VELLERS & VELLERS
[2019] FamCA 412
•20 June 2019
FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA
| VELLERS & VELLERS | [2019] FamCA 412 |
| FAMILY LAW – PROPERTY – enforcement of previous orders – orders to restrict movement – enforcement of orders made in Australia in another jurisdiction – airport watch list – urgent ex parte application – orders made. |
| Family Law Rules 2004 (Cth) r 5.12. |
| Rahman & Rahman [2013] FamCAFC 162 Xuen & Chao (injunction in aid of enforcement) [2014] FamCA 798 |
| APPLICANT: | Ms Vellers |
| RESPONDENT: | Mr Vellers |
| FILE NUMBER: | HBC | 256 | of | 2019 |
| DATE DELIVERED: | 20 June 2019 |
| PLACE DELIVERED: | Sydney |
| PLACE HEARD: | Sydney |
| JUDGMENT OF: | McClelland DCJ |
| HEARING DATE: | 20 June 2019 |
REPRESENTATION
| COUNSEL FOR THE APPLICANT: | Mr Trezise |
| SOLICITOR FOR THE APPLICANT: | Wallace Wilkinson & Webster |
| COUNSEL FOR THE RESPONDENT: | No appearance |
| SOLICITOR FOR THE RESPONDENT: | No appearance |
THE COURT ORDERS THAT THE FOLLOWING ORDERS WILL APPLY UNTIL 5 PM ON 3 JULY 2019:
The wife’s Initiating Application filed on 17 June 2019 be listed for hearing on 3 July 2019 at 9.15 am in Hobart.
Until further Order, the respondent, Mr Vellers (born … 1968) is restrained from leaving or attempting to leave the Commonwealth of Australia and it is requested that the Australian Federal Police give effect to this Order by immediately registering the respondent on the Airport Watch List. It is directed that the Applicant’s solicitor, Ms Sally Rofe of Wallace, Wilkinson and Webster, serve a sealed copy of this Order on the Australian Federal Police.
The respondent must immediately deliver up to the Office Manager of the Hobart Registry of this Court, his Country B passport, his birth certificate and his Australian citizenship documents, original and copies (if any).
The respondent is restrained by injunction from applying for a passport from the government of the Country B, from any Country B authority, from the Commonwealth of Australia and from any other source.
The costs of the applicant are reserved until further hearing.
The solicitor for the wife is to serve a copy of these orders upon the solicitor for the father by close of business today.
THE COURT NOTES THAT:
A.The wife has provided an undertaking as to damages that will apply until 5pm on 3 July 2019
Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry of the order in the Court’s records.
IT IS NOTED that publication of this judgment by this Court under the pseudonym Vellers & Vellers has been approved by the Chief Justice pursuant to s 121(9)(g) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth).
Note: This copy of the Court’s Reasons for Judgment may be subject to review to remedy minor typographical or grammatical errors (r 17.02A(b) of the Family Law Rules 2004 (Cth)), or to record a variation to the order pursuant to r 17.02 Family Law Rules 2004 (Cth).
| FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA AT SYDNEY |
FILE NUMBER: HBC 256 of 2019
| Ms Vellers |
Applicant
And
| Mr Vellers |
Respondent
EX TEMPORE REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
introduction
The matter before the court concerns an application by Ms Vellers (“the wife”) for interim orders in aid of the enforcement of orders previously made by the court in circumstances where the respondent has not been given notice of these proceedings.
The subject orders were made by consent on 10 May 2019. Those orders are as follows:
1. The Respondent Husband is permitted to pursue a dissolution of the Parties marriage in the High Court of Country B – City C (…79 of 2018) (“the B Proceedings”).
2. The Respondent Husband is otherwise restrained by an injunction and an injunction is granted from taking any step in the B Proceedings relating to the enforcement of the Parties’ Country B prenuptial Contract or financial matters between the parties, including a property settlement.
3. The Respondent Husband:
(a)subject to paragraph 4 below is restrained by injunction from withdrawing and/or disposing the funds held in the D Bank – Country B account in the Husband’s sole (account number …33); and
(b)the Husband will provide the wife statements of account monthly within 24 hours of being received by the husband AND FOR THIS ORDER the Husband will provide the Wife with the most current statement in his possession within 1 business day of the date of this Order.
