VILNIUS & VILNIUS
[2016] FamCA 16
•22 January 2016
FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA
| VILNIUS & VILNIUS | [2016] FamCA 16 |
| FAMILY LAW – CHILDREN – Interim parenting – where mother unilaterally changed the child’s school – where both father and mother now post-separation reside some distance from the old school – where child now enrolled in school close to the mother’s residence – where question of equal shared parental responsibility agreed – where mother and father agree that the child should reside primarily with one or the other – where agreement as to time with the non-resident parent – where consideration as to the best interests of the child – where child to live primarily with the mother – where child will spend substantial and significant time with the father. |
| Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) ss 60B, 60CA, 60CC, 61DA, 65DAA |
| Deiter & Deiter [2011] FamCAFC 82 George & George [2013] FamCAFC 182 Goode and Goode [2006] FamCA 1346 Kirkland and Granger [2007] FamCA 1471 Marvel & Marvel (No. 2) [2010] FamCAFC 101 Mazorski & Albright [2007] FamCA 520 McCall & Clark (2009) FLC 93-405 MRR v GRR (2010) 240 CLR 461 Raymond and Harold [2009] FamCA 155 Re G: Children’s Schooling [2000] FamCA 462 |
| APPLICANT: | Mr Vilnius |
| RESPONDENT: | Ms Vilnius |
| FILE NUMBER: | PAC | 4975 | of | 2014 |
| DATE DELIVERED: | 22 January 2016 |
| PLACE DELIVERED: | Parramatta |
| PLACE HEARD: | Parramatta |
| JUDGMENT OF: | Foster J |
| HEARING DATE: | 18 January 2016 |
REPRESENTATION
| COUNSEL FOR THE APPLICANT: | Ms Giacomo |
| SOLICITOR FOR THE APPLICANT: | DIB Lawyers |
| COUNSEL FOR THE RESPONDENT: | Mr Morley |
| SOLICITOR FOR THE RESPONDENT: | Ghobrial Legal |
Orders Until Further Order:
That by consent the mother and father have equal shared parental responsibility for the child B born on … 2007 (“the child”).
That the child reside with the mother.
That the child spend time with the father as agreed between the mother and father in writing such writing to include SMS or email communication and in default of agreement as follows:
(a) During school term each alternate weekend from after school Friday to before school Monday commencing on the first weekend after the resumption of school term that the mother is required to work and then each alternate weekend thereafter,
(b) During school term from after school Wednesday to before school Thursday in each week,
(c) For first half of the child’s school holidays commencing on the day school term concludes from after school to the midpoint day of such holiday periods at 5pm,
(d) That for the purposes of changeovers where not at school the father shall return the child to the mother’s residence at the conclusion of the child’s time with him.
That if applicable the child’s time with the father shall be suspended on the Mother’s Day weekend provided always that the child’s time with the mother shall if applicable be suspended and the child shall spend the Father’s Day weekend with the father in addition to any other time provided.
That the mother shall use her best endeavours, save for extenuating circumstances, to avoid the child being carried in the work truck of her partner whilst he is engaged in work.
That the mother be authorised by virtue of this order to continue the child’s enrolment at the C School pending further order.
NOTATION
(A)That should the parties residential circumstances change so as to make shared care practicable they would use their best endeavours to implement same.
(B)That it is the expectation of the Court that the mother and father will enrol in and attend an appropriate “Parenting after Separation” course conducted by Unifam or Relationships Australia in the period of the adjournment.
IT IS NOTED that publication of this judgment by this Court under the pseudonym Vilnius & Vilnius has been approved by the Chief Justice pursuant to s 121(9)(g) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth).
| FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA AT PARRAMATTA |
FILE NUMBER: PAC 4975 of 2014
| Mr Vilnius |
Applicant
And
| Ms Vilnius |
Respondent
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
The present interim applications, whilst ostensibly relating to the question of the school at which the subject child B born in 2007 in the forthcoming 2016 academic year, in reality raises immediate questions as to the child’s residence circumstances pending final hearing.
The mother, the applicant in the primary proceedings, relevantly seeks final orders that in summary provide for:
a)The mother and father to have equal shared parental responsibility for the child;
b)That the child live with her during school term from after school Monday to before school on Friday, on certain special occasion days and one half of the school holiday periods; and
c)That the child live with the father during school term from after school on Friday to before school on Monday, on certain special occasion days and one half of school holidays.
