Vassalo and Graham

FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA

VASSALO & GRAHAM

[2010] FamCA 724

FAMILY LAW – PROPERTY – entities owned by the husband and wife – injunctive orders previously made in relation to those companies – breaches of those orders by both parties – expert evidence of the value of the companies

Family Law Act 1975 (Cth)

APPLICANT:

Ms Vassalo

RESPONDENT:

Mr Graham

FILE NUMBER:

ADC

2195

2007

DATE DELIVERED:

6 August 2010

PLACE DELIVERED:

Sydney

PLACE HEARD:

Adelaide

JUDGMENT OF:

Justice Fowler

HEARING DATE:

10-14 May 2010

REPRESENTATION

COUNSEL FOR THE APPLICANT:

Mr Berman

COUNSEL FOR THE RESPONDENT:

Mr Heinrich

Orders

The husband is to do all such acts and things as may be necessary to transfer to the wife all his right, title and interest in and to the properties situate at and known as 7A B Street and 7B B Street, …, in the State of South Australia, being the whole of the land comprised in Certificates of Title Volume … Folio … and Volume … Folio ….
Forthwith upon such transfer the wife is to do all such acts and things as may be necessary to discharge the husband from his liability under the terms of the mortgage charged upon the said properties in Order 1 above.
Simultaneously with the transfer in Order 1 hereof, the wife is to execute all such documents as may be necessary to transfer to the husband all her right, title and interest in and to the property situate at H in the State of South Australia, being the whole of the land comprised in Certificate of Title Register Book Volume … Folio ….
Simultaneously with the transfer in Order 3 hereof, the husband is to do all such acts and things as may be necessary to discharge the wife from any and all her liability under the terms of a mortgage or mortgages charged on the said property and will pay to the wife the sum of $160,185.
The husband is to assign to the wife any sum as may be owing to him by C Pty Limited or the wife.
Subject to the Orders otherwise made herein the husband is to do all such acts and things as may be necessary to cause to be assigned to the wife all amounts which may be owing by C Pty Limited or the wife to the husband or to RPty Limited or G Pty Limited.
Subject to the orders otherwise herein made the wife is to do all such acts and things as may be necessary to cause to be assigned to the husband any sums that may be owing to her or C Pty Limited by the husband or R Pty Limited or G Pty Limited.
The wife is to assign to the husband all sums as may be due to her from any trust of which R Pty Limited or G Pty Ltd is the trustee.
The husband is to assign to the wife all sums as may be due to him from any trust of which C Pty Limited is the trustee.

IT IS NOTED that publication of this judgment under the pseudonym Vassalo & Graham is approved pursuant to s 121(9)(g) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Vth)

FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA AT SYDNEY

FILE NUMBER: ADC 2195 of 2007

MS VASSALO

Applicant

And

MR GRAHAM

Respondent

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

Introduction and Background Facts

The proceedings before the Court are proceedings between the parties to a marriage in which orders for alteration of their interests in property are sought.
Where, in this judgment I make statements of fact they are, unless otherwise specified, my findings of fact.
The husband was born in 1968 and is currently 42 years of age.
The wife was born in 1970 and is currently 40 years of age.
The parties met in 1985 and commenced a relationship in 1986.
In 1990 the husband and wife were married.
In 2006 the parties separated.
There are three children of the marriage, K born in August 1994 and currently 15 years of age; A born in October 1996 and currently 13 years of age; and D born in October 1999 and currently 10 years of age.
When the parties married they were young and the husband’s family were kindly disposed to the husband. He was provided with money to purchase the former matrimonial home, to the extent of an amount of $61,000 initially said to be a loan but which was conceded by the time the trial finished to be

