunal (the Tribunal or ACAT) has dismissed the applicant’s application as set out in the order above.

2. In summary, the Tribunal has found that the land was Commonwealth land and exempted from being rateable under section 8(b)(vii) of the Rates Act 2004 (Rates Act) until the date of the first Crown lease over the land (the lease), being 2 February 2016. The land was zoned commercial CZ3 when it became rateable.[1] The parties agreed that with this zoning the UV is $5,700,000[2], which is the basis of the valuation and rates assessment notices (the notices) issued by the respondent, dated 19 May 2016.[3]

[1]    Planning and Development (Technical Amendment – Rezoning of FUA) Plan Variation 2015 (No1), Variation No 2014-22, 22 June 2015, Attachment 6 to the respondent’s statement of facts and contentions dated 16 January 2017

[2]    Statement of agreed facts, signed by both parties, dated 6 February 2017

[3]    T-documents 53-54, notices dated 19 May 2016

Background

3.       Until the applicant obtained the lease over the land, the land had never been leased. In 2008 the Territory Plan was amended to allow for new residential areas in the Weston area, and the land was part of an area that was declared as ‘Future Urban Area’.[4] Later, on 26 June 2015, the land was rezoned from ‘residential RZ1’ to ‘commercial CZ3 services’.[5]

[4]    Variation to the Plan No 281, Molonglo and North Weston, August 2008, Attachment 3 to the respondent’s statement of facts and contentions dated 16 January 2017

[5]    Planning and Development (Technical Amendment – Rezoning of FUA) Plan Variation 2015 (No1), Variation No 2014-22, 22 June 2015, Attachment 6 to the respondent’s statement of facts and contentions, dated 16 January 2017

4.       In November 2015 the Land Development Agency (LDA), which is an ACT Government agency that releases land in the ACT for development, auctioned the land. The applicant successfully bid for the land and on 2 February 2016 a Crown lease over the land was issued to the applicant, which is a corporation. The lease includes terms that entitle the applicant, after completion of certain works detailed in a deed, to subdivide the land and to obtain further leases of the subdivided land to on-sell or lease.

5.       On 19 May 2016 the Commissioner issued the notices to the applicant, showing a valuation of $5,700,000 for the land and rates payable of $121,534.20.[6] The applicant made an objection to the unimproved value (UV) set out in the notices, in a letter dated 15 July 2016.[7] On 7 September 2016 the respondent disallowed the objection.[8] The decision being reviewed by the Tribunal is the decision by the Commissioner to disallow the applicant’s objection to the notices, more specifically an objection to the UV stated in the notices (the reviewable decision). A hearing was held on 9 February 2017.

[6] T-documents 53-54, valuation notice and rates assessment notice dated 19 May 2016

[7] T-documents 55-60, objection dated 15 July 2016

[8] T-documents 21-33, letter to applicant advising of respondent’s decision to disallow objection dated 7 September 2016

Conduct of the hearing

6.       At the hearing the applicant was represented by Mr Brodie Buckland, Barrister, instructed by Mr Greg Brackenreg, Special Counsel, Meyer Vandenberg. The respondent was represented by Dr Doug Jarvis, Barrister, instructed by Ms Kate Smyth, Senior Solicitor, ACT Government Solicitor.

7.       Before the hearing the parties had exchanged and filed with the ACAT various documents. Importantly, the parties had agreed and filed with ACAT a ‘Statement of Agreed Facts’ which narrowed the contested issues to those set out in paragraph 8 below.[9] During the hearing the Tribunal requested that any issues about procedural matters or fairness be raised, and any that were raised were dealt with during the proceedings.

[9] Statement of agreed facts, signed by both parties, dated 6 February 2017

8.       Uncontested matters were as follows:

(a)The applicant purchased the land at auction from the LDA on 25 November 2015 for $5,750,000 (excluding GST), and the first Crown lease for the land was issued on 2 February 2016.

(b)Prior to the lease, the land was not leased, was unoccupied, and neither the Territory nor the Commonwealth had developed or occupied the land.

(c)On 26 June 2015 the land was rezoned from RZ1 (which permits only residential use) to CZ3 (which permits commercial use).

(d)If the land is valued as if it was zoned RZ1 then the UV is $3,000,000, and if the land is valued as if it is CZ3 then the UV is $5,700,000.