The father, the respondent in the primary proceedings, relevantly seeks final orders that provide for:
a)The mother and father to have equal shared parental responsibility for the child;
b)That the child live on a week-about basis with the mother and father commencing after school each alternate Monday, half the school holidays, and certain special occasion days; and
c)That the father be entitled to and roll the child at Suburb E Primary School or alternatively Suburb D Public School.
Context
The father relied on his affidavits filed 27 November 2015 and 12 January 2016.
The mother relied on her affidavit filed 18 January 2016.
The parties’ respective position at interim hearing was framed by their concession that the shared care arrangement was in the circumstances impracticable and further by the agreement referred to below.
The mother and father commenced living together in about 1991 and married in 1993.
There are three children of the relationship. The eldest child Mr F now aged almost 21 resides with the paternal grandparents at Suburb E. The child is studying at the G University and appears to run a small business that employs the father.
The child H now aged almost 17 resides independently of her parents at Suburb I. The child is unemployed but seeking work.
The youngest child the child is now nearly 9 years of age. The child had attended Suburb E Primary School since kindergarten and had continued to do so until early October 2015.
Separation
In June 2014 the father vacated the then matrimonial home at Suburb J near Suburb E. The father thereafter resided with his parents at Suburb E for a short period and thereafter moved to rental accommodation with his new partner at Suburb K in the inner west area of Sydney.
The mother remained living in the matrimonial home until 26 September 2015, shortly before the completion of the sale of that property in October 2015. The mother relocated her residence to reside with her current partner in rental accommodation at Suburb L. The mother and her partner plan to settle in the Suburb L area where the mother’s partner has family, as does the mother.
Subsequent to final separation in June 2014 the child B has been spending approximately equal time with the mother and father but with a number of changeovers in each fortnightly period, with the child spending two nights with the mother, five nights with the father, five nights with the mother and then two nights with the father. The father initially proposed that this arrangement be formalised to a week-about basis in final orders.
The schooling issue
In the first week of Term 4 2015 the father received SMS communication from the mother on 12 October 2015 informing him that the child had changed schools to the local primary school C School near the mother’s residence at Suburb L.
The mother’s solicitor wrote to the father’s solicitors the same day by facsimile transmission confirming the change of schooling and otherwise advising:
Furthermore our client will commence a new job from early next week which is within 15 minutes from her current address. Her working hours are flexible Monday – Friday with no weekend work.
The mother acknowledges that her actions were without the consent of the father or prior notice to him.
The father’s solicitors responded immediately inviting the mother to return the child to the Suburb E Primary School.
The father’s position
The father complains that the child’s new school is about 30 km from his residence and almost an hour’s drive depending on traffic. The father complains of the disruption to the child’s friendship group established over the years of attendance at the school. He asserts that the child was progressing well at her school, although neither party has provided to the Court any school reports that would provide information as to the child’s academic progress at either school or any details of the child’s extracurricular activities or engagements if any.
The father further complains that notwithstanding the mother’s representations through a solicitor as to her prospective new employment local to her new residence that employment has not eventuated and the mother is working long hours at Suburb M some distance from her residence at Suburb L that involves significant travel.
The father asserts that he is employed in the business operated by his son. The mother asserts that the milk vending business is nominally operated by their son but that it is in reality the business of the father. The father currently works five days per week from about 8:30am to 12 noon and from 4:00pm to 5:30pm except on days when he has had the child in his care and on those days he starts work later in order to facilitate a drop off of the child to school at about 8:30am. The father says that he has the paternal grandparents who live in the Suburb E area who would be able to assist, although he adduces no evidence from them as to their availability or the nature of the assistance they could offer.
The father reports complaints by the child that she has been collected by the mother’s partner, Mr N, on occasions after school and that she had to remain with him in his truck while he completed deliveries for the day and that on one occasion when she was ill she was with Mr N in his truck until her mother picked her up later. The mother agrees that this should no longer occur except in urgent circumstances.
On 13 October 2015 the father gave an undertaking to the Court through his solicitor:
not to interfere with or disturb the child’s attendance at her now current school pending either agreement between the parties in writing or court order.
