JURISDICTION : STATE ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL
STREAM: COMMERCIAL & CIVIL
ACT: COMMERCIAL TENANCY (RETAIL SHOPS) AGREEMENTS ACT 1985 (WA)
CITATION: VATILLA PTY LTD and CITYGATE PROPERTIES PTY LTD [2012] WASAT 213
MEMBER: MR D AITKEN (MEMBER)
HEARD: 8 AUGUST 2012
DELIVERED : 24 OCTOBER 2012
FILE NO/S: CC 382 of 2012
BETWEEN: VATILLA PTY LTD
Applicant
AND
CITYGATE PROPERTIES PTY LTD
First RespondentJEANARON PTY LTD
Second Respondent
Catchwords:
Commercial Tenancy (Retail Shops) Agreements Act 1985 Unconscionable conduct claim by tenant against landlord and former tenant Determination of preliminary issue on jurisdiction Whether the applicant and the respondent have to be parties to the same retail shop lease for the purpose of s 15F of the Commercial Tenancy (Retail Shops) Agreements Act 1985
Legislation:
Commercial Tenancy (Retail Shops) Agreements Act 1985 (WA), s 6(5), s 6A(5), s 10, s 13(8), s 13(9), s 15C, s 15D, s 15E, s 15F, s 15F(1), s 15C(1), s 15C(2), s 15D(1), s 15D(2), s 16
Interpretation Act 1984 (WA), s 18, s 19
Interpretation of Legislation Act 1984 (Vic), s 35, s 35(a)
Retail Shops and Fair Trading Legislation Amendment Bill 2005 (WA)
State Administrative Tribunal Act 2004 (WA), s 47
Result:
Proceeding against second respondent, Jeanaron Pty Ltd, dismissed
Summary of Tribunal's decision:
A tenant under a retail shop lease applied to the Tribunal for an order under s 15F of the Commercial Tenancy (Retail Shops) Agreements Act 1985 (WA), claiming unconscionable conduct, firstly by the landlord under the lease, and secondly by the former tenant of the retail shop.
The Tribunal decided, as a preliminary issue, that s 15F of the Commercial Tenancy (Retail Shops) Agreements Act 1985 is limited to a claim by a tenant or a landlord against the other party to a retail shop lease.
The Tribunal therefore dismissed the proceeding against the previous tenant as being misconceived or without substance, because the Tribunal did not have jurisdiction to deal with that claim.
Category: B
Representation:
Counsel:
Applicant: Mr S Jacobs
First Respondent : Mr J Skinner
Second Respondent : Mr G Dunne
Solicitors:
Applicant: Young & Young
First Respondent : Jackson McDonald
Second Respondent : Slee Anderson & Pidgeon
Case(s) referred to in decision(s):
Dileum Pty Ltd v J K Corporation Pty Ltd (1989) 1 WAR 244
Mills v Meking (1989 1990) 169 CLR 214
Monroe Topple and Associates v The Institute of Chartered Accountants (2001) ATPR 46-212
Murphy and Fremantle Markets Pty Ltd [2009] WASAT 84
Shree Sai Charan Pty Ltd v North Indian Flavour (Broadway) Pty Ltd and Bobby Singh [2011] NSWADT 95
Waltons Stores (Interstate) Ltd v Maher (1988) 164 CLR 387
Western Australian Planning Commission v Dungey [2010] WASC 52
REASONS FOR DECISION OF THE TRIBUNAL:
Introduction
The applicant, Vatilla Pty Ltd (Vatilla) and the second respondent, Jeanaron Pty Ltd (Jeanaron) both carry on retail businesses, and the first respondent, Citygate Properties Pty Ltd (Citygate) owns the Homemaker Centre in Strickland Street, Bunbury.