4. Within 7 days of the date of this Order, the husband do all things necessary to update his D Bank internet banking to enable him to transfer 50% of his D Bank balance into an Australian interest bearing account.
The wife’s contentions
As noted, the applicant, by Initiating Application filed on 17 June 2019, has sought orders in aid of enforcement of the Courts orders of 10 May 2019 together with an order varying one particular order concerning the transfer of funds. The reasons for the application being made are set out in the Affidavit of the wife filed on 17 June 2019 which states:
31. I strongly believe that it is [Mr Vellers'] intention is to leave Australia in order to defeat any anticipated Order in my favour. This is due in no small part to his past behaviour where he agreed to preserve funds but then, without notice to me, transferred funds, including a transfer of A$300,000.00 out of Australia to Country B.
32. I also believe he instigated a breach of trust with Company F. The funds that were held in trust there were refunded to him on 27 November, one week after [Mr Vellers] deposited it in the trust account, again without any notice to myself or On 12 December 2018, [Mr Vellers] requested an informal settlement conference. He clearly had no bona fide intention of attending that conference. By then, all of the funds that were in trust had been returned to him. I believe that this was only a measure to delay me from commencing proceedings in Australia, while he surreptitiously started divorce proceedings in Country B.
34. As noted in his affidavit filed 8 May 2019, [Mr Vellers] recently withdrew his permanent residency application. He can re-apply at any time before his current visa expires on 21 July 2020, which I believe he may ultimately do one day. Indeed, he expressed in his affidavit that he might re-apply. I strongly believe he will not transfer the funds back to Australia in compliance with the Order. No order made in Australia will be acknowledged or enforced in Country B. I also strongly believe he will leave Australia to frustrate any further Orders made in Australia which are not in his favour. From his past actions and behaviour, I do not believe he will attend the Court-ordered Conciliation Conference on 22 July
2019.35. [Mr Vellers] has continuing, strong ties in Country B. His sister is living in a property owned by him there and I believe his brother is also still in City C, Country B. He also has strong employment ties in Country E. These ties will make it very easy for him to travel to and stay in either Country B or Country E and to retain sole control of the funds which he transferred to Country B.
36. I respectfully request that my Application for an interim Order be initially heard and determined without prior notice to [Mr Vellers]. If he is given prior notice of the Application, he will be able to depart from Australia before the Application is heard, even with a short/early listing date. From his previous actions I firmly believe that he will do so and then retain sole use of the funds which are the subject of my property adjustment application. If he travels to Country E or to
Country B, my application will be utterly frustrated and lost.37. Dealing then with the relevant parts of Rule 5.12:
- There are pending property adjustment proceedings in this Court between [Mr Vellers] and myself.
- The Order dated 10 May 2019 remains in full force and effect.
- [Mr Vellers] has provided no evidence of his compliance with paragraph 4 of that Order. In my own experience, compliance could have been effected quite easily and within the prescribed period of seven (7) days. That time has well and truly elapsed.
- [Mr Vellers] has not been informed of my intention to make this application. I have instructed WWW not to inform his legal practitioners, Company F, his last known address for service.
- There will be no hardship, danger or prejudice to [Mr Vellers], nor to any third party, if the interim Order which I seek is made. [Mr Vellers] may well be financially disappointed, but he will still be able to continue to live and work in Australia as he has done now since 2016.
- If the interim Order which I seek is not made, [Mr Vellers] can and, I believe, will depart from Australia and retain sole use of the cash funds which he has already transferred from Australia to Country B. My application for a property adjustment will then be fruitless. We have no other assets of significance in Australia. [Mr Vellers] has seen to that. Moreover, I have no reasonable prospect of successfully enforcing Orders against him in either Country B or Country E, where he is then certain to reside and work.
- If the interim Order is not made urgently and without notice to [Mr Vellers], this result may well be assured. The long-term financial hardship to me will then be extreme. The hardship to [Mr Vellers] if the Order is made is difficult for me to identify. Apart from his very evident wish to defeat my property adjustment application, I am not aware of any reason why [Mr Vellers] would want or need to depart from Australia in the foreseeable future.
- If the interim Order which I seek is made, I will have the capacity to give an undertaking as to damages. Specifically, the cash funds of $300,000.00 would need to be in the control of my either myself or my legal practitioners.
