VBN and Australian Prudential Regulation Authority and Anor - [2005] AATA 861

CATCHWORDS – PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – joinder application – whether Trustee a person whose interests are affected by decision to disqualify former director who was a responsible officer – whether discretion should be exercised to join as a party – order for joinder.

Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 ss. 27 and 30
Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 s. 12
Superannuation Industry (Supervision) Act 1993 ss. 3, 10, 52, 55, 120, 120A, 121, 262A and 263

Allan v Transurban City Link Ltd (2001) 208 CLR 167

Alphapharm Pty Ltd v SmithKline Beecham (Australia) Pty Ltd (1994) 49 FCR 250

Comptroller-General of Customs v Members of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (1994) 123 ALR 140
Drake v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1979) 24 ALR 577; 2 ALD 60
Edwards v Australian Securities Commission and Others (1997) 72 FCR 350
Eurovox Pty Ltd v Chief Executive Officer of Customs [2000] FCA 1906
Kioa v West (1985) 159 CLR 550
News Ltd and Ors v Australian Rugby Football League Ltd (1996) 139 ALR 193
Pegang Mining Co Ltd v Choong Sam [1969] 2 MLJ 52
Re Boyd and Comcare (1991) 23 ALD 392
Re Control Investments Pty Ltd and Australian Broadcasting Tribunal (No 1) (1980) 50 FLR 1; 3 ALD 74
Re Eurovox Pty Ltd and Chief Executive Officer of Customs (2000) 63 ALD 755; 32 AAR 15
Re Marine World Victoria Ltd and Minister for Arts, Heritage and Environment (1986) 10 ALD 262
Re McHattan and Collector of Customs (1977) 18 ALR 154
Re Peters and Department of Health and Aged Care (1999) 56 ALD 561
Re Scott and Secretary, Department of Social Security (1996) 42 ALD 738
Re VBJ and Australian Prudential Regulation Authority [2005] AATA 642
United States Tobacco Co v Minister for Consumer Affairs (1988) 20 FCR 520

DECISION AND REASONS FOR DECISION [2005] AATA 861

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL     )
  )          V2005/686
GENERAL ADMINISTRATIVE DIVISION     )

Re VBN

Applicant

AndAUSTRALIAN PRUDENTIAL REGULATION AUTHORITY
Respondent

Application by

VBT
To be joined as a party

DECISION

Tribunal:  Deputy President S A Forgie
Date:  26 August 2005
Place:  Melbourne

Decision:The Tribunal orders that:
1.the applicant for party joined be described by the letters “VBT” for the purpose of the application; and
2.VBT be joined as a party to the proceeding;

and further orders that:
3.publication of and access to:
(1)the name of the party joined;
(2)any material tending to identify it or any entities in which it has an interest;
(3)any affidavits, outlines of submissions or other documents filed with the Tribunal; and
(4)the reasons of the Tribunal;
be restricted to members and staff of the Tribunal, the parties and their representatives and professional advisers and staff of Auscript; and

4.all hearing shall be held in private;

and directs that:
5.in relation to the application for review of the respondent’s decision:
(1)on or before close of business 19 August 2005 the respondent comply with s. 37 of the AAT Act;
(2)on or before close of business 6 September 2005 the applicant file and serve his Statement of Facts and Contentions;
(3)on or before 16 September 2005 the party joined file and serve its Statement of Facts and Contentions;
(4)on or before close of business 30 September 2005 the respondent file and serve its Statement of Facts and Contentions;
(5)the telephone directions hearing listed for 26 September 2005 at 9:30am is vacated; and
(6)a directions hearing be held in this matter on 4 October 2005 at 9:30am; and

6.each party has liberty to apply.

S A FORGIE
Deputy President

REASONS FOR DECISION

The Trustee, which is described by the letters “VBT”, is the corporate trustee of the SFund and VBN was one of its directors for a little over two years. On 9 June 2005, the Australian Prudential Regulation Authority (“APRA”) disqualified VBN under ss. 120A(2) and (3) of the Superannuation Industry (Supervision) Act 1993 (“SIS Act”). Unless the order is stayed, a person who is disqualified and knows of the disqualification cannot intentionally be, or act as, a trustee[1] or as a responsible officer[2] of a superannuation fund. VBN has applied to this Tribunal for review of APRA’s decision. The Trustee has applied to be made a party to the proceeding. APRA opposes its application but VBN supports it. I have decided that the Trustee is a person whose interests are affected by the decision under review and that I should exercise my discretion to grant its application to be joined as a party.

BACKGROUND

[1] SIS Act, s. 121(1)

[2] SIS Act, s. 121(2). A responsible person in relation to a body corporate is a director, secretary or executive officer of the body: SIS Act, s. 10(1).

For the purposes of this proceeding only, I will give a very broad sketch of the factual background as it appears to be. The SFund has several broad categories of members. One of them comprises those members whose retirement, death, disablement or resignation benefits are calculated as a multiple of salary (“MoS Division members”). Another comprises those whose benefits are the accumulation of the contributions they and their employers have made together with interest on those contributions (“Accumulation Division members”). Some years ago, the SFund was advised to create a further division. It comprised those members who had resigned with at least ten years of service and who had left their benefit in the fund until they were at least 55 years of age. After they reached 55, they were entitled to a pension determined by whether they were initially MoS Division or Accumulation Division members (“deferred benefit members”). The rate at which interest accrued to their funds was based on a three year compound average but with a specified minimum rate determined by reference to tax cash rates and ten year bond yields. Members were advised of this. This was the crediting rate policy and it was later reviewed. APRA has found that the deferred benefit members were not told of the review. In June, SPL advised members that the crediting rate policy had been reviewed to allow it to determine the rate each year rather than using a formula. Consistent with the revised policy, interim crediting rates had been set for the various categories of members. All were positive, rather than negative rates. In August of that same year, SPL advised members of the SFund that the net earning rate for the financial year just completed was a negative figure.

Also in August, SPL told SFund’s members of the interest crediting rate decision, it also advised that the Sponsors were considering whether to offer deferred benefit members aged over 50 years an enhancement to their account balances if they chose to take their benefit as a lump sum. This was based on a lump sum’s being a cheaper option to the SFund than a pension once the members turned 55 years. The Sponsors ultimately made an offer and SPL passed it on to SFund’s members without comment.

