VGAB v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

VGAB v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs
[2004] FCA 123

W148/00A v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2001] FCA 679 cited
Guss v Johnstone [2000] FCA 1455 applied
Cottrell v Wilcox [2002] FCA 232 cited
Wilson v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy [2000] FCA 304 cited
CDJ v VAJ (1998) 197 CLR 172 cited
VACC v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2003] FCAFC 74 applied
NADR v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2003] FCAFC 167 applied

APPLICANT VGAB OF 2002 v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & MULTICULTURAL & INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS

V 856 OF 2003

SUNDBERG J
24 FEBRUARY 2004
MELBOURNE


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

VICTORIA DISTRICT REGISTRY

V 856 OF 2003

BETWEEN:

APPLICANT VGAB OF 2002
APPELLANT

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & MULTICULTURAL & INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS
RESPONDENT

JUDGE:

SUNDBERG J

DATE OF ORDER:

24 FEBRUARY 2004

WHERE MADE:

MELBOURNE

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The appeal be dismissed.

2.The applicant pay the respondent’s costs of the appeal.

Note:    Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

VICTORIA DISTRICT REGISTRY

V 856 OF 2003

BETWEEN:

APPLICANT VGAB OF 2002
APPELLANT

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & MULTICULTURAL & INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS
RESPONDENT

JUDGE:

SUNDBERG J

DATE:

24 FEBRUARY 2004

PLACE:

MELBOURNE

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

BACKGROUND

  1. The appellant, a citizen of Sri Lanka, arrived in Australia on 22 March 2000, travelling as a member of the Sri Lankan Life Saving Association. On 6 April 2000 he applied for a Protection (Class XA) Visa. On 3 July 2000 a delegate of the respondent refused to grant the visa. The refusal was affirmed by the Refugee Review Tribunal. The appellant’s application for review of the Tribunal’s decision was dismissed by the Federal Magistrates Court. He has appealed from that decision to this Court. Pursuant to s 25(1A) of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) the Acting Chief Justice considered it appropriate that the appellate jurisdiction of the Court be exercised by a single Judge.

    APPELLANT’S CLAIMS

  2. The appellant gave oral evidence before the Tribunal. He had legal representation, and submissions were made on his behalf. He claimed to be a member of the United National Party (UNP). He had enlisted in the Sri Lankan army and was fighting the LTTE in the north and east of Sri Lanka. When the People’s Alliance (PA) came to power, the appellant’s officers were replaced by members of the armed forces who supported the PA. He claimed that in the course of his duties he and six other soldiers were ordered to bury the bodies of a large number of people who had been killed by four officers. He said he and the other soldiers were warned by the four officers to say nothing about the matter or they would suffer the consequences. Two of the seven soldiers were killed by one of the four officers in front of the remaining…

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Details
Case
[2004] FCA 123
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of VGAB v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs involved an appeal against a decision by the Refugee Review Tribunal, which refused the applicant a protection visa. The applicant, a Sri Lankan national, claimed that he was persecuted due to his involvement in burying victims of the Sri Lankan military and that he had a well-founded fear of persecution if he were to return to Sri Lanka. The primary legal issue before the court was whether the Tribunal erred in asking the wrong question regarding the applicant’s unwillingness to avail himself of his country’s protection. The court also considered whether the Tribunal had made a jurisdictional error by asking the wrong question in relation to “own nationality” protection. The second issue was whether the Tribunal’s rejection of the applicant’s credibility was open on the evidence.

The court found that the Tribunal had not misunderstood its statutory task, even if it had asked a question not strictly required. The court emphasised that the critical issue was whether the Tribunal had directed its mind to the correct question, which it had. The Tribunal’s finding that the applicant was not in need of protection as he had not experienced the threats or engaged in the conduct that gave rise to his fear of persecution was valid. Regarding the credibility issue, the court noted that the Tribunal’s determination that the applicant was not a credible witness was a finding of fact, and the court should not set it aside unless it was clearly erroneous. The Tribunal’s reasons indicated that its credibility findings were open on the evidence.

The court dismissed the appeal and ordered that the applicant pay the respondent’s costs of the appeal.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal be dismissed.