The application has been made without notice to the respondent in the proceedings, Mr Vellers (“the husband”). The reasons why the wife has not provided notice to the husband are set out in the Affidavit as referred to above.
By way of summary those reasons are, according to the wife, that the respondent is a flight risk and if he leaves the jurisdiction, it will deprive the wife of the opportunity of obtaining the remedy she seeks in the Family Court of Australia.
The Family Law Rules 2004 permit an application to be made without notice. Relevantly, rule 5.12 sets out the matters that the Court is required to consider. These are:
An applicant seeking that an interim order or procedural order be made without notice to the respondent must:
(a) satisfy the court about why:
(i) shortening the time for service of the application and the fixing of an early date for hearing after service would not be more appropriate; and
(ii) an order should be made without notice to the other party; and(b) in an affidavit or orally, with the court’s permission, make full and frank disclosure of all the facts relevant to the application, including:
(i) whether there is a history or allegation of child abuse or family violence between the parties;
(ii) whether there has been a previous case between the parties and, if so, the nature of the case;
(iii) the particulars of any orders currently in force between the parties;
(iv) whether there has been a breach of a previous order by either party to the case;
(v) whether the respondent or the respondent’s lawyer has been told of the intention to make the application;
(vi) whether there is likely to be any hardship, danger or prejudice to the respondent, a child or a third party if the order is made;
(vii) the capacity of the applicant to give an undertaking as to damages;
(viii) the nature of the damage or harm that may result if the order is not made;
(ix) why the order must be urgently made; and
(x) the last known address or address for service of the other party.Note: The applicant must file any existing family violence order when filing the application (see rule 2.05).
The Applicant’s Counsel has referred the Court to two authorities of this court that have relevance to this application. First, in Rahman & Rahman [2013] FamCAFC 162 the Court stated:
54. There is no doubt a court exercising jurisdiction under the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) (“the Act”) has the power to make an order, pursuant to s 114, restraining a person from leaving Australia pending compliance with orders, including final orders (see, for example, Anstis & Anstis (1999) 26 Fam LR 548, Khademollah & Khademollah (2000) FLC 93-050, Brown & Brown (2007) FLC 93-316 and Porto & Porto (No 3) (2010) 45 Fam LR 101).
55. Indeed, the written submissions filed on behalf of the appellant accept as much (see, [33]). The error asserted in Ground 4 is that his Honour failed to “consider at any level how the making of Orders 4 to 7 inclusive impacted on the Husband’s right of freedom to leave the Commonwealth of Australia … in accordance with Article 12.2 [of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights]”.
56. A person’s freedom of movement is, by virtue of Australia’s ratification of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (“ICCPR”), certainly a relevant consideration when making an order pursuant to s 114 restraining a person from leaving Australia (see, Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Teoh (1995) 183 CLR 273, particularly Mason CJ and Dean J at 286-288).
57. However, that consideration must be taken into account by reference to the plain terms of the relevant municipal law and balanced against a competing principle relating to the likelihood that the party applying for the order will be denied a remedy if the respondent’s freedom to leave the jurisdiction is not restrained (see, for example, Anstis at [38]). The Full Federal Court said recently in Talacko v Talacko (2010) 183 FCR 311 (at 326), in respect of s 30(1) of the Bankruptcy Act which, like s 114 of the Act, confers a “broad discretionary power in support of its jurisdiction”:
To restrain a citizen from travelling is an order which would not be granted lightly and, in granting the order, the importance of the right to be free to travel would be a significant consideration to weigh in the balance. So, also, would be the prospect that the [orders sought to be effected by virtue of the restraint] would be defeated … if travel were not restrained … The weighing of such considerations in the course of the exercise of judicial discretion is a task with which courts are charged on many occasions.
58. The parties were agreed at trial that the totality of their assets comprised the sum of approximately $580,000 which had been transferred to Country F. The husband had travelled to Country F on three occasions since repatriating those funds to that country. At the trial, the parties were in dispute over who had disposed of those funds; the appellant maintained the respondent (through her father) had disposed of the funds, whilst the respondent maintained that the appellant was responsible. Ultimately, his Honour found:
160. The undisputed fact is that the husband was responsible for moving virtually all of the parties’ assets from Australia to [Country F]. I do not accept the husband’s version as to what happened to those assets.