APRA commenced an investigation of the SFund under s. 263 of the SIS Act. Subsequently, APRA accepted an Undertaking from the Trustee given under s. 262A(1) of the SIS Act. The Undertaking is available to the public through APRA’s website and that of the Australian Securities and Investments Commission (“ASIC”) as is a Media Release issued jointly by those two bodies. The Media Release stated that:
“The Trustee provided the Enforceable Undertakings following its own investigations, and investigations by APRA and ASIC into the affairs of the Fund. The trustee will:
·reinstate for 2001-02 and 2002-03 the earlier method of calculating interest on members’ superannuation, giving an aggregate increase in benefits of some $10 million;
·offer certain former members the opportunity to re-enter the Fund on actuarially-determined terms; and
·provide disclosure to members of both of these decisions. Affected members and former members should receive individualised correspondence from the trustee around mid-June.
The restoration means that the superannuation benefits of more than of 2,000 current and former members of the … [VBT] will be adjusted upwards, with an estimated $9.2 million of the aggregate total to go to 288 ‘deferred benefits members’.
The investigations by APRA and ASIC followed complaints by some members, and concerns by the regulators about the prudential and disclosure aspects of a decision in 2002 to change the method of calculating the interest rate on termination benefits left in the Fund from a ‘smoothed’ rate to an actual earnings rate.
The regulators also had concerns that the trustee had not given members of the Fund all the information they needed to make an informed decision about whether to accept an offer made by the employer to members in April 2003.
‘APRA welcomes the trustee’s decisions to address its concerns. The right outcome has been achieved for members,’ APRA Deputy Chairman Mr Ross Jones said.
‘Timely disclosure of accurate and relevant information by superannuation trustees is critical, particularly in situations were members are exercising choices based on that information. This is particularly important in an era of superannuation choice,’ ASIC’s Executive Director of Enforcement, Ms Jan Redfern said.
APRA has no concerns about the safety of member entitlements and confirms that the Fund is currently financially sound.
Following the acceptance of the enforceable undertaking, ASIC’s investigations into the matter are now concluded.”[3]

The Trustee will fund the provision of independent advice to each member affected by the new offer up to an amount of $2,000.[4]

[3] Affidavit of Roger Heath Charles Brown, Exhibit “RHCB-10”

[4] Affidavit of Roger Heath Charles Brown at [37]

The recitals at the beginning of the Undertaking set out certain acknowledgements made by the Trustee but also set out areas in which the Trustee does not share APRA’s views. It also includes a denial by the Trustee “… that it, or any of its officers or employees, has breached any statutory or other legal or equitable obligation with respect to the [Sponsor’s] Employer Offer.”[5] Furthermore, the Trustee did not share APRA’s concerns on that offer but, in order to respond to APRA’s concerns, had no objection to providing members affected by it with an opportunity to reconsider their acceptance of it.[6] Without making any admission, the Trustee also acknowledged that APRA considered that some of its actions might be in breach of the covenants in s. 52(2) of the SIS Act.[7] APRA acknowledged in turn that the Trustee was not making any admissions.[8]For its part, APRA confirmed that its concerns would be finally resolved with respect to the Trustee by the Trustee’s entering into and complying with the undertakings set out in the Undertaking.[9]

LEGISLATIVE FRAMEWORK

[5] Affidavit of Trustee’s Chairman, Exhibit “…2” at M(1)

[6] Affidavit of Trustee’s Chairman, Exhibit “…2” at M(2)

[7] Affidavit of Trustee’s Chairman, Exhibit “…2” at N

[8] Affidavit of Trustee’s Chairman, Exhibit “…2”at V

[9] Affidavit of Trustee’s Chairman, Exhibit “…2”at cl. 20

Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act

Section 27(1) of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (“AAT Act”) provides, in so far as it is relevant, that:
“Where … any … enactment … provides that an application may be made to the Tribunal for a review of a decision, the application may be made by or on behalf of any person or persons … whose interests are affected by the decision.”

A person may apply to be joined as a party to a proceeding where another person has made an application to the Tribunal for review of a decision. An application to be joined as a party is made in writing and may be made by “any other person whose interests are affected by the decision”.[10] The Tribunal may, in its discretion, order that such a person be made a party to the proceeding. As there is no contrary intention shown in the AAT Act, a “person” includes a body corporate.[11]
[10] AAT Act, s. 30(1A)
[11] Acts Interpretation Act 1901, s. 22(1) supported by AAT Act, s. 27(2)

The SIS Act

The SIS Act provides for the “… supervision of certain entities engaged in the superannuation industry …”.[12] It does not apply to all entities engaged in the superannuation industry as the legislation depends on the Commonwealth’s powers with respect to corporations or pensions. Those funds that are supervised may be eligible to be taxed at concessional rates.[13] With these matters in mind, s. 3(1) provides that:
“The object of this Act is to make provision for the prudent management of certain superannuation funds, approved deposit funds and pooled superannuation trusts and for their supervision by APRA, ASIC^[[14]] and the Commissioner of Taxation.”

Together, those certain superannuation funds, approved deposit funds and pooled superannuation trusts are known as superannuation entities.[15]

[12] SIS Act, long title

[13] SIS Act, ss. 3(2) and (3)

[14] Australian Securities and Investments Commission

[15] SIS Act, s. 10(1)

The SIS Act provides for such matters as the approval of trustees,[16] the prescription of operating standards for superannuation entities,[17] and trustees’ lodgement of annual returns.[18] It provides for APRA’s supervision of those superannuation entities to which the legislation applies by providing that it may give a written notice to the trustee of a superannuation entity stating, in effect, whether that entity has, or has not, complied with its obligations under the SIS Act.[19] The entity’s obligations are set out[20] as well as those of its trustees, custodians and investment managers[21] and its actuaries and auditors.[22] The SIS Act goes on to, among other matters, regulate and prohibit certain sorts of conduct[23] and to give APRA power to monitor and investigate entities.[24]
[16] SIS Act, Part 2
[17] SIS Act, Part 3
[18] SIS Act, Part 4
[19] SIS Act, Part 5
[20] SIS Act, Parts 6-14
[21] SIS Act, Part 15
[22] SIS Act, Part 16
[23] e.g. SIS Act, Parts 19 and 20
[24] SIS Act, Part 25

One way in which the SIS Act prescribes the obligations of a superannuation entity is to provide that:
“If the governing rules of a superannuation entity do not contain covenants to the effect of the covenants set out in subsection (2), those governing rules are taken to contain covenants to that effect.”[25]