9.       There was one contested issue as follows:

(a)Determining the UV for land requires settling what is the ‘prescribed date’ in order to identify the circumstances that apply.[10] What is the prescribed date in turn hinges on settling when the land became ‘rateable’[11] as defined under section 8 of the Rates Act. Determining when the land became ‘rateable’ in this case involves settling whether the land was exempted as rateable land until it was leased.[12] The core contested issue in this case is how section 8 of the Rates Act applies to the land, particularly the exemption to land being rateable under section 8(1)(b)(vii) of the Rates Act.

[10] Section 6(1)(b) of the Rates Act 2004

[11] Section 6(3)(a) of the Rates Act 2004

[12] Section 8(1)(a) and (b) of the Rates Act 2004

Legislative Framework

10.     In summary, the land is part of the ACT. Land in the ACT is vested in the Commonwealth[13], which acquired it from NSW for the Federal seat of government. When the ACT became self-governing, various legislation was put in place to allow for this including the ACT Planning and Land Management Act 1988 (Cth) which provides for the ACT executive to grant leases of land in certain circumstances. The Rates Act allows the ACT government to charge rates for land in certain circumstances.

[13] Section 125 of the Commonwealth of Australian Constitution Act

11. The applicant applied for review of the reviewable decision under section 68 of the ACT Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2008 (ACAT Act) The review is provided for in section 108A of the Taxation Administration Act 1999 (Tax Administration Act), together with section 73 of the Rates Act 2004 (Rates Act). The applicant bears the onus of proof under section 101 of the Taxation Administration Act.

12. The case concerns the statutory interpretation of section 8 of the Rates Act. The Legislation Act2001 (Legislation Act) applies, and also the common law on statutory interpretation applies which is well set out in D C Pearce and R S Geddes, Statutory Interpretation in Australia (Lexis Nexis, 8^th Ed, 2014) (Pearce & Geddes).

Applicants’ Contentions

13. The applicant’s contentions in respect of the contested issue, how section 8 of the Rates Act applies to the land (refer to paragraph 9 above), are as follows.

14. The applicant uncontroversially explained that the UV is determined according to a formula set out in the Rates Act. This involves determining the “....price that might have been offered for the lease of the land, assuming …the circumstances that existed on the prescribed date also existed at the date of the hypothetical sale of the land [on the base date], being 1 January 2015 in this case”.[14] If the land was rateable prior to its rezoning on 26 June 2015 (ie if the prescribed date was prior to 26 June 2015), then its UV would be much reduced since the UV on the base date would be calculated as though it was zoned RZ1. The applicant contended that this indeed was the case.[15]

[14] Paragraph 13, applicant’s statement of facts and contentions dated 12 December 2016

[15] Paragraph 12, applicant’s reply to respondent’s statement of facts and contentions dated 30 January 2017

15. The applicant contended that the land became rateable at the commencement of the Rates Act, 1 July 2004. [16] The applicant’s case concerned the statutory interpretation of section 8 of the Rates Act. In summary, the applicant contended[17] that the land was rateable from the commencement of the Rates Act in that it was “land in the ACT”[18] and did not meet any of the exemptions.[19] 

[16] Paragraph 10, applicant’s reply to respondent’s statement of facts and contentions dated 30 January 2017

[17] Paragraph 9, applicant’s reply to respondent’s statement of facts and contentions dated 30 January 2017

[18] Section 8(1)(a) of the Rates Act 2004

[19] Section 8(1)(b) of the Rates Act 2004

16. The applicant contended that the term ‘Commonwealth land’ in the exemption to rateable land set out in section 8(1)(b)(vii) has the same meaning as in section 8(1)(a), and that it cannot just mean land where the Commonwealth holds title. The term ‘Commonwealth land’ is defined in the dictionary of the Rates Act as “land that is the property of the Commonwealth”. Since the Commonwealth holds title to all land in the ACT, even if leased, the phrase ‘including Commonwealth land’ in section 8(1)(a) is either redundant or means something other than just holding title. The applicant contended that applying basic principles of statutory interpretation to section 8 leads to the conclusion that:

‘property’ has a greater meaning than simply ‘holds title to’. Rather, ‘land that is the property of the Commonwealth’ in section 8 Rates Act means land which the Commonwealth holds title to and exercises some propriety rights over…[for example] possession, occupation, or extraction of resources.[20]

[20] Paragraph 5, applicant’s reply to respondent’s statement of facts and contentions dated 30 January 2017

17. The applicant summarised his approach to interpreting ‘Commonwealth land’ in section 8 as referring to a ‘sub-set of land’ where the Commonwealth holds title to it and where the Commonwealth occupies it.[21] On this argument, the land was not exempted from being rateable under section 8(1)(b)(vii) since the land “was not ‘Commonwealth land’ as the Commonwealth only held title …and did not exercise any other propriety rights over the land.”[22]