59. The appellant’s challenge to that finding has failed on this appeal; his Honour’s finding was well open to him.
60. Specific statutory power is given to this Court to grant injunctions “…in aid of enforcement…” It emerges clearly from his Honour’s Reasons that this is the power upon which his Honour relied. The exercise of the power involves the exercise of a discretion informed by factors which include the appellant’s right to travel as he might desire and, specifically, the ICCPR.
61. His Honour’s findings at [165]-[167] of the Reasons have been quoted by May and Ainslie-Wallace JJ. The appellant’s freedom to travel was, plainly, a relevant consideration in his Honour’s exercise of the power pursuant to s 114. However, based on his Honour’s finding as to the disposal of the totality of the parties’ assets by the appellant (the challenge to which has failed in this Court) and the absence of evidence proffered by the appellant regarding the availability of other assets to meet his obligations under the final property orders (which, it ought be noted, were agreed to by the parties), that consideration was plainly outweighed by the “prospect that the [final property orders] would be defeated … if travel were not restrained.”
62. As the transcript of the trial proceedings makes plain, the appellant’s counsel was invited by his Honour to make submissions as to why an order pursuant to s 114(3) restraining the appellant from leaving Australia as a means of enforcing the final orders ought not be made. The appellant’s counsel submitted that, by virtue of s 81, the Court does not have the power to make an “open-ended” order pursuant to s 114 restraining a person from leaving Australia.
63. The statutory mandate in s 81 is not absolute; it is conditioned by a consideration of what is “practicable”. Of itself, the section does not preclude an order of the type made; it is an important factor which is also to be considered.
64. Further, and importantly, no submissions were made in respect of the appellant’s rights pursuant to the ICCPR; that contention is, it seems, raised for the first time on appeal.
65. In my view, his Honour was plainly correct in being satisfied that the “heavy onus” that there was “a likelihood that [she] [would] be denied a remedy if the [appellant’s] freedom to leave the jurisdiction is not limited or suspended” had been met (Anstis at [38]).
The second authority of relevance is a decision of Tree J in Xuen & Chao (injunction in aid of enforcement) [2014] FamCA 798.
5. To most civil lawyers, it would probably seem most unusual that, in aid of the enforcement of a purely money judgment, individual civil liberties, including the right to freedom of movement, may be curtailed. Indeed it seems uncontroversial that in all State Supreme Courts, no such aid to enforcement presently exists, and indeed in most Australian States, has not done so for about 100 years. However it seems plain upon a review of the authorities, that no such prohibition exists in Commonwealth Courts, and specifically, by s 34 of the Family Law Act, this Court has the power to make orders of such kinds, and issue or direct the issue of, writs of such kinds, as the court considers appropriate. An alternative source of power could be found in the general injunction power in s 114 of the Act.
6. A convenient starting point in reviewing the authorities is Anstis & Anstis (2000) FLR 93-013. At [18] to [38] of that judgment, Mullane J reviewed the relevant law (albeit apparently only adverting to s 114 as the potential source of power) including the relevant provisions relating to the Supreme Court of New South Wales about arrest in aid of enforcement of civil debts.
7. At [35] the Court said:
Clearly, quite apart from the Covenant [on Civil and Political Rights] the court should not lightly exercise a power to restrain a party’s freedom to leave the jurisdiction, as to do so is a serious restraint on any citizen. Whilst article 12.2 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights has not been incorporated in Australian Municipal Law, it has ratified by Australia and incorporated for the limited purposes that I referred to earlier. The same provision is also part of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights passed unanimously by the United Nations. The ratification of the Convention by Australia gives rise to a legitimate expectation that in exercising the power under s114(3) a court will act in accordance with the Convention.
8. Later at [38] the Court continued:
In any event the onus on the applicant is not satisfied merely by evidence which establishes that if the respondent left the jurisdiction permanently, the applicant could be denied a remedy which the proceedings are otherwise likely to provide. The onus on the applicant is to establish a likelihood that the applicant will be denied a remedy if the respondent’s freedom to leave the jurisdiction is not limited or suspended.
