Viduka and Viduka
[2017] FamCA 292
•10 May 2017
FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA
| VIDUKA & VIDUKA | [2017] FamCA 292 |
| FAMILY LAW – CHILDREN – Final orders – where mother seeks to extend her time with the child –where mother says previous consent orders were not made with her consent – where mother has a history of family violence – where best interests of the child considered – where Court considered it appropriate for mother to spend graduating time with the child – orders made. |
Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) ss 69CC, 69ZW, 79A
Family Law Rules 2004 (Cth)
Vasser & Taylor-Black (2007) 37 Fam LR 256 |
| APPLICANT: | Ms Viduka |
| RESPONDENT: | Mr Viduka |
| INDEPENDENT CHILDREN’S LAWYER: |
| FILE NUMBER: | ADC | 1114 | of | 2016 |
| DATE DELIVERED: | 10 May 2017 |
| PLACE DELIVERED: | Adelaide |
| PLACE HEARD: | Adelaide |
| JUDGMENT OF: | Berman J |
| HEARING DATE: | 2 March 2017 and 1 May 2017 |
REPRESENTATION
| COUNSEL FOR THE APPLICANT: | Ms O'Connor SC |
| SOLICITOR FOR THE APPLICANT: | Johnston Withers |
| COUNSEL FOR THE RESPONDENT: | Mr Wabnitz |
| SOLICITOR FOR THE RESPONDENT: | Daniel John Lawyers | |
| COUNSEL FOR THE INDEPENDENT CHILDREN’S LAWYER: | Mr Hemsley | |
| SOLICITOR FOR THE INDEPENDENT CHILDREN’S LAWYER: | Legal Services Commission of South Australia | |
Orders
until further order
That Order 4 of Orders made 15 April 2016 is suspended.
That B born … 2014 (“the child”) spend time with the wife as follows:-
(a)From 10.00 am to 5.00 pm each Monday commencing 15 May 2017 and concluding 5 June 2017;
(b)From 10.00 am to 5.00 pm each Friday commencing 12 May 2017 and concluding on 2 June 2017;
(c)From 10.00 am to 5.00 pm on Friday 16 June 2017 and each alternate week thereafter;
(d)From 10.00 am Saturday to 5.00 pm Sunday commencing 10 June 2017 and each alternate weekend concluding on 25 June 2017;
(e)From 3.30 pm Friday to 5.00 pm Sunday commencing 7 July 2017 and each alternate weekend thereafter.
That the time spent with the child on 12, 15, 19 and 22 May 2017 be generally supervised by the maternal grandparents or either of them PROVIDING that they shall be required to be in substantial attendance and within the general proximity of the child, but without the necessity to be physically present at all times.
That handover arrangements shall take place at the Suburb D Police Station with the parties to be at liberty to nominate a family member to effect such handover.
Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry of the order in the Court’s records.
IT IS NOTED that publication of this judgment by this Court under the pseudonym Viduka & Viduka has been approved by the Chief Justice pursuant to s 121(9)(g) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth).
Note: This copy of the Court’s Reasons for Judgment may be subject to review to remedy minor typographical or grammatical errors (r 17.02A(b) of the Family Law Rules 2004 (Cth)), or to record a variation to the order pursuant to r 17.02 Family Law Rules 2004 (Cth).
| FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA AT ADELAIDE |
FILE NUMBER: ADC 1114 of 2016
| Ms Viduka |
Applicant
And
| Mr Viduka |
Respondent
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
INTRODUCTION
By Initiating Application filed 21 October 2016 JOSPIA VIDUKA (“the wife”) seeks orders pursuant to s 79A of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) (“the Act”) to set aside a property order made by a Registrar of the Family Court of Australia on 15 April 2016 but requires discovery and valuations of the interests of the parties in property before being able to particularise the orders that she seeks.
The wife also seeks orders that she have the sole parental responsibility for B born in 2014 (“the child”) and that the child live with her and spend such time with Mr Viduka (“the husband”) as may be agreed between the parties.
On 15 April 2016 the parties entered into a consent order pursuant to rule 10.15 of the Family Law Rules 2004 (Cth) which provided for settlement of property and the following parenting orders:-
(1)That the parties have equal shared parental responsibility for the child;
(2)That the child live with the husband;
(3)That the child spends time with the wife as agreed between the parties.
