VHCB and Secretary, Department of Social Services (Social security second review)
[2025] ARTA 1799
•16 September 2025
VHCB and Secretary, Department of Social Services (Social security second review) [2025] ARTA 1799 (16 September 2025)
Applicant/s: VHCB
Respondent: Secretary, Department of Social Services
Tribunal Number: 2024/1274
Tribunal:Senior Member T Simon (second review)
Place:Sydney
Date:16 September 2025
Decision:The decision of the Centrelink, made on 13 December 2012, to raise and recover a debt of $62,175.91 is set aside and in substitution:
·The applicant had a debt of $61,159.98 for overpayment of parenting payment single in the period 2 August 2005 to 25 October 2010; and
·The whole of the debt is to be recovered.
Directs that information tending to reveal the identity of the Applicant in these proceedings is prohibited pursuant to subsection 70(1) of the Administrative Review Act 2024.
………………[SGD]…………………………….
Senior Member T Simon
Names used in all published decisions are pseudonyms. Any references appearing in square brackets indicate that information has been removed from this decision and replaced with generic information so as not to identify involved individuals as required by subsections 201(1A) to 201(1B) of the Social Security (Administration) Act 1999.
Catchwords
SOCIAL SECURITY – parenting payment single – income – income apportionment – gambling – lump sum deposits – criminal assets recovery – exempted income – special circumstances – knowingly – waiver – write off – decision under review set aside
Legislation
Administrative Review Tribunal Act 2024 (Cth)
Administrative Review Tribunal (Consequential and Transitional Provisions No. 1) Act 2024 (Cth)
Criminal Assets Recovery Act 1990 (NSW)
Social Security Act 1991 (Cth)
Social Security Act 1947 (Cth)
Social Security (Administration) Act 1999 (Cth)Cases
Angelakos v Secretary, Department of Employment and Workplace Relations (2007) 100 ALD 9
Chaplin v Secretary, Department of Social Services [2025] FCAFC 89
Re Callaghan and SDSS [1996] AATA 413
Read v Commonwealth [1988] HCA 26
SDSS v Hales [1998] FCA
Social Security Act in Secretary, Department of Social Services and FTXB [2024] AATA 3021Secondary Materials
Statement of Reasons
This application is for second review of a decision made by Services Australia (Centrelink) on 13 December 2012 to raise and recover a debt of $62,175.91 for the period 2 August 2005 to 25 October 2010. The debt was raised on the basis that the applicant had been overpaid parenting payment due to unexplained deposits into her accounts and a failure to accurately declare her income.
On 12 March 2014, the applicant applied for internal review of the decision. On 7 April 2014, an authorised review officer affirmed the original decision.
On 4 September 2023, the applicant sought first review of the decision by the then Administrative Appeals Tribunal. On 1 February 2024, the Tribunal affirmed the decision to under review.
On 27 February 2024, the applicant applied to the Tribunal for second review of the decision.
From 14 October 2024, the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (ART) became the Administrative Review Tribunal and under the transitional provisions in the Administrative Review Tribunal (Consequential and Transitional Provisions No. 1) Act2024 (Cth), applications for review to the Administrative Appeals Tribunal that were not finalised before 14 October 2024 are taken to be an application for review to the Administrative Review Tribunal.
Pursuant to s 131D of the Administrative Review Tribunal Act 2024 (Cth), a person whose interests are affected by an ART social services decision may apply to the Tribunal for second review of the decision. An ART social services decision includes an eligible social services decision which has been affirmed by the Tribunal; s 131D(3)(a). An eligible social services decision includes a decision made under the Social Security Act 1991; s 131C(g). Section 131J of the Administrative Review Tribunal Act, an application for second review must be made within the time prescribed under s 18 of the Administrative Review Tribunal Act. Relevantly, s 18 provides that a second review application must be made within 28 days of the party receiving the decision.
The decision made by the Tribunal on 1 February 2024 is an eligible social services decision and the applicant's interests are affected by the decision. The second review application was made on 27 February 2024. On that basis the second review application has been made within time.
The parties appeared at the hearing in person. The applicant appeared with the assistance of a Vietnamese interpreter. The respondent appeared through a representative who is legally qualified. The respondent helpfully provided a joint tender bundle of 1503 pages which collated all the respondent’s and applicant’s documents.
The respondent also provided a statement of facts, issues and contentions. The applicant gave evidence and was cross examined at the hearing.
After the hearing the respondent provided supplementary submissions, dated 20 August 2025, in relation to the decision in Chaplin v Secretary, Department of Social Services [2025] FCAFC 89 (Chaplin).
The Tribunal has considered the documents contained in the joint tender bundle, the oral evidence and submissions made by the parties in coming to its decision.
Consideration
Does the applicant owe a debt?
Section 500 of the Social Security Act 1991 (Cth) provides that a person is qualified for parenting payment if they have at least one parenting payment child. Section 500D of the Social Security Act defines a parenting payment child of a person (not a member of a couple) as not having turned 14 years of age.
