VDAE v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

VDAE v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs
[2003] FCAFC 123

MIGRATION – possession of sensitive political information – imputed political opinion - whether well founded fear of persecution - requirement to take evidence into account

VDAE, VDAF AND VDAG v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AND INDIGENOUS AFAIRS

V 4 of 2003

FRENCH, von DOUSSA and MARSHALL JJ
5 JUNE 2003
MELBOURNE


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

VICTORIA DISTRICT REGISTRY

V 4 OF 2003

ON APPEAL FROM A SINGLE JUDGE OF THE COURT

BETWEEN:

VDAE
FIRST APPELLANT

VDAF
SECOND APPELLANT

VDAG
THIRD APPELLANT

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AND INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS
RESPONDENT

JUDGES:

FRENCH, von DOUSSA and MARSHALL JJ

DATE OF ORDER:

5 JUNE 2003

WHERE MADE:

MELBOURNE

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

  1. The appeal be dismissed.
  2. The appellants pay the respondent’s costs of the appeal.

Note:   Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

VICTORIA DISTRICT REGISTRY

V 4 OF 2003

ON APPEAL FROM A SINGLE JUDGE OF THE COURT

BETWEEN:

VDAE
FIRST APPELLANT

VDAF
SECOND APPELLANT

VDAG
THIRD APPELLANT

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AND INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS
RESPONDENT

JUDGES:

FRENCH, von DOUSSA and MARSHALL JJ

DATE:

5 JUNE 2003

PLACE:

MELBOURNE

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

THE COURT

  1. This is an appeal from the judgment of a judge of the Court (“the primary judge”) in which his Honour dismissed an application by the appellants for judicial review of a decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal (“the RRT”).

  2. The appellants contend that the issue for determination in the appeal is whether the RRT fell into jurisdictional error by failing to deal with an allegedly essential element of the claims made by the appellants in their application for a protection visa. This contention was put to the primary judge but rejected.  The primary judge considered that on a fair reading, the decision of the RRT included non-acceptance of evidence that the appellants alleged was not dealt with by the RRT.

    Background

  3. The appellants are respectively a de facto wife, and husband and the child of the wife from her marriage to a formerly powerful politician in Sri Lanka, referred to by the primary judge as “A”.

  4. The appellants entered Australia on 6 October 1997.  On 22 October 1997 they lodged an application for a protection visa. On 3 December 1997 a delegate of the respondent refused that application.  On 8 December 2000 the RRT affirmed the decision of the delegate. The appellants applied to the Federal Court for review of the RRT’s decision.  On 22 May 2001, by consent, Weinberg J remitted the matter to the RRT. A second RRT hearing occurred on 18 December 2001.  On 26 March 2002, the RRT affirmed the decision of the delegate.

    The claims and the RRT's treatment of them

  5. The appellants claimed that they had a well founded fear of persecution on the ground of imputed political opinion if returned…

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Details
Case
[2003] FCAFC 123
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The appeal, VDAE v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs, involved a family from Sri Lanka who sought protection visas on the basis of imputed political opinion. The appellants, a de facto wife and husband along with their child, claimed that they would face persecution if returned to Sri Lanka due to their alleged knowledge of a powerful politician's involvement in political assassinations. The Refugee Review Tribunal (RRT) affirmed a delegate's decision to refuse their visa application. The primary judge rejected the appellants' contention that the RRT failed to address an essential element of their claims.

The key legal issue before the court was whether the RRT's decision contained a jurisdictional error by not adequately addressing an essential aspect of the appellants' claims. The appellants argued that the RRT did not properly consider evidence of threats made by the politician, Mr A, to the daughter. The court had to determine if the RRT's reasons implied a rejection of this evidence, and if so, whether this led to procedural unfairness or affected the substantive outcome of the appeal.

The court concluded that the RRT's reasons did imply a non-acceptance of the evidence concerning the threats made by Mr A to the daughter. However, even if this evidence had been accepted, it would not have altered the RRT's findings. The RRT had considered the broader context of the appellants' claims and found that the information they claimed to possess about Mr A had been publicly available for a long time and was not of significant concern to him or his associates. As such, the RRT's decision to uphold the delegate's refusal of the visa application was upheld, and the appeal was dismissed. The court ordered the appellants to pay the respondent's costs of the appeal.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal be dismissed.

