Vidler and Vidler

FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA

VIDLER & VIDLER

[2013] FCCA 1176

Catchwords:
FAMILY LAW – Children’s wishes – allegations of family violence and abuse.

Legislation:

Family Law Act 1975, ss.4, 60CC, 60B, 60CA, 61BA, 65DAA

Jones & Dunkell (1959) 101 CLR 298
Harrison & Woollard (1995) FLC 92-598
Re R & R Children’s Wishes [2002] FamCA 43

Applicant:

MR VIDLER

Respondent:

MS VIDLER

File Number:

PAC 2856 of 2012

Judgment of:

Judge Harman

Hearing date:

12 March 2013

Date of Last Submission:

12 March 2013

Delivered at:

Parramatta

Delivered on:

12 March 2013

ORDERS

I discharge all existing parenting orders with respect to the children [X] born [in] 1998 and [Y] born [in] 2000.
The applicant father, Mr Vidler, shall have sole parental responsibility for [X] and [Y].
[X] and [Y] shall live with their father.
Dismiss all outstanding applications and responses and remove all issues from the list of cases awaiting hearing.
Upon the expiration of the Appeal period and in the event that no appeal is lodged that all exhibits then be returned to the party who tendered same and that all material produced on subpoena be returned to the person or organisation who produced same.
Mr Vidler shall notify Ms Vidler of orders made today by forwarding a sealed copy of same to Ms Vidler at her last known address, namely, [omitted], New South Wales, by ordinary prepaid post and within seven days of today’s date.

IT IS NOTED that publication of this judgment under the pseudonym Vidler & Vidler is approved pursuant to s.121(9)(g) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth).

FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT
OF AUSTRALIA
AT PARRAMATTA

PAC 2856 of 2012

MR VIDLER

Applicant

And

MS VIDLER

Respondent

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

These proceedings relate to parenting arrangements for two children or young persons:
a)[X], born [in] 1998, (who will, at the conclusion of this week, turn 15; and
b)[Y], born [in] 2000, (who will, later this year, turn 13 years of age)
The parties to the proceedings are the children’s father, Mr Vidler, who is the applicant, and the children’s mother, Ms Vidler, who is the respondent.