Those that may be of relevance in this case include:

“… the following covenants by the trustee:
(a)…
(b)to exercise, in relation to all matters affecting the entity, the same degree of care, skill and diligence as an ordinary prudent person would exercise in dealing with property of another for whom the person felt morally bound to provide;
(c)to ensure that the trustee’s duties and powers are performed and exercised in the best interests of the beneficiaries;
…”[26]

[25] SIS Act, s. 52(1)

[26] SIS Act, s, 52(2)

Section 55 provides for the consequences of contravening a covenant contained in the governing rules of a superannuation entity. Contravention is not an offence and does not invalidate a transaction[27] but:
“A person who suffers loss or damage as a result of conduct of another person that was engaged in in contravention of … [a covenant] may recover the amount of the loss or damage by action against that other person or against any person involved in the contravention.”[28]

Such an action may be begun at any time within six years from day on which the cause of action arose.[29]

[27] SIS Act, s. 55(2)

[28] SIS Act, s. 55(3)

[29] SIS Act, s. 55(4)

A person must not intentionally be, or act as, a trustee[30] or as a responsible officer[31] of a superannuation entity if the person is, and knows, that he or she is a disqualified person. A responsible person in relation to a body corporate is a director, secretary or executive officer of the body.[32] A trustee has certain defences in limited circumstances but, in effect, only if it has acted in accordance with the covenants.[33]
[30] SIS Act, s. 121(1)
[31] SIS Act, s. 121(2)
[32] SIS Act, s. 10(1)
[33] SIS Act, ss. 10(5) and (6)

A person becomes a disqualified person by operation of s. 120(1) in certain circumstances. In addition, APRA may disqualify an individual if it is satisfied that the individual has contravened the SIS Act, whether before or after s. 120A(1) commenced on 18 January 2001[34] and “… if the nature or seriousness of the contravention or contraventions, provides grounds for disqualifying the individual.”[35] It may also disqualify an individual in two other circumstances set out in ss. 120A(2) and (3):
“(2) The Regulator^[[36]] may disqualify an individual who is, or was (including before the commencement of this section), a responsible officer of a trustee, investment manager or custodian (the body corporate) if satisfied that:
(a)the body corporate has contravened this Act or the Financial Sector (Collection of Data) Act 2001 on one or more occasions (whether before or after the commencement of this section); and
(b)at the time of one or more of the contraventions, the individual was a responsible officer of the body corporate; and
(c)in respect of the contravention or contraventions that occurred while the individual was a responsible officer of the body corporate—the nature or seriousness of it or them, or the number of them, provides grounds for the disqualification of the individual.
(3)The Regulator may disqualify an individual if satisfied that the individual is otherwise not a fit and proper person to be a trustee, investment manager or custodian, or a responsible officer of a body corporate that is a trustee, investment manager or custodian.”
[34] Inserted by the Financial Sector Legislation Amendment Act (No.1) 2000, s. 3, Schedule 3, item 14
[35] SIS Act, s. 120A(1)
[36] For the purposes of this case, the Regulator is APRA: SIS Act, s. 10(1)

A disqualification takes effect on the day on which it is made.[37] APRA’s decision to disqualify a person is a reviewable decision.[38] APRA may revoke a disqualification either on the application by the person it has disqualified or on its own initiative.[39] A revocation takes place on the day on which it is made.[40]
[37] SIS Act, s. 120A(4)
[38] SIS Act, s. 10(1)
[39] SIS Act, s. 120A(5)
[40] SIS Act, s. 120A(5)

CONSIDERATION

A decision whether to grant an application under s. 27(1) of the AAT Act requires me to make two decisions. First, I must decide whether the Trustee is a “… person … whose interests are affected by the decision” made by APRA. If so, the second question is whether I should exercise my discretion to permit the Trustee to be made a party to the proceeding.

Determining whether the trustee’s interests are affected by APRA’s decision: the general principles

The answer to the first question depends on what is meant by “a person whose interests are affected by the decision”. The same expression is used in s. 27(1) when providing those who may make an application to the Tribunal. It is an expression that has been referred to in both contexts as well as in that of the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (“ADJR Act”).[41] I will attempt to summarise the principles that have been established in both interpreting and applying it.
[41] The provisions in s. 12 of the ADJR Act are similar to those in the AAT Act in so far as the joinder of parties is concerned. It refers to a “person interested in a decision”.

(1)There are two contexts in which the question must be answered
(a)Statutory
“In each case, the content of the terms ‘affect’ and ‘interest’ are to be seen in the light of the scope and purpose of the particular statute in issue.”[42]
[42] Alphapharm Pty Ltd v SmithKline Beecham (Australia) Pty Ltd (1994) 49 FCR 250 at 272 per Gummow J
“ The expression ‘affected by’ and cognate terms appear in a range of laws of the Commonwealth. … It is necessary to answer the questions posed … in respect … of the … Act by reference to the subject, scope and purpose of that statute, rather than by the application of concepts derived from decisions under the general law respecting what has come to be known as ‘standing’. …”[43]

[43] Allan v Transurban City Link Ltd (2001) 208 CLR 167 at 174 per Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, Gummow, Hayne and Callinan JJ
“… A particular statute may establish a regime which specifically provides for its own measure of judicial review on the application of persons meeting criteria specified in that statute. …”[44]
[44] Allan v Transurban City Link Ltd (2001) 208 CLR 167 at 174 per Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, Gummow, Hayne and Callinan JJ
Matters that may be relevant in interpreting the statutory regime include:
(i)     whether notice is required to be given of one decision but not another. So, for example, a statutory requirement that notice be given of a decision to refuse to grant a certificate but not of a notice to grant may suggest that where “…the decision is one to grant, the legislation treats that as the end of the matter, save for the potential operation of the variation and cancellation provisions. …”;[45]
[45] Allan v Transurban City Link Ltd (2001) 208 CLR 167 at 178 per Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, Gummow, Hayne and Callinan JJ
(ii)     whether there is provision for the decision-maker to give notice of the decision and, if so, to whom;[46]
[46] Allan v Transurban City Link Ltd (2001) 208 CLR 167 at 178-179 per Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, Gummow, Hayne and Callinan JJ
(iii)    the persons who are party to the original decision-making process and the relationship of the applicant for joinder to those persons;[47] and
[47] Allan v Transurban City Link Ltd (2001) 208 CLR 167 at 179-180 per Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, Gummow, Hayne and Callinan JJ
(iv)    whether any decision given on reconsideration could have any practical effect.[48]
[48] Allan v Transurban City Link Ltd (2001) 208 CLR 167 at 179 per Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, Gummow, Hayne and Callinan JJ
(b)Decision under review
“In order to determine what interests are affected by the decisions, it is necessary to look both at the terms of the decisions and at their ramifications.”[49]
[49] Re Control Investments Pty Ltd and Australian Broadcasting Tribunal (No 1) (1980) 50 FLR 1; 3 ALD 74 at 4; 76 per Davies J
“The nature of the interest required in a particular case will be influenced by the subject matter and content of the decision under review.”[50]
[50] United States Tobacco Co v Minister for Consumer Affairs (1988) 20 FCR 520 at 529