Notwithstanding that undertaking, whilst the child was in the father’s care for a period from 11 December 2015 he did not facilitate the child’s attendance at school for the last few days of school term. The father says that during this period the child expressed a wish not to return to her new school. Thereafter the child has made further complaint about remaining with the mother’s partner in his truck while he made deliveries.
The child remained with the father over part of the Christmas school holiday period until 13 January 2016 whilst the mother was overseas. Interviews in relation to the Child Responsive Program Memorandum were conducted on 13 January 2016.
Neither the mother nor the father has adduced any evidence from their present partners in relation to the partners’ engagement with the child or their availability to assist with care.
The mother
The mother complains of the impossibility of the onerous travel required under the old schooling arrangements if the child was to return to her former school and the cost of road tolls that over five days could add up to $140.
She says that the child has made a number of friends at her new school, one of whom lives four doors away. To her observation the child has settled in well at her new school. However no school report is in evidence.
The mother is employed at Suburb M working an eight day fortnight. She works a fortnightly roster being in Week 1 Tuesday, Thursday, and Friday to Sunday and Week 2 Tuesday, Thursday and Friday with her hours being 8:00am to 6:00pm. The mother uses the before and after school care facility at the child’s new school. On work days the child is dropped off at about 7:00am and collected by her partner from school or after school care.
The father had sent to the mother a text message on the 11 December 2015 to the effect that if the mother did not agree to a school about half way between their respective residences that he would have the child for time on alternate weekends. He no longer has that position.
It is acknowledged by both parties that by reason of their respective residences the child is now an out-of-area child so far as her old school is concerned (see Exh D). However the father adduces evidence that the child will be accepted back to the school (Exh E), in the event that an order is made for the child to reside primarily with him.
The parties’ agreement
At the commencement of submissions the parties’ counsel advised that the parties were in agreement as to the following:
a)That there be a consent order for equal shared parental responsibility;
b)That if the child was to primarily live with the mother the child would spend time with the father on alternate weekends during school term from after school Friday to before school Monday and from after school Wednesday to before school Thursday each week and half school holidays;
c)That if the child was to primarily live with the father the child would spend time with the mother on alternate weekends during school term from after school Friday to before school Monday and half school holidays; and
d)That it be noted that should the parties residential circumstances change so as to make shared care practicable they would use their best endeavours to implement same.
The Child Responsive Program Memorandum
The parties and the child attended upon the family consultant for interview purposes on 13 January 2016.
The subsequent Child Responsive Program Memorandum was dated 14 January 2016.
The child stated to the family consultant that she wished to return to her old school. She reported that there were “some mean kids” at her new school and “barely any mean kids” at her old school. However the child identified that she had made two friends at her new school and that she liked the teachers at both of her schools. It was clear that the child was well aware of the significant exigencies of travel should she returned to her old school.
The child reported good relationships with both of her parents and with the mother’s partner.
Importantly the child was well aware of the conflict between her parents reporting that they were “kind of” friends and that they “fight a lot”. In an incident post-separation the child had seen both of the parents yelling and observed her father to be “very angry”. She reported that her father had broken a candle, a statue and the television remote in the incident that occurred whilst the child was hiding in the pantry. The child reported that she was scared that her father would hurt her mother because he was so angry.
The mother reported incidents of family violence post-separation including the father throwing objects at her, damaging belongings in their home and verbally abusing her. This is consistent with the child’s report. The incident observed by the child has caused the child distress. The father denied the mother’s assertions that he had thrown items at her although he conceded that such allegation was part of the mother’s complaint to the police about the father’s behaviour.
The family consultant opined that the family violence described by the mother “appears consistent with separation-instigated violence. This type of violence does not generally suggest a high level of risk to children if it is clear that the violence is not ongoing”.
At interview the child said that she saw her older brother at her paternal grandparent’s home but had not seen her older sister for some time, although she would be seeing her older sister on the day of the interviews.
In looking at risk factors the family consultant conceded travel distances involved in each of the parties’ proposals. Concerningly, on one occasion when the father was unable to collect the child from school and the mother was unable to assist the father threatened to have the child’s new school drive the child to a police station.
The mother reported that notwithstanding the child’s wishes in relation to her old school, that in the circumstances were understandable, the child has settled well into her new school and had made friends there already.