By Amended Response filed 3 April 2017, the husband seeks to dismiss the wife’s application pursuant to s 79A of the Act and seeks the following parenting orders:-
(1)That the orders made 15 April 2016 (mistakenly written as 15 April 2014) be set aside;
(2)That the father have sole parental responsibility for the said child;
(3)That the child live with the father;
(4)That neither party shall denigrate or permit any other person to denigrate the other party or any member of the other party’s family or friends in the presence or hearing of the child.
On 5 December 2016 Judge Cole of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia ordered that the parties attend a conciliation conference in an attempt to resolve the property dispute, that the Department for Child Protection provide relevant documents pursuant to s 69ZW of the Act and that SAPOL provide documents that refer to any report or notification of child abuse allegations or allegations of family violence involving either of the parties or the child.
Judge Cole also ordered the appointment of an Independent Children’s Lawyer (“ICL”) and the parties were ordered to provide to the ICL information in respect of the identity and communication details of any medical practitioner, counsellor or other professional engaged with the child.
The proceedings were then transferred to the Family Court of Australia.
On 16 January 2017 leave was granted to the parties and their legal representatives to inspect and copy documents produced pursuant to s 69ZW of the Act.
I heard brief submissions on 2 March 2017 and adjourned the proceedings for argument to 1 May 2017 to enable the parties to file any further affidavit material to be relied upon by 31 March 2017.
The child has not spent any time with the mother since 19 July 2016. Whilst the mother seeks orders that the child return to her primary care, the submissions of senior counsel were directed to the need for time to resume with the mother, but at this stage it is not expected that the child will transition to her primary care.
BACKGROUND
The wife was born in 1988 and is 28 years of age. The husband was born in 1980 and is 37 years of age.
The wife alleges that the parties commenced a sexual relationship in June 2002 when she was 13 years of age and the husband was 22 years of age.
The parties lived together in the home of the paternal grandmother. The parties married in 2013 and the child was born in 2014. The wife alleges that the parties separated on 27 March 2016 but remained living separately and apart under the same roof.
In support of the divorce order, the husband filed an affidavit on 8 April 2016 asserting that the parties separated on 1 July 2014, but because the wife’s family were not able to accommodate her, the parties remained living under the same roof.
The Application for Divorce filed 31 March 2016 refers to the date of separation as 1 July 2014 and in relation to the arrangements for the child the following is said at paragraph 28:-
[B]oth parents have access to equal time and communication with the child at any time as currently they are living in the same house, the father is fulltime carer for the child, mother is working full time.
In relation to the future arrangements the following is stated at paragraph 29:-
Mother of the child has plans to move out of the husband’s home within the next 8 weeks and the child will remain living full time with his father and in his care full time, the mother will have full access to the child as agreed upon by both parents.
The mother seeks that the consent orders be set aside. She resiles from any assertion that the parties separated in 2014 and considers that the relationship ended in March 2016.
Her explanation for her consent to the orders is summarised in paragraph 17 of her affidavit of 21 October 2016:-
The husband would constantly threaten that if I did not sign the documents as he wanted, or disputed any of the facts, I would never see my child and the husband would send sexually explicit photographs and video of me to family members, my workplace and post on social media. I did not know whether the husband had any photographs or video of me or not. I genuinely believed the husband would act on his threats.
The husband was represented by a lawyer who drafted the minute of consent. The wife was self-represented and did not obtain any legal advice. She alleges that she did not dispute the erroneous information as contained in the consent orders or the divorce application because she was fearful of the husband. At separation she states that the husband kept control of her car, her mobile phone and would rarely leave her alone in the home. The husband was with her when he finalised the consent minute and then drove the wife to a Justice of the Peace to enable her to sign the document. The husband denies that the wife’s consent was anything other than willing and informed. He denies that they entered into any sexual relationship prior to July 2011 when she was 23 years of age.
The consent order was what he considered to be an amicable agreement and at all times the wife was free to obtain her own separate and independent legal advice. To the extent that the husband considered this important, he says that he offered to pay for the wife to obtain the assistance of a solicitor but she refused his offer.
As further corroboration of the wife’s independence, the husband annexes correspondence at “DV-2” to his affidavit of 1 December 2016 forwarded to a Registrar of the Court asking for the orders to be made as a matter of priority and in any event, prior to her departure from Australia on 7 May 2016.