Under a lease dated 9 December…
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- Case
- [2012] WASAT 213
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court examined the purpose of the Commercial Tenancy (Retail Shops) Agreements Act 1985, which was to regulate retail shop leases and prohibit unconscionable conduct by landlords or tenants in relation to those leases. The court concluded that the assignment of a lease did not create a tenancy agreement, and therefore, the Act did not apply to assignments of retail shop leases. The court also found that the use of the term "another person" in section 15F did not indicate an intention to extend the operation of the section to cover assignments of retail shop leases. The court held that the Act's purpose was to regulate retail shop leases and the conduct of landlords and tenants in relation to those leases, and not to regulate assignments of leases.
In light of the above, the court determined that the applicant and the respondent did not have to be parties to the same retail shop lease for the purpose of section 15F of the Act. Consequently, the court held that it did not have jurisdiction to hear the claim of unconscionable conduct by the tenant against the landlord and former tenant. The court dismissed the claim and made no orders as to costs.
Orders
Orders of the court
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Background
Background to the litigation
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Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
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Decision
Reasons for decision
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Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The assignment of a retail shop lease does not create a retail shop lease: see Dileum Pty Ltd v J K Corporation Pty Ltd (1989) 1 WAR 244. The assignment of a lease does not create a tenancy; it transfers the rights and interest of the assignor tenant under the lease to the assignee tenant. Therefore, an assignment of a lease is not a tenancy agreement, and the term 'commercial tenancy agreements' in the short title and the long title of the CT(RS)A Act refers to leases, not to assignments of lease. From that, it follows that the purpose of the CT(RS)A Act, stated in its long title, is the regulation of retail shop leases, the prohibition of unconscionable conduct by landlords or tenants in relation to those leases, and the determination of questions arising under such leases. That purpose does not extend to the regulation of assignments of retail shop leases, nor the prohibition of unconscionable conduct by assignor tenants and assignee tenants in relation to those assignments of lease, nor the determination of questions arising under such assignments of lease. I will now consider how the provisions of s 15D(1) and s 15F(1) should be interpreted to promote the legislative purpose of the CT(RS)A Act, in accordance with s 18 of the Interpretation Act. In Mills v Meking (1989 1990) 169 CLR 214, at 235, Dawson J made the following comments in respect of the operation of s 35 of the Interpretation of Legislation Act 1984 (Vic) (Interpretation of Legislation Act):The approach required by s 35 … allows a court to consider the purposes of an Act in determining whether there is more than one possible construction. References to the purposes may reveal that the draftsman has inadvertently overlooked something which he would have dealt with had his attention been drawn to it and if it is possible as a matter of construction to repair the defect, then this must be done. However, if the literal meaning of a provision is to be modified by reference to the purposes of the Act, the modification must be precisely identifiable as that which is necessary to effectuate those purposes and it must be consistent with the wording otherwise adopted by the draftsman. Section 35 requires a court to construe an Act, not to rewrite it, in light of its purposes. Section 18 of the Interpretation Act is in very similar terms to s 35(a) of the Interpretation of Legislation Act and those comments apply equally to it. Vatilla contends that the use of the term 'another person' in s 15F, instead of a term which is more specifically limited to the other party to the retail shop lease, indicates an intention that the operation of s 15F is not to be limited to claims of unconscionable conduct by landlords against tenants under a retail shop lease and vice versa. I do not agree. I note that s 15E uses the terms 'a person' and 'the person' where those terms are clearly only referring to a landlord or a tenant who is a party to a retail shop lease. Section 15E provides that 'a person' is not to be taken, for the purposes of s 15C or s 15D, to engage in unconscionable conduct in connection with a retail shop lease only because the person takes legal action in relation to the lease or fails to renew the lease or enters into a new lease. That person can only be a landlord (in the case of s 15C) or a tenant (in the case of s 15C). It is clear that the 'draftsman' has used the terms 'a person' and 'the person' in s 15E as a succinct way of referring to landlords and tenants, and those terms must be interpreted as referring to landlords and tenants.