Past proceedings and history of litigation

The parties have a history of litigation although not over a significant period of time.
Proceedings were first commenced between the parties on 6 June 2012, at which time Mr Vidler filed an application seeking both parenting and property adjustment orders. With that application was filed a notice of abuse, a financial statement, and affidavits by Mr Vidler as well as a supporting witness.
An amended application was filed shortly thereafter, on 28 August 2012.
Significant allegations were raised in those prior proceedings as to suggestions of drug use and engagement in violent relationships by the respondent, Ms Vidler.
The notice of abuse filed at that time had alleged that the eldest child, [X], had been involved in a physical altercation with his mother and had been wrestled onto the bed whilst held in a headlock and it was suggested that this had caused the child to be choked. Further allegations were raised on the basis of similar allegations of violence and anger directed by Ms Vidler towards at least [X].
The Notice filed also raised a suggestion that Ms Vidler was addicted to patent and prescription medications including codeine and that, as a consequence of that or some other underlying morbidity, there was a pre-determined propensity towards aggression.
A response was filed by Ms Vidler, same having been filed on 20 August 2012. That response, filed at a time when Ms Vidler was legally represented, sought that the children be subject to orders for equal shared parental responsibility and to live in a shared-care arrangement with substantial periods of each week shared between the parents. Ms Vidler’s evidence was that the children had, until that point, lived primarily with her and had done so since birth and certainly since the separation of the parties.
Those proceedings were brought to a conclusion by orders made by consent on 9 October 2012. An Independent Children’s Lawyer had been appointed on the basis of the allegations of abuse raised in those proceedings, there having been two separate notices of abuse filed by Mr Vidler. The Independent Children’s Lawyer had also consented to the orders made.
The orders concluding the prior proceedings provided, insofar as they related to parenting arrangements that the children would live with their mother from 3pm Wednesday until 7pm Saturday in each week together with periods on special occasions.
Thus the orders provided that the children would live in a shared-care arrangement and be in their mother’s care from Wednesday afternoon till Saturday evening and in their father’s care from Saturday evening until Wednesday afternoon (or commencement of school) in each week.
In a very short space of time, after the conclusion of those proceedings, a period of less than three weeks, a further application initiating proceedings was filed by Mr Vidler commencing these, fresh proceedings.
Mr Vidler’s application was filed on 26 October 2012 and sought orders in the following terms:
a)That the father have sole parental responsibility for the children; and,
b)That the mother pay the applicant father’s costs.
The same orders were sought on an interim and final basis.
Together with the application an affidavit by Mr Vidler and a notice of abuse were filed.
The notice of abuse filed on this occasion suggested that there were ongoing concerns with respect to violence. It related specifically to an alleged incident on 11 October 2012, two days after the making of final orders by consent, wherein it was suggested that at a changeover of the children between the parents occurring at a McDonald’s restaurant, that Ms Vidler had thrown a hot beverage at the father whilst he was seated in his car and had thrown [X]’s iPod and thrown an almost full bottle of water at the father, (all of which are alleged to have struck him), and had screamed and yelled at both the father and at [X].
These proceedings having been commenced, a number of subpoenas were issued and that material has been produced and released. None of that material is before the Court today.
A further amended application was filed on 14 December 2012. The further amended application seeks orders by reference to the earlier consent orders and which would interfere with them and effect some minor changes and which would provide, ultimately, for the children to live primarily with Mr Vidler and spend time with their mother each alternate weekend.
A further amended application was filed on 24 December 2012. That application seeks orders in not dissimilar terms, although continuing to press for an order for sole parental responsibility, for the children to live with their father and spend time with their mother under the supervision of the father or his nominated representative. A mandatory injunction is also sought which would preclude the children being in the presence of or brought into contact with a Mr D, who is suggested to be Ms Vidler’s partner.
Together with the amended application and further amended application a number of additional affidavits have been filed and an additional notice of abuse or family violence has been filed, the most recent of which having been filed 14 December 2012. That notice, by reference to the affidavits filed at the same time, suggest that the mother has been assaulted by her boyfriend, Mr D on or about 9 November or the morning of 10 November, resulting in Ms Vidler suffering a black eye and cut lip.
It is suggested that the child, [Y], who was present with the mother at that time, had been exposed to that violence, (at least within the definition of exposure to family violence contained within section 4AB of the legislation), in that if he did not directly and visually witness the assault, he heard it and saw the detritus of the assault, including what is described as “blood all over his mother’s face”.
The parties discussed that alleged incident with a family consultant at a child dispute conference on 29 January 2013. When the allegation of family violence was put to the mother she had indicated to the family consultant, and the family consultant has reported under the heading “Family Safety Factors”:
The mother said there had been one incident of family violence after the October 2012 orders were made. She claimed that she had been violent towards Mr D but that he had not been violent towards her. The mother said that she was intoxicated at the time and that [Y] had seen her injuries following this incident. She denied that there had been any other instances or violence but said that she did sometimes argue with Mr D.
That is a cause of some concern. It is suggested by Ms Vidler that she has been the perpetrator of violence rather than the victim, but then she has clearly indicated to the family consultant, if one accepts that the family consultant’s report is accurate (and I have no reason to doubt it), that she has been the one who has suffered injuries and that the child has then seen those injuries. The two allegations are inconsistent.
The mother also suggests that at the time of that incident that she was intoxicated. There is no further particularisation or concession as to what is meant by that statement, nor the extent to which alcohol had been consumed nor the extent to which Ms Vidler is suggested to be affected by alcohol nor the extent to which it had affected, impacted upon or precipitated the violence referred to.

Material considered

In these proceedings the mother has not filed a response and does not appear today.
The mother was served and has previously appeared. There is no explanation for her non appearance.
I am satisfied that the mother has been afforded due process and that such considerations neither preclude nor obviate against the matter being concluded today on an undefended basis and for reasons that will become apparent..
In dealing with the father’s application I have had regard to and considered the following:
a)The father’s further amended application;
b)The father’s affidavit filed with his initiating application 26 October 2012;
c)The father’s affidavit filed 14 December 2012;
d)The father’s affidavit filed 24 December 2012;
e)The father’s affidavit filed in court 29 January 2013; and
f)The father’s affidavit filed 8 March 2013.
I have, in addition, had regard to the child dispute conference memo produced following the parties’ attendance 29 January 2013, the orders made on 29 January 2013, (which had included orders with respect to interim parenting which I will return to shortly), together with a notice of intention to withdraw as lawyer and notice of withdrawal of lawyer each filed by the mother’s former attorneys on 25 February 2013. That is a somewhat unusual circumstance but, in any event, those documents are each respectively dated 18 February and 25 February 2013.