Division 4 titled ‘Rate of Parenting Payment’ determines how to work out a person’s parenting payment rate. Section 503(a) of the Social Security Act provides that if a person is not a member of a couple the rate calculator at the end of section 1068A applies. A person's maximum benefit rate is determined, and then reduced by their ordinary income in accordance with the income test set out in Module E of section 1068A of the Social Security Act.
The applicant received parenting payment (Single) between 30 June 2005 to 27 October 2010 totalling an amount of $75,404.97.[1]
[1] Joint tender bundle, p885.
On 9 June 2011, Centrelink decided to raise and recover a parenting payment debt of $917.05 for the period of 2 August 2005 to 25 August 2010.[2] This debt was raised based on the employment income the applicant earned.[3] The debt has been recovered in full.[4]
[2] Joint tender bundle, p 1442.
[3] Joint tender bundle pp1378 – 1381.
[4] Joint tender bundle, p 800.
On 13 December 2012, Centrelink decided to raise and recover a parenting payment debt for the period 2 August 2005 to 25 October 2010. Initial calculations provided that the debt was $63,092.95. The amount sought was later amended to $62,175.91.[5]
[5] Joint tender bundle, p 807
Income apportionment
The terms ‘ordinary income’, ‘income amount’ and ‘income’ are defined in section 8(1) of the Social Security Act. Section 8(1) of the Social Security Act defines income as being an amount that is earned, derived or received by the person, as follows:
income, in relation to a person, means:
(a) an income amount earned, derived or received by the person for the person's own use or benefit; or
(b) a periodical payment by way of gift or allowance; or
(c) a periodical benefit by way of gift or allowance;
On 28 August 2024, the Administrative Appeals Tribunal considered the meaning of the phrase ‘earned, derived or received’ in Social Security Act in Secretary, Department of Social Services and FTXB [2024] AATA 3021 (FTXB). The phrase was considered in the context of s 1067G-H23. The Tribunal in FTXB found that income from employment is “earned” when the person becomes legally entitled to the income, which is ascertained by reference to the legal arrangements between the person and their employer (FTXB at [136]-[139]).
On 24 September 2024, the respondent in FTXB lodged an appeal in the Federal Court of Australia. The appeal was heard on 6 March 2025 and at the time of the hearing of this matter judgement was reserved in the Federal Court.
Centrelink had already performed provisional recalculations in these proceedings regarding the debt and calculated that the applicant’s debt would remain the same regardless of the construction in FTXB or Centrelink’s preferred construction was used. The respondent, who had knowledge of the Federal Court proceedings, indicated that it was open to the Federal Court to adopt a third construction which may have an alternative effect on the calculation of the debt.
On 15 July 2025, after the hearing of this matter, the appeal judgement was made handed down in Chaplin. On 16 July 2025, the Tribunal made directions for the parties to provide any submissions they intended to rely on in relation to the decision in Chaplin. Only the respondent provided submissions. The Tribunal is aware that a further application may have been made for special leave to the appeal the decision in Chaplin to the High Court of Australia and that a Bill[6] is presently before parliament regarding the income apportionment issue. Neither party has sought that the decision in this matter be deferred until the leave application to the High Court is determined or based on any outcome that might arise from the Bill. The Tribunal does not have the details of the leave application. The impact of the Bill, if any, can only be speculative at best. In any event, calculations on the two alternatives in FTXB and Chaplin already produce the same result. Consistent with the Tribunal’s objective in s 9 of the Administrative Review Tribunal Act, the Tribunal is of the view that these proceedings should not be delayed any further and the Tribunal has proceeded to determine the income based on the decision in Chaplin.
[6] Social Security and Other Legislation Amendment (Technical Changes No. 2) Bill 2025.
In Chaplin, the majority of the Court held that the Tribunal in FTXB erred in finding that Mr Chaplin’s income from casual employment was ‘earned’ at the time at which he had a legally enforceable right to require payment.[7] They found that it is the service that ‘earns’ remuneration, in the sense that the services are the consideration for the entitlement to be paid and typically that income is earned on an ‘hourly, daily or per shift Basis’[8]. The income test under Module H of the rate calculator for Youth Allowance in s 1067G required income from employment to be considered in the fortnight in which it was ‘received’ in circumstances where the evidence did not establish the fortnight in which it was ‘earned’.[9]
[7] at [178]-[179]
[8] at [180]
[9] at 14](d); [193]-[198]; [203]
There is no equivalent provision in the rate calculator for parenting payment single in s1068A of the Social Security Act. Youth allowance, which was the relevant payment in Chaplin, requires the working out of income on a fortnightly basis. Parenting payment single requires the working out of a person’s ordinary income on a yearly basis. The Tribunal is required to make a factual finding as to the instalment period in which employment income is ‘earned, derived or received’ for the purposes of s 1073B of the Social Security Act. The daily amount of employment income attributed under s 1073B is converted by s 1073C(b) to an annual rate of employment income for the purposes of the parenting payment single income test.