non-repayable.
The parties worked hard and co-operatively in the improvement of their property and were assisted in this regard during the marriage by the provision of the skill and labour of the wife’s father, at no charge, in undertaking some of those improvements.
The parties procured investment properties.
Evidence was provided that the wife’s parents assisted with some mortgage payments. The parties, and their relationship, were supported by the parents of each of them in a beneficial and fulsome way.
Given the nature of that support and the work undertaken by the parties during the marriage, it is the wife’s contention that the contributions made by each of them and on their behalf to the acquisition, conservation and improvement of their property both financially and otherwise and to the marriage and welfare of the family, including in the role of homemaker and parent, should be treated as equal during the period of cohabitation and equal at the time of trial. The husband conceded that during the marriage the contributions of the parties were to be treated as equal, but argued that allowance should be made to him for the initial contribution of his family in determining the contributions overall.
The parties established and proceeded with the operation of a business until 2003 known as C Pty Limited (“C Business”) as trustee for a family trust known as the S Family Trust. The C business was engaged in cleaning.
In 2003 the parties established another division of that business which was later incorporated and known as R Pty Limited (“R Business”) which developed as a more specialised business specialising in the cleaning of large areas such as warehouses and industrial space, utilising specialised equipment. That company was the trustee of the R Family Trust.
A further company was established by the husband, known as G Pty Limited (“G Business”), which took over the business of R Business after the making of certain injunctive orders, which placed restraints on the husband in the operation of that business. That company was the trustee of the Graham Family Trust.
There is no doubt that the business of the company, R Business, provided greater turnover and greater profitability than did the business of C Pty Ltd as was deposed by each of the company accountant, the independent expert and the wife.
In 2004 the husband was involved in a serious motor vehicle accident and ultimately a day or so before the trial received compensation in the sum of about $280,000 and which the husband applied to the reduction of debt which had been incurred since separation.
No evidence was adduced which would bind the Court to the effect that the sum so paid represented other than compensation for existing loss rather than estimated future loss.
In these circumstances and having regard to the husband’s basis for his claim for compensation, it seems that the loss was a joint one to some extent at least. In any event, the payment of the sum cannot be ignored. I will take it into consideration when turning my attention to considerations under section 75(2) of the Family Law Act1975 (Cth) (“the Act”).
Reference was made in the particulars supplied by the husband in support of his claim for compensation as to the effect of the husband’s accident on the wife and the pressure bought to bear on her to work in the circumstances where he was unable to work himself.
There is a dispute between the parties as to the date of their separation, with the wife asserting that they separated in January 2006 and the husband asserting a later date in June 2006. On this matter I accept the evidence of the wife as being more likely to be correct.
Shortly after the separation the wife moved into rented accommodation and the husband retained the occupancy of H property (“the former matrimonial home”) until the hearing.
Initially after separation the wife continued in the role which she had predominantly fulfilled previously, namely as the bookkeeper and financial controller for the entities.
The wife complained from time to time and in the proceedings of the drawings made by the husband from the companies which made their proper management difficult. She recorded the monthly expenditure of which she complained. These withdrawals are set out in Exhibit “2”.
In an endeavour to bring some order to the financial position the wife sought injunctive relief.
On 7 August 2007 orders were made restraining the parties from drawing funds from the business in other than a prescribed manner and for prescribed amounts and categories of expense. The orders included that the husband have the responsibility for the day to day running of R Business and that the wife have the responsibility for the day to day running of C Business and further orders were made to give effect to the sale of C Business. Orders were made in relation to the delivery and collection of documents to be provided to the other and the husband and wife were each permitted to take personal drawings from the payments received by each of them for the business in the sum of $1,750 per fortnight. The parties were each restrained from selling, encumbering, transferring or otherwise dealing with the assets of the companies and applying any and all income received in the businesses, save and except for the fortnightly personal drawings, and the orderly payment of direct loan repayments, as listed.
Orders were further made on the abovementioned date requiring the written consent of both parties disposing of the income of the companies R Business and C Business in payment of debts and liabilities for the continued management of those companies. Injunctions were further granted and restraints made preventing the parties from taking any action, signing any document or attempting to lodge any document in relation to R Business and C Business, or from resigning as directors from R Business, C Business and DAK Investments. In relation to the children’s accounts, the parties were restrained and injuncted from dealing with those accounts, or withdrawing funds from them. Orders were further made for the appointment of a single expert, including for the valuation of the parties’ furniture and motor vehicles. On that date the parties also entered into final consent orders in relation to the parenting proceedings between them.
Both parties breached those injunctions and, on the evidence set forth in Exhibit “2”, the husband more egregiously than the wife. Any expense which was not within the ambit of expenses permitted by the order were expenses requiring the consent of the other party before they were paid. The husband conceded in his evidence that he had spent money outside the limit permitted and had not procured the wife’s consent to such expenditure.
It was suggested by the wife, and I find it more probable than not, that the husband, following restrictions created by the injunctive order being imposed, set up an alternate company so that he could undertake his enterprise without the restrictions imposed on R Business and himself in relation to that company. He established G Business. That company took over some of the business which had been the property of R Business and developed a new business utilising the contacts and reputation of R Business.
It was not surprising that, in circumstances which followed the making of the injunctive order, in August 2008 an order was made by way of partial property settlement in which each of the husband and the wife were to take ownership of the companies which were under their then control, the wife taking C Business and the husband taking R Business. At that time orders were made for the disclosure of information in relation to G Business.
Since the parties’ separation, the husband’s father has been significantly involved in the continued financial support of his son. The husband’s father made available through his entities monies for the use of the husband. They were referred to in the Valuer’s report on the husband’s company and are shown in the following terms, namely:
a)Loan Z Nominees of $270,932; and
b)Bank Loan (Z Nominees) of $309,210.
Z Nominees Pty Limited (“Z Nominees”) was incorporated by the husband’s father to operate as a trustee of the Graham Family Trust, and which trust was established in 1997.
The husband’s father deposed:
“[i]n about 2007 the company commenced loaning monies to [the husband] in respect of expenses incurred by him for legal and accounting fees in relation to his family law proceedings. As at the 30 June 2009 it paid $59,000.00 towards [the husband’s] fees.”
It was further deposed by the husband’s father that the husband approached him following the parties’ separation claiming he needed money to meet his liabilities, as he was having problems in gaining access to funds, and further monies were provided.
It is further asserted by the husband’s father that in or after July 2008 the husband informed him that he did not have sufficient assets to borrow monies and that he was not able to obtain plant and equipment and operate G Business and he requested a loan. The husband, it seems with the guarantee of Z Nominees, obtained a loan from the Macquarie Bank and which was later replaced by the Bank of South Australia.
In August 2009 the Bank of South Australia offered loan facility of up to $650,000 to Z Nominees for the purpose, inter alia, of “Loan to assist with business set up and divorce costs for [the husband]”. The husband was a guarantor of the facility.
The husband’s father deposed that of that amount the company Z Nominees had lent the husband, R Business and G Business, since the date of the parties’ separation, a total of $547,883. The husband’s father said that the arrangements with the husband were that he and his two companies were to repay a sum of $250,000 and reimburse the monthly interest payments and repay the balance.
The monies were provided to the husband by him utilising a facility he had been granted of drawing on an account in the name of the father’s Trust. The amount shown in the expert’s report as owing to the father’s entity is $580,142.
The father acknowledged that upon receiving compensation he had received for the injury occurring during the marriage, he had repaid it significantly to the credit of that account, thereby reducing the debt which was owed to his father’s entities.
There is no issue that the debts are real. It is in issue as to whether they have been procured for business purposes and whether they are properly included in the balance sheet as a debt for company related purposes.
Rather it is asserted by the wife that the monies so borrowed and shown as a business debt were funds utilised by the husband for his own purposes and that the husband has wasted capital that might otherwise have been available for division between the parties.
The issues for determination by the Court importantly include a question of what value the parties’ assets should be found to have. Central to the determination of that issue is a finding sought by the wife that the interests of the husband in two companies should be found to be of greater value than that ascribed to it by an independent expert.
The Court did not have the benefit of being provided with documents, which allowed it to see the financial position of both the companies owned by the husband and the company owned by the wife other than through a glass darkly.
It seemed that each of the parties treated their companies as their private fiefdom and paid scant attention to the independent existence of a corporate entity in utilising their funds held by those entities in and for purposes not related to them, but rather related to the parties themselves or their children.
It seems that the husband embarked on an expansion plan for his companies, R Business and G Business, which was not successful and which involved the spending of significant money. The husband also used company funds to pay his legal and accounting fees and some of his child support obligations as well as for his own support. The wife made a similar use of funds of C Business, although it is asserted that this did not take place to the same extent.
Ultimately, the wife asserted that the husband’s company was worth more than asserted and that her own company was of no or little value. The husband asserted that each of the companies should be taken at no value in accordance with the determination of an independent expert.
The wife provided detailed schedules of amounts withdrawn by the parties which she said were other than for the purposes of the company. The schedules were admitted into evidence. The husband said he was not able to agree to them because although he had had the opportunity to check them, he had not done so. The allegation and the schedules were before the Court earlier in the proceedings in a different form and the issue had clearly been enlivened at that time and was referred to again by the wife’s counsel in his opening remarks.
Exhibit “2” tendered in evidence in the early part of the proceedings was asserted to only be an update of earlier assertions and contained some corrections. However, the wife in her evidence conceded that some of the statements made in them were not correct. Exhibit “2” however contained a number of spreadsheets setting out transfers made from the accounts of the husband and wife, including in relation to R Business and C Business and which include sums asserted to have been made in breach of the injunctive orders, and which include an amount of $61,460 attributed to “[R Business] Transfers”.
Some of the other disputes between the parties were resolved during the course of the hearing.
For example, it was conceded that a “loan” said to be owing to the husband’s father, and being monies provided by him to assist in the purchase of a property which became the parties’ home, ought not to be taken into account because there was no real expectation that it would be demanded and there had been no demand of it since it had been provided many years ago.
It was also conceded, for example, that certain furniture not valued had to be taken into account and the value of that furniture was agreed.
It was also agreed that the contribution of the parties during cohabitation was to be treated as equal.
There was a further dispute however as to the matters which should be taken into account in the determination of what, if any, adjustment should be made to a contribution based assessment by reason of the matters referred to in section 75(2) of the Family Law Act1975 (Cth) (“the Act”) and in particular what, if any, matters should be considered under section 75(2)(o) of the Act, and what weight should be given to them.
The first step I must undertake is to identify the property of the parties or either of them available for division between them.
The Court at the commencement of the hearing was provided with a balance sheet for its consideration. Ultimately two balance sheets were prepared, one by each of the parties.
The differences between the parties as to the inclusion of assets in the balance sheet were reduced to only a consideration of the proper value to be attributed to the interests of the parties in the companies which had been the subject of the partial property settlement and, whether or not the compensation received by the husband which had been utilised to reduce post separation debt, was to be added into the balance sheet. In effect the wife wanted attributed to the husband’s companies a value of $305,457.
The husband sought to add to the balance sheet certain taxation liabilities incurred by R Business for tax in the sum of $45,546. This arguably has been taken into account in the value of the company and so, in my view, should be omitted.
There had been a difference between the parties as to the inclusion of an asset in the form of a Lexus motor vehicle but that car was the property of C Business and so was already accounted for in the valuation of that company.