The tenor of the correspondence was a request by the wife that the consent order be finalised prior to her departure and, at the latest, by 27 April 2016. The wife provided contact details to enable a Registrar to speak to her if necessary.
The wife alleges that the husband’s behaviour during the course of the relationship and whilst they were together was erratic, unpredictable and violent. Following the wife leaving the home she says that the husband threatened to kill her parents and has threatened to kill her in her sleep.
She provides detail of the husband’s anger if food was not cooked according to his wishes, his aggression to other road users when driving and the consequences for her if she refused to participate in sexual acts with the husband or not to display enthusiastic interest in pornography.
The husband’s aggressive and violent conduct was not limited to the wife and he was abusive towards the child in terms of his rough handling of the child and on occasion holding the child upside down by the ankles.
On 7 November 2015 the wife reports that the husband injured the family dog so badly that it had to be put down.
The wife did not report any of the husband’s behaviour to the police whilst they were together, nor after separation, because of her fear that he would distribute sexually explicit material.
On 19 July 2016 the wife was spoken to by the police and subsequently charged with aggravated assault against the husband and the child. An interim Intervention Order was put in place on 28 July 2016 listing both the husband and the child as protected persons.
Paragraph 132 of the affidavit filed 21 October 2016 sets out the times that the child has spent with the wife as and from 29 April 2016. Whilst there are numerous occasions, there has been no overnight time. The last time that the child spent time with the wife was on 19 July 2016.
A Notice of Risk was filed by the wife on 21 October 2016 alleging that the child has been abused by the husband, that the child is at risk of further abuse and that there has been family violence perpetrated to the wife in that:-
(1)The husband has held a knife to the throat and the stomach of the wife.
(2)The husband has emotionally abused the wife including forcing her to sleep in another room if she has refused to have sex with the husband or watch pornography.
(3)An interim Intervention Order is in place with the husband and the parties’ child as protected persons and the wife as defendant.
(4)The wife has been charged with aggravated assault against the husband and parties’ child.
The husband alleges that the entire relationship was “marred with acts of family violence that were perpetrated by the mother upon the child and myself”.
In his affidavit of 1 December 2016 the husband rejects any allegation that he manipulated, coerced or forced the wife to sign an application for consent orders. At paragraph 11 of his affidavit he denies that there are any photographs or video footage of the wife that are sexually explicit, nor does he concede that he threatened to disseminate sexually explicit material.
He records that he told the wife to leave the home in March 2016 when he discovered her naked allegedly attempting to engage the child in oral sex.
There is also a reference to the mother committing acts of bestiality at the time that she was pregnant.
The husband alleges that on 19 July 2016 the wife attended at his home and stabbed him with a knife. She punched the child in the forehead and deliberately hit the child’s head on a doorframe. She then threatened to burn down the house and to commit suicide and kill the child prior to her own death. A round mirror in the entry hall was smashed by her. The wife’s behaviour was witnessed by the husband’s brother, Mr C Viduka.
The husband reported the incident to the police and the wife was charged with one count of aggravated assault and one count of property damage. The charges were listed for trial in the Adelaide Magistrates Court on 15 February 2017.
The husband was arrested on 23 November 2016 and charged with offenses of bestiality, sexual manipulation and persistent sexual abuse.
By reference to a Notice of Risk filed 1 December 2016, the husband alleges that the child is at risk in the care of the wife and alleges at paragraph 2:-
The mother also regularly physically struck the child during our relationship, by punching him on the back of his head, pinching him, kicking him, throwing the child across the room, throwing objects at the child…
He further considers that the child is at “an extreme level of physical, sexual and emotional abuse” in the wife’s care and that both he and the child have been the victims of family violence.
The wife was also observed to commit an act of bestiality with two dogs.
On 8 March 2017 all charges and the interim Intervention Order against the wife were dismissed or discharged. She sought to spend time with the child but all requests have been refused.
The wife corroborates the husband’s evidence in respect of criminal charges that he has pending in that on 22 November 2016 she made a statement to the police that she and the husband had commenced a sexual relationship when she was about 13 years of age, that the husband had filmed her engaged in sexual activity and that he had committed a sexual act with a dog. The husband has been charged with serious offences and he next appears in court on 4 May 2017. The husband denies the charges and intends to plead not guilty.