(2)General principles
“The cases illustrate the great variety of circumstances in which it may be sought to join an additional party to an existing action. In their Lordships’ view one of the principal objects of the rule is to enable the court to prevent injustice being done to a person whose rights will be affected by its judgment by proceeding to adjudicate upon the matter in dispute in the action without his being given an opportunity of being heard. To achieve this object calls for a flexibility of approach which makes it understandable in the present case, in which the facts are unique, to attempt to lay down any general proposition which could be applicable to all cases.[51]
[51] Pegang Mining Co Ltd v Choong Sam [1969] 2 MLJ 52 at 55 per Diplock LJ and approved by Full Court of the Federal Court in News Ltd and Ors v Australian Rugby Football League Ltd (1996) 139 ALR 193 (Lockhart, Von Doussa and Sackville JJ). The Privy Council considered a forerunner of Order 6 Rule 8 of the Federal Court Rules. Order 6 Rule 8 provides:
‘(1) Where a person who is not a party:
(a)ought to have been joined as a party; or
(b)is a person whose joinder as a party is necessary to ensure that all matters in dispute in the proceeding may be effectually and completely determined and adjudicated upon;
the Court, on application by him or by any party or of its own motion, may order that he be added as a party and make orders for the further conduct of the proceeding.’
In News Ltd and Ors v Australian Rugby Football League Ltd the Full Court of the Federal Court has adopted and explained this approach:
“… The test involves matters of degree, and ultimately judgment, having regard to the practical realities of the case, and the nature and value of the rights and liabilities of the third party which might be directly affected. The requirement that a third party’s rights against, or liability to, any party to the proceedings be directly affected is an important qualification that recognises that many orders of a court are likely to affect other people to a greater or lesser extent. This is particularly so with remedies in the nature of an injunction: see Silktone Pty Ltd v Devreal Capital Pty Ltd (1990) 21 NSWLR 317 AT 322, per Kirby P. The requirement of a direct effect on rights or liabilities differentiates the case where a person ought to be joined, from other cases where the effect of the order on non-parties can be characterised as only indirect or consequential.”[52]
[52] (1996) 139 ALR 193 at 298-299

(3)No two interests need be the same
(a)Interests affected may vary across the continuum of decision-making
“… The denotation of the phrase ‘whose interests are affected’ … should not be assumed to be the same across this spectrum of decision making. It has series of distinct operations and, in this sense, is of an ambulatory nature. …”[53]
[53] Alphapharm Pty Ltd v SmithKline Beecham (Australia) Pty Ltd (1994) 49 FCR 250 at 272 per Gummow J
“… What serves to identify a person as one affected by a reviewable decision will vary having regard to the nature of the reviewable decision itself. …”[54]
[54] Allan v Transurban City Link Ltd (2001) 208 CLR 167 at 174 per Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, Gummow, Hayne and Callinan JJ
(b)Examples
“There is no ‘general principle’ that a decision under an enactment which favours one corporation cannot relevantly affect the interests of a competitor …”[55]
[55] Alphapharm Pty Ltd v SmithKline Beecham (Australia) Pty Ltd (1994) 49 FCR 250 at 272 per Gummow J
“The interest affected need not be a legal interest nor need the person seeking joinder establish legal ownership of the interest. ... However, a person seeking joinder must be able to identify a relevant interest which is his.”[56]
[56] Re Control Investments Pty Ltd and Australian Broadcasting Tribunal (No 1) (1980) 50 FLR 1; 3 ALD 74 at 9; 79 per Davies J

(4)Interest must be a “sufficient interest’[57] in the proceeding
[57] United States Tobacco Co v Minister for Consumer Affairs (1988) 20 FCR 520 at 530.
(a)More than a general interest
“In their context in ss 27 and 30, the words ‘interests are affected’ denote interests which a person has other than as a member of the general public and other than as a person merely holding a belief that a particular type of conduct should be prevented or a particular law observed.”[58]
[58] Re Control Investments Pty Ltd and Australian Broadcasting Tribunal (No 1) (1980) 50 FLR 1; 3 ALD 74 at 8; 79 per Davies J. This passage and those in the following three footnotes were approved by the Full Court of the Federal Court in United States Tobacco Co v Minister for Consumer Affairs (1988) 20 FCR 520, Alphapharm Pty Ltd v SmithKline Beecham (Australia) Pty Ltd (1994) 49 FCR 250 and Comptroller-General of Customs v Members of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (1994) 123 ALR 140.
“Many … decisions [which affect rights, interests and legitimate expectations] do not affect the rights, interests and expectations of the individual citizen in a direct and immediate way. Thus a decision to impose a rate or a decision to impose a general charge for services rendered to ratepayers, each of which indirectly affects the rights, interests or expectations of citizens generally does not attract this duty to act fairly. This is because the act or decision which attracts the duty is an act or decision:
‘… which directly affects the person (or corporation) individually and not simply as a member of the public. An executive or administrative decision of the latter kind is truly ‘policy’ or ‘political’ decision and is not subject to judicial review.’…”[59]
[59] Kioa v West (1985) 159 CLR 550 at 584 per Mason J and referred to with approval by Davies J in Alphapharm Pty Ltd v SmithKline Beecham (Australia) Pty Ltd (1994) 49 FCR 250 at 260
“… The term ‘interest’ has long been an expression used in the law with respect to parties so as to require an involvement with a case greater than the concern of a person who is a mere intermeddler or busybody. …”[60]
[60] United States Tobacco Co v Minister for Consumer Affairs (1988) 20 FCR 520 at 527

