FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
VDAE v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs
[2003] FCAFC 123MIGRATION – possession of sensitive political information – imputed political opinion - whether well founded fear of persecution - requirement to take evidence into account
VDAE, VDAF AND VDAG v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AND INDIGENOUS AFAIRS
V 4 of 2003
FRENCH, von DOUSSA and MARSHALL JJ
5 JUNE 2003
MELBOURNE
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
VICTORIA DISTRICT REGISTRY
V 4 OF 2003
ON APPEAL FROM A SINGLE JUDGE OF THE COURT
BETWEEN:
VDAE
FIRST APPELLANTVDAF
SECOND APPELLANTVDAG
THIRD APPELLANTAND:
MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AND INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS
RESPONDENTJUDGES:
FRENCH, von DOUSSA and MARSHALL JJ
DATE OF ORDER:
5 JUNE 2003
WHERE MADE:
MELBOURNE
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
- The appeal be dismissed.
- The appellants pay the respondent’s costs of the appeal.
Note: Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
VICTORIA DISTRICT REGISTRY
V 4 OF 2003
ON APPEAL FROM A SINGLE JUDGE OF THE COURT
BETWEEN:
VDAE
FIRST APPELLANTVDAF
SECOND APPELLANTVDAG
THIRD APPELLANTAND:
MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AND INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS
RESPONDENT
JUDGES:
FRENCH, von DOUSSA and MARSHALL JJ
DATE:
5 JUNE 2003
PLACE:
MELBOURNE
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
THE COURT
This is an appeal from the judgment of a judge of the Court (“the primary judge”) in which his Honour dismissed an application by the appellants for judicial review of a decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal (“the RRT”).
The appellants contend that the issue for determination in the appeal is whether the RRT fell into jurisdictional error by failing to deal with an allegedly essential element of the claims made by the appellants in their application for a protection visa. This contention was put to the primary judge but rejected. The primary judge considered that on a fair reading, the decision of the RRT included non-acceptance of evidence that the appellants alleged was not dealt with by the RRT.
Background
The appellants are respectively a de facto wife, and husband and the child of the wife from her marriage to a formerly powerful politician in Sri Lanka, referred to by the primary judge as “A”.
The appellants entered Australia on 6 October 1997. On 22 October 1997 they lodged an application for a protection visa. On 3 December 1997 a delegate of the respondent refused that application. On 8 December 2000 the RRT affirmed the decision of the delegate. The appellants applied to the Federal Court for review of the RRT’s decision. On 22 May 2001, by consent, Weinberg J remitted the matter to the RRT. A second RRT hearing occurred on 18 December 2001. On 26 March 2002, the RRT affirmed the decision of the delegate.
The claims and the RRT's treatment of them
The appellants claimed that they had a well founded fear of persecution on the ground of imputed political opinion if returned…
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- Case
- [2003] FCAFC 123
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The key legal issue before the court was whether the RRT's decision contained a jurisdictional error by not adequately addressing an essential aspect of the appellants' claims. The appellants argued that the RRT did not properly consider evidence of threats made by the politician, Mr A, to the daughter. The court had to determine if the RRT's reasons implied a rejection of this evidence, and if so, whether this led to procedural unfairness or affected the substantive outcome of the appeal.
The court concluded that the RRT's reasons did imply a non-acceptance of the evidence concerning the threats made by Mr A to the daughter. However, even if this evidence had been accepted, it would not have altered the RRT's findings. The RRT had considered the broader context of the appellants' claims and found that the information they claimed to possess about Mr A had been publicly available for a long time and was not of significant concern to him or his associates. As such, the RRT's decision to uphold the delegate's refusal of the visa application was upheld, and the appeal was dismissed. The court ordered the appellants to pay the respondent's costs of the appeal.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The appeal be dismissed.
2. The appellants pay the respondent’s costs of the appeal.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
At [12] his Honour said, with reference to the above quoted passage from the RRT's reasons:“A fair reading of this includes a non-acceptance of the evidence as to A's acting by making threats to the daughter.”Consideration We are inclined to agree with the primary judge that a fair reading of the reasons of the RRT includes a finding of non-acceptance of the evidence as to Mr A’s acting by making threats to the daughter. However, if this is so, the following questions would then arise: ·whether there was procedural unfairness on the part of the RRT in not taking evidence from the third appellant, who was 13 years of age at the time of the hearing, and ·whether there was procedural unfairness in rejecting that part of the appellant’s claim regarding the allegation of the threat to the daughter, having regard to what the RRT said to the appellants about the evidence which the third appellant proposed to give. However, we do not think it is necessary to explore these questions as we consider that the appeal must in any event fail. This is so, as even if the RRT had accepted that Mr A said words as alleged to the third appellant (as the RRT appeared to do at the hearing), that acceptance would not have had any bearing on other findings made by the RRT which led to the upholding of the delegate’s decision. The RRT considered independent information available to it concerning events in Sri Lanka in 1993 and later years about which the first and second appellants gave evidence, and about the Commission of Inquiry and its findings. The RRT found that Mr A had not been implicated by the Commission of Inquiry. The RRT also found that information of the kind which the appellants alleged they had about Mr A, and about another political figure who they also claimed could present a threat to them, had been publicly aired in Sri Lanka, some of it in the Commission of Inquiry. That information had no impact on Mr A’s capacity to participate in political activity. In relation to the other political figure, the RRT found that the appellants did not have anything new and credible to say about him; he had taken no action against the appellants in the past and it was implausible that he or his associates would now do so because of information the appellants claim to have. These findings led the RRT to be ‘unable to be satisfied that there is a real chance that the issue of [Mr A’s] alleged involvement would be raised in any substantial way if the applicants were to return to Sri Lanka …’. The RRT found, in substance, that there was no objective basis for a well founded fear of persecution as information of the kind claimed to be possessed by the appellants was information that had been in the public domain for a long time and was not information of a kind that was likely to be of concern or interest to Mr A and his associates, or to the political opponents of Mr A. This conclusion would not be affected by a positive acceptance of the alleged conversation on 26 August 1997. The information claimed to be possessed by the applicants would nonetheless still lack current importance. Conclusion