In Chaplin the majority stated at [203]:
The decision‑maker must take income into account (Step 1 in Point H1) and, where appropriate, it must be taken into account when first earned derived or received (Point H23). That does not have the result that income known to be received must be ignored under Step 1 in Point H1, because information which is likely once to have existed about when it was earned or derived is no longer available. It means that, in making a decision about a person’s entitlement in accordance with the statutory scheme, the entitlement is ascertained on the material available.
Income from employment
The applicant was employed and received employment income from two employers during the relevant period which she declared. I shall refer to those employers as employer 1 and employer 2.
Section 1073B of the Social Security Act (as it was during the debt period) relevantly provided:
1073B Daily attribution of employment income
(1) If:
(a) a person is receiving a social security pension or a social security benefit; and
(b) the person’s rate of payment of the pension or benefit is worked out with regard to the income test module of a rate calculator in this Chapter; and
(d) the person earns, derives or receives, or is taken, either by virtue of the operation of section 1073A or any other provision of this Act, to earn, derive or receive, employment income during the whole or a part of a particular instalment period of the person;
the person is taken to earn, derive or receive, on each day in that instalment period, an amount of employment income worked out by dividing the total amount of the employment income referred to in paragraph (d) by the number of days in the period.
In relation to the income the applicant earned from employer 1, the payslip information demonstrates that the applicant was paid on a weekly basis. It also shows the date on which the applicant was paid by her employer as demonstrated by the ‘pay date’ in the payslips.[10] The payslip information indicates that the applicant was consistently paid weekly on a Wednesday. Every second week, the applicant’s pay period fell entirely within a single instalment period. For the weeks that fall entirely within an instalment period, it is known that the applicant ‘earned’ the income in that instalment period and has been assessed in that way. For the weeks that overlap two instalment periods, the income has been assessed in the instalment period in which the applicant ‘received’ the income in circumstances where it cannot be determined when the applicant ‘earned’ the income.
[10] Joint Tender Bundle 1376-1383.
In relation to the applicant’s employment with employer 2, the applicant declared her earnings. From the period of 23 December 2008 to 20 July 2009, the applicant consistently declared her income as $440 per fortnight.[11] The income has been considered according to what was reported by the applicant. Consistent with the principles in Chaplin, the Tribunal finds she earned the income on the date she declared it to Centrelink. There is no evidence to the contrary.
[11] Joint tender bundle p 895.
On that basis the Tribunal accepts that the income which the applicant has earned or received from employer 1 and employer 2 for the period has been calculated correctly by Centrelink.
Were the deposits made into the applicant’s accounts income?
Centrelink raised the debt of $62,175.91, based on a series of deposits made by the applicant into her accounts:[12]
(i)from 23 September 2005 to 23 October 2009, cash and cheque deposits amounting to $431,529.18 were made into the applicant's St George bank account; and
(ii)From 18 July 2005 to 8 October 2007, repayments of $87,350.00 were made to the applicant's Commonwealth Bank credit card account.
[12] Joint Tender bundle p 544 – 547.
The Tribunal must determine whether those deposits amount to income for the purposes of s 8(1) of the Social Security Act.
Section 8(8) of the Social Security Act provides that the following is not income:
"(z) a periodical payment by way of gift or allowance, or a periodical benefit by way of gift or allowance, from a parent, child, brother or sister of the person;"
Section 8(11) of the Social Security Act outlines which lump sums can be exempted from the income test:
(11) An amount received by a person is an exempt lump sum if:
(a) the amount is not a periodic amount (within the meaning
of subsection (11A)); and
(b) the amount is not a leave payment within the meaning of points
1067G - H20, 1067L - D16 and 1068 - G7AR; and
(c) the amount is not income from remunerative work undertaken by
the person; and
(d) the amount is an amount, or class of amounts, determined by the Secretary
to be an exempt lump sum.
Note: Some examples of the kinds of lump sums that the Secretary may determine to be exempt lump sums include a lottery win or other windfall, a legacy or bequest, or a gift--if it is a one - off gift.
Centrelink issued various notices as is required by section 196 of the Social Security (Administration) Act 1999 to obtain information from banks holding accounts in the applicant's name, namely, the Westpac Banking Corporation (Westpac), the Commonwealth Bank of Australia (CBA)[13] and the St George Bank (St George).[14] The banks complied with production and using the bank statements, Centrelink has prepared a summary of specific amounts deposited into the applicant's savings account and paid onto her credit card in the relevant period. Centrelink identified payments received by the applicant totalling into her St George bank account between 23 September 2005 and 23 October 2010 totalling an amount of $431,529.18. She made repayments onto her Commonwealth bank credit card between 18 July 2005 to 8 October 2010 totalling an amount of $87,350.00.[15]
[13] Joint tender bundle pp 160-161.
[14] Joint tender bundle p 410.
[15] Joint tender bundle pp 567 – 570.
Attachment A to the respondent’s statements of facts, issue and contentions, provides a collated table of deposits and withdrawals with cross-references to each of the transactions to the applicant's bank account statements for the relevant period.[16]
[16] Joint tender bundle p 1479 – 1501.