The expert evidence was that the companies did not have any value. The value was assessed on a net tangible asset backing basis, the valuer concluding that, having regard to a proper return to be ascribed to the efforts of the proprietor working in the businesses and the trading results, there would not have been any profit upon which a future maintainable earnings valuation would have been conducted. In effect, the valuer asserted that there was no goodwill in either business and to find a value one was left with the consideration of the net tangible asset backing basis of valuing the shares.
That evidence was founded upon information provided to the valuer by the husband through his accountant.
The valuer did not undertake any audit of the company and took the figures at face value. It appears that the husband’s accountant equally did not undertake any audit of the figures and accepted the information provided to him by the husband.
The valuer acknowledged in evidence that, in coming to his conclusion, there was no value to be attached to the companies, he relied, inter alia, on entries in the balance sheet of outstanding loans to Z Nominees in the sum of $283,347 and $270,932. He made no further inquiries in relation to these amounts and accepted them as corporate liabilities which, on their face in the documents, they were.
These loans were not recorded in the year ending 30 June 2008 but were recorded in the year ending 30 June 2009. Accordingly, it seems that they arose in the financial year ending 30 June 2009.
The valuer, in making his valuations, has assumed that the loans contained in the balance sheet were loans relating to the business of the company.
It was put to the valuer by counsel for the wife that:
“[i]f it should turn out … that some or all of those loans are not liabilities of [G Business], what’s the implication in respect of the valuation on an asset-based value of [R Business] and [G Business], I suppose combined entity.”
The valuer replied to the effect that he did not think that it made any difference to his conclusion that the proper basis for valuation was a net asset backing basis.
He went on to reply that that assertion raised an interesting question of what the other side of the transaction would be. He observes that the taking away of the liability might have an impact on an expense of some kind.
The Court raised with the valuer that the loan might, in some circumstances, be balanced by a loan account, rather than expenditure.
The Court would, in those circumstances, have to have regard to the expenditure incurred by the husband in relation to his personal needs under section 75(2) of the Act but would alternatively in a balance sheet as between the parties have to include the husband’s liability to the company for such amounts.
Substantially the valuer however said that he would not remove the liabilities from the balance sheet because he had come to the conclusion that they were liabilities which were real and payable and accordingly should remain in the figures.
There nevertheless was the question of how the sum has been spent and whether that should be reflected in a loan account or perhaps director’s fees or salary, dividend or a combination of all, were the amounts spent by the proprietor on non business expenses. In the valuation, related party loan accounts were not considered.
There was further cross-examination of the expert dealing with the wife’s like drawings from C Business.
The wife, as a result of her inquiries and investigation of documents which were available at all times to the husband, produced Schedule (Exhibit “2”), setting out what she claimed were amounts expended by all the companies other than for company purposes and, in particular, for the purposes of the husband or the children or the wife.
She argued that if that expenditure had not occurred the position of the company would be different and, in particular, the sums borrowed to meet that expenditure would not appear in the balance sheet as liabilities of the company.
Alternatively, it appears that if the sums were borrowed and the liabilities were there in the balance sheet that there should be a corresponding asset in the balance sheet in the form of a loan account in the name of the husband or the wife.
Were that to be the case in the circumstances of this case I would of necessity include such a loan account as a liability of the husband or the wife in the balance sheet as between the husband and the wife.
The proposition was, in any event, put to the valuer that in the circumstances alleged by the wife the simple situation would be that the value of the company would rise to a positive value.
The valuer was not prepared to commit to that as a necessary result. He said that it would be necessary to see to the application of the funds individually to make a determination. In addition, since the parties used the companies’ funds as their own without formally taking a salary, it would be necessary it seems to make a determination as to how much of the sum utilised by the husband for his own purposes might be attributed to salary or director’s fees or dividend perhaps. It might be necessary in that event to make some allowance for tax on those payments.
These allocations might or might not leave a balance to be included in the assets of the company on loan account. I find that it is not possible for me to determine with any accuracy the value of the company based on the assertions of the wife. Any such assessment of value would be in the realm of speculation and I accept the evidence of the valuer in that regard.
What I can do, however, and what I propose to do, is to take into account the matters to which she has referred, (amongst others) in a consideration of the issues which arise under section 75(2) and including section 75(2)(o). It is a requirement of justice in this case that the substantial funds available to the husband and utilised for his purposes should be taken into account in this way. I accept, however, that the valuation of the companies should remain as found by the valuer to be nil.

