SUPREME COURT OF VICTORIA
COURT OF APPEAL
No. 3735 of 2003
| STREBENA VELJANOVSKA | Appellant |
| v. | |
| SOCOBELL OEM PTY. LTD. | Respondent |
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JUDGES: | CALLAWAY, BUCHANAN and ASHLEY, JJ.A. | |
WHERE HELD: | MELBOURNE | |
DATE OF HEARING: | 1 September 2005 | |
DATE OF JUDGMENT: | 14 September 2005 | |
MEDIUM NEUTRAL CITATION: | [2005] VSCA 227 | |
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Accident compensation – Workers compensation – Serious injury – Application for leave to bring common law proceeding – Application unsuccessful - Whether judge constrained to find that appellant had suffered serious injury within the meaning of paragraph (c) of s.135A(19), Accident Compensation Act 1985 – Application for leave to appeal granted nunc pro tunc – Appeal allowed.
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| APPEARANCES: | Counsel | Solicitors |
| For the Appellant | Mr J.R. Moore, Q.C. with | Rose Mary Brondolino & Co |
| For the Respondent | Mr J.H.L. Forrest, Q.C. with Mr J.P. Gorton | Wisewoulds |
CALLAWAY, J.A.:
I agree with Ashley, J.A.
BUCHANAN, J.A.:
I agree with Ashley, J.A., for the reasons he has stated, that leave to appeal should be granted nunc pro tunc, the appeal allowed and the appellant granted leave to bring proceedings for damages.
ASHLEY, J.A.:
Statement of the case
This is an appeal from the order of a County Court judge made on 4 July 2003 dismissing the appellant’s application “under s.135A(19)(a) and (c) of the Accident Compensation Act 1985”, which I shall call “the Act”.[1]
[1]Strictly speaking, the application was not an application under paragraphs (a) and (c) of the definition of “serious injury” in s. 135A(19). It was an application under s. 135A(4)(b). That was common ground. It does not affect the substance of the judge’s order.
The appellant commenced her application by Originating Motion filed in March 2001. By Particulars of Injury and Impairment dated 3 June 2002 she claimed that she suffered from
“Serious injury within the meaning of s.135A(19)(a) and in particular … has suffered a long-term bilateral impairment or loss of function of the shoulders and arms as a consequence of the following injuries.
…
(a)Neck and bilateral shoulder and upper limb soft tissue strain injuries.
(b)Bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome.
(c)Chronic pain syndrome.
(d)Consequential depression and anxiety.”
I pause to note that the matters relied upon in paragraphs (c) and (d) of the particulars could only be relied upon in proof of serious injury under s.135A(19)(a) if they were a consequence of long-term impairment of body function rather than its cause.[2] No doubt that explains use of the adjective “consequential” in paragraph (d).
[2]Cf Richards v. Wylie (2000) 1 VR 79 at [16], [17] 86-88 per Winneke, P., at [23], [24] 89 per Brooking, J.A., and at [28] 90 per Chernov, J.A.
At the hearing of the application the appellant was granted leave to amend the Particulars of Injury and Impairment to which I have just referred by adding a cumulative or alternative reliance on s.135A(19)(c), and by adding to paragraphs (d) of the Particulars
“ … within the meaning of s.135A(19)(c) of the definition of serious injury.”
The material adduced on the application was largely…
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- Case
- [2005] VSCA 227
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court was tasked with determining whether the judge presiding over the workers' compensation claim was obligated to conclude that Veljanovska's injury was serious. It examined whether the judge was bound to find that the injury caused a permanent impairment, as required by the legislation, or if there was room for judicial discretion in such assessments. Additionally, the court had to consider whether the application for leave to bring a common law proceeding was properly denied and whether there were grounds for granting leave to appeal nunc pro tunc.
Upon review, the court found that the judge did not have the discretion to find that the injury was serious under the statutory definition, and thus, the initial application for leave to bring a common law proceeding was correctly denied. However, the court granted leave to appeal nunc pro tunc, recognising that the original application for leave was mishandled. Consequently, the appeal was allowed, providing Veljanovska with the opportunity to pursue her common law claim against her employer.
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