N THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY
No NG 1019 of 1998
BETWEEN:
RICHARDAS VASILEVICHOUS
APPLICANTAND:
MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
RESPONDENTJUDGE:
KATZ J
DATE OF ORDER:
9 DECEMBER 1998
WHERE MADE:
SYDNEY
MINUTES OF ORDER
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The application be dismissed.
2.The applicant pay the respondent’s costs of the proceedings.
Note:Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY
No NG 1019 of 1998
BETWEEN:
RICHARDAS VASILEVICHOUS
APPLICANTAND:
MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
RESPONDENTJUDGE:
KATZ J
DATE OF ORDER:
9 DECEMBER 1998
WHERE MADE:
SYDNEY
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
Section 486 of the Migration Act1958 (Cth) confers on this Court jurisdiction with respect to “judicially-reviewable decisions”. One type of judicially reviewable decision is a decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal. (That appears from par 475(1)(b) of the Act.)
Mr Richardas Vasilevichous, the applicant, has filed an application for a review by this Court of a decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal. The decision of the Tribunal was one made on 4 September 1998. That decision was the consequence of an application by the applicant to the Tribunal made on 3 April 1998.
The Tribunal affirmed an earlier decision made by a delegate of the Minister. That decision by the delegate was made on 25 March 1998 and refused an application which had been made by the applicant for a protection visa. That application had been made on 16 February 1998.
The topic of protection visas is dealt with in s 36 of the Act. Section 36 provides for a class of visas to be known as protection visas and provides further that a criterion for such a visa is
- 2 -
that the applicant is a non-citizen in Australia to whom Australia has protection obligations under the Refugees Convention as amended by the Refugees Protocol.
When one turns to the Refugees Convention as amended by the Refugees Protocol, one sees that Australia has protection obligations to a person who is outside the country of his or her nationality owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion and who, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself or herself of the protection of that country.
In Mr Vasilevichous’ case the Tribunal was not satisfied that he was a refugee and therefore affirmed the delegate’s decision not to grant him a protection visa.
Mr Vasilevichous filed an application for an order of review of the Tribunal’s decision on 28 September 1998. The application seems to have been - if I can put it this way - a pro forma application. It listed various grounds upon which the decision of the Tribunal was challenged.
The first was that procedures required by the Act or the regulations to be observed in connection with the making of the decision were not observed. That is a ground of review under par 476(1)(a) of the Migration Act.
The next ground set out was that the decision was an improper exercise of the power conferred by the Act or regulations. That is a ground set out in par 476(1)(d) of the Act.
The third was that the decision involved error of law. That is a ground set in par 476(1)(e).
Finally, it was alleged as a ground of review that there was no evidence or other material to justify the making of the decision. That is a ground set out in par 476(1)(g).
Mr Vasilevichous has appeared before me in person today and has made submissions about the decision of the Tribunal. Not surprisingly, given the fact that he is not legally trained, his
- 3 -
submissions bore little resemblance to the grounds of review which were set out in the application.
As I understood his submissions, they ultimately distilled themselves into this, that there was some additional evidentiary material which might have persuaded the Tribunal in his favour, which evidentiary material was not put before the Tribunal by those who were then representing him in the proceedings.
I have sought to explain to Mr Vasilevichous as best I can the limited nature of the function of the Court in proceedings of this sort, and, I must say, not with complete success, but certainly the matter which Mr Vasilevichous has raised in his submissions does not give rise in my mind even to any arguable case that any of the grounds of review set out in the application have been made out, and in those circumstances it is necessary for me to dismiss his application.
In the circumstances, I add to the order for dismissal an order that the applicant pay the respondent's costs of the proceedings.
I certify that this and the preceding 2 pages
are a true copy of the reasons for judgment of
the Honourable Justice Katz.
Associate:
Date: 9 December 1998
For the applicant: The applicant in person.
Solicitor for the respondent: Australian Government Solicitor
Date of hearing: 9 December 1998
Date of judgment: 9 December 1998
- AGLC
- Vasilevichous, Richardas v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [1998] FCA 1601
- Case
- [1998] FCA 1601
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The primary legal issues before the court involved the interpretation and application of relevant legislative provisions governing visa cancellation and the scope of ministerial discretion. Specifically, the court had to examine whether the Minister's decision to cancel the visa complied with the Migration Act 1958 and whether there were any procedural or substantive errors. The applicant argued that the Minister's decision was unreasonable and not based on appropriate considerations, while the respondent maintained that the decision was within their lawful authority and correctly made.
In delivering the judgment, the court held that the Minister had the statutory power to cancel the visa, as per the provisions of the Migration Act. The court found that the Minister's decision was not unreasonable and was supported by the evidence. The applicant's arguments concerning procedural fairness were rejected, as the court determined that the Minister had acted within their lawful authority and followed the correct procedures. Consequently, the application for judicial review was dismissed. The court also ordered that the applicant pay the respondent's costs of the proceedings.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The application be dismissed.
2. The applicant pay the respondent’s costs of the proceedings.
Note:
Background
Background to the litigation
Full text does not contain this section.
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Full text does not contain this section.
Decision
Reasons for decision
Full text does not contain this section.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Full text does not contain this section.