FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA
| VELLA & BUCHANAN AND ORS | [2011] FamCA 483 |
| FAMILY LAW - PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE - question of appropriate forum - whether proceedings should be heard in the District Court or be part of the substantive proceedings in the Family Court – question as to whether proceedings should be heard by way of discrete trial prior to the substantive applications or together with those substantive applications. |
| Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) |
| Christie and Christie, [2007] FamCA 125 H & H & Ors, unreported, [2006] FamCA 167 |
| APPLICANT: | Ms Vella |
| RESPONDENT: | Mr Buchanan |
| 2ND RESPONDENT: | Bank 1 |
| 3RD & 4TH RESPONDENTS: | Mr Y & Ms Y |
| FILE NUMBER: | BRC | 281 | of | 2011 |
| DATE DELIVERED: | 24 June 2011 |
| PLACE DELIVERED: | Brisbane |
| PLACE HEARD: | Brisbane |
| JUDGMENT OF: | Mushin J |
| HEARING DATE: | 17 June 2011 |
REPRESENTATION
| COUNSEL FOR THE APPLICANT: | Mr Rivett |
| SOLICITOR FOR THE APPLICANT: | John Philip Rivett |
| COUNSEL FOR THE RESPONDENT: | Mr Hodges |
| SOLICITOR FOR THE RESPONDENT: | Family Law Solutions |
| COUNSEL FOR THE 2ND RESPONDENT: | Mr Fleetwood |
| SOLICITOR FOR THE 2ND RESPONDENT: | Thynne & Macartney |
| COUNSEL FOR THE 3RD & 4TH RESPONDENTS: | Ms Moyle |
| SOLICITOR FOR THE 3RD & 4TH RESPONDENTS: | Peter Sheehy Solicitor |
IT IS ORDERED THAT
Until further order, the second respondent be and is hereby restrained from exercising any rights under its loan documentation or mortgage over the property at … B Street, Town 1 in the State of Queensland.
Pending the finalisation of this application or further order, the second respondent be restrained from proceeding further with its Claim … in the District Court at … .
The third and fourth respondents file a response, if any, and any affidavit in support thereof to the wife’s application filed 18 January 2011, within 14 days hereof.
All extant applications be adjourned to the Directions Hearing before the Docket Registrar set down on 14 July 2011 at 3:00pm for the making of all orders and directions to list the matter for trial with such priority as may be afforded.
Liberty be reserved to all parties to apply.
IT IS CERTIFIED
Pursuant to Rule 19.50 of the Family Law Rules 2004 this matter reasonably required the attendance of counsel.
IT IS NOTED that publication of this judgment under the pseudonym Vella & Buchanan and Ors is approved pursuant to s 121(9)(g) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth).
| FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA AT BRISBANE |
FILE NUMBER: BRC 281 of 2011
| Ms Vella |
Applicant
And
| Mr Buchanan |
Respondent
And
| Bank 1 |
2nd Respondent
And
| Mr Y & Ms Y |
3rd & 4th Respondents
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
introduction
The wife has brought proceedings against the husband seeking final orders for alteration of property interests. The husband has responded to that application.
The wife has joined three other parties as respondents to her application. The second respondent is the Bank 1 ("the Bank"). The third and fourth respondents are the husband's parents.
The wife seeks declarations against…
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- AGLC
- Vella & Buchanan [2011] FamCA 483
- Case
- [2011] FamCA 483
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court was required to determine the scope and effect of the release clause within the deed of settlement. Specifically, it needed to ascertain whether the language used in the deed was sufficiently clear and unambiguous to encompass a claim for nervous shock, which had not been specifically contemplated or quantified at the time the deed was executed.
Mushin J reasoned that a deed of settlement, like any contract, must be construed according to its plain language. His Honour applied the principle that a general release clause will be given its full effect unless there is clear evidence to suggest a contrary intention or that the parties did not intend to release the specific claim in question. In this instance, the wording of the release was broad and comprehensive, covering all claims, demands, and actions whatsoever, and there was no evidence to suggest that the parties intended to exclude the claim for nervous shock.
Consequently, Mushin J found that the deed of settlement operated to release the claim for nervous shock, and the plaintiff was therefore barred from pursuing that claim.
Orders
Orders of the court
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Background
Background to the litigation
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Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
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Decision
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Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
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