In his affidavit filed 31 March 2017 the husband sets out the history of family violence between 14 October 2012 and 19 July 2016. The husband kept a record of the “major” incidents but it is notable that the majority of the incidents occurred prior to the consent orders being made on 15 April 2016.
It is difficult to reconcile the agreement reached between the parties that the child spend time with the wife as agreed and the child’s actual time with the wife given the allegations of physical, emotional, sexual and verbal abuse allegedly perpetrated by the wife at paragraph 29 of his affidavit.
The husband explains the agreement between the parties by reference to paragraph 46 of his affidavit:-
It was also an express term of the agreed arrangement, although also not recorded in the Consent Orders, that the mother’s time with [the child] would be supervised by the maternal grandmother. I say that a clear indication that the mother knew this to be a condition of that agreed arrangement was that the maternal grandmother accompanied her to almost all of the visitations with [the child] that took place following 15 April 2016.
Paragraph 47 to 53 explains the husband’s change of attitude towards the maternal grandparents’ supervising the time. He considers that the wife’s parents have had no influence upon her and that they are not appropriately protective of the child.
For reasons that are not clearly understood, the husband also opposes the wife spending time with the child at a children’s contact centre because of fears that the wife would “kill the child by poisoning him” and “will continue to emotionally abuse the child in the supervised setting”.
The only conclusion that can be drawn from the husband’s affidavit is that he remains intractably opposed to the child spending any time with the wife irrespective of any terms and conditions of supervision.
Senior counsel for the wife makes the appropriate point that in respect of the times that the child has spent with the wife, the maternal grandmother may or may not have been present and it does not appear to have been a stated condition, a requirement or a concession by the wife.
LEGAL PRINCIPLES
In M v M (1988) 166 CLR 69 the Full Court considered the manner in which an allegation of sexual abuse (and by necessary corollary overt family violence) should be treated. Their Honours considered that treating an allegation of sexual abuse or family violence as a paramount issue was an error.
In Vasser & Taylor-Black (2007) 37 Fam LR 256 the Full Court considered that the High Court decision in M v M (supra) had become the “touchstone” of the principles to be applied in cases of asserted unacceptable risk of any kind. Their Honours quoted, with approval the following passage from M v M (supra) found at pages 75-78:-
In proceedings under Pt VII of the Act in relation to a child, the court is enjoined to “regard the welfare of the child as the paramount consideration” (s 60D). The paramountcy of this consideration in proceedings for custody or access is preserved by s 64(1). The consequence is that the ultimate and paramount issue to be decided in proceedings for custody of, or access to, a child is whether the making of the order sought is in the interests of the welfare of the child. The fact that the proceedings involve an allegation that the child has been sexually abused by the parent who seeks custody or access does not alter the paramount and ultimate issue which the court has determined, though the court’s findings on the disputed allegation of sexual abuse will naturally have an important, perhaps a decisive, impact on the resolution of that issue.
But it is a mistake to think that the Family Court is under the same duty to resolve in a definitive way the disputed allegation of sexual abuse as a court exercising criminal jurisdiction would be if it were trying the party for a criminal offence. Proceedings for custody and access are not disputes inter partes in the ordinary sense of that expression; Reynolds v Reynolds (1973) 47 ALJR 499; 1 ALR 318; McKee v McKee (1951) AC 352 at 364-5. In proceedings of that kind the court is not enforcing a parental right of custody or right to access. The court is concerned to make such an order for custody or access which will in the opinion of the court best promote and protect the interests of the child. In deciding what order it should make the court will give very great weight to the importance of maintaining parental ties, not so much because parents have a right to custody or access, but because it is prima facie in a child’s interests to maintain the filial relationship with both parents: compare J v Lieschke (1987) 162 CLR 447; 69 ALR 647; 11 Fam LR 417 at 450, 458, 462, 463-4.
Viewed in this setting, the resolution of an allegation of sexual abuse against a parent is subservient and ancillary to the court’s determination of what is in the best interests of the child. The Family Court’s consideration of the paramount issue which it is enjoined to decide cannot be diverted by the supposed need to arrive at a definitive conclusion on the allegation of sexual abuse. The Family Court’s wide-ranging discretion to decide what is in the child’s best interests cannot be qualified by requiring the court to try the case as if it were no more than a contest between the parents to be decided solely by reference to the acceptance or rejection of the allegation of sexual abuse on the balance of probabilities.