9. Next in Khademollah & Khademollah (2000) FLC 93-050, the Full Court refused to interfere with an order restraining the husband from leaving the country without him having first paid arrears in child support due to the mother. Whilst there was no extensive discussion of the relevant principles, at [171] the Court said “we see no justification for this court interfering with her Honour’s restraining order, particularly when her Honour has provided a mechanism for the re-listing of the matter before herself.”
10. In Ejje & Ejje (2003) FLC 93-129 the Full Court dealt glancingly with the power of the court to restrain a party from leaving Australia and to require them to surrender their passport at [18]. It appears as though the Full Court was of the view that there was power under s 114(3) to make that order, but was also of the view that the husband’s subsequent bankruptcy relieved him of any obligation to pay creditors, and therefore the injunctions were no longer sustainable and should be discharged.
11. Next in 2003, a useful review of the authorities – albeit undertaken in an ex tempore judgment – was undertaken by Young J in B & B [2003] FamCA 36. There his Honour ultimately made an order for an interim injunction for a finite period to permit further hearing of the application. His Honour specifically adverted to s 34 as containing the power to make such an order.
12. The Full Court revisited the issue in Brown & Brown (2007) FLC 93-316 where at [192] to [195] the Court said as follows:
192. What senior counsel for the husband sys (whether defensively or offensively) of the “error” in the earlier orders comes essentially to this; namely that the power to grant restraints on freedom of movement in cases involving monetary disputes is only to be exercised:
· where it is in the nature of a short term restraint; and
· the restraint does not take on the character of a free standing enforcement procedure.
193. Senior counsel for the husband relied upon the English authority of B & B (injunction: restraint on leaving jurisdiction) [1997] 3 AllER 258.
194. It seems to us that though that authority contains a helpful consideration of principle, the starting point in the instant case is with the Act. We think there is little doubt that in making the orders of 22 and 23 December 2005, O’Ryan J relied upon s114(3) of the Act. In any event, the subsection is a relevant source of power.
195. The use of s114(3) to found injunctions restraining freedom of international movement in financial cases has not received direct scrutiny by the Full Court of this Court. However, that the power exists for such restrictions was at least impliedly accepted in the single Judge decisions of Anstis & Anstis & Anor (No 1) (2000) FLC 93-013 and B & B [2003] FamCA 36 and the decisions of the Full Courts in Ejje & Ejje(2003) FLC 93-129 and in Khademollah (2000) FLC 93-050, a case where the High Court rejected an application for special leave on 15 February 2002.
13. In Castles & Pesic [2008] FamCA 1003 Watt J also made an injunction restraining a husband from leaving the country until certain financial orders had been complied with.
14. Next in Porto & Porto (No 3) (2010) 45 FamLR 101, Dessau J had occasion to again review the authorities relevant to restraints on personal movement. Ultimately her Honour made an order restraining the husband from being able to leave Australia for a period of 12 months unless and until he complied with certain money orders.
15. At [145]-[146] her Honour concluded:
[145] It was argued strenuously on the husband’s behalf that he should be able to leave Australia. To restrict someone’s freedom of movement is not a decision taken lightly, but the justice of this case, and enforcement of the wife’s rights under these orders, leads me on balance to make an order restraining the husband from leaving the country. Of course he should not be restrained once he has complied with the orders.
[146] That brings me to the form of the orders. An order that he is restrained from leaving the country until he has complied with the orders, would not give sufficient certainty for immigration officers to determine whether a Watch List order that I will make to support the injunction, is or is not still in place. The better course is for the restraint on a Watch List order to remain clearly in force until specifically varied by this court.
16. Most recently the Full Court of the Federal Court of Australia has considered the restraint of persons pending the determination of bankruptcy proceedings in Talacko & Ors v Talacko (2010) 183 FCR 311. That was a case stated which, albeit in the context of the Bankruptcy Act, dealt with a general power to issue injunctions not materially different to s 114. The specific question posed of the Full Court was whether the provisions of s 30(1) of the Bankruptcy Act1966 (Cth) empowered a court to order that a person in respect of whom a Bankruptcy Notice has been issued, be restrained from leaving the jurisdiction and be required to deliver up his or her passports. The court answered both questions in the affirmative. At [35]-[37] the court said as follows:
[35] To restrain a citizen from travelling is an order which would not be granted lightly and, in granting the order, the importance of the right to be free to travel would be a significant consideration to weigh in the balance. So also would be the prospect that the purposes of the Bankruptcy Act would be defeated or the bankruptcy rendered nugatory if travel were not restrained. The weighing of such considerations in the course of the exercise of judicial discretion is a task with which courts are charged on many occasions.