The applicant submits that in relation to the deposits, at the relevant time she was a gambler and she had applied for a MasterCard credit card. She had also borrowed money from family and friends.
Supreme Court Proceedings for assessment order under Criminal Assets Recovery
The applicant has been subject of proceedings under Criminal Assets Recovery Act 1990 (NSW) in the Supreme Court of NSW. On 29 February 2012, the applicant was ordered to pay to the Treasurer the amount of $922,738.00 for recovery of proceeds of crime. The Tribunal has before it a copy of the judgement in those proceeds of crime proceedings.[17] The serious crime activity which the applicant had engaged in occurred in the period from March to April 2008 when the applicant applied for finance in the sum of $184,000 for the purpose of purchasing a home unit. The applicant made an application for finance using a mortgage broker and falsely stated that she had been employed by a tobacconist since 17 August 2005, with an annual salary package of $45,657. The loan application was accompanied by a letter dated 26 March 2008, purportedly from the tobacconist, certifying the employment, together with two payslips said to relate to the applicant’s employment in March 2008. The Judge found that the applicant had engaged in a serious crime-related activity involving an offence punishable by imprisonment for five years or more and that the applicant had knowledge of the use of the false documents in support of her loan application.[18]
[17] Joint tender bundle, pp 23 - 56.
[18] at [68] – [69]
The Judge noted that the applicant had been a regular gambler since at 1998, if not before. She was a patron at a casino and the casino’s records revealed substantial gambling by the applicant in and after 1998. Records disclosed that the applicant was a regular gambler using poker machines and table gambling. A range of banking records in the evidence disclosed cash withdrawals by the applicant from time to time at the casino and withdrawals or cash advances obtained by her at other locations. In the proceeds of crime proceedings, the applicant stated that she had been a busy and successful gambler over many years, and that the level of success constituted the source of a substantial level of income legally obtained by her. There was substantial evidence that the applicant was an active gambler throughout the period 2003 to 2009. The applicant also stated she had received loans and gifts from family and friends.[19]
[19] at [45] – [48]
The Judge considered the purported income from family and gambling.[20] The Judge noted expenditure by the applicant on luxury items and that at all relevant times, the applicant was in receipt of Centrelink benefits with very limited periods of employment. The Judge noted that between December 2003 and July 2009, the applicant departed from Australia on no fewer than nine occasions for periods usually of between one week and four weeks in duration. In relation to the gambling activities the Judge found that the statistical prospect that the applicant was a heavy and regular winner whilst gambling at clubs and hotels had an air of improbability about it. The evidence in that regard emanated from the applicant alone and in a generalised way. The Judge accepted evidence that the applicant had spent $1,263,988 over that period and that of that amount $341,246.00 was from income unrelated to illegal activities.
[20] at [80] – [106]
Ultimately, the Judge did not accept the evidence of the respondent concerning her successful gambling winnings or the uncorroborated evidence of the respondent concerning gifts and loans from her parents.[21]
[21] at [102]
Were the deposits income for the purposes of the Social Security Act?
The definition of “income”, as it appeared in the former Social Security Act 1947 (Cth), was considered by the High Court in Read v Commonwealth [1988] HCA 26, the following observation were made[22]:
“The definition is exhaustive: the term "income" means what it is defined to mean; it does not mean what "income" would be understood to mean if the definition were not in the Act.
The definition is couched in the widest terms, presumably to ensure that public expenditure is directed to those who stand in actual need of the periodic support which income-related pensions provide. The definition is wide enough to embrace receipts of a capital nature as well as receipts of income, for "income" is defined to mean, inter alia, any moneys, valuable consideration or profits irrespective of the means by which or the source from which those moneys, etc. are received.”
[22] at [3]
Analogously, the definition of income should be couched in the widest terms for the purposes of the current Social Security Act.
For the reasons that follow, l find that the relevant amounts received by the applicant into her bank account were amounts earned, derived or received by the applicant for her own use or benefit and fall within the definition of income under s 8(1) of the Social Security Act and that the amounts were assessable for the purposes of calculating the applicant’s rate of parenting payment in the relevant period.
In relation to the applicant’s gambling activities, I find that some of the amounts received by the applicant into her bank account may have been from the applicant's gambling activities, as some of the entries on the applicant’s bank statements indicate that transactions were occurring at gaming venues. However, those transactions were generally withdrawals. I accept the findings made by the Judge in the proceeds of crime proceedings that the applicant that she was a gambler over the relevant period. However, as the applicant was a long-term repeat gambler, any gambling receipts would not represent a one-off windfall to fall within the exemption under s 8(11) of the Social Security Act. Further, any gambling losses were incurred because of the applicant’s own gambling activities which she undertook for her own benefit.
At the hearing the applicant also stated that some of the deposits were from money she had borrowed from her mother who had sent cash to her from overseas. The applicant also stated that she had to borrow money from her friends to fuel her gambling addiction. That contradicts the submissions that she made in the Supreme Court, being that she had been a successful gambler who had made a lot of income from gambling.