Service

The father has deposed in the affidavits referred to above as to his service of material upon the mother’s attorneys at the time that they were retained in the proceedings.
The mother was present and legally represented on 29 January 2013. The mother participated in the Child Dispute Conference that day and was present in Court and legally represented when the matter was dealt with and the proceedings adjourned to today’s date.
The proceedings are today listed at 9.30 and the matter has been called three times outside of the Court at both 9.30am and 10.05am. There has been no response by Ms Vidler nor any person purporting to act on her behalf.
The Court has attempted to telephone Ms Vidler using the mobile phone number held by Mr Vidler and which is corroborated as Ms Vidler’s phone by reference to a number of text messages recited within the material. There was no answer upon that call being placed by the Court and in open Court.
The notice of intention to withdraw as lawyer gives an address for service of Ms Vidler, which is the address to which Mr Vidler has forwarded documents to Ms Vidler by way of service and by express post. I have no reason to doubt that the material has not been received by Ms Vidler as a consequence.
The material also makes clear that Ms Vidler has been advised by her former attorneys that the matter is before the court today. The notice of intention to withdraw erroneously suggests to Ms Vidler that the matter is listed at 10 am rather than 9.30 am. In any event, these reasons have commenced at 10.20am and there is still no appearance by Ms Vidler.
The inaccuracy of the notice of intention to withdraw does not cause me sufficient concern as to a denial of due process or a concern that

Ms Vidler may have been misled as to the time, date or place of attendance. Whilst no notice has specifically been given to Ms Vidler that the matter would be heard in her absence today or, at least, no such notice is apparent from the material that has been read and considered, extensive as that material is, I am satisfied that the matter can and should proceed today on a final and undefended basis.
This arises as:
a)
I am satisfied that Ms Vidler is clearly aware of the proceedings being before the court today and the orders that are sought by

