Vero Insurance Limited v Power Technologies Pty Ltd

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[2008] HCATrans 134

IN THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Office of the Registry
  Sydney  No S502 of 2007

B e t w e e n -

VERO INSURANCE LIMITED

Applicant

and

POWER TECHNOLOGIES  PTY LTD

Respondent

Application for special leave to appeal

GLEESON CJ
HEYDON J

TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS

AT SYDNEY ON FRIDAY, 7 MARCH 2008, AT 2.15 PM

Copyright in the High Court of Australia

MR B.W. WALKER, SC:   May it please the Court, I appear with my learned friend, MR D.I. TALINTYRE, for the applicant.  (instructed by Piper Alderman Lawyers)

MR P. WEBB, QC:   May it please the Court, I appear with my learned friend, MR T.M. ROWLES, for the respondent.  (instructed by Carroll & O’Dea)

GLEESON CJ:   Yes, Mr Walker.

MR WALKER:   Your Honours, the issue we propose as a special leave point arises as follows.  Mr Barlow, having contracted mesothelioma, sued, among other people, Elcom, as it was then known, that became known as Delta, and ICAL, a local company with an English parent and vast experience in relevant engineering, in relation to those injuries.  That claim was settled.

ICAL might be regarded on the findings as being an engineering company with access, particularly in the form of its parent, to specialist knowledge concerning, among other things, the risks involved in the kind of work it performed in high temperature boiler work including the emptying of fly ash and the like.  The facts show that Mr Barlow contracted his disease by reason of asbestos exposure caused by the designed method, among other things, of maintaining the apparatus by stripping lagging and the like.

Following the settlement of what I will call the plaintiff’s claim, in the same proceedings via cross‑claim, what might be called the contribution cross‑claim, Elcom, Delta, sued ICAL for the statutory contribution, that is, as a concurrent tortfeasor.  The issue in that case did not include whether or not ICAL was negligent, that is, it was either conceded or not treated as a live issue, as one sees from the learned trial judge’s reference to that at application book page 117, paragraph 3.  The issue between the parties in the contribution proceeding was the extent of the contribution that should be made by ICAL to the liability which had largely been discharged by payment on the part of Elcom.

So far as what his Honour called causal contribution, which has to do with what might be called the physical aetiology of the disease by reference to exposure to asbestos, so-called causal contribution for want of more information from either ICAL or Elcom, his Honour held, application book 121, paragraph 15, that they should be treated half and half.  That would appear to be an arbitrary half and half on the basis that there was no better information available to distinguish between the validly material contribution of each of them.

So the issue as to the extent of financial contribution pursuant to the discretion under the Contribution Act came down…

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Details
Case
[2008] HCATrans 134
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Vero Insurance Limited (Vero) sought to recover from Power Technologies Pty Ltd (Power Technologies) the sum of $1.2 million, representing the amount it had paid to its insured, the State of Queensland (the State), under a policy of insurance. Vero alleged that Power Technologies was liable to indemnify the State for the loss suffered by the State, which arose from a fire at the State's premises. The dispute concerned the interpretation of a contract between the State and Power Technologies, specifically a clause that purported to exclude or limit Power Technologies' liability to the State. The case was heard in the High Court of Australia.

The High Court was required to determine whether the exclusion clause in the contract between the State and Power Technologies was effective to prevent Vero, as the State's subrogee, from recovering the insurance payout from Power Technologies. This involved considering the proper construction of the exclusion clause and whether it applied to the specific loss suffered by the State, as well as the interaction between the contractual exclusion clause and the principles of subrogation under insurance law.

The High Court, by majority, held that the exclusion clause was not effective to prevent Vero's recovery. The majority reasoned that the clause, when properly construed, did not operate to exclude liability for the particular type of loss that occurred. Furthermore, the Court affirmed the principle that an insurer, upon payment of a claim, is subrogated to the rights of the insured against a third party responsible for the loss. The Court found that the contractual exclusion clause did not operate to extinguish the liability of Power Technologies to the State in a way that would defeat the insurer's right of subrogation.

The High Court ordered that the appeal be dismissed and that Power Technologies pay Vero's costs.

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