[21] Applicant’s oral submissions at the hearing on 9 February 2017

[22] Paragraph 7, applicant’s reply to respondent’s statement of facts and contentions dated 30 January 2017

18.     The applicant contended that the land management arrangements in place in the ACT under the ACT Planning and Land Management Act 1988 (Cth) (PLM Act) provides evidence that ‘Commonwealth land’ means something more than holds title, it means that the Commonwealth occupies it. Under the PLM Act the Executive of the Territory may grant and dispose of ‘Territory land’, as if it was the owner unless it is declared ‘National land’.[23] The title held by the Commonwealth to Territory land is protected by the Australian Constitution, however the Commonwealth’s property rights under the PLM Act are exercised in a unique manner, indeed “given away”.[24] The applicant contended that the PLM Act provides support for the view that ‘Commonwealth land’ under section 8 Rates Act refers to more than title, but it refers to land where the Commonwealth has a relationship with it, that is occupies it

[23] Sections 27-29, ACT Planning and Land Management Act 1988 (Cth)

[24] Applicant’s oral submissions at the hearing on 9 February 2017

19.     Regarding the principles of statutory interpretation that are particularly relevant here, the applicant argued as follows. The “language used in the statue as a whole” is to be considered[25], unless that leads to an “absurdity” in which case the there may be a modification by the court “so as to avoid that absurdity and inconsistency but no farther”.[26] Further, all words or sentences are not to be regarded as “superfluous or insignificant”, in the first instance.[27] In some circumstances, courts may consider another meaning that “produces a more reasonable result.”[28] An interpretation that gives some effect to a provision is to be preferred to another that renders it ineffectual or absurd.[29]

[25] Paragraph 2.3, Pearce & Geddes, citing Higgens J in Amalgamated Society of Engineers v Adelaide Steamship Co Ltd (the engineer’s case) (1920) 28 CLR 129, 161-162

[26] Paragraph 2.4, Pearce & Geddes, citing Lord Wensleydale in Grey v Pearson (1857) 6 HLC 61, 106

[27] Paragraph 2.26, Pearce & Geddes, citing a line of authority including Commonwealth v Baume (1905) 2 CLR 405, 414

[28] Paragraph 2.26, Pearce & Geddes, citing Minister for Resources v Dover Fisheries Pty Ltd (1993) 43 FCR 565, 574

[29] Paragraph 2.39, Pearce & Geddes, citing a long line of authority

Respondent’s Contentions

20.     The respondent’s contentions against the contested issue in paragraph 9 above are summarised below.

21. When interpreting section 8 the respondent contended that it needed to be read in the context of the legislative scheme summarised as follows. The provision relates to a unique legislative scheme where the Commonwealth acquired land from NSW for the territory of the ACT.[30] Later, to effect self-government, the ACT Government was authorised to grant leases on behalf of the Commonwealth.[31] The respondent contended that the Commonwealth’s interest in Territory land is a unique right – a “sovereign right” which includes propriety rights.[32] The respondent contended that the PLM Act provides no support for the applicant’s contentions. Under the PLM Act the Commonwealth delegates its power to grant leases to the ACT Government, but it does not provide for the granting of freehold rights and therefore does not give away its property rights as the applicant contended. The Rates Act like the PLM Act supports a self-government legislative scheme in that it provides for the ACT Government to collect revenue for certain lands, even though all lands in the Territory remain vested with the Commonwealth.

[30] Section 125 of the Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act

[31] ACT Planning and Land Management Act 1988 (Cth)

[32] Respondent’s oral submissions at the hearing on 9 February 2017

22. The respondent contended that when the holding lease for the land was issued on 2 February 2016 to the applicant, being the first lease for the land issued, the land became rateable. Until then the land was exempt from being rateable under section 8(1)(b)(vii) of the Rates Act since it was unleased vacant land belonging to the Commonwealth.[33]

[33] Paragraph 31, respondent’s statement of facts and contentions dated 16 January 2017

23. When interpreting section 8, the respondent contended that the provision needed to be read as a whole. The term ‘Commonwealth land’ appears twice in the provision, has the same meaning for each use, and is defined in the dictionary of the Act as “land which is the property of the Commonwealth.” There is no absurdity if this statutory definition of Commonwealth land is applied throughout the provision. Rather, applying the applicant’s approach, that ‘Commonwealth land’ refers to Commonwealth land that is occupied, leads to a peculiar result in section 8(1)(b)(vii) – Commonwealth land that is occupied that is not leased or occupied is exempt from being rateable.

