Vidler v Commissioner of Taxation

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Vidler v Commissioner of Taxation [2010] FCAFC 59

Citation: Vidler v Commissioner of Taxation [2010] FCAFC 59
Appeal from: Vidler v Commissioner of Taxation [2009] FCA 1426
Parties: BRAITH VIDLER v COMMISSIONER OF TAXATION OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA
File number: NSD 1480 of 2009
Judges: SUNDBERG, BENNETT AND NICHOLAS JJ
Date of judgment: 1 June 2010
Catchwords: TAXATION – goods and services tax – “residential premises” – whether vacant land without living facilities can be residential premises – whether residential zoning and access to services sufficient
Legislation: A New Tax System (Goods and Services Tax Act) 1999 (Cth), ss 40‑65, 195‑1
Cases cited:

CIC Insurance Ltd v Bankstown Football Club Ltd (1997) 187 CLR 384 cited
Electrolux Home Products Pty Ltd v Australian Workers’ Union (2004) 221 CLR 309 cited
Marana Holdings Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Taxation (2004) 141 FCR 299 considered and applied
South Steyne Hotel Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Taxation (2009) 180 FCR 409 followed
South Steyne Hotel Pty Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (2009) 71 ATR 228 considered

Date of hearing: 24 May 2010
Place: Sydney
Division: GENERAL DIVISION
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 38
Counsel for the Appellant: IS Young
Solicitor for the Appellant: Robert Richards & Associates
Counsel for the Respondent: DFC Thomas
Solicitor for the Respondent: Australian Taxation Office Legal Services

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

GENERAL DIVISION

NSD 1480 of 2009

ON APPEAL FROM THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
BETWEEN:

BRAITH VIDLER
Appellant

AND:

COMMISSIONER OF TAXATION OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA
Respondent

JUDGES:

SUNDBERG, BENNETT AND NICHOLAS JJ

DATE OF ORDER:

1 JUNE 2010

WHERE MADE:

SYDNEY

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The appeal be dismissed.

2.The appellant pay the respondent’s costs of the appeal.

Note:Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.
The text of entered orders can be located using Federal Law Search on the Court’s website.


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

GENERAL DIVISION

NSD 1480 of 2009

ON APPEAL FROM THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
BETWEEN:

BRAITH VIDLER
Appellant

AND:

COMMISSIONER OF TAXATION OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA
Respondent

JUDGES:

SUNDBERG, BENNETT AND NICHOLAS JJ

DATE:

1 JUNE 2010

PLACE:

SYDNEY

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

THE COURT

BACKGROUND

  1. The appellant purchased land at Gledston Street, North Booval in Ipswich in August 2004 for $1,000,000 and sold it in December 2004 for $2,350,000. The land comprised 2.7 hectares of vacant land and was zoned residential low density. It was connected to the electricity supply but not to the gas, water or sewerage, although access to these services was available at the boundaries of the land.

  2. The appellant purchased land at Gladstone Road, Sadliers Crossing in Ipswich in May 2004 for $175,000 and sold it in April 2005 for $285,900. Access to electricity, water and sewerage was available, but the services were not in fact connected.

  3. The appellant did not pay goods and services tax…

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Details
Case
[2010] FCAFC 59
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Vidler v Commissioner of Taxation involved a dispute concerning the application of the goods and services tax (GST) to vacant land. The appellant contested the Commissioner's decision that the vacant land, which was sold without any shelter or basic living facilities, did not qualify as "residential premises" under section 40-65(1) of the GST Act. The matter was heard and determined by the Federal Court of Australia.

The central legal issue before the court was whether vacant land, even if zoned for residential purposes and with access to essential services such as water and sewerage, could be classified as "residential premises" for the purposes of the GST Act. The court needed to interpret the definition of "residential premises" and ascertain whether the presence of residential zoning and access to utilities alone could transform vacant land into such premises.

The court concluded that the term "residential premises" required more than just residential zoning and access to utilities. It necessitated that the land or building be "capable" of being occupied as a residence, which included the presence of some facilities ordinarily associated with residency. The court found that the memorandum’s reference to facilities like water and sewerage contemplated structures serviced by these utilities, not merely the potential connection to such services. The court held that vacant land, even with access to utilities, did not meet the statutory definition of "residential premises" unless it included some physical structures or facilities necessary for residential occupation.

The court dismissed the appeal, affirming the primary judge's decision that the vacant land in question was not "residential premises" at the time of sale. Consequently, the appellant was ordered to pay the respondent's costs of the appeal.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal be dismissed.

2. The appellant pay the respondent’s costs of the appeal.

Note:

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

This is a very strained reading of the paragraphs. In the definition’s original form it required only that the land or building be “occupied or intended to be occupied as a residence”. The amendment requiring that the land or building be “capable” of being occupied is an additional requirement. The second sentence of par 1.167 is explaining that additional requirement. Two elements are mentioned: it must be permissible (ie lawful) to use the land for residential purposes, and the land must have some facilities ordinarily associated with residency. However, par 1.167 does not mention vacant land, and the paragraph provides no foundation for a distinction between “bare” vacant land and “serviced” vacant land. The context shows that the memorandum’s use of the word “land” is shorthand for “land or a building”. Furthermore, in our view par 1.168 shows that vacant land (even with such services laid on) does not come within the definition. Reading pars 1.167 and 1.168 together, we regard the memorandum’s reference to the two facilities (water and sewerage) ordinarily associated with residences, as contemplating the existence on the land of structures serviced by water and sewerage, and not, as the appellant would have it, merely the ability to connect vacant land to such services. We agree with the Commissioner’s contention that it would be absurd if the mere existence of a tap in the middle of an acre of vacant land transforms the land into “residential premises” for the purposes of the GST Act. We note in passing that it was common ground that “(ie water and sewerage)” in par 1.167 of the memorandum should be understood as examples of “facilities”, and that “utilities” is a more apt description of the provision of water and sewerage.CONCLUSION The properties here in question were vacant land. At the time of the sales no shelter or basic living facilities were present on the land. No error has been shown in the primary judge’s conclusion that at the time of sale neither parcel of land was “residential premises” within the meaning of s 40‑65(1) of the GST Act because it was not capable of being occupied as a residence or for residential accommodation. As was the case at first instance, we need not determine whether, at the time of sale, the properties were “intended to be occupied, as a residence or for residential accommodation”.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established