The applicant provided letters to Centrelink from individuals who stated that she had borrowed money from them. She provided the following letters:
(a)An undated letter from an individual stating that the applicant borrowed $8,000 in October 2017 for her living expenses[23] However, October 2017 is outside the debt period (2 August 2005 to 25 October 2010) and any such loan in not relevant to the consideration of whether the amounts deposited for the purposes of this review, were income.
(b)A letter dated 28 November 2023 from her sister in which the applicant’s sister states that she lent the applicant $14,000 from July 2007 and that repayments were being made in small increments over time.[24] There is no corroborating evidence in relation to those repayments. It is not clear that the purported loan makes up part of the bank deposits which were considered by Centrelink raising the debt and the applicant did not identify which deposit amounts any such loan related to. The deposits which appear in the applicant's Commonwealth Bank account and St George Bank account in June 2007 (being the month in which the applicant's sister says the loans commenced) do not immediately reveal a deposit of $14,000, rather they are a range of deposits for amount ranging from $1,300 to $16,400. None of the deposit transactions indicate the payments are from her sister and there has been no evidence other than the statement from the applicant’s sister about when the amount of $14,000 was deposited into the accounts. I am not satisfied that any such loan, if it did exist, formed part of the deposits into the accounts which Centrelink has considered when calculating the applicant’s income. The letter from the applicant’s sister also fails to provide details as to whether there is a legal obligation on the applicant to repay her sister back.
(c)A letter dated 27 November 2023, from another individual, stating that in May 2020 they lent $4,000 to the applicant, and as at August 2023, the applicant has made a payment of $2,000.[25] Again, November 2023 is outside the debt period.
(d)A letter dated 25 November 2023 from the applicant's daughter, stating that she sold her mother a motor vehicle for the value of $5,000 which is still in debt to her.[26] It is unclear from the daughter's letter when this transaction occurred.
[23] Joint tender bundle p 578.
[24] Joint tender bundle p 579.
[25] Joint tender bundle p 581.
[26] Joint tender bundle p 580.
In the first review proceeding’s the applicant stated that in relation to a cash deposit of $45,000, it was given by her parents for a deposit on her unit. She stated they gave her the cash and that she deposited it into the account. The Tribunal set out the following in its reasons [27]:
The Tribunal took [the applicant] to folio 178, which showed that a cash deposit of $45,000 was paid into her account in August 2007. [The applicant] stated that this was from her parents for her property deposit. The Tribunal asked why [the applicant’s] parents would have given her cash rather than transferring money to her and she stated in response that her mother doesn’t know anything and just helped with her deposit. The Tribunal observed that it didn’t make sense that [the applicant’s] parents would give her that amount of cash rather than organise a bank transfer, to which [the applicant] stated they are from Vietnam and don’t have a bank account. The Tribunal asked why [the applicant’s] parents did not have a bank account in Vietnam and she stated in response that her parents love her and she doesn’t know how to explain this but they wanted to help her. In response to further questions by the Tribunal, [the applicant] stated that her parents had brought that amount of money with them from Vietnam and she thinks they didn’t declare this amount to Customs upon their arrival in Australia. She stated that her parents sold property and are suffering and if she had money, she would have paid them.
[27] Joint tender bundle p 63 – at [15].
Other than the applicant’s assertions, there is no objective corroborative evidence as to the source of the $45,000 deposit or that the money was from the applicant’s parents.
In cross examination, the applicant was visibly upset by the events of her life. She repeatedly stated she did not remember certain matters including in relation to records of numerous overseas trips and deposits. She stated she had fallen and had short term memory loss and that the events she was being asked about were in the past and she wanted to move past those events and move forward. The sources of the amount’s deposited into the applicant’s account remains unclear and her evidence has been vague and evasive. The applicant’s assertions regarding gifts from her family and winnings from gambling activities are largely uncorroborated and I do not accept that they were gifts from family, windfall winnings or that they are exempt income pursuant to s 8(8) of the Social Security Act or exempted lump sums amounts pursuant to 8(11) of the Social Security Act.
The applicant’s Commonwealth Bank account reveals general expenditure transactions and expenditure occurring at places such as Gucci, Louis Vuitton, Gianni Versace, G star, Chanel and Bing Lee.[28] I accept that the deposit amounts have been received by the applicant for her own use or benefit, including purchasing her house, gambling, paying off her credit card expenses and general spending.
[28] Joint tender bundle pp 1479 – 1488.
Section 1073(1) of the Social Security Act states that certain amounts are taken to be received over 12 months, commencing on the day which the person becomes entitled to receive that amount, as follows:
(1) …), if a person receives, whether before or after the commencement of this section, an amount that:
(a) is not income within the meaning of Division 1B or 1C of this Part; and
(b) is not:
(i) income in the form of periodic payments; or
(ii) ordinary income from remunerative work undertaken by the person; or
(iii) an exempt lump sum.
the person is, for the purposes of this Act, taken to receive one fifty - second of that amount as ordinary income of the person during each week in the 12 months commencing on the day on which the person becomes entitled to receive that amount.