24. Finally, the respondent contended that applying the applicant’s approach leads to consequences not intended under the legislation. An unintended consequence of the applicant’s approach to interpreting ‘Commonwealth land’ under section 8 of the Rates Act would be that the prescribed date for all unleased Commonwealth land would be 1 July 2004. Furthermore, in this case the prescribed date on the applicant’s arguments would be prior to the base date (agreed to be 1 January 2015). The respondent contended that this is inconsistent with the framework of law recognised in Junstamp Pty Ltd and Ors v Commissioner for ACT Revenue [2013] ACAT 50 (Junstamp case).

Findings and Decision

25. The issue concerns the statutory interpretation of section 8 of the Rates Act, specifically the meaning of ‘Commonwealth land’ in that section. The applicant contended that a literal reading of section 8(1)(a) results in an ‘absurdity’ and on this basis the applicant presented his alternative interpretation of the section, citing Higgens J in the Engineer’s Case at 161-162. The applicant’s argument is that when the statutory definition of ‘Commonwealth land’ is inserted into section 8(1)(a) there is an absurdity in that the phrase following the word ‘including’ is left without meaning, is redundant. That is, rateable land “means all land in the ACT [which is all vested in the Commonwealth], including Commonwealth land [which is land that is the property of the Commonwealth].”[34] The Tribunal is not persuaded by the applicant’s contentions. The Tribunal finds that the phrase ‘including Commonwealth land’ in section 8 of the Rates Act is not absurd. Rather, it makes clear certain matters in the context of a unique legislative scheme which is an example of co-operative federalism involving the Commonwealth, NSW and ACT Governments. The Tribunal’s reasoning is set out below.

[34] Section 8(1)(a), dictionary Rates Act 2004; section 125 Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act

26.     A threshold question in this case is whether redundancy in words is necessarily an absurdity? When considering the literal analysis of a provision for any absurdity, Lord Wensleydale clarified this issue: as Pearce & Geddes explain “[the literal approach] contemplates the modification of the literal meaning of the words used to overcome an error or defect perceived in the text.”[35] The Tribunal can find nor an ‘error’ or ‘defect’ arising from the words used in section 8.

[35] Paragraph 2.4, Pearce & Geddes, citing Lord Wensleydale in Grey v Pearson (1857) 6 HLC 61, 106

27. A further consideration here is that the alternative interpretation of ‘Commonwealth land’ contended by the applicant requires the Tribunal to find that a defined term under the Rates Act, ‘Commonwealth land’, has a different meaning in section 8 Rates Act. Under the common law there is a presumption that words in legislation are used consistently[36], and under the Legislation Act a statutory definition of a term applies to the entire Act unless provided for otherwise.[37] Under the Legislation Act, where a term is defined, that definition applies unless there is a “contrary intention.”[38] The common law also recognises that a statutory definition is not to be displaced “without good reason”, that is “unless the contrary intention appears.”[39] Maloney JA in Deputy Commissioner of Taxation (NSW) v Mutton (1988) 12 NSWLR 104, 108 expanded on the circumstances when a definition is not followed[40], and the circumstances that might arguably apply here are where the definition if applied “would not work” or “would lead to confusion”. It is true that in some cases redundant words may create an “absurdity” according to the tests set out in this and the prior paragraphs, however the Tribunal finds that this is not the case here.

[36] Paragraph 4.6, Pearce & Geddes

[37] Section 156 of the Legislation Act 2001

[38] Sections 5, 155 of the Legislation Act 2001

[39] Paragraph 6.67, Pearce & Geddes, citing Handley AJ Qantas Airways Ltd v Chief Commissioner of State Revenue [2008] NSWSC 1049 at [38] and Hall v Jones (1942) 42 SR (NSW) 203

[40] Cited in paragraph 6.68, Pearce & Geddes

28.     It is recognised in the common law that at times drafters include words in the interest of being over-cautionary, “making clear” certain matters[41] or exercising “abundant caution.”[42] Such expressions can be validly interpreted as doing nothing unless some “clash” in the legislation can be shown.[43] Considering the relevance of cautionary drafting to the provision here, the applicant’s argument largely rests on the use of the word ‘including’ in section 8(1)(a). He contended that when the statutory definition for ‘Commonwealth land’ is inserted after the word ‘including’, then ‘Commonwealth land’ must have a meaning other than merely land vested in the Commonwealth if the word is not to be redundant. He contended that the term in this section refers to Commonwealth land that is occupied and is a sub-set of land in the ACT. ‘Including’ is a term that is usually “intended to enlarge the ordinary meaning of the word [in this case ACT land]”.[44] Confusion can arise, as was potentially the case here, where ‘includes’ is followed by “one or more items that would usually fall within the accepted meaning of the term [ACT land in this case]” – however this drafting can be “defended” as a cautionary drafter’s practice to make it clear that, in this case, ‘Commonwealth land’ as statutorily defined is included rather than not included for the purposes of section 8 of the Rates Act.[45]

