Victims Compensation Fund Corporation v GM & 5 Ors

The parties in this matter were the Victims Compensation Fund Corporation (the Corporation) and five claimants who were victims of sexual assault. The dispute concerned whether the claimants were entitled to compensation under the *Victims Support & Rehabilitation Act 1996* (NSW) (the 1996 Act) for sexual assaults they had suffered. The case came before the Supreme Court of New South Wales.

The central legal issues before the court were whether evidence of actual physical injury was required to establish that a claimant was a primary victim of an act of violence, or otherwise entitled to compensation for the compensable injury of sexual assault. Specifically, the court had to determine if the facts of the sexual assaults themselves demonstrated actual physical contact amounting to 'harm' as defined by 'injury' in the 1996 Act.

The court reasoned that legislative schemes for compensating victims of crime, including the 1996 Act, have consistently required claimants to establish that they have sustained injury or loss by reason of the relevant crime. This principle, derived from earlier legislation and confirmed in *Victims Compensation Fund Corporation v Brown*, means that compensation is founded on the concept of "compensation for injury" or "loss". The court noted that the 1996 Act, by repealing the *Victims Compensation Act 1987*, was intended to limit eligibility for compensation, including for sexual assaults, by establishing monetary thresholds and caps. The court concluded that the mere fact of a sexual assault did not automatically establish an "injury" for the purposes of the Act without further inquiry into whether harm had been sustained.

The Supreme Court ordered that the proceedings be removed into the Supreme Court, quashed the orders made by the District Court, and remitted the proceedings to the District Court to be dealt with according to law. The claimants were ordered to pay the Corporation's costs.