The mother conceded that on occasion when the child had been collected from school by her partner the child had remained with him whilst he completed his work deliveries for the day but denied that this was anything other than an irregular occurrence.
It is clear that the communication between the parties is poor and that when they do so it is via text message.
Ultimately the family consultant made no recommendations that assist the present determination.
Interim parenting
In Marvel & Marvel (No. 2) [2010] FamCAFC 101 the Full Court (Faulks DCJ, Boland and Stevenson JJ), discussed the difficulties associated with making findings on contested evidence as follows:
120. As has frequently been emphasised interim parenting proceedings, and orders made as a consequence, are a necessary but temporary measure until all the evidence can be tested, evaluated and weighed at a final hearing by the making of final parenting orders. Decisions judicial officers have to make in interim proceedings are difficult and, often for very good reason, a conservative approach, or one which is likely to avoid harm to a child is adopted. This is often to the understandable distress of a party who may not achieve the outcome he or she desires, or thinks to be in the best interests of their child or children. Interim parenting orders are frequently modified or changed after a final hearing, and any allocation of parental responsibility made at an interim hearing is disregarded at the final hearing (s 61DB).
…
122. In SS & AH [2010] FamCAFC 13 the majority (Boland and Thackray JJ) discussed at paragraph [88] of their reasons the care necessary to be exercised in making findings in interim parenting proceedings. Their Honours said:
In our view, findings made at an interim hearing should be couched with great circumspection, no matter how firmly a judge’s intuition may suggest that the finding will be borne out after a full testing of the evidence.
Later, at paragraph 100 their Honours amplified their comments and said:
The intuition involved in decision-making concerning children is arguably of even greater importance when a judge is obliged to make interim decisions following a hearing at which time constraints prevent the evidence being tested. Apart from relying upon the uncontroversial or agreed facts, a judge will sometimes have little alternative than to weigh the probabilities of competing claims and the likely impact on children in the event that a controversial assertion is acted upon or rejected. It is not always feasible when dealing with the immediate welfare of children simply to ignore an assertion because its accuracy has been put in issue.
In George & George [2013] FamCAFC 182 the Full Court cited Deiter & Deiter [2011] FamCAFC 82 in confirming that the mere fact that matters are in dispute does not mean the Court can ignore concerns that are raised in the material before it.
In Deiter (supra) the Court was there concerned with the situation where the contested facts related to an assessment of risk and where it was said at [61]:
… Risk assessment comprises two elements - the first requires prediction of the likelihood of the occurrence of harmful events, and the second requires consideration of the severity of the impact caused by those events. In our view, the assessment of risk in cases involving the welfare of children cannot be postponed until the last piece of evidence is given and tested, and the last submission is made. We accept, however, that it is always a question of degree depending on the evidence that is before the Court.
Much of the factual background set out above is not in issue between the parties. However it is difficult for there to be a determination as to the existence of violence perpetrated by the father against the mother in the context of his denial. However the matters reported to the family consultant by the child provide a significant indication that there is a strong inference that there were aspects of violence in the relationship between the father and mother around separation.
The relevant principles in relation to parenting are well settled Goode and Goode [2006] FamCA 1346. Section 60B of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) (“the Act”) outlines the objects and principles underlying Part VII of the Act. Section 60CA provides that in deciding whether to make a particular parenting order, the Court is to regard the best interests of the child as the paramount consideration.
Section 60CC then outlines the primary (sub-s (2)) and additional (sub-s (3)) considerations that the Court is to take into account in determining what is in the best interests of the child. In the context of this matter it is not necessary to undertake a detailed examination of each of the consideration set out in s 60CC. The issues are limited as discussed above.
Section 61DA of the Act provides that when making a parenting order, the Court must apply a presumption that it is in the best interests of the child for the child’s parents to have equal shared parental responsibility. In this matter the parties agree that there should be such an order.
If the presumption in s 61DA is to apply and the Court makes an order for equal shared parental responsibility, this “triggers” the operation of s 65DAA which requires the Court to consider whether equal time or substantial and significant time with each parent is in the child’s best interests and reasonably practicable.
The High Court in MRR v GRR (2010) 240 CLR 461 affirmed the “legislative pathway”.
It is not necessary in the context of this application to further consider the proposals of each of the parties as to equal time. Neither at this stage contends that such an arrangement is in the best interests of the child for the reasons discussed above.