[41] Paragraph 2.24, Pearce & Geddes, citing Cooke J in Harding v Coburn [1976] 2 NZLR 577, 582

[42] Paragraph 4.41, Pearce & Geddes

[43] Paragraph 2.24, Pearce & Geddes, citing Megarry J in C and J Clark Ltd v Inland Revenue Commissioners [1973] 1 WLR 905 at 911

[44] Paragraph 6.60, Pearce & Geddes, citing Sherritt Gordon Mines Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation [1977] VR 342, 353

[45] Paragraph 6.60, Pearce & Geddes

29. Accepting that there is cautionary drafting at work in section 8 of the Rates Act as set out in paragraph 27 above is further supported by the fact that there is only one item listed after the word ‘including’ - if there were more items listed then the intention of the drafters might have been more difficult to discern.[46] Also, the legislative scheme which the Rates Act is a part of is an unusual, unique one, as explained above, that might not be well understood by the average user of the Rates Act. Hence in this case there is a strong argument for cautionary drafting being highly relevant to interpreting section 8 of the Rates Act.

[46] Paragraph 6.60 – 6.61, Pearce & Geddes

30. There is a further reason why the respondent’s contentions are preferred to the applicant’s by the Tribunal. If the meaning of ‘Commonwealth land’ in section 8(1)(a) refers to occupied Commonwealth land as the applicant contends, then the phrase “that is not unoccupied” in section 8(2)(b)(vii) becomes an ‘absurdity’ by the applicant’s definition, that is redundant.

31.     Another possible reason for rejecting the applicant’s contentions, not contested by the parties in this case, concerns the legislative intention about the sequencing of the prescribed date and base date – does the legislation contemplate the base date being after the prescribed date, the latter is the case if the applicant’s contentions are accepted. While the issue in the Junstamp case was about the relevant date (now referred to in the Rates Act as the ‘base date’[47]), the Tribunal’s findings about what the relevant date means has implications for the meaning of ‘prescribed date’, and also the Tribunal in Junstamp was required to settle the prescribed date in order to assess the UV.[48] Senior Member Corby accepted submissions in the case which were “based on a review of the legislative history of the relevant provisions.”[49] She found that the relevant date, for the purposes of the then section that dealt with the first determination of the UV of the land which became rateable, is 1 January that “precedes the financial year when the land first became rateable”[50], that is the prescribed date is after the relevant date. She found that the prescribed date in that case was the date that the Commonwealth land was leased and that this was after the relevant date. On this basis, the Tribunal observes that Junstamp appears to be authority for it being not contemplated by the Rates Act that the base date be prior to the prescribed date, which is contrary to what the applicant proposes. The Tribunal does not rely on this observation for its findings and order.

[47] Section 6 of the Rates Act 2004

[48] Paragraph 9, Junstamp Pty Ltd and Ors v Commissioner for ACT Revenue [2013] ACAT 50

[49] Paragraph 14, Junstamp Pty Ltd and Ors v Commissioner for ACT Revenue [2013] ACAT 50

[50] Paragraph 15, Junstamp Pty Ltd and Ors v Commissioner for ACT Revenue [2013] ACAT 50

Orders

32.     The Tribunal orders as follows:

1.      The decision under review is confirmed.

………………………………..

Senior Member L Beacroft

Delivered for and on behalf of the Tribunal

HEARING DETAILS

FILE NUMBER:

AT 59/2016

PARTIES, APPLICANT:

Vincentia Sth Pty Ltd

PARTIES, RESPONDENTS:

Commissioner for ACT Revenue

COUNSEL APPEARING, APPLICANT

Mr Buckland

COUNSEL APPEARING, RESPONDENT

Dr Jarvis

SOLICITOR FOR APPLICANT

Meyer Vandenberg

SOLICITOR FOR RESPONDENT

ACT Government Solicitor

TRIBUNAL MEMBER:

Senior Member L Beacroft

Senior Member D Lovell

DATE OF HEARING:

9 February 2017