Vasek & Vasek
[2012] FamCAFC 206
•7 December 2012
FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA
| VASEK & VASEK | [2012] FamCAFC 206 |
| FAMILY LAW – APPEAL – PROPERTY – Where the appellant husband appealed from orders for property settlement – Where the appellant husband asserted that the trial Judge erred in his Honour’s determination of the value of certain trade dollars – Where neither party produced evidence of the value of the trade dollars – Where the trial Judge concluded that it was appropriate to treat each trade dollar as being equivalent to one ordinary dollar based on their value to the husband as opposed to a third party – No appealable error established. FAMILY LAW – APPEAL – PROPERTY – Where the appellant husband asserted that the trial Judge erred in his Honour’s determination not to add back money received by the respondent wife pursuant to orders made before the final hearing and in surplus of her legal fees – No appealable error established. FAMILY LAW – APPEAL – PROPERTY – Where the appellant husband asserted that the trial Judge erred in his Honour’s determination not to add back money allegedly advanced to third parties – No appealable error established. |
| Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) |
| Gabel & Yardley (2008) FLC 93-386 Norbis v Norbis (1986) 161 CLR 513 Reynolds & Reynolds (1985) FLC 91-632 Turnbull & Turnbull (1991) FLC 92-258 |
| APPELLANT: | Mr Vasek |
| RESPONDENT: | Ms Vasek |
| APPEAL NUMBER: | WA | 22 | of | 2011 |
| FILE NUMBER: | PTW | 1097 | of | 2001 |
| DATE DELIVERED: | 7 December 2012 |
| PLACE DELIVERED: | Sydney |
| PLACE HEARD: | Perth |
| JUDGMENT OF: | Bryant CJ, Thackray & Ainslie-Wallace JJ |
| HEARING DATE: | 23 October 2012 |
| LOWER COURT JURISDICTION: | Family Court of Western Australia |
| LOWER COURT JUDGMENT DATE: | 13 July 2011 |
| LOWER COURT MNC: | [2011] FCWA 50 |
REPRESENTATION
| COUNSEL FOR THE APPELLANT: | Mr John Hedges |
| SOLICITOR FOR THE APPELLANT: | Butcher, Paull & Calder |
| COUNSEL FOR THE RESPONDENT: | Mr Peter Dowding SC |
| SOLICITOR FOR THE RESPONDENT: | Holden Barlow |
Orders
The appeal be dismissed.
The appellant husband pay the respondent wife’s costs of and incidental to the appeal as agreed or, in default of agreement, as assessed on a party/party basis.
IT IS NOTED that publication of this judgment by this Court under the pseudonym Vasek & Vasek has been approved by the Chief Justice pursuant to s 121(9)(g) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth).
| THE FULL COURT OF THE FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA AT PERTH |
Appeal Number: WA 22 of 2011
File Number: PTW 1097 of 2001
| Mr Vasek |
Appellant
And
| Ms Vasek |
Respondent
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
Mr Vasek (“the husband”) appeals against orders for property settlement made by Crooks J on 5 August 2011. Ms Vasek (“the wife”) resists the appeal and seeks to maintain his Honour’s orders.
The husband’s son from an earlier relationship had intervened in the proceedings before the trial Judge but did not appeal the decision.
Background
The husband and the wife commenced to live together in September 1985 and married in January 1998. Each had been married before. They separated in August 2004.
When the parties married neither had any assets of significance. Each was working. In 1987 the husband started working in an office supplies dealership and eventually acquired a 50 per cent interest in the dealership through a company, C Pty Ltd which was incorporated for that purpose. The husband and the wife were directors and shareholders of that company, the husband held nine of the ten issued shares and the wife held one share. Some time later the wife resigned from the company and surrendered her share to the husband. In March 1990 a discretionary trust was established, the C Trust, of which the husband was the appointor. The wife, husband and the husband’s children were beneficiaries of the trust.
In March 1996 through C Pty Ltd, the husband purchased an X franchise. X is a trade exchange system by which members provide other members with services and goods without payment of cash. It is not necessary to go into the exact method of operations of X for these purposes. His Honour at [14] cited Mr P’s report:
Each member maintains a “trade account” with [X] in a similar fashion to a bank account. When members provide their goods and services to other members their trade account is credited with “trade dollars” equal to the cash price of the goods and services. Conversely, when members purchase goods and services from other members their trade account is debited with trade dollars.
The franchise was successful and the parties acquired significant property and other holdings.
The Trial Judge’s Reasons
His Honour, after considering the husband’s evidence found at [126] that he was not a witness on whose evidence his Honour could safely rely without supporting evidence. His Honour made similar findings about the evidence of the Intervener who claimed an equitable interest in property concerned in the proceedings. In the result, the trial Judge dismissed the Intervener’s claim.
His Honour found the total net assets of the parties was in the order of $5 million. His Honour found that the wife’s percentage entitlement was 46 per cent. He made orders apportioning the property of the parties in accordance with that percentage.