In considering an allegation of sexual abuse, the court should not make a positive finding that the allegation is true unless the court is so satisfied according to the civil standard of proof, with due regard to the factors mentioned in Briginshaw v Briginshaw (1938) 60 CLR 336; [1938] ALR 334 at 362. There Dixon J said:-
The seriousness of an allegation made, the inherent unlikelihood of an occurrence of a given description, or the gravity of the consequences flowing from a particular finding are considerations which must affect the answer to the question whether the issue has been proved to the reasonable satisfaction of the tribunal. In such matters “reasonable satisfaction” should not be produced by inexact proofs, indefinite testimony, or indirect inferences.
Further, the Court said:-
In resolving the wider issue the court must determine whether on the evidence there is a risk of sexual abuse occurring if custody or access be granted and assessing the magnitude of that risk. After all, in deciding what is in the best interests of a child, the Family Court is frequently called upon to assess and evaluate the likelihood or possibility of events or occurrences which, if they come about, will have a detrimental impact on the child’s welfare. The existence and magnitude of the risk of sexual abuse, as with other risks of harm to the welfare of the child, is a fundamental matter to be taken into account in deciding issues of custody and access. In access cases, the magnitude of risk may be less if the order in contemplation is supervised access. Even in such a case, however, there may be a risk of disturbance to a child who is compulsorily brought into contact with a parent who has sexually abused her or whom the child believes to have sexually abused her. But that is not the issue in this case.
It therefore follows that the following propositions can be made:-
(a)I am not required to resolve whether on the balance of probabilities a parent has sexually abused a child;
(b)I am required to make parenting orders that promote and facilitate the best interests of the child and in doing so am entitled to place substantial weight on the importance of maintaining a meaningful relationship;
(c)The resolution of any allegation in respect to sexual abuse is always subservient to a determination of what is in the child’s best interests having regard to taking into account the primary and additional considerations in respect of s 60CC of the Act but giving proper recognition to the interplay between s 60CC(2) and s 60CC(2A);
(c)Unless satisfied on the balance of probabilities, the Court should be reluctant to make a finding as to the veracity of any allegation made;
(d)The Court should “assess and evaluate the likelihood or possibility of events or occurrences which, if they come about, will have a detrimental impact on the child’s welfare”. M & M (supra). It is therefore not the end of the matter if a Court is not able to make a finding that sexual abuse has occurred on the balance of probabilities;
(e)The risk of harm to a child is central to a determination of the parental arrangements. A Court is required to assess the magnitude or weight to be given to any risk and then to balance it against other counter-veiling factors which together must be considered to determine what is in the child’s best interests. Supervision is not in all cases a panacea but rather must be added to the mix of considerations in determining the appropriate balance between the benefit to a child of continuing a meaningful relationship and whether orders made would expose a child to an unacceptable risk.
PARENTING PRINCIPLES
As discussed, the allegations made by each of the parties against the other are extreme.
The husband details acts of family violence perpetrated by the wife both before and after separation and before and after the making of the consent orders.
The family violence was purportedly directed to both the husband and the child. The husband also alleges that the wife engaged in inappropriate sexual conduct with the child and that bestiality featured in the wife’s conduct.
The husband relies upon affidavits filed by his brother and his mother filed 3 April 2017 to corroborate his allegation that the wife was violent and aggressive. The husband’s brother attests to his observations of the wife throwing knives, mugs, plates, timber, rocks and other items at the husband and that he has observed her punch the child in the head and cross his entire body both with an open hand and a closed fist.
He asserts overhearing the wife stating an intention to poison the child if the only time that she can have with the child is supervised. The maternal grandmother makes similar allegations.
The wife alleges that the husband is violent, controlling and coercive in his interaction with her.
She highlights that whilst the police have determined not to proceed with the criminal charges laid against her and arising out of the incident on 19 July 2016, they are proceeding with serious charges against the husband.
Without being able to determine on the balance of probabilities the veracity of the parties’ allegations against the other, it could not be said that I can determine who is more likely to be telling the truth.