(b)But need not be belong to any particular class of interest
“… Nevertheless the criterion for standing prescribed by the Act is not a restrictive one. The broadest of technical terms has been selected. The necessary interest need not be a legal, proprietary, financial or other tangible interest. Neither need it be peculiar to the particular person. …”[61]
[61] United States Tobacco Co v Minister for Consumer Affairs (1988) 20 FCR 520 at 527

(c)Relevance of having interests that ought to have been taken into account in making the decision under review
“The question of standing is, indeed, related to issues of procedural fairness. If a person has interest which ought to be taken into account in the making of a decision, then ordinarily that person should be entitled to be heard. …”[62]
[62] Alphapharm Pty Ltd v SmithKline Beecham (Australia) Pty Ltd (1994) 49 FCR 250 at 260 per Davies J
“ The fact that … AFCO [a consumer organisation] wrote to the Attorney-General seeking a ban on the importation of smokeless tobacco would not of itself be a matter to found a sufficient interest in the Minister’s subsequent decision. It is not shown that AFCO was the moving force behind the action taken under the Trade Practices Act. …
However, the Minister’s decision and the action of calling the conference, which are the decision under challenge, are decisions which have benefited AFCO in a special way. AFCO is now entitled to and is exercising its entitlement to attend the conference … AFCO has acquired a special position because it has been admitted to the conference. The validity of the conference depends on the validity of the Minister’s decision … Thus AFCO has an interest in that decision as well as in the conference itself. That interest is different in kind from the interest of members of the public. …
… AFCO has a sufficient interest to be joined as a party to the proceedings. Indeed, it would be a breach of the rules of natural justice if AFCO, a participant in the conference, was not given an opportunity by the Court to say that the conference, which is alleged by US Tobacco to be unlawful and void, was indeed lawfully called … and the conference as the force and effect given to by … [the relevant legislation].”[63]
[63] United States Tobacco Co v Minister for Consumer Affairs (1988) 20 FCR 520 at 530

(d)The relevance of the effect of a decision on the person seeking to be joined as a party
“… a decision which affects interests of one person directly may affect the interests of other indirectly. Across the pool of sundry interest, the ripples of affection may widely extend. The problem which is inherent in the language of the statute is the determination of the point beyond which the affection of interests by decision should be regarded as too remote for the purposes of s 27(1). The character of the decision is relevant, for if the interests relied on are of such a kind that a decision of the given character could not affect them directly, there must be some evidence to show that the interests are in truth affected.”[64]
[64] Re McHattan and Collector of Customs (1977) 18 ALR 154 at 157 per Brennan J
At least in a context in which the spectrum of decision-making includes decisions made on the initiative of a regulator “… it cannot be correct that … the class of persons whose interests are affected by an initial decision is limited to disaffected applicants. Persons whose existing situation under the legislation is change by the operation of the initial decision, which was not sought but was imposed upon them, must be persons whose interests are affected by the initial decision.”[65]
[65] Alphapharm Pty Ltd v SmithKline Beecham (Australia) Pty Ltd (1994) 49 FCR 250 at 273 per Gummow J.

(e)The relevance of commercial interests
It has been sometimes said as in Moser v Marsden [1892] 1 Ch 487 and in Re IG Farbenindustrie AG [1944] Ch 41 that a party may be added if his legal interests will be affected by the judgment in the action but not if his commercial interests only would be affected. While their Lordships agree that the mere fact that a person is likely to be better off financially if a case is decided one way rather than another is not a sufficient ground to entitle him to be added as a party, they do not find the dichotomy between ‘legal’ and ‘commercial’ interests helpful. A better way of expressing the test is: will his rights against or liabilities to any party to the action in respect of the subject matter of the action be directly affected by any order which may be made in the action?”[66]
Whether his rights or liabilities are affected in that way depends on an analysis of the decision under review. In Comptroller-General of Customs v Members of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal,[67] Hill J determined that Akai’s interest in proceedings relating to applications for tariff concession orders made by Sanyo was more than merely an interest as a commercial competitor but a direct financial interest. Consequently, it was entitled to be considered by the Tribunal for joinder as a party.
In Alphapharm Pty Ltd v SmithKline Beecham (Australia) Pty Ltd, Davies J concluded:
“In the case of the decision as to generic cimetidine, SmithKline’s interests as outlined in the letter of 8 June 1993 and in the solicitor’s affidavit were entirely irrelevant. The issue before the decision-maker was the safety of the drug and the appropriateness of its use in humans. Some elements of commerce may have intruded into the decision for, no doubt, the decision-maker would have wished to be satisfied that the manufacturer of the drug was reputable and had the capacity to ensure quality control. But the affairs of SmithKline were irrelevant, though information related to its cimetidine may have been taken into account. The decision did not concern itself with any of SmithKline’s affairs and was not a decision relating to SmithKline’s cimetidine.”[68]

[66] Pegang Mining Co Ltd v Choong Sam [1969] 2 MLJ 52 at 55-56

[67] (1994) 123 ALR 140

[68] (1994) 49 FCR 250 at 262 per Davies J. Similarly, in Edwards v Australian Securities Commission and Others (1997) 72 FCR 350, the Full Court (Lee, Carr and RD Nicholson JJ) decided that a person engaged in litigation with a company was not a person whose interests were affected when the Australian Securities Commission registered that company as a foreign company. The statutory regimen requiring registration resulted in criminal penalties being imposed if a foreign company were to carry on business without being registered, did not give third parties the right to be heard on the application for registration, required no reasons had to be given for the decision to register and did not require any reasons that were given to be published. The only person having an interest that could be affected by a decision to register a foreign company is the company itself. No other person can have such an interest.

Are the trustee’s interests affected by APRA’s decision?

On behalf of APRA, Mr Almond QC with Mr Archibald submitted that the Trustee’s interests could only have any relevance in so far as it made its decision under s. 120A(2) and not in so far as it was made under s. 120A(3) of the SIS Act. That followed from APRA’s not being able to exercise its power under s. 120A(2) unless the Trustee had been found to have been in contravention of the Act. No such condition qualified the exercise of its power under s. 120A(3). The subject matter of its decision was the disqualification of VBN. No decision was made in relation to the Trustee and the Tribunal will not need to make such a decision.