I find that the deposit amounts fall within the definition of income under the Social Security Act and have been properly assessed by Centrelink for the purposes of calculating the applicant’s rate of parenting payment in the relevant period and have been apportioned correctly in accordance with s 1073(1) of the Social Security Act.
Conclusion on whether the applicant owes a debt to the Commonwealth
I find that the applicant received $431,529.18 into her St George bank account between 23 September 2005 and 23 October 2010. Repayments were made on her Commonwealth bank credit card between 18 July 2005 to 8 October 2010 in the amount of $87,350.00. The deposits made into the applicant’s account and paid against her credit card did form part of her income for the relevant period. There are no relevant exceptions to that income. The applicant’s income from the unexplained deposits and employment has been correctly attributed for a 12- month period The deposits were income and were used by the applicant for her own benefit, including purchasing her house, paying off her credit card expenses and general spending.
Accordingly, the applicant was overpaid parenting payment of $62,175.91 between 2 August 2005 and 25 October 2010.
Subsection 1223(1) of the Social Security Act states that if a social security payment is made and the person who obtains the benefit of the payment was not entitled for any reason to obtain that benefit, the amount of the payment is a debt due to the Commonwealth by the person and the debt is taken to arise when the person obtains the benefit of the payment.
The respondent conceded that they have already recovered an amount of $917.04 arising from the separate parenting payment single debt raised on 9 June 2011 and that should be considered by reducing the overall debt owed and in accordance with those submissions I have deducted the amount of $917.04 from $62,175.91.
The applicant owes a debt to the Commonwealth in the amount of $61,159.98 under subsection 1223(1) of the Social Security Act.
Is there any reason the debt should not be recovered?
Certain sections of the Social Security Act permit the waiving or write off recovery of a debt.
Sole administrative error
Section 1237A of the Social Security Act, allows the recovery of a debt to be waived if the debt is solely attributable to an error by the Commonwealth, the person received the payment in good faith, and the debt is raised more than 6 weeks from the end of the notification period. The parenting payment debt was caused by the applicant not declaring her full income to Centrelink during the relevant period. Therefore, it was not caused by sole administrative error and cannot be waived under section 1237A of the Social Security Act.
Special Circumstances
Section 1237AAD of the Social Security Act provides:
1237AAD Waiver in special circumstances
The Secretary may waive the right to recover all or part of a debt if the Secretary is satisfied that:
(a) the debt did not result wholly or partly from the debtor or another person knowingly:
(i) making a false statement or a false representation; or
(ii) failing or omitting to comply with a provision of this Act, the Administration Act or the 1947 Act; and
(b) there are special circumstances (other than financial hardship alone) that make it desirable to waive; and
(c) it is more appropriate to waive than to write off the debt or part of the debt.
Section 66A of the Social Security (Administration) Act 1999 (Cth) outlines a general requirement for a person who has been granted a claim for a social security payment notify Centrelink with 14 days after an event or changes circumstances occurs that might affect the payment of or qualification for that social security payment.
Section 63 of the Social Security (Administration) Act allows Centrelink to issue a notice for a person receiving a social security payment to provide information.
The respondent refers to information notices sent by Centrelink to the applicant during the period from 18 April 2005 to 25 October 2010. The notices notified the applicant that amongst other things, she was required to advise the Centrelink within 14 days of any changes in circumstances including income from employment and changes to her income and assets. Examples of notices included:
(i)An information notice dated 18 April 2005[29] stating:
[29] Joint tender bundle p 977 – 979.
You must tell us within 14 days (28 days if residing outside Australia) if any of these things happen, or may happen….
CHANGES TO INCOME AND ASSETS
…
your income, not including financial investments or maintenance, increases;"
(ii)an information notice dated 26 May 2006[30] stating that the applicant was to notify Centrelink within 14 days if the applicant’s income from any source increases or she get a new source of income. The notice notes that if the applicant does not notify Centrelink her payments may be affected.
[30] Joint tender bundle pp 993 - 994.
(iii)An information notice dated 13 February 2007[31] which provided that:
[31] Joint tender bundle p 1021.
There are a number of events and changes in circumstances that you need to tell us about. You have 14 days to tell us about these changes from the day after the change happens or you know it is likely to happen.
This request is an information notice given under the social security law.
…
The changes you must tell us about include:
if your income from any source increases. (You do not need to tell us if your Centrelink payments increase)
if you get a new source of income…
Further information notices requesting similar information were issued to the applicant on 4 July 2007, 8 February 2008, 25 November 2008, 1 December 2008 and on 24 December 2008.