The question as to the primary residence of the child is guided by the determination as to the child’s best interests from which will flow the time with arrangements for the child with the other parent as agreed above.
The primary considerations: s 60CC(2)
The primary considerations are:
a)The benefit to the child of having a meaningful relationship with both of the child's parents; and
b)The need to protect the child from physical or psychological harm from being subjected to, or exposed to, abuse, neglect or family violence.
Section 60CC(2)(a) – “meaningful” relationship
In Mazorski & Albright [2007] FamCA 520 Brown J considered the ordinary definitions of the term “meaningful” and observed at [26]:
What these definitions convey is that “meaningful”, when used in the context of “meaningful relationship”, is synonymous with “significant” which, in turn, is generally used as a synonym for “important” or “of consequence”. I proceed on the basis that when considering the primary considerations and the application of the object and principles, a meaningful relationship or a meaningful involvement is one which is important, significant and valuable to the child. It is a qualitative adjective, not a strictly quantitive one. Quantitive concepts may be addressed as part of the process of considering the consequences of the application of the presumption of equally shared parental responsibility and the requirement for time with children to be, where possible and in their best interests, substantial and significant.
In McCall & Clark (2009) FLC 93-405 the Full Court at 83,476 accepted as appropriate this interpretation by Brown J of “meaningful relationship”.
The child is nearly nine years of age and has a good relationship with both parents. Both parties agree that the previous equal time arrangement is not in the child’s best interests and that by reason of their residential circumstances there will need to be a primary live with order. It is important for the child to be able to continue to spend significant time with each parent in circumstances where significant and unnecessary travel for her is avoided.
School holidays are to be shared. The parties agree that if the child resides with the mother that she will spend alternate weekends and overnight time with the father each week. In that event she would see the father at regular intervals of not more than five days. Should the child live with the father it is agreed that the child will have only alternate weekends with the mother at eleven day intervals with this arrangement dictated by distance.
It is “important, significant and valuable to the child” to have regular time with both parents, not time determined by the exigencies of distance for one or the other of them or in this case the mother. However it is important for the child to continue to enjoy a regular relationship with both parents as has continued since separation. Such relationships will be valuable and important to the child pending final hearing. This consideration is indicative of ensuring regular and significant time with both parents. Should the child live with the father the mothers time will be emasculated by the tyranny of distance but should the child live with the mother both parties agree on arrangements that will see the child have substantial and significant time with the father.
Overall this consideration favours the child primarily living with the mother.
Section 60CC(2)(b) – need to protect
This is not a significant consideration save for the mother and father being conscious of the need to not expose the child to their conflict either verbally or by conduct as it appears happened post-separation. The nature and extent of the conflict and any violence at the hands of the father awaits a fuller examination at final hearing.
The additional considerations: s 60CC(3)
The child is of a young age and although she expressed some views to the family consultant they understandably focused on her attachment to her old school. However the practical considerations of travel and a determination as to primary residence must overshadow any weight to be afforded to the child’s wishes as to schooling.
The nature of the relationship between each of the parents is discussed above and they both need to look introspectively at the way in which they are managing their interpersonal relationship. Neither has any real reflective capacity as to the needs of their child. Both have made life choices that provide some misgivings that they have placed their own needs ahead of those of this little girl.
The child enjoys relationships with extended family.
Both parents until separation appear to have taken the opportunity to participate in making decisions about the long-term issues in relation to the child until the mother’s unilateral decision to relocate the child’s schooling.
There is no evidence as to the child support obligations in existence but each parent in the context of the earlier shared care arrangement assumed their obligation to maintain the child.
The likely effect of change relates to the primary residence issue and the child’s change of schooling by the mother and yet again another change as proposed by the father. The change to the child’s school has been considered above. A return to the old school and thus residing with the father would emasculate the mother’s time with the child by reason of distance. Retention of the new school would see the child in the primary care of the mother and on the parties agreed alternatives the child having substantial and significant time with the father. Such proposal to some extent deals with the father’s complaint about the child in before and after school care on some days. The mother does not work Mondays and the father would collect the child each Wednesday and alternate Friday from school (or after school care if he arranges) and return the child to school each Thursday morning and each alternate Monday. His weekends should coincide with the weekend the mother is required to work.