APRA, Mr Almond submitted, will not take any action against the Trustee since it gave it an Undertaking dated 20 May 2005. The effect of the Undertaking is that members of the SFund affected by certain decisions of the Trustee will be placed in the same position as they would have been had those decisions not been made. This substantially minimises the likelihood of a member’s taking any action against the Trustee.

The risk may be minimised but it is impossible to say that there is no risk. Equally, it is impossible to say that the Trustee will face the prospect of recovery action. Either way, if the Trustee were found to have contravened a covenant set out in s. 52 of the SIS Act, it would leave it open to an action brought under s. 55(3). Certainly, it is not the Tribunal’s role to make a determination that the Trustee has, or has not, been in breach of the covenants. That is the role of the courts. In the course of its merits review of a decision made under s. 120A(2), though, the Tribunal must come to a conclusion on that very issue. It must make findings of fact as to the Trustee’s actions along the way in making the Sponsor’s Offer.

Similar findings of fact will need to be made in reviewing a decision under s. 120A(3) even if they do not need to extend to whether the Trustee has been in breach of a covenant. A consideration of whether VBN is a fit and proper person to be a responsible officer of a body corporate that is a trustee, investment manager or custodian must include a consideration of the individual’s actions and the context in which they were taken. That context necessarily includes the Trustee’s actions.

Through the publication of the Undertaking on the website of APRA and ASIC, the Trustee is on the public record as denying that it has breached any legal or equitable obligation. The denial would include its obligations under the SIS Act. If the Tribunal were to find that the Trustee had breached its covenants, it is likely that APRA would make those findings public. In that case, the Trustee’s Chairman has stated that it might consider it appropriate to report on them to the SFund’s members. APRA has responded by submitting that details of APRA’s views in relation to the Trustee’s conduct have already been communicated to members and are substantially available to the public in the form of the Media Release and the Undertaking. That submission does not meet the Trustee’s concerns. It is one thing to have APRA’s views known and a different thing to have the findings of the Tribunal known. APRA’s views are those of the Regulator whose decision is under review. If its views were, in effect, endorsed by the Tribunal, they would be given the imprimatur of having been endorsed by a third party after an independent merits review. Depending on the findings made the Tribunal, that might place the Trustee in a more difficult position than it is at the moment. It might have to report to its members in a fashion beyond what it has already done. Its reputation and the confidence of the members of the SFund and of the public generally that the Trustee will perform its duties in a proper manner could be open to question.

The Trustee’s concerns about the effect that the Tribunal’s findings may have upon it are matters of some substance. It may well be that the Trustee is never sued but it remains a real possibility just as adverse reflection on, and so damage to, its reputation is a real possibility. Those matters may or may not lead to adverse financial consequences for the Trustee but it is not necessary that they do so in the circumstances in which the Trustee finds itself. It is conducting a commercial operation in a regulated legal environment in which its reputation is important in maintaining and attracting members. It has an interest in maintaining its reputation. That is an interest which is affected by APRA’s decision in relation to VBN because it is a decision that either depends on findings about the Trustee’s conduct or is a decision made against a background of the Trustee’s conduct. It is not an interest which is dissipated by the fact that only one of the directors at the relevant time remains a director and that director stood aside from active participation on the Board in October 2004. It is an interest that leads me to conclude that the Trustee is “a person whose interests are affected by the decision” of APRA within the meaning of s. 30(1A) of the AAT Act.

Exercising the discretion: the general principles

My decision that the Trustee is a person whose interests are affected by the decision under review does not lead automatically to the conclusion that it must be joined as a party. I have a discretion and I must decide whether or not to exercise it in favour of the Trustee. The cases establish a number of general principles to which I should have regard in deciding whether or not to exercise that discretion. They have been developed against a background of the role that a person plays once joined to a proceeding. I considered that role in Re Eurovox Pty Ltd and Chief Executive Officer of Customs.[69] In my view, a party joined to an application may lead evidence and cross-examine witnesses as well as make submissions regarding the decision under review. The Tribunal’s decision on review does not affect any decision made in respect of the party joined, as opposed to the applicant for review, and in respect of which he or she has not lodged a separate application.
[69] (2000) 63 ALD 755; 32 AAR 15 (appeal dismissed in Eurovox Pty Ltd v Chief Executive Officer of Customs [2000] FCA 1906).

In Re Control Investments, Davies J said that the Tribunal “…may not, in a proper case, refuse to make an order joining a person whose interests are affected by the decision under review.”[70] He was considering the Tribunal’s power when it was found in s. 30(1)(c).[71] On its face, s. 30(1)(c) did not confer a discretion on the Tribunal when it provided:
“The parties to a proceeding before the Tribunal for a review of a decision are –
(c)any other person who was entitled to apply to the Tribunal for a review of the decision, applied to the Tribunal to be made a party to the proceeding and was made such a party by an order of the Tribunal.”

Despite its wording, his Honour decided that the provision did confer a discretion on the Tribunal. Determining how it should be exercised and so what is a “proper case” to make an order must be done against a background that:

“… the power of joinder … [is] to be read in the light of the function of the Tribunal including the duty imposed upon it by s 33(1)(b) which directs the Tribunal to proceed with as much expedition as the nature of the matter before it permits.”[72]

[70] Re Control Investments Pty Ltd and Australian Broadcasting Tribunal (No 1) (1980) 50 FLR 1; 3 ALD 74 at 10; 80 per Davies J

[71] Section 30(1A) was inserted by the Statute Law (Miscellaneous Amendments) Act (No 1) 1982, No. 26 of 1982, s. 24(b)

[72] Re Control Investments Pty Ltd and Australian Broadcasting Tribunal (No 1) (1980) 50 FLR 1; 3 ALD 74 at 10; 80 per Davies J

Occasions on which there may not be a proper case:
“… may occur where the person applying to be made a party has not applied within a reasonable time and his joinder at a late stage would unduly impede the expeditious conclusion of the proceedings or where, although an organisation has an object or purpose to which the decision relates, joinder is sought not for the purpose of protecting or supporting that interest but with some other end view. … While it will ordinarily be the duty of the Tribunal to make an order joining a party whose interests are affected by the decision under review, that duty is limited by the function which the Tribunal performs and by its duty to provide a fair hearing and to deal with the matter as expeditiously as the subject matter of the review permits.”[73]
[73] Re Control Investments Pty Ltd and Australian Broadcasting Tribunal (No 1) (1980) 50 FLR 1; 3 ALD 74 at 10; 80-81 per Davies J