Mr Vidler
b)I am satisfied that there is a benefit to these children of this litigation being brought to a conclusion
c)I am satisfied that the orders that I propose to make, being portions of the orders sought by Mr Vidler, are not contrary to the position advanced by Ms Vidler. That arises from the concessions made by Ms Vidler in the child dispute conference memo as well as by reference to the evidence in the proceedings.
In the Child Dispute Conference Ms Vidler had made clear and as is reported in the memo under the heading “Summary of Agreements Reached”:
The mother said she would agree to [X]’s living and spending time arrangements being as per his wishes and for [Y] to live with his father and for [Y] (and [X] if he wished to do so) to spend time with her for a period of two or three months each Sunday for three hours supervised by the father or when he was unavailable due to work commitments by Ms T, the parent of one of [Y]’s friends.
The mother goes on to give some reasons regarding this.
It is of some concern that it is suggested within the memo that on those concessions being raised with Mr Vidler, that he has not accepted and embraced them as an appropriate concession and acknowledgment of the children’s clearly expressed views and welfare but has, instead, indicated that he “preferred the Court to determine the matter”, which ultimately is what occurred and will occur today. However, there was the real possibility for these parents to have reached an agreement, interim and of longstanding duration or final as a consequence of that Court-funded intervention. However, that may be explicable by reference to the concerns and issues raised and the allegation of family violence and abuse.
The mother has also indicated in text messages, which are annexed to the father’s affidavit, 8 March 2013, and responding to a message from the father, that if she is unable to see the children for other than limited periods of time, that she has indicated:
“I am seriously moving to [P],” [presumably [P]] “if all I can only see the boys once a fortnight, two hours. As you know, I extremely alone here, and if I want to see my babies, I’m not sure you encourage it. If you could listen to them as you like, you do not please take,” and the message then concludes.
I am not satisfied that there would be any purpose served or anything gained, particularly as regards Ms Vidler’s participation in the proceedings, in the event that the matter was adjourned to afford some further opportunity for her to participate. I note that the orders made on 29 January 2013 provided, as regards Ms Vidler’s time with the children that time would occur on each Saturday for not less than two hours, commencing 2 February 2013, and that such time was to occur at the home of the paternal grandparents, with some reservations as to affording some privacy.
An order was consented to on that occasion that [X] would be at liberty to spend time with his mother, but that would be entirely a matter for his views and wishes. Orders were made on a final and consensual basis regarding the children’s future school attendance, it also having been a cause of concern and controversy.
Importantly, an order was also made that the mother spend time with [Y] conditional upon her providing fortnightly drug tests that showed and demonstrated that she has not consumed illicit drugs or any drugs not prescribed to her by her current doctor, being a Dr P, nor any drug containing codeine.
The concerns and allegations raised by the father relating to the mother’s alleged dependence upon Nurofen Plus, codeine and other similar patent medication is significant.
The father’s evidence makes clear that the mother has failed to provide any drug test outcome. Thus, I am satisfied by reference to authorities such as Jones & Dunkel (1959) 101 CLR 298 that I can and should accept the veracity of the allegations raised by the father as to the mother’s addiction to those substances. The mother has been afforded the opportunity to scientifically address if not disprove those allegations and has failed to do so.
The above arises in the context whereby the allegation, having been raised, the mother has made some limited concessions with respect to the allegation, including her report to the child dispute conference reporter that she had quite recently, and no later than January 2012, completed an inpatient rehabilitation project through [omitted] relating to such use, and has proposed and consented to an order for testing. In those circumstances I find that that the mother is, in all probability, abusing those substances.
The mechanism by which the mother could forensically and scientifically disprove that allegation was made available to her and she has declined to cooperate with that Court ordered evidence gathering tool. Further, I am satisfied that what the mother has to the father by text messages would suggest that she has contemplated abandonment of, if she has not if fact abandoned, the proceedings and, thus, a relationship with the children.
The mother was also ordered on 29 January 2013 to file a response and affidavit material. That material was to be filed no later than close of business 1 March 2013. No material has been filed.
Whilst there is no affidavit of service before the Court today, the mother had clearly been served with the father’s application initiating proceedings filed 26 October 2012 on an expeditious basis and, thus, by reference to the Federal Magistrates Court Rules2001, a response and affidavit material were to have been filed within 14 days of service and by mid-November. Thus, a period now of approximately four months has passed and the mother has not taken any active step to participate in these proceedings. I have no confidence that she would take any active step to participate in the proceedings if the matter were further adjourned.
The mother has not appeared today to prosecute any application or to seek any adjournment. She has made no application to appear by telephone. Thus, in all of those circumstances, I am satisfied that the matter can and should proceed to finality. I am also satisfied in that regard by reference to the provisions of s.60CC, to which I now turn.

Legislative Considerations

In dealing with the substantive provisions of the application I am required to commence with a consideration of the objects and principles set out in s.60B. Those objects and principles require the Court to ensure that the best interests of children are met by ensuring that they have the benefit of both their parents having a meaningful involvement in their lives, that they are protected from physical and psychological harm, and that they are properly and adequately parented.

There is some concern, on the present evidence, that the mother has exposed the children to at least psychological harm and including, in relation to [Y], through his exposure to family violence.
As the matter is undefended I accept the father’s evidence and make findings of fact in accordance with that evidence. It is unchallenged and undisputed. Notwithstanding that by the operation of the Federal Circuit Court Rules and orders of this Court made 29 January 2013 the mother was to have filed material putting into issue any matter in dispute she has not done so.
On that basis, and by reference to s.60CC(2A), I must be concerned to ensure a prioritisation of the children’s protection from the matters complained of by the father.
Section 60CA reminds the Court that in all that is done, the child’s best interests are the paramount consideration.
I must determine whether the presumption of equal shared parental responsibility applies pursuant to s.61BA.
I am satisfied by reference to the above findings that family violence has occurred which would constitute not only family violence to which the child is exposed, but would, by reference to s.4 on the definition of “abuse”, constitute abuse by the child’s exposure thereto.
On that basis, I am satisfied that the presumption does not apply.
In any event and lest I am wrong in that regard and noting that the orders made on 9 October 2012 (by consent and on a final basis) were silent on the issue of parental responsibility, I am satisfied that the presumption, if it were found to apply, would be rebutted as being contrary to the child’s best interests and for reasons that I will deal with as part of the overall address of the father’s application.
In light of the above, equal and substantial and significant time need not be considered pursuant to s.65DAA. In any event there is no application nor agitator of such application for time orders.
In turning to s.60CC, I must commence with the primary considerations, being, the benefit to the child of having a meaningful relationship with both parents and the need to protect the child from physical and psychological harm.
These proceedings, having been commenced after the June 2012 amendment, subsection (2)(a) applies and thus the later consideration is prioritised over the former.
The relationship between Ms Vidler and [X] would appear to have broken down. That would appear to be accepted by Ms Vidler from that which is reported by the family consultant’s memo. That being so, there is then no benefit to the child, at this point in time, of a meaningful relationship or any relationship.
As regards [Y], there is no clear evidence as to his relationship with Ms Vidler at this time. However, he clearly has a meaningful relationship with his father and his brother and continues to live with both.
There is some concern, as regards [Y], that he has been and may in the future be, exposed to physical or psychological harm. That is particularly so in light of his clear exposure to the incident in October 2012 and the disingenuous description, and I am satisfied, attempt by Ms Vidler to minimise the reality of his exposure to and the ferocity of that incident, through that reported in the memo.
In turning to the additional considerations:

(a) Views

Clearly, [X], at 15, is a young man who has expressed a strong and clear view to terminate his relationship with his mother at least at this point in time.
Based upon the material that is before the Court, and which I accept as truthful, there is some good basis for that view in light of the child’s exposure to drug and/or alcohol abuse over some time, which has typified his relationship with his mother as well as, in all probability, his exposure to violence.
Similar considerations apply to [Y].
These are children who will within days, in the case of [X], turn 15, and in the case of his younger sibling, will turn 13 later this year.
By reference to authorities such as Harrison & Woollard (1995) FLC 92-598 and Re R & R Children’s Wishes [2002] FamCA 43, I am satisfied that I should place substantial weight upon the views expressed by [X] in particularly. That is all the more so given the context in which those views have been expressed and the children’s lived experience of their mother’s difficulties.
Whilst clearly the mother has indicated to the family consultant and in material previously filed by her in the prior proceedings that she considers herself to have been the children’s primary carer at all times in the past, the circumstances and context of this case perhaps highlight, as was identified by Warshak, through the title of an article, “Primary Carer Primarily Meaningless”, the falsity of asserting primacy of care as a shield to an application which seeks to change past arrangements.
Clearly, if one accepts that the predominance of time has been spent by these children in their mother’s care up to and including mid-2012, that has been at a time when Ms Vidler has clearly had significant difficulties. She has, on her own admission, spent a period of inpatient rehabilitation through [omitted] attempting to address her drug and/or alcohol problems. Thus, one is again reminded that a simple reference to chronology and quantity of time is of little use or benefit in assessing future arrangements for children, or indeed determining that which the Act requires, being the benefit to a child of a meaningful relationship and meaningful involvement with each parent.
If the mother has had the predominance of time but has been drug and alcohol-affected and in relationships of violence, that is hardly a benefit to the children, and in fact, compels change. Thus, asserting primacy of care or making the allegation that a parent has been the primary parent is irrelevant.

(b) Nature of the child’s relationship with each parent

There is no real evidence as to the children’s present relationship with their mother other than [X]’s rejection of that relationship.
The children clearly have a good relationship and a meaningful relationship with their father.

(c) The extent to which either child’s parent has taken or failed to take the opportunity to participate in decision-making, spending time with the child or communicating with the child

That is not a criticism that can be levelled at Mr Vidler.
It is most assuredly a criticism of Ms Vidler who has simply dropped out of the arrangements put in place by the orders of 29 January.

(ca) The extent to which a parent has fulfilled, or failed to fulfil, their obligation to maintain the child

There is no clear evidence regarding this, but it would appear, inferentially, if nothing else, that Ms Vidler makes no contribution to the children’s maintenance.

(d) Likely effect of change, including separation from either parent or any other person

I am satisfied that it would be detrimental for these children to leave their present care arrangements wherein they live with their father.
The practical reality is that their father makes all decisions for them and that there is no effective communication or consultation between these parents and no ability to resolve difficulties.
I am satisfied also that it would be detrimental for these children, and each of them, to be separated from each other, and that would do nothing more but create anxiety for one or both and, thus, the orders made by consent on 29 January which provided for [Y] to attend in the absence of his brother unless his brother chose to attend will conclude.

(e) Practical difficulty and expense

There is a real issue in this regard, but I will address it as part of s.65DAA(5).