His Honour ordered the husband to effect the transfer of a property to the wife and to give certain indemnities. The husband was further ordered to pay $325,724 to the wife. The effect of his Honour’s orders was to include in the assets to be retained by the husband, 186,483 X dollars (see [201]).
The appeal as argued was of a narrow compass and it is unnecessary to traverse all of his Honour’s reasons. The appeal grounds were distilled in argument to cover three discrete areas of appeal. They concerned his Honour’s determination of the value of the X dollars; the treatment of an amount of money paid to the wife which the husband argued should be “added back” into the assets of the parties and considered as part of the overall pool and his Honour’s treatment of unsecured loans made by the husband to a Mr W.
X Dollars
In issue between the husband and the wife was how the 186,483 X dollars then held by the husband were to be valued.
Neither party produced evidence of the value of the X dollar.
Mr P, an accountant, conducted a valuation of the business of the X franchise operated by the husband. The valuation was in the context of a sale of the business to a third party. There was no challenge to his evidence.
In considering the X dollar holdings, again in the context of a sale of the business to a third party, Mr P said:
…Whilst [the trade dollars] can be converted to goods and services at dollar for dollar, there are other considerations such as:
·Present value issues i.e. how long does it take on average before the trade dollars are converted?
·The opportunities to exchange trade dollars are limited (by the number of members, the type of business conducted etc) and the more trade dollars one has, the less likely that they will ultimately all be able to be converted to goods and services.
·Some of the cash fees involved in the 3 for 1 exchanges may be repaid by the member within the 12 month period, thus cancelling out the trade dollars acquired. (This consideration would be unique to PNB’s position rather than applying to trade dollars generally).
Taking the first two factors into consideration, the true value of [an] X trade dollar for a large holder most likely lies somewhere between 30c and 70c…
Mr P was not required for cross-examination on his report.
In his reasons his Honour said:
222.…The husband gave evidence that the monetary value of one [X] trade dollar should be set at 13.067 cents. He asserted this was the net cost paid by [X] North to [X] Australia to acquire [X] dollars when clients of the franchise failed to pay their accounts to [X] Australia.
223.The husband submitted, however, that if the Court was not prepared to value each [X] dollar at 13.067 cents, then given that there was no valuation evidence, it was appropriate to divide the [X] dollars between the husband and wife in the same proportions as the Court found to be the parties’ entitlement to the other assets.
224.The wife submitted the value of each [X] dollar should be assessed as having the same value as one ordinary dollar and opposed the [X] dollars being divided in percentage terms as sought by the husband.
His Honour concluded that it was appropriate to treat each X dollar as being equivalent to one ordinary dollar and at [229] set out his reasons for so concluding. We observe that no challenge was raised by the husband to any of these factual findings. His Honour said:
229. I have reached this conclusion, particularly for the following reasons:
(a)whilst the husband gave evidence that the cost of acquiring each [X] dollar from [X] Australia was 13.067 cents, he has been able to exchange [X] dollars for a wide range of purposes, including meeting:
(i)his [sporting interest] expenses;
(ii)payments to his accountant;
(iii)fees for his barrister;
(iv)fees to his former solicitors;
(v)personal expenses, eg hospitality; and
(vi)fees for a private investigator.
(b)there was no evidence to suggest the [X] dollars used to pay for the services I have mentioned were exchanged, other than on a full dollar for dollar basis;
(c)the sum of 66,500 [X] dollars, allegedly used to purchase the ring I have earlier considered, was recorded on a full dollar for dollar value in the financial statements prepared for the [C] Superannuation Fund for the year ended 30 June 2006; and
(d) it is reasonable to assume the husband is likely to be able to continue to exchange what [X] dollars remain, for goods and services on a full dollar for dollar basis.
In conclusion, his Honour said:
456. In my view the husband should retain all of the [X] dollars in the division of assets. I accept the husband clearly has extensive knowledge of the [X] system and networks, which should allow him to fully utilise the value of [X] dollars. He is far better placed then the wife to get the maximum value from any future trading in [X] dollars, having demonstrated this ability in the past by trading [X] dollars for goods and services on a full dollar for dollar basis.
It was argued for the husband that his Honour ought to have divided the X dollars between the parties in the same proportions as the balance of the asset pool. Counsel for the husband submitted that had his Honour done so, it would have been “uncontentious”. The written submissions observed:
1.2 It is submitted that, in the absence of direct valuation evidence from either side, in order to do justice between the parties, the available options were to divide the asset as suggested, adjourn the matter to obtain valuation evidence or pose the question: “What would a willing but not anxious vendor pay a willing but not anxious purchaser to acquire $186,843 [X] trade dollars?”.
Two observations are apposite here. First, given that the matter had taken some five years to come to hearing, principally it seems to us because of the husband’s recalcitrance in providing proper, or indeed any, disclosure of his financial affairs, to adjourn the matter, had any such application been made, would have been a very serious step.