2. The applicant pay the respondent’s costs of the appeal.

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

The second ground of appeal as recorded by the Magistrate was that in finding the applicant was not a credible witness the Tribunal “left itself open to a claim that it was open for a reasonable person to apprehend bias in its deliberations and reasons”. Her Honour rejected this ground. She said:“The Tribunal determined as a factual matter to reject certain parts of the applicant’s evidence. The Tribunal determined that the applicant was not a credible witness, which is a finding of fact.”Her Honour then referred to W148/00A v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2001] FCA 679 at [64] where Tamberlin and Nicholson JJ said:“A finding as to credibility is a finding of fact and, as the authorities indicate, a reviewing body must not set aside such a finding simply because it thinks that the probabilities of the case are against, or even strongly against, the finding.”The Magistrate said it was clear that the Tribunal’s credibility findings were open on the evidence.APPLICATION TO RECEIVE FRESH EVIDENCE When the appeal was called on, the appellant’s counsel sought to tender the tapes of the Tribunal’s hearing and transcripts thereof. They were not before the Magistrate. They are said to be relevant because they will disclose the “wrong question” referred to at [5], and that a witness to the burial incident, who could have corroborated the appellant’s account, was not required by the Tribunal to give evidence. The tapes can be put aside. The appellant’s counsel informed me that the transcript accurately records what is on the tapes. The tapes may have had some independent relevance to the bias ground that was before the Magistrate. But that is not pursued here. The tender of the tapes was not pressed. Resort to the transcript is not necessary in order to deal with the “wrong question” issue. Although there was no evidence before the Magistrate about the “wrong question”, because the tapes and transcript were not before her, the matter appears to have been argued on the basis that the Tribunal had asked the question set out at [5]. I will proceed on the same basis. In Guss v Johnstone [2000] FCA 1455 at [30] Sackville J, with whom Drummond and Dowsett JJ agreed, said:“it is ordinarily necessary for the party seeking to adduce further evidence to demonstrate that the evidence relied on is cogent; that is, the Court exercising appellate jurisdiction needs to be satisfied that the proffered evidence would be likely to have produced a different result had it been available at the trial.” The application was not supported by any evidence. In particular there was no evidence from the burial witness as to what he would have said had he given evidence before the Tribunal. The witness lives in Melbourne and attended the Tribunal hearing. In the absence of such evidence the Court is unable to determine whether his evidence would be likely to have produced a different result had it been available to the Magistrate. Cf Guss v Johnstone at [29], [35]‑[42] and Cottrell v Wilcox [2002] FCA 232 at [16]. Further, the transcript was in counsel’s possession and could have been tendered to her Honour. It is a factor militating against the exercise of the discretion to admit fresh or further evidence on appeal that it was in the hands of the party and available for use at the trial. See Wilson v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy [2000] FCA 304 at [34] and CDJ v VAJ (1998) 197 CLR 172 at [116]. In these circumstances, I will not receive the transcript into evidence.GROUNDS OF APPEAL TO THE FULL COURT

Decision

Reasons for decision

SUNDBERG J
The Tribunal also rejected the claim that one of the four officers had shot two of the soldiers the appellant said had been ordered to assist him in burying the victims. It said:“Based on its disbelief of these elements of the applicant’s claim, the Tribunal finds that the applicant has fabricated the claims that he was one of the soldiers required to help dig mass graves and that the four officers involved threatened that he would be killed if he spoke about what had happened. The Tribunal finds that the applicant did not desert from the army in 1999 because he feared that he would be harmed by the four officers. The Tribunal therefore does not accept that the applicant’s family were threatened by the four officers or their associates …. The Tribunal is strengthened in its conclusion that the applicant’s claims are not true by the implausibility of his story that while he was hiding in a temple in Colombo, he was able to participate in selection trials for a Sri Lankan Life Saving Association tour of Australia and that he was assisted to come to Australia to escape his fear of persecution by being selected for the team.”The Tribunal rejected a letter from Mr Lokuge which was said to corroborate the appellant’s claims because it did not accept that he had been truthful in what he had told Mr Lokuge any more than he had been truthful in what he had told the Tribunal. It noted an inconsistency between the appellant’s evidence and the letter which gave it further cause to disbelieve his claim to have been involved in burying people killed by the four officers.DECISION APPEALED FROM Two grounds of appeal were pursued before the Magistrate. The first was that the Tribunal had made a jurisdictional error in that it asked the wrong question in relation to “own nationality” protection. The Tribunal is said to have asked the appellant:“Why wouldn’t the Sri Lankan government protect you?”It was submitted that this was not a question the Convention required the Tribunal to answer. Rather it should have asked what was the basis for the appellant’s unwillingness to avail himself of his country’s protection. It was said that had that question been asked, the appellant would have been able to explain why his “well founded fear of persecution” would have prevented him from approaching the government. The Magistrate rejected this ground. Her Honour said:“The issue is not whether any particular question was asked during the decision making process but whether the decision maker directed its mind to the question that that decision maker was required by statute to answer. There is no suggestion in the reasons for decision that the Tribunal misunderstood its functions.…If in attempting to understand the claims made by an applicant the Tribunal asks a question or questions not strictly required in order for the Tribunal to discharge its task, that does not reveal error of law unless by an examination of the reasons provided by the Tribunal that examination shows that the Tribunal misunderstood its task. That is not the case here.Indeed, the Tribunal made a finding of fact that the applicant was not in need of protection from anyone as he had not experienced the threats or engaged in the conduct that he claimed gave rise to his fear of persecution. Thus whether the Sri Lankan authorities would protect him (as submitted by counsel for the respondent) did not play any part in the Tribunal’s decision to refuse to grant the applicant a protection visa.”

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: SUNDBERG J