The respondent submits that those notices were issued under s 63 of the Social Security (Administration) Act and because of the notices the applicant was aware of her obligation to notify Centrelink of any changes to her income. The respondent also submits that the notices informed the applicant that she had to inform Centrelink if she was travelling to another country. Records from Centrelink dated 26 May 2006,[32] 13 February 2007,[33] and 8 February 2008[34] show that the applicant informed Centrelink regarding her plans to travel outside Australia. The respondent submits that the applicant’s disclosure regarding her travel demonstrates that the applicant was aware of her obligations to inform Centrelink of changes in circumstances that would affect her parenting payment single payments. The respondent submits that as the applicant was aware of her obligation to notify the Centrelink of overseas travel, the Tribunal could be satisfied that she knowingly failed to comply with section 68(2) of the Social Security (Administration) Act by failing to advise the Centrelink of any changes in her income.
[32] Joint tender bundle p 992
[33] Joint tender bundle p 1019
[34] Joint tender bundle p 1061
The Social Security Act provides no definition in relation to knowingly in relation to s1237AAD.
While there has been extensive consideration of the term “knowingly” in the context of s12139AAD in this Tribunal and the AAT, there has been surprisingly little consideration of the term in the context of the position by the Courts.
In Re Callaghan and SDSS [1996] AATA 413, the applicant in that matter had read at least one of the notices sent to him under former s 727 of the Social Security Act. The Tribunal found that that he had “knowingly” omitted to comply with a provision of the Social Security Act and stated at [48]:
48. There is nothing in s 1237AAD which suggests that the word “knowingly” should be given any meaning other than that a person has actual knowledge, rather than constructive knowledge, that he or she is making a false statement or representation or that he or she is failing or omitting to comply with a provision of the Act. That actual knowledge is to be ascertained by reference to the statements of the person as to his or her actual state of knowledge at the time and to events surrounding the false statement or the act or omission.
In cross examination, the applicant confirmed that she knew that if she was travelling overseas, she had to inform Centrelink. She also confirmed that she knew she needed to inform Centrelink if her income changed. When asked about the addresses where notices had been sent and whether she lived there the applicant indicated that she did not have a good memory, and these events occurred over 20 years ago, and she was not sure. The applicant also stated at the hearing that she never meant to deceive Centrelink. At the time she was a single mother, and she had only received Centrelink payments to look after her three children. She stated that she never meant to ever commit fraud or deceive anyone.
The applicant was evasive in her answers at the hearing, repeating that she did not remember matters and that she just wanted to put the past behind her. However, she agreed that she knew that she needed to inform Centrelink about matters such as overseas travel, (which she did) and changes in her income. The amounts that the applicant received into her account were substantial and occurred over a significant period. The applicant knew that she had to inform Centrelink in relation to changes in her income. I find on the evidence that the applicant knowingly failed to comply with s 66A of the Social Security (Administration) Act in omitting to tell Centrelink about the cash deposits in her account.
Even if I am wrong in that regard, I find that there are no special circumstances in this case which would warrant waiving the debt.
In Angelakos v Secretary, Department of Employment and Workplace Relations (2007) 100 ALD 9 at [33], Besanko J stated in relation to special circumstances:
... I also note that the authorities have emphasised time and again the importance of maintaining flexibility in determining what constitutes special circumstances. The danger is that the test will be overstated if the word ‘exceptional’ is emphasised. It was not the intention of Parliament to confine the exercise of the discretion to an exceptional case. There is less risk of overstatement if the words ‘unusual’ or ‘uncommon’ are emphasised. Those words indicate, correctly in my view, the fact that there must be something that distinguishes the case from the ordinary or usual case. It may not be easy to postulate the ordinary or usual case other than in quite general terms and, in doing so, close attention must be given to the particular statutory context.
In SDSS v Hales [1998] FCA 219 French J stated:
The concept of special circumstances is broad. A constellation of factors, including financial circumstances, may fall within it. The express exclusion of financial hardship alone as a special circumstance is an indicator that it would otherwise be included. This gives some measure of the range of circumstances which will qualify as special. But as a matter of grammar and ordinary logic, the exclusion of financial hardship alone as a special circumstance does not mandate its inclusion in the range of matters constituting such circumstances for the purpose of enlivening the Secretary’s discretion. …
The evident purpose of s 1237AAD is to enable a flexible response to the wide range of situations which could give rise to hardship or unfairness in the event of a rigid application of a requirement for recovery of debt. It is inappropriate to constrain that flexibility by imposing a narrow or artificial construction upon the words. It may be that there will be few cases in which the Secretary will be satisfied that there are special circumstances in the absence of financial hardship. It may be that there are few cases in which having found special circumstances to exist, the Secretary would exercise the discretion to waive in the absence of financial hardship. But to anticipate the limits of the categories of possible cases by imposing on the language of the section a fetter upon its application which is not mandated by its words, is to erode its useful purpose.
At the hearing the applicant was asked about a statement of financial circumstances which she had provided to the Tribunal on first review of the decision.[35] The applicant confirmed that she is currently working and receives just over $1,727 a fortnight. There is nothing out of the ordinary in the applicant’s household expenses. The applicant spends money on medications amounting to $120.00 per fortnight. She stated she had pain in her legs and there is a sound in her knee when she moves it. She also has a pain in her elbow from a previous broken arm and takes pain medication and buys compression tools to help with her knee and elbow. She also takes medication for gastro issues. The applicant also takes anti-depressant medication.