Senior Member Bayne stated in Re Peters and Department of Health and Aged Care[74] that Deputy President Thompson took a more restrictive view of the discretion than did Davies J. A similarly restrictive view, he said, had also been taken by Justice O’Connor J in Re Boyd and Comcare[75] and by Senior Member Dwyer in Re Scott and Secretary, Department of Social Security.[76] The restrictive view was to be found in the words of Deputy President Thompson in Re Marine World Victoria Ltd and Minister for Arts, Heritage and Environment:[77]
“There is also the requirement that the matter be dealt with expeditiously. That, and the need to keep the cost within proper bounds, make it undesirable that there should be a multiplicity of additional parties each separately represented and presenting a separate case. Only if their interests affected by the decision under review are both substantially and significantly different from one another can that be justified. …”[78]
[74] (1999) 56 ALD 561
[75] (1991) 23 ALD 392 at 394 per O’Connor J, President
[76] (1996) 42 ALD 738 at 741 per Senior Member Dwyer.
[77] (1986) 10 ALD 262
[78] (1986) 10 ALD 262 at 272

In Re Marine World Victoria Ltd and Minister for Arts, Heritage and Environment,[79] Deputy President Thompson was considering applications by a number of people to be joined to an application for review of a decision refusing a permit under the Whale Protection Act 1980 to take cetaceans in Commonwealth waters for live display and educational purposes. He said that the increased cost of the proceeding to the applicant and respondent from the joinder of additional parties was a factor to be taken into account and continued:
“… I am unable to accept that the Tribunal should allow Marine World to be subjected to greater expense than is necessary for the proper review of the Minister’s decision. Further, the Tribunal must be concerned with the cost not only to Marine World but also to public funds and endeavour to contain it to what is sufficient to enable it to undertake a proper review.”[80]
[79] (1986) 10 ALD 262
[80] (1986) 10 ALD 262 at 271-272

It was then that Deputy President said:
“There is also the requirement that the matter be dealt with expeditiously. That, and the need to keep the cost within proper bounds, make it undesirable that there should be a multiplicity of additional parties each separately represented and presenting a separate case. Only if their interests affected by the decision under review are both substantially and significantly different from one another can that be justified. …”[81]

followed by a consideration of his options in that case:

“… The options open to the Tribunal in respect of the applications for joinder now before it are, I consider, either to prevent there being a multiplicity of parties by rejecting most of the applications or, while permitting a multiplicity of parties, to prevent there being a multiplicity of representatives of those parties presenting their cases at the hearing. If the first of those options were chosen, most of the applicants for joinder would be likely to feel that the Tribunal had discriminated against them. I consider that the second option is preferable and should be adopted.”[82]

[81] (1986) 10 ALD 262 at 272

[82] (1986) 10 ALD 262 at 272

Justice O’Connor J in Re Boyd and Comcare[83] referred to an earlier passage from Deputy President Thompson’s reasons relying on the principles developed in Re Control Investments and to increased costs to the applicant and respondent as a further factor to consider. [84] Her Honour then set out the following sentence that appeared half way through the paragraph from Re Marine World that I have set out in my previous paragraph:
“Only if their interests affected by the decision under review are both substantially and significantly different from one another can that be justified.”[85]

She went on to conclude that the interests of the Commonwealth Bank of Australia and of Comcare were common in that:

“… Both Comcare and the bank’s interest here is to ensure that compensation is not paid to the applicant unless the facts of the case and the legislation require. This common interest can be adequately represented by Comcare. Indeed, Comare, as an organisation specialising in compensation, could be regarded as being in a better position to present the case. The CERC Act envisages that Comcare will act like an agent of the bank.”[86]

[83] (1991) 23 ALD 392 at 394 per O’Connor J, President

[84] (1986) 10 ALD 262 at 271 [32]

[85] (1986) 10 ALD 262 at 271 [33]

[86] (1991) 23 ALD 392 at 394-395

It would seem that there was an unfortunate typographical mistake in O’Connor J’s reasons. It led to the omission of a significant passage from Deputy President Thompson’s reasons and gave an impression of them that joinder could only ever be justified when the interests of those wishing to be joined are both substantial and significantly different from those of the applicant and respondent. A complete reading of his reasons shows that he was thinking solely of the various interests of the applicants for joinder when he referred to the need for the effect on their interests to be both substantial and significantly different from one another. Even though he did not find that difference in that case, he made an order that permitted joinder but was intended to minimise costs. A complete reading of O’Connor J’s reasons shows that she did not base her decision on the interests of the bank and Comcare being substantially and significantly different but upon their having a common interest and one being able to represent that interest adequately.

Senior Member Dwyer in Re Scott correctly quoted the small passage from Re Marine World that I have shown above. [87] Although this was not the passage set out in Re Boyd, she said that O’Connor J had approved it.[88] Her mistake is understandable given the way in which the passage was reproduced in Re Boyd but, given my analysis of the authorities, I am unable to agree with her conclusion that:
“… the authorities establish that unless the interest of the person seeking to be joined as a party to the proceeding is both substantial and significantly different from that of any other party to the proceeding there is no reason to make that person a party to the proceeding.”[89]

The authorities establish that the nature of the interest, its significant and substance, are matters that will be taken into account and balanced against other relevant factors such as those identified by Davies J in Re Control Investments.[90] The factors, and the weight to be given to them, will vary from case to case. At times, one or another will be determinative in a particular case as to whether or not a person is joined as a party. In another case another factor may be determinative and, in yet another, none may be. Whether the party seeking to be joined will be able to lead evidence or make submissions different from those who are already parties is just one of the factors to be considered. So too are the directions that the Tribunal could give to the parties and any party joined to limit the duplication of evidence and submissions and so minimise the costs that are inevitably increased to some extent by permitting a person to be joined as a party.

[87] at [29] above

[88] (1996) 42 ALD 738 at 741

[89] (1996) 42 ALD 738 at 741

[90] This is consistent with the conclusion reached by Senior Member Bayne in Re Peters.

Should I exercise the discretion in favour of the Trustee?