The Balance Sheet

There were some concessions made by the parties and as a result of the above finding and those concessions, I find that the assets of the parties are as follows

Assets	($)
H property (h)	660,000
7A B Street (h, w)	300,000
7B B Street (h, w)	300,000
1966 motor vehicle	5,500
1968 motor vehicle	8,000
Honda motor bike	150
Household contents and personal property (h)	28,695
Household contents and personal property (h)	7,055
Household contents and personal property (w)	15,710
Wife’s jewellery (w)	5,185
Husbands jewellery (h)	2,100
R Business and G Business (h)	0
C Business Pty Limited (w)	0
Superannuation	0
Husband’s Superannuation AXA …02 (h)	9,512
Husband’s Superannuation AXA …7/8 (h)	15,174
Wife’s Superannuation Tower (w)	6,163
Wife’s Superannuation AXA …96 (w)	13,520
Wife’s Superannuation AXA 9…7/3 (w)	1,546
Total Assets	$1,378,310

Liabilities	($)
St George Bank Loan of the husband and the wife …974 secured against H property	97,059
St George Bank Loan – B Street	359,975
St George Bank Loan – H property	240,762
Total Liabilities	$697,796

($)
Nett Asset Pool (inclusive of Superannuation):	$680,514

Section 79(4) contributions to date of separation

Although it is clear that the husband had at the beginning of the marriage monies made available to him by his father to which he has asserted some weight might be given to justify a finding of unequal contributions during this marriage to the date of separation, it cannot be regarded in isolation from the contributions made aliunde by the parties and the wife’s parents as well both in cash and in labour.
Given the length of the marriage and the concession by the husband that the contributions of the husband and the wife, apart from the assistance received from the husband’s father, should be treated as equal, I find however on the evidence relating to the contributions made by the parties and others on their behalf overall to the acquisition, conservation and improvement of the property of the parties or either of them and to the welfare of the family are such that the contributions should be treated as equal in value to the date of separation.