Save for the school community, the parties’ residential dislocation has, it is to be inferred, ended the child’s social capital in the Suburb E area so far as after school and extra-curricular activities are concerned. Yet there is no evidence of such so it is to be inferred it was an insignificant issue. However such social capital needs to be generated with the child living in an area where she can develop friendships at school, after school and in extracurricular activities and not at some remote distance from her day-to-day school environment.
Should there be an order that the child reside with him and thus change schools as sought by the father there is a risk that at final hearing there could be a further change that may well reflect the mother’s proposal for primary residence with her and schooling. It is not appropriate to expose the child to unnecessary change in interim circumstances.
There is no practical difficulty or expense considerations as to the child spending time and communicating with each of the parents save for the exigency of distance. However that is significantly ameliorated should the child live with the mother. Perhaps into the future the parents may look at the child’s needs in terms of their long-term geographic residential proposals.
Clearly the capacity of each of the parents to provide for the needs of the child, including the child’s emotional and intellectual needs, is largely overshadowed by their ongoing conflictual relationship in the context of which they both reveal little reflective capacity as to the needs of the child. They have to date prioritised their own conflict and needs over the interests of this little girl. No doubt this aspect of their relationship will be an issue at final trial.
The child is young and requires an ongoing and consistent relationship with each of her parents so as to ensure that both primary and secondary attachments are properly developed and that she is able to move freely without anxiety between her parents. This is indicative of an arrangement where she resides with the mother and spends substantial and significant time with the father as referred to above.
Both parents have demonstrated an inappropriate attitude to the child and their responsibilities of parenthood by reason of their conflict and self-interest. The child asserts that she was exposed to the father’s violent conduct necessitating her hiding, the mother’s unilateral change of schooling, the parties own choices as to residence location, their conflictual relationship and lack of communication should give them both cause for reflection in the interests of the child. An engagement in a post-separation parenting program may well facilitate some improvement in their interpersonal relationship.
There is an strong inference of family violence perpetrated by the father by reason of the child’s statements to the family consultant and the complaints of the mother although denied by the father. The existence, nature and extent of same awaits final hearing.
The present application is an interim application and final parenting orders will no doubt await a resolution by agreement or a final hearing.
There is no other relevant fact or circumstance.
A consideration of the factors referred to above clearly indicate that an order that the child on an interim basis primarily reside with the mother is in the child’s best interests. From that conclusion the child’s school is readily determined.
The question of children’s schooling was considered by the Full Court of the Family Court in Re G: Children’s Schooling [2000] FamCA 462. The Full Court in re-exercising the discretion proceeded on the basis that (at [64]):
Although there is no legal presumption in favour of the residence parent and, correspondingly, no hurdle or onus faced by the other parent, that is not to say that the reality of the children residing predominantly with one parent has no relevance.
Cronin J in Kirkland and Granger [2007] FamCA 1471 said at [60]:
There is little doubt therefore that an impasse between parents relating to both current and future education is a matter within the definition of parental responsibility and one which should the parties not be able to agree upon, a court should step in to their shoes. The Act gives no guidance as to how that decision making process is to occur save that any decision must be in the best interests of the child. Section 65D (1) says that the court may make such parenting order as it thinks proper.
Young J in Raymond and Harold [2009] FamCA 155 said at [204]:
There are many reported decisions of this court dealing with the determination of the appropriate school, the most often cited of which is the decision of the Full Court (Nicholson CJ, Kay and Brown JJ) in Re G: Children’s Schooling (2000) FamCA 462 where the various factors considered by that court on the schooling issue included:
othe wishes of the child, where appropriate;
oany prior agreement in relation to schooling;
oany change to the existing arrangements;
oany anxiety which the child may experience as a result of changing peer groups
othe views of the parents about the aspect of change upon the child;
othe travel time to school;
othe costs of education;
oany particulate issue that may have a real impact upon the child and his immediate schooling and social environment
The above list of matters are not exhaustive. They vary from case to case and are always to be tailored to the individual needs of the child.
Many of those considerations are discussed above.
Overall it is the child’s best interests that she reside primarily with the mother and remain in her new school.
Orders will be made accordingly.
I certify that the preceding eighty-five (85) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for judgment of the Honourable Justice Foster delivered on 22 January 2016.
Associate:
Date: 22 January 2016
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