VEUKISO v Minister for Immigration
[2003] FMCA 470
•21 October 2003
FEDERAL MAGISTRATES COURT OF AUSTRALIA
| VEUKISO v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION | [2003] FMCA 470 |
| MIGRATION – Bridging visa – failure to comply with condition – where the relief sought is in respect of a visa that has expired – whether the application lacks utility – whether any grounds can be supported. |
Judiciary Act (1903) ss.39B, 75, 78B
Migration Act (1958) Cth s.474Plaintiff S157 of 2002 v Commonwealth (2003) 77 ALJR 454
| Applicant: | SIOSIFINA VEUKISO |
| Respondent: | MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & MULTICULTURAL & INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS |
| File No: | SZ 1715 of 2003 |
| Delivered on: | 21 October 2003 |
| Delivered at: | Sydney |
| Hearing date: | 21 October 2003 |
| Judgment of: | Raphael FM |
REPRESENTATION
| For the Applicant: | Applicant in person |
| Solicitors for the Respondent: | Australian Government Solicitor |
ORDERS
Application dismissed.
Applicant to pay respondent’s costs in the sum of $2,500 pursuant to Part 21, Rule 21.02(2)(a) of the Federal Magistrates Court Rules
| FEDERAL MAGISTRATES COURT OF AUSTRALIA AT SYDNEY |
SZ 1715 of 2003
| SIOSIFINA VEUKISO |
Applicant
And
| MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & MULTICULTURAL & INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS |
Respondent
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
On 25 August 2003 the applicant in this matter filed an application under section 39B of the Judiciary Act (1903) claiming that a decision by a Delegate of the Minister given on 11 August 2003 to require the applicant to present a valid ticket for departure by 26 August 2003 was incorrect and wrong in law. The grounds upon which this application was made were:
1.The proceeding involved a matter arising under section 78B of the Judiciary Act (1903).
2.It is unconstitutional for the parliament to enact legislation in the form of Migration Act to abolish the rights to have a poor decision checked by an independent umpire according to law.
3.That the decision was otherwise contrary to law.
4.The applicant seeks to challenge section 474 of the Migration Act (1958).
5.That the decision involves section 75 of the Constitution.
The decision which was referred to by the applicant was a decision by a delegate of the Minister to grant her a bridging visa E subclass 050 subject to certain conditions, being conditions 8101, 8505, 8506, 8207 and 8511. One of those conditions required the applicant to present a ticket for her departure from Australia by 26 August 2003. The bridging visa itself was to remain in effect until 26 August 2003. I assume that what was intended was that if an appropriate ticket was produced for a date in the not too distant future, the bridging visa would be further extended until that date.
It is now 21 October 2003 and the applicant appeared today in court and informed me that no ticket had been purchased. The respondent by way of a notice of motion filed on 2 October 2003 sought to dismiss the application because it showed no reasonable cause of action. The notice of motion was supported by an affidavit of Ms Watson, a solicitor with the Australian Government Solicitor. In her affidavit Ms Watson points to the decision and the condition concerning the production of a ticket. She says that as the bridging visa has now expired, the application is without utility and should be dismissed. She also argues that the application discloses no arguable grounds. To the extent that the application appears to assert that section 474 of the Migration Act (1958) (Cth) is unconstitutional, it is plainly wrong, see Plaintiff S157 of 2002 v Commonwealth (2003) 77 ALJR 454.
The applicant appeared before me in person. She readily admitted in response to my questions that she did not know what section 78B of the Judiciary Act (1903) was, nor was she able to tell me anything about section 75 of the Constitution. She told me that the application had been completed by her husband with the advice of friends.
The applicant addressed me in support of her claim and in response to the notice of motion. The matters which she referred to were matters which related to her personal situation, that of her husband and her children. She told me that she had been informed that she had a debt to the Commonwealth and that unless it was paid off she would be unable to return to Australia if she left it. She advised me that she had been unable to pay the debt. I am not entirely sure what that debt is but there certainly will be a debt owing in respect of costs for these proceedings.
None of the matters raised by the applicant went to those matters contained in the application itself, nor was she able to answer the respondent's point that the visa had now expired and therefore there was no utility in making some decision concerning one of the conditions subject to which it was issued. Likewise, there is nothing in the papers and nothing which I heard from the applicant that would indicate the decision that was made was made in error.
In all the circumstances I feel that the most appropriate course to take is to dismiss the application pursuant to the notice of motion, which I do. I order that the applicant pay the respondent's costs which I assess in the sum of $2,500 pursuant to Part 21, Rule 21.02(2)(a) of the Federal Magistrates Court Rules.
I certify that the preceding seven (7) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for judgment of Raphael FM
Associate: Brant S
Date:
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