[35] Joint tender bundle pp 597 - 602
The reasons for the decision on first review the Tribunal noted that the applicant told the Tribunal she is often sad, has depression and has had thoughts of ending her life. The applicant provided documents to the Tribunal confirming that she attended a psychologist during 2012, attended a consultant psychiatrist during 2013 and that she had been diagnosed with major depression disorder. In 2013 she had reported a suicide attempt and been prescribed antidepressant medication.
Together with the second review application, the applicant provided a letter dated 26 February 2024 setting out her current circumstances.[36] She noted in 2015, following the proceeds of crime order and due to the inability to pay, the Justice of New South Wales Trustee & Guardian issued an order to seize all her assets including her apartment, motor vehicle and remaining funds in both her bank accounts. On 31 January 2024, she had been diagnosed with an underlying kidney and liver condition which warranted admission into the emergency department. She has underlying medical conditions that require her to attend regular specialist appointments and future procedures that can be costly. These include, but are not limited to depression, hearing loss, kidney and liver conditions. She states that she works to survive and to pay medical expenses and strongly believes that she will not have the capacity to pay the debt.
[36] Joint tender bundle p 14
At the hearing, the applicant stated that she had already been punished because of the order for repayment in the Supreme Court. She stated she had been through a lot to be able to attend Tribunal hearing and has faced many difficulties. She stated she works to be able to look after herself and that is all she has. She stated she really did not want to be in a state of anxiety and worry and fall sick once again because she is waiting to have an operation.
The applicant confirmed at hearing that she has three adult children. She had her eldest child when she was 16 years old. She is now 33 years old. The applicant arrived in Australia with her eldest child when she was 19. The applicant also stated that her children were concerned for her and had indicated that they would be willing to help her pay back the debt if she was required to pay the debt. She stated that even though her children were willing to help her continue paying off the debt she did not want to burden her children.
I accept from the evidence that the applicant does have some health conditions, including depression and cholecystitis and issues relating to her hearing. I accept that that the conditions have some impact on the applicant’s financial circumstances as she needs certain medications.
I also accept that the applicant’s house has been repossessed because of the orders for proceeds of crime proceedings in the NSW Supreme Court. I accept that has impacted on the applicant both financially and emotionally. I accept from the applicant's evidence and her statement of financial circumstances that the applicant has a modest range of living expenses. However, those matters have not prevented the applicant from continuing to work. However, the applicant continues to earn a fortnightly income of $1,727.84 and presently lives in housing and pays $500 a week in rent. She also owns a car valued at $5,000.
With respect to the purported loans from family and friends, there is no corroborating evidence regarding those loans, and even if they were loans, there is no evidence of the terms and legal obligations to make the repayments on those loans. The applicant is not being required to make payments presently.
Weighing up the way in which the debt arose and the applicant’s present health and financial position, the circumstances are not sufficiently unusual, uncommon or exceptional so as to make her case markedly different from the usual or ordinary run of the cases and otherwise ‘special’. The applicant has had the benefit of the social security payments to which she was not entitled, and she is being asked to repay that overpayment. The deposits were substantial and occurred over a period. The debt is also significant. The applicant continues to work, and the financial circumstances statement generally indicate that she is meeting her financial commitments. While she has health concerns, they are generally being treated.
Write off
Section 1236 of the Social Security Act sets out the circumstances in which the applicant's debt can be written off. It relevantly provides that a debt may be written off for a stated period in certain circumstances, relevantly in this case, if the applicant has no capacity to repay the debt. If a debt is recoverable by means of:
(a)deductions from the debtor’s social security payment; or
(b)deductions under section 84 of the A New Tax System (Family Assistance) (Administration) Act 1999; or
(c)setting off under section 84A of that Act;
the debtor is taken to have a capacity to repay the debt unless recovery by those means would result in the debtor being in severe financial hardship.
The term 'severe financial hardship' is not defined in the Social Security Act.
As noted above, I accept that the applicant has a modest range of living expenses, but her financial situation does not demonstrate she in severe financial hardship. The applicant has some capacity to repay the parenting payment debt and there are no other relevant grounds for the parenting payment debt to be written off.
Conclusion
The applicant owes a parenting payment single debt of $61,159.98 for the period of 27 July 2005 to 25 October 2010. There is no basis to waive or write off the debt.
The Tribunal makes the following order:
The decision of the Centrelink, made on 13 December 2012, to raise and recover a debt of $62,175.91 is set aside and in substitution:
·The applicant had a debt of $61,159.98 for overpayment of parenting payment single in the period 2 August 2005 to 25 October 2010; and
·The whole of the debt is to be recovered.
Date(s) of hearing: 27 March 2025 Applicant: Self-represented Solicitors for the Respondent: Mr Hilliyard, Sparke Helmore
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