2. The appellants pay the respondent’s costs of the appeal.

Background

Background to the litigation

The appellants contend that the issue for determination in the appeal is whether the RRT fell into jurisdictional error by failing to deal with an allegedly essential element of the claims made by the appellants in their application for a protection visa. This contention was put to the primary judge but rejected. The primary judge considered that on a fair reading, the decision of the RRT included non-acceptance of evidence that the appellants alleged was not dealt with by the RRT.Background The appellants are respectively a de facto wife, and husband and the child of the wife from her marriage to a formerly powerful politician in Sri Lanka, referred to by the primary judge as “A”. The appellants entered Australia on 6 October 1997. On 22 October 1997 they lodged an application for a protection visa. On 3 December 1997 a delegate of the respondent refused that application. On 8 December 2000 the RRT affirmed the decision of the delegate. The appellants applied to the Federal Court for review of the RRT’s decision. On 22 May 2001, by consent, Weinberg J remitted the matter to the RRT. A second RRT hearing occurred on 18 December 2001. On 26 March 2002, the RRT affirmed the decision of the delegate.The claims and the RRT's treatment of them The appellants claimed that they had a well founded fear of persecution on the ground of imputed political opinion if returned to Sri Lanka. The essence of their claim is that Mr A would seek to harm them because they possessed information about him that would be damaging to him. They claimed to know details of his involvement in the assassination of a number of political figures in Sri Lanka in about 1993. They also feared that opponents of Mr A may harm them in order to force them to divulge that information. They claimed to hold these fears notwithstanding that there had been extensive police investigations and a major government Commission of Inquiry concerning the matters about which the appellants claimed to have information during 1996 and 1997 that did not lead to any charges being laid against Mr A, or even named in the report of the Commission of Inquiry. In the material advanced in support of their application for protection visas the appellants referred to incidents which they said occurred on:· 26 July 1997· 21 August 1997· 10 September 1997, and· 24 September 1997 The 26 July 1997 incident was described in the following way by the RRT:“On 26 July 1997, while the applicant wife and husband were visiting an employee [Mr A] and a number of other people came and shot at them. The applicant wife and husband ‘ran through the paddy fields during this dark night and escaped death’.” The 21 August 1997 incident was described as follows:“[Mr A] was in custody and released on bail on 20 August 1997. The applicant [wife] states that [Mr A] had told the applicant daughter after his release that he would kill the family if the applicant mother went to court and that he ([Mr A]) had a person who had already killed two people.”At paragraph 27 of her statutory declaration made on 21 October 1997, the first appellant said the conversation between her daughter and Mr A occurred on 21 August 1997, the day after Mr A was released on bail. She said Mr A’s words were ‘your mother is trying to send me to the gallows and also she has made a statement to the police and if she comes to Court I will kill all of you’. The daughter was aged 9 years at the time.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

This conclusion would not be affected by a positive acceptance of the alleged conversation on 26 August 1997. The information claimed to be possessed by the applicants would nonetheless still lack current importance. Conclusion For the foregoing reasons we consider that the appeal should be dismissed, with costs.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

At [12] his Honour said, with reference to the above quoted passage from the RRT's reasons:“A fair reading of this includes a non-acceptance of the evidence as to A's acting by making threats to the daughter.”Consideration We are inclined to agree with the primary judge that a fair reading of the reasons of the RRT includes a finding of non-acceptance of the evidence as to Mr A’s acting by making threats to the daughter. However, if this is so, the following questions would then arise: ·whether there was procedural unfairness on the part of the RRT in not taking evidence from the third appellant, who was 13 years of age at the time of the hearing, and ·whether there was procedural unfairness in rejecting that part of the appellant’s claim regarding the allegation of the threat to the daughter, having regard to what the RRT said to the appellants about the evidence which the third appellant proposed to give. However, we do not think it is necessary to explore these questions as we consider that the appeal must in any event fail. This is so, as even if the RRT had accepted that Mr A said words as alleged to the third appellant (as the RRT appeared to do at the hearing), that acceptance would not have had any bearing on other findings made by the RRT which led to the upholding of the delegate’s decision. The RRT considered independent information available to it concerning events in Sri Lanka in 1993 and later years about which the first and second appellants gave evidence, and about the Commission of Inquiry and its findings. The RRT found that Mr A had not been implicated by the Commission of Inquiry. The RRT also found that information of the kind which the appellants alleged they had about Mr A, and about another political figure who they also claimed could present a threat to them, had been publicly aired in Sri Lanka, some of it in the Commission of Inquiry. That information had no impact on Mr A’s capacity to participate in political activity. In relation to the other political figure, the RRT found that the appellants did not have anything new and credible to say about him; he had taken no action against the appellants in the past and it was implausible that he or his associates would now do so because of information the appellants claim to have. These findings led the RRT to be ‘unable to be satisfied that there is a real chance that the issue of [Mr A’s] alleged involvement would be raised in any substantial way if the applicants were to return to Sri Lanka …’. The RRT found, in substance, that there was no objective basis for a well founded fear of persecution as information of the kind claimed to be possessed by the appellants was information that had been in the public domain for a long time and was not information of a kind that was likely to be of concern or interest to Mr A and his associates, or to the political opponents of Mr A. This conclusion would not be affected by a positive acceptance of the alleged conversation on 26 August 1997. The information claimed to be possessed by the applicants would nonetheless still lack current importance. Conclusion