FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Vata-Meyer v Commonwealth of Australia [2015] FCAFC 139
Citation: Vata-Meyer v Commonwealth of Australia [2015] FCAFC 139 Appeal from: Vata-Meyer v Commonwealth of Australia (Department of Education, Employment and Workplace Relations) & Ors [2014] FCCA 463 Parties: EDNA VATA-MEYER v COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA, ANGUS LEE, LISA PAUL, MARGARET LEGGETT, BEN WYERS, VICKI RUNDLE, JAMES HALLIGAN and JENNIFER ROYLANCE File number: ACD 97 of 2014 Judges: NORTH, COLLIER AND KATZMANN JJ Date of judgment: 22 September 2015 Catchwords: ADMINISTRATIVE LAW – whether court took into account irrelevant considerations – whether court failed to take into account relevant considerations – procedural fairness – unrepresented litigant prevented from putting submission
APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL – primary judge did not address the elements of the legislation – postulating alternatives but failing to make a finding – inconsistencies in evidence unresolved – forensic advantage of trial judge – fact finding process of trial judge – decision at trial “glaringly improbable” or “contrary to compelling inferences” – review of findings of fact based on trial judge’s assessment of credibility of witnesses – whether findings inconsistent with incontrovertibly established facts – credibility undermined by other evidence unchallenged, unanswered and ostensibly reliable – power of appellate court to set aside findings – errors made by primary judge causing trial to miscarry – proceeding remitted to Federal Circuit Court for retrial – retrial limited to matters agitated on appeal
EVIDENCE – standard of proof in civil proceedings – standard of proof in discrimination proceedings – balance of probabilities – higher standard of proof erroneously applied – requirement to take into account gravity of matter – drawing of inferences – failure to reconcile conflicting evidence – benefit of doubt on basis that respondent was unsophisticated and obtuse – conflicting conjectures about respondent’s knowledge and intent – failure to weigh up the strength of cumulative evidence – failure to assess demeanour of key witness in light of all the evidence
HUMAN RIGHTS – discrimination – racial discrimination – correct test to be applied under s 9(1) of the Racial Discrimination Act1975 (Cth) – act involving distinction, exclusion, restriction or preference – discrimination based on race, colour, descent or national or ethnic origin – purpose or effect of nullifying or impairing – recognition, enjoyment or exercise of any human right or fundamental freedom – on equal footing – right to just and favourable conditions of work – causal nexus between act and race – act done for more than one reason – vicarious liability for racial discrimination – comments referring to “black babies” and “Coon cheese” likely to offend an Aboriginal person – whether racist remarks may constitute racial discrimination – whether occasional politically incorrect banter has requisite discriminatory purpose or effect – whether response to complaint is a relevant consideration in determining whether there was discrimination – whether remarks were innocent – racially-based remarks may affect a person’s self-worth and disadvantage them in their conditions of work – subjective sense of injustice
HUMAN RIGHTS – termination…
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- Case
- [2015] FCAFC 139
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court found that the primary judge did not adequately address the statutory elements required to establish unlawful discrimination under s 9(1) of the Racial Discrimination Act. This omission led to confusion and inconsistency in the judgment, as the court did not clearly articulate whether the conduct in question involved a distinction based on race. Additionally, the court held that the primary judge failed to properly assess the credibility of the evidence, particularly concerning the remarks made by Mr Lee, and did not reconcile conflicting testimonies effectively. The appellate court concluded that these errors were significant enough to warrant a retrial, limited to specific questions regarding the nature of the alleged discriminatory acts, vicarious liability, and the appropriate relief.
In light of these findings, the appeal was allowed, and the decision of the Federal Circuit Court was set aside. The case was remitted for a retrial, with specific questions to be addressed, including whether the actions of the second respondent constituted racial discrimination, whether the first respondent was vicariously liable, and what relief should be granted. The first and second respondents were ordered to pay the appellant’s costs of the appeal, while the costs of the trial would depend on the outcome of the retrial. The court also granted leave for the parties to apply to vary the costs orders within seven days.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The appeal is allowed.
2. The order of the Federal Circuit Court made on 10 September 2014 is set aside.
3. The cross appeal is dismissed.
4. The notice of contention is dismissed.
5. The proceeding is remitted to the Federal Circuit Court for a retrial confined to the following questions:
(a) whether the acts of the second respondent on 28 September 2011 contravened s 9(1) of the Racial Discrimination Act 1975 (Cth);
(b) whether the first respondent is vicariously liable for those acts; and
(c) what relief, if any, should be granted.
6. The first and second respondents pay the appellant’s costs of the appeal.
7. Costs of the trial abide the outcome of the retrial.
8. Leave is given to the parties to apply in writing within seven (7) days to vary the orders for costs.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Full text does not contain this section.
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Full text does not contain this section.
Decision
Reasons for decision
Full text does not contain this section.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
In respect of the procedural fairness argument, Mr Seck submitted that Ms Vata-Meyer was not prevented from putting a submission about Ms Leggett’s evidence that she had not heard Mr Lee make the comments. Rather, his Honour simply explained that human memory is often unreliable and inconsistencies in evidence do not necessarily demonstrate that a witness is lying. It was open to his Honour to accept Ms Leggett’s evidence that she did not hear the comments. Ms Vata-Meyer’s evidence was circumstantial and did not directly refute Ms Leggett’s evidence. That Ms Leggett was present at the afternoon tea did not establish that she heard the comments. CONSIDERATION Section 9(1) of the Act contains a number of elements which an applicant must establish in order to prove unlawful discrimination. First, there must be an act involving a distinction, exclusion, restriction or preference. Then, the distinction, exclusion, restriction or preference must be based on race, colour, descent or national or ethnic origin. Next, the act must have the purpose or effect of nullifying or impairing the recognition, enjoyment or exercise, on an equal footing, in this case, of a right to work or to just and favourable conditions of work. A recurring problem with the primary judge’s reasons is that they do not in terms address the elements of s 9(1) of the Act. As a consequence it is not always clear whether or what issue arising under s 9(1) is being addressed in those reasons. The respondents suggested an analysis of the reasons which, if correct, would have supported the judgment even if other errors alleged by Ms Vata-Meyer had occurred. We will address that question first. Then we will deal with the errors about which Ms Vata-Meyer complains.The respondents’ suggested short answer to the appeal The problem referred to in [61] above arises in a stark form in the consideration of the respondents’ primary basis for contending that there was no error made by the Federal Circuit Court. The respondents submitted that the reason the primary judge dismissed the application was that he held that Mr Lee’s conduct was not action involving a distinction based on race. Mr Seck relied on what his Honour said at [67], [68] and part of [69]. Those paragraphs do not in terms address the question whether Mr Lee’s conduct amounted to an act involving a distinction based on race. Rather, those paragraphs seem to address a question whether the remarks were intended to offend Ms Vata-Meyer, or whether, intended or not, the remarks had the effect of offending Ms Vata-Meyer. The paragraphs conclude that Mr Lee did not intend to offend Ms Vata-Meyer by making the “black babies” remark, but nevertheless the remark is likely to offend an Aboriginal person. The reasons also conclude that the Coon cheese remark has no necessary connection with race. In view of the statutory context, it is likely that the primary judge meant these passages to express findings required by s 9(1) that the “black babies” remark was a statement involving a distinction based on race, but that the reference to “coon” may or may not have involved a distinction based on race.