As Mr Almond submitted, the Trustee has already had the opportunity to make submissions during the decision-making process. An examination of the material that has been filed shows that VBN has addressed the Trustee’s alleged statutory contraventions and that he has adopted the Trustee’s submissions. The Trustee’s conduct will continue to be a very relevant consideration. It is only fair that it be permitted to be heard about its own conduct. It may be that the evidence, material and submissions will extend only to those considered by APRA but, as is often the case, it may go beyond them. In so far as it relates to its conduct, it should be in a position to answer them and should not be left in the position in which it must do so through a former director, VBN.

Up until this stage of the review process, VBN and the Trustee have adopted similar positions and relied on each other’s material and submissions. This may or may not continue to be the position. Even if it does continue to be so, it is not inevitable that each will duplicate the effort of the other or that APRA’s effort in the review process will be duplicated. All parties are represented by very senior counsel who are undoubtedly experienced in the management of such cases and in minimising any such duplication. If they have any difficulties in doing so, those difficulties can be resolved by the Tribunal’s giving directions.

Similar considerations lead me to conclude that concerns about potential delay can be addressed in a similar way. Already there is a timetable in place and the Trustee can be slotted into that timetable with little disruption. They also lead me to conclude that the Trustee should not be limited to making written submissions as sought by APRA. That may or not be a problem with less experienced counsel or unrepresented parties but is not a problem that can reasonably be expected to occur in a case like this.

Even with the minimisation of delay and of duplication of effort, the hearing time may be extended a little. That will add to the costs of VBN and APRA. It is of concern to both for, even as a Commonwealth agency, APRA’s pockets cannot be regarded as bottomless. Indeed, in relative terms, they may be somewhat shorter than the pockets of Commonwealth agencies in times past. If the interests of VBN and the Trustee diverge, APRA will be faced with further costs. That is a consideration but it is also a consideration that, despite any divergence, the cases that VBM and the Trustee present cannot go outside the bounds of what is relevant to review APRA’s decision to disqualify VBN. Consequently, none can go outside what is relevant to the Tribunal in carrying out is function to determine what is the correct or preferable decision.[91]
[91] Drake v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1979) 24 ALR 577; 2 ALD 60 at 599; 77 per Smithers J and at 589; 68 per Bowen CJ and Deane J

Taking all of these matters into account, I have decided that the Trustee should be joined as a party and have made a number of directions to accommodate all three parties in their preparation for the matter to be heard expeditiously. As I indicated what my decision would be at the conclusion of the hearing, those directions have been made after hearing submissions from the parties. These directions are reproduced below.

For the reasons I have given and having regard to the reasons that I have previously given in relation to confidentiality in a related matter,[92] I order that:
[92] Re VBJ and Australian Prudential Regulation Authority [2005] AATA 642
1.the party joined be described by the letters "VBT” for the purpose of the application; and
2.VBT be joined as a party to the proceeding;
and further order that:
3.        publication of and access to:
(1)       the name of the party joined;
(2)any material tending to identify it or any entities in which it has an interest;
(3)any affidavits, outlines of submissions or other documents filed with the Tribunal; and
(4)       the reasons of the Tribunal;
be restricted to members and staff of the Tribunal, the parties and their representatives and professional advisers and staff of Auscript; and
4.        all hearing shall be held in private;
and direct that:
5.in relation to the application for review of the respondent’s decision:
(1)on or before close of business 19 August 2005 the respondent comply with s. 37 of the AAT Act;
(2)on or before close of business 6 September 2005 the applicant file and serve his Statement of Facts and Contentions;
(3)on or before 16 September 2005 the party joined file and serve its Statement of Facts and Contentions;
(4)on or before close of business 30 September 2005 the respondent file and serve its Statement of Facts and Contentions;
(5)the telephone directions hearing listed for 26 September 2005 at 9:30am is vacated; and
(6)a directions hearing be held in this matter on 4 October 2005 at 9:30am; and
6.        each party has liberty to apply.

I certify that the thirty-seven preceding paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for the decision herein of
Deputy President S A Forgie,

Signed: ...............................................................

Nathaniel Wills Associate

Date of Hearing of Application
to Join Party  16 August 2005
Date of Decision  26 August 2005
Counsel for the Applicant             Mr J. Santamaria QC and Mr A. Pound
Solicitor for the Applicant            Corrs Chambers Westgarth
Counsel for the Respondent         Mr P. Almond QC and Mr C. Archibald
Solicitor for the Respondent         Australian Prudential Regulation Authority
Counsel for Party Joined              Mr P. Collinson SC
Solicitor for Party Joined              Freehills

LEGEND

VBN =Trevor Duncan Lloyd
VBO =Keat Seng Chew
VBP =Jason William Brown
VBQ =Craig Robert Dainton
VBR =Howard Wayne Coleman
VBV =Melvyn Keith Ward
VBW =Andrew Richard Penn
ND1 =Jane Lovell Perry

C1 =Mark Philip Delaney
C2 =Ross Andrew Wilson
C3 =Stephen Douglas Spiller
C4 =Neil Roderick Whiteside
C5 =Frank Allan Catlin
MS1 =Andrea Piaia
MS2 =Laurence Dalton
MS3 =Kate Maartensz
MS4 =Kim Webber

Plan Actuary A =   Kristain Fok
Plan Actuary B =   John Smith
Plan Actuary C =   Paul Shallue
Actuary D =          Paul Francis (Employer’s consultant actuary from Towers Perrin)
Actuary E =          Steven John Schubert (a second Employer’s consultant actuary from Towers Perrin)

CEO =Les Owen
Plan Executive = Cyril Twomey

Accumulation Category =       AXA Select
Actuarial Firm =  NSP Buck Pty Ltd
EC1 =Michael Baker
Employer Plan
Superannuation Committee = AXA’s Superannuation Plan Steering Committee
Employer’s Plan
Representative =   Richard Veale
FS = Mallesons Stephen Jaques
FSS = Christopher Martin Beeny
PD1 = Colin Royce Grenfell
TS = Bruce Akiva Goldman
TSF = Deacons Lawyers

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Citations

VBN and Australian Prudential Regulation Authority and Anor [2005] AATA 861

Cases Citing This Decision

0

Cases Cited

4

Statutory Material Cited

0

Eurovox Pty Ltd v Chief Executive Officer of Customs [2000] FCA 1906

Secretary, Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet and Treasurer of the Commonwealth of Australia and Combined Pensioners and Superannuants Association of New South Wales Incorporated (Party Joined) [2014] AATA 485

Mobil Oil Australia Pty Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation [1963] HCA 41