(f) Capacity of each parent to care for the children and provide for their needs

I am satisfied that Mr Vidler is, with some reservations, discharging those duties. Those reservations arise from Mr Vidler’s own evidence wherein he suggests that on at least one occasion when there has been an altercation between the parents in the children’s presence, but not necessarily involving physical violence, that this has involved both parents goading each other.
That particularly arises from Mr Vidler’s evidence, and on one occasion, on or about 22 December 2012, that during a changeover when both parents were present, that Mr Vidler did not restrain himself, making a number of snide, and as he has described, “under‑his‑breath” comments which have clearly, in the vernacular, pushed Ms Vidler’s buttons and caused an escalation of circumstances, in the children’s presence, and, thus, while Ms Vidler is responsible for her own actions, each has contributed to the problems.

(f) Capacity to meet the children’s needs

This clearly favours a continuation of the present arrangements.

(g) Maturity, sex, lifestyle and background of the children

These are young men, rather than children, and thus I am satisfied that obviates against any discounting of the abuse to which it is suggested these children have been exposed and, in light of the difficulties that have plagued arrangements since the final orders were made on 9 October, obviates against a continuation of those orders.

(h) Aboriginality

There is no suggestion the children or either parent are from an Aboriginal or Torres Strait Islander background.

(i) The attitude to the child and the responsibilities of parenthood demonstrated by each parent

Clearly, whilst there are criticisms that can be levelled at each parent, Mr Vidler is caring for the children and meeting their needs at present.
Ms Vidler would appear to have abandoned both the proceedings and her relationship with the children, at least for present purposes.

(j) Family violence

Whilst there is an outstanding apprehended domestic violence complaint relating to Mr Vidler as a defendant, the allegations raised in the complaint are both denied and defended as well as suggesting little that would outweigh the very clear family violence to which the children have been exposed in the mother’s care since the orders of 9 October 2012.

(k) Family violence orders

There are none in force.

(l) Whether it is preferable to make the order that will least likely lead to the institution of future proceedings

I have no confidence that Ms Vidler would, if the proceedings were adjourned, participate in them or participate in them with any effect. Thus, I am satisfied that the matter can and should conclude today.
Further, I am satisfied that if I conclude the matter today by making orders that relate solely to parental responsibility and with whom the children live, that this will reserve to Ms Vidler, should she wish to file an application at any time, the opportunity to do so, albeit that that will be a fresh round of proceedings. However, in my mind, that is preferable to a continuation of these proceedings with an uncertainty of participation, let alone outcome.

Other matters – Reasonable Practicality

I turn to s.65DAA(5). The parents do not live any significant distance apart. However, logistics are not the sole determinant of reasonable practicality. What is required is a more nuanced consideration of the matters that would, in effect, support or, in this case, contraindicate, shared care.
The parents have little, if any, current or future capacity to implement an arrangement, as typified by the abandonment of the existing interim arrangement by Ms Vidler.
The parents have little, if any, current or future capacity to communicate with each other and resolve difficulties.
I am satisfied there will be a detrimental impact upon these children in continuing the final orders of 9 October in that they are clearly contrary to [X]’s strongly expressed and reasonably held views and would have the potential to continue to expose [Y] to family violence and unacceptable drug and/or alcohol use.

Summary and Orders

For all of those reasons I am satisfied that orders with respect to sole parental responsibility and with arrangements as proposed in the further amended application filed 24 December 2012 are appropriate and, in effect, the only orders that are reasonably available to the court at this time that will meet these children’s needs.
I do not propose to make any order with respect to the children’s time with their mother, noting that this is a matter that the mother is at liberty to pursue by fresh application initiating proceedings, should she wish to do so, and noting that:
a)There is no person present to prosecute any application regarding the children’s time with the mother;
b)The order as proposed for time supervised by the father or his nominee, whilst not inconsistent with that expressed by Ms Vidler to the family consultant, is an order that would be largely impractical and absent any further definition, largely unworkable; and,
c)It would be preferable to make no order than to make an order which would simply expose the parties or either of them to ongoing disputation as to interpretation and implementation.
Accordingly I make the following orders:

I certify that the preceding one hundred and three (103) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for judgment of Judge Harman

Associate:

Date: 23 August 2013

[2013] FCCA 1176

Key Legal Topics

Areas of Law

Family Law

Evidence

Civil Procedure

Legal Concepts

Abuse of Process

Procedural Fairness

Costs

Jurisdiction