[36] A contention that the question should be answered in the negative could readily defeat the objectives of the Bankruptcy Act. It fails to take into account the requirement that a court must act judicially in the making of any order under s30(1)(b) and must have regard to whether or not such an order is “necessary” for the purposes of carrying out or given effect to the Bankruptcy Act.
[37] For the foregoing reasons, the questions posed for the court’s consideration in the case stated will be answered in the affirmative.
17. From the foregoing analysis of the cases it can be seen that the following principles may be discerned:
· Whether it be pursuant to s 34 or s 114(3) there is clear power in this court to restrain a party from leaving Australia, and to require them to deliver up their passport, in aid of enforcement proceedings in relation to orders requiring them to pay a sum or sums of money;
· In the exercise of the discretion whether or not to make such an order, the legitimate expectation of a person for the freedom of movement will loom as a large, but not necessarily determative, consideration;
· Additional considerations will include the interests of justice and the court ensuring, to the extent that it can, that its orders are not wilfully flouted.
Dealing with the specific provisions of rule 5.12(a), Counsel for the applicant argued the applicant has a legitimate concern that she may be deprived of final relief as a result of the husband leaving the jurisdiction, for the following reasons;
a)The lack of information received from the respondent at least since communication was made on 7 June 2019 as to steps that are being made to transfer funds in accordance with the orders made on 10 May 2019 by consent;
b)The fact that there has to date been non-compliance with those orders;
c)The history of circumstances in which funds have been removed from the jurisdiction by the husband; and
d)The ease of international movement of the husband in circumstances where by Affidavit dated 8 May 2019 at paragraph 20, the husband advised that he had withdrawn his permanent residence application from Australia.
Dealing further with the matters referred to in rule 5.12(b), the Court has given consideration to all paragraphs and consider rule 5.12(b)(iii) to have relevance to these proceedings. With regard to Order 4 of the orders made on 10 May 2019, to which the Court has referred above, while the Court is unable to determine that there has been a breach of that order, certainly, as at this point in time, there has been a non-compliance, at least in its totality, to Order 4.
In terms of rule 5.12(b)(v), the Court has been advised by counsel for the applicant that the husband’s lawyers have not been advised of these proceedings because of a concern that their communication of the fact of the application to the husband would result in activation of the flight risk to which she has referred.
In terms of rule 5.12(b)(vi), which deals with whether there is likely to be any hardship, danger or prejudice to the respondent, the Court notes that the wife in her Initiating Application seeks orders for the husband to pay an amount of $300,000 into the trust account of her lawyers. That amount is over and above the amount that he would be required to provide in compliance with Order 4 of the orders made on 10 May 2019. In those circumstances I am not prepared to make the order sought by the wife in the absence of providing the husband with the opportunity of presenting a contrary argument.
However, I accept that if the Applicant’s concerns about the husband being a flight risk do eventuate, that she would, on the other hand, suffer very real prejudice. And that consideration is relevant in both rule 5.12(b)(vi) and (viii).
The issue of potential flight risk is also of relevance is rule 5.12(b)(ix) which provides that the court is required to consider why the order must be made urgently.
In considering whether to make the order, I note that the applicant has provided undertaking as to damages in accordance with rule 5.12(b)(vii).
Having considered this matter and determined that, in the absence of representation of the husband’s interests, it is inappropriate to make an order requiring him to transfer $300,000 to the trust account of the wife’s solicitors, I will nonetheless make orders which are broadly consistent with those orders made by Tree J in the matter of Xuen & Chao (injunction in aid of enforcement) (supra).
In view of the impact that the orders will have on the freedom of movement, in particular of the respondent, I propose listing this matter for further hearing on at 9.15 am on Wednesday, 3 July in Hobart, at which time I will be able to consider the application in circumstances where the husband will have received notification of the wife’s application and these orders and where he will have the opportunity of presenting a case in reply to that advanced by the wife. In those circumstances, I make have made the orders stated above.
I certify that the preceding seventeen (17) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for judgment of the Honourable Judge McClelland delivered on 20 June 2019.
Associate:
Date: 01 July 2019
4
1