Contributions post separation

The wife since separation appears to have had the primary care of the children in addition to running her business. She has been obliged to house herself and the children in rented premises away from the former matrimonial home, which continues to be occupied by the husband.
The husband has received compensation for injuries he received in several accidents. However, in relation to that compensation the husband particularised in his claim in Exhibit “21” and spoke of:
a)the loss that he had suffered and the fact “that his spouse’s income had suffered because of his incapacity”
b)“The plaintiff carried out the more physically arduous activities of the two businesses whereas the spouse was responsible for the financial/ administrative aspects of the businesses. His disabilities arising from the two accidents affected his ability to conduct the more arduous activities of the two businesses, to the extent that he has had to seek further assistance from his spouse…”; and
c)“The extra pressure put on his spouse in having her carry out additional duties to her financial and administrative duties, contributed to a breakdown in the marriage.”
There seems little doubt that the loss which was incurred by reason of the husband’s incapacity was in some ways a joint loss.
The compensation that the husband has received since separation is in the order of $280,000 and has been used by him to repay debt owing to his father’s family trust.
That debt was incurred and reflected in the balance sheets of the companies and was the subject of debate, as herein set out. I am urged by the wife to add this sum back into the balance sheet of husband and the wife but, as I have indicated to counsel, it is not my practice to add non-existent sums to balance sheets. However, I will take it into account in my considerations of the justice of the case, and in particular that the husband has had this money, that it represents a loss which was suffered by both the husband and the wife and that it has been utilised in the reduction of liabilities of the husband incurred post separation.

Conclusion based on contribution

All in all, I assess the contributions of the parties to the acquisition, conservation and improvement of the property of the parties to the marriage or either of them, including such property which is no longer the property of the parties to the marriage or either of them, and to the welfare of the family to be equal to the date of the hearing.

Section 75(2) considerations

I take into account the following matters:
a)The fact that since separation the husband has had available to him the drawings he has made from the business and that those drawings are significantly higher than the drawings available to the wife.
b)The wife has had the continuing care of the children of the marriage and that her contribution to the support of those children has been significantly more than the contribution of the husband. The evidence particularly in relation to the open declaration of the husband’s income seems to suggest that she will continue to bear the major burden of such support for some time.
c)The husband has received significant advances on favourable terms which have been procured from or with the assistance of his parents. He has had free access to funds so provided and arrangements for their repayment are flexible.
d)There is no evidence that the wife has the like capacity to access such funds.
e)The husband has the ownership of a company built up by the joint efforts of the parties to the marriage which on all accounts has a higher potential for profit and turnover than does the business operated by the wife. It has developed contacts with significant clients.
f)The husband has suffered injuries but there is no credible evidence that they will provide a significant inhibitor to his capacity to derive income given the nature of the business which he operates.
g)The wife’s capacity to earn income will to some extent be affected by the role that she will it seems continue to undertake as the primary carer for the children at least for a time.
h)The husband has received compensation for injuries in the sum of $280,000 which has been utilised by him to reduce liabilities incurred since the date of separation. In part the loss giving rise to the compensation was a loss suffered by both parties to the marriage.

Conclusion on section 75(2)

For all the reasons referred to above I find that it is appropriate the wife should receive a further 15% of the assets and a division overall of 65% of the available assets.
In the circumstances of this case I determine that result to be just and equitable.

Orders which should be made

I propose orders which will give effect to the following division.
The wife will receive:

Assets	($)
7A B Street	300,000
7B B Street	300,000
House contents and personal property	15,710
Wife’s jewellery	5,185
C Pty Limited	0
Wife’s Superannuation Tower	6,163
Wife’s Superannuation AXA …96	13,520
Wife’s Superannuation AXA …7/3	1,546
Total Assets	$642,124
Liabilities
St George Bank Loan B Street	359,975
Total Liabilities	$359,975
Net Assets (including superannuation)	$282,149
Payment by the husband to the wife	$160,185
Total to be received by the wife - 65%	$442,334

The husband will receive:

Assets	($)
H property	660,000
1966 motor vehicle	5,500
1968 motor vehicle	8,000
Honda Motor Bike	150
Household contents and personal property	28,695
Household contents and personal property	7,055
Husband’s jewellery	2,100
R Business and G Business	0
Husband’s superannuation AXA …02	9,512
Husband’s Superannuation AXA …7/8	15,174
Total Assets (including superannuation)	$736,186
Liabilities
St George Bank Loan H property	97,059
St George Bank Loan H property	240,762
Payment by the husband to the wife	160,185
Total Liabilities	$498,006
Net Assets (including superannuation)	$238,180

I certify that the preceding ninety-six (96) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for judgment of the Honourable Justice Fowler.

Associate:

Date: 6 August 2010

[2010] FamCA 724

6 August 2010

Key Legal Topics

Areas of Law

Family Law

Property Law

Equity & Trusts

Legal Concepts

Remedies

Constructive Trust

Fiduciary Duty

Restitution