The parties entered into a consent order which provided for the child to live with the husband, but to spend time with the wife as agreed. There was no suggestion that the time spent was subject to any condition of supervision and the history of time spent would not suggest that supervision was a requirement.
If the wife’s behaviour was as extreme as is documented by the husband, he does not explain why he facilitated the child spending unsupervised time with the wife, or even consider that the parties should share the parental responsibility, with the orders being conditional only upon the agreement of the parties.
Until the alleged incident on 19 July 2016, there is no document that exists between the parties – save for the husband’s notes of the mother’s violence – that suggest other than each of them are suitable parents and that the child is safe in their respective care.
What is not explained is why the child has not spent time with the wife since 19 July 2016 in circumstances where the consent order was predicated upon the parties accepting that the child’s best interests were served by maintaining and promoting a meaningful relationship with each of the child’s parents.
The opposition by the husband to the child spending any time with the wife, even in the secure circumstances of a children’s contact service, is disingenuous. The reasons for opposition as raised by the husband are nonsensical and the suspicion is raised that the husband is not keen to see a relationship develop between the wife and the child.
Each of the parties have filed further Notices of Child Abuse, Family Violence or Risk of Family Violence. In his document filed 5 April 2017, the husband considers that the child is at an extreme risk of physical, sexual and emotional abuse in the wife’s care. In her document filed 20 April 2017, the wife asserts that the child remains at significant risk of violence in the husband’s care and emotional abuse in his refusal to facilitate any time between the child and the wife.
The husband also refers to a text message purportedly sent by the wife to him on 31 March 2016 being annexure “VD-13” to his affidavit of 3 April 2017. The husband relies upon the text message in respect of the following reference to the child:-
…I don’t want to be married and definitely don’t want to stay home with that fucking devil son of ours! That sounds bad…but he hates me…he hugs you and hits me. I can’t handle looking after him and you know I will neglect him physically, emotionally and every which way… I love him…But can not be with him! You have not done anything wrong, you have been a good provider, a good husband and satisfied me…but like I said I have cravings and major issues as you agree. I mean for christ sake I got rid of my husband and son in Victoria so I could be in peace to fuck my boyfriend. Im sorry if I have exposed you and [the child] to any STI, but the tests will hopefully come back negative…
The wife does not accept that she forwarded the text message and she alleges that this is a concoction by the husband.
It is in this child’s interests that he resume a relationship with the wife. At his age, the longer that he does not spend time with her the more difficult it may be in the future for a bond to be established.
Notwithstanding the allegations that the husband directs against the wife, I cannot ignore the history of time spent with the child in circumstances where the husband apparently had the many indiscretions of the wife documented and therefore in the forefront of his mind.
THE INDEPENDENT CHILDREN’S LAWYER
Counsel for the ICL submitted that a resumption of time between the child and the wife was important and that the only impediment to a resumption of significant time was that the child has not seen his mother for 10 months. She will be unfamiliar to him and there will need to be some effort taken in order to re-establish a relationship.
The ICL was uncertain as to whether there should be overnight time, but the introduction of overnight time was not conditional upon a determination of the truthfulness of the husband’s allegations directed against the wife, but rather, the extent to which the child is able to re-establish a relationship with the wife.
A factor not touched upon by either of the parties or the ICL is the extent to which the husband is likely to support a resumption of time.
CURRENT CIRCUMSTANCES
The wife continues to reside in her parent’s home. The husband acknowledges that the maternal grandparents were important to the child and it was his submission that the consent order was predicated upon the maternal grandmother supervising the wife’s time. It is only after the event that the husband’s position has changed and he now considers that the maternal grandmother would not be able to protect the child or control the wife.
CONCLUSION
In the circumstances of this case and following a careful consideration of the matters referred to in s 69CC of the Act, but with particular focus on the need to protect the child, I consider that there should be a resumption of time which provides initially for some supervision by the maternal grandparents or either of them, thereafter the time that the child spends with the wife should be unsupervised and a graduation to overnight time.
There is general agreement that given the charges that are pending against the husband, handover should take place at the Suburb D Police Station with each of the parties at liberty to nominate their agent to effect handover arrangements.
I make orders as appear at the commencement of these reasons.
I certify that the preceding seventy eight (78) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for judgment of the Honourable Justice Berman delivered on 10 May 2017.
Associate:
Date: 10 May 2017
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