Secondly, it is insufficient for an appellant to point to other, different orders that may have been made by a trial Judge. To mount a successful challenge the appellant must show that the trial Judge’s finding was not open to him on the evidence.
At this point, we observe that the Court’s discretion in determining what is just and equitable in a particular case is a very broad one. As Brennan J said in the High Court in Norbis v Norbis (1986) 161 CLR 513 at 539-540:
The difficulties in the way of developing guidelines beset an appellate review of the exercise of a discretion under s. 79. Unless the primary judge reveals an error in his reasoning, the Full Court can intervene only if the order made is not just and equitable. How does the Full Court arrive at that conclusion? In Bellenden (formerly Satterthwaite) v. Satterthwaite, Asquith L.J. stated the rationale of an appellate court’s approach:
“It is, of course, not enough for the wife to establish that this court might, or would, have made a different order. We are here concerned with a judicial discretion, and it is of the essence of such a discretion that on the same evidence two different minds might reach widely different decisions without either being appealable. It is only where the decision exceeds the generous ambit within which reasonable disagreement is possible, and is, in fact, plainly wrong, that an appellate body is entitled to interfere.”
The “generous ambit within which reasonable disagreement is possible” is wide indeed when there are a number of factors to be taken into account and the comparative weight to be attributed to those factors is not clearly indicated by uniform standards and values of the community. The generous ambit of reasonable disagreement marks the area of immunity from appellate interference. (citations omitted)
The husband’s submission reveals a fundamental error which is in the question posited for his Honour’s answer. Although his Honour could have determined a valuation of the X dollars based on their purchase by a third party, he was not confined to that approach. His Honour was entitled to determine the value of the X dollars to the husband. This Court has long recognised that commercial or capital values of shares may not reflect their value to the party who ultimately has control over them. In Turnbull & Turnbull (1991) FLC 92-258, Baker J said at 78,738:
I am satisfied therefore in the context of proceedings under the Family Law Act that when a judge is determining the value of shares held by a party in a family company, he must look at the reality of the situation and value the shares on the basis of their worth to the shareholder.
The Full Court comprising Asche, Barblett and Murray JJ in Reynolds & Reynolds (1985) FLC 91-632 remarked at 80,111:
We are doubtful, however, whether valuation methods which have been developed for commercial purposes are entirely appropriate for the purposes of family law. The present commercial or capital value of shares in a proprietary company may not reflect their value to the spouse, who either has control after divorce or who stands ultimately to benefit from them or control them after the death of generous parents, as appears to be the case here.
Although his Honour was dealing with X dollars rather than shares, we consider the principle of ‘value to the owner’ was open to his Honour and we thus conclude that his Honour’s approach to the value of the X dollars did not constitute an error.
The Add Back for Legal Fees
The second challenge to his Honour’s reasons concerned his determination not to “add back” money had by the wife pursuant to orders made before the hearing and applied towards the wife’s legal fees.
It was uncontentious that the wife had received money from time to time in the proceedings pursuant to orders. The total of the money received by her in this way was $633,500.
His Honour said:
262.As earlier noted, since the start of the proceedings the wife has received various advances pursuant to orders, which are set out as follows together with the notations made as to the basis for those payments:
(a) 14 October 2004 – $35,000 (to be characterised by the trial Judge);
(b) 20 May 2005 – $54,500 (to be characterised by the trial Judge);
(c) 7 December 2005 – $50,000 (to be characterised by the trial Judge);
(d) 27 September 2006 – $80,000 (to be paid as interim costs with such sum to be taken into account or at least had regard to, in the determination of the property settlement proceedings between the parties);
(e) 19 December 2008 – the sum of $50,000 (to be spent on the Applicant’s legal fees); and
(f) 22 May 2009 – $54,000 and $310,000 (characterised as interim property settlement)
…
His Honour noted too that the wife claimed to have borrowed sums to meet legal expenses and he set those out at [263]. The borrowings were said to have been $100,000 from Mr M, $6,000 from Mr R and $60,000 from the wife’s mother. His Honour, observing that the wife was not challenged on her assertion that she had made these borrowings, accepted her evidence.
The trial Judge set out the way in which the wife funded her legal expenses by reference to the loans and the payments through court orders. The total amount paid was $626,016.
His Honour then said:
266.I am unable, however, to reconcile the wife’s affidavit evidence with her asserted borrowings for legal fees as set out in the fee analysis, which omitted reference to the borrowing from Mr [M] of $100,000 but included an ANZ bank loan for $50,000, I note the ANZ loan was stated to have been borrowed since the wife concluded her evidence.
267. To proceed on the basis of the wife’s evidence and include as a liability the $100,000 loan from Mr [M] may be unfair to the husband and before making final orders, I will invite submissions from the parties to clarify this issue.
As we understand the matter, submissions were indeed made to his Honour.
His Honour said:
268. The husband submitted that the difference between the wife’s paid legal fees and the total of the payments she received pursuant to orders of the Court, should be treated as a partial property settlement and be added back to the wife in the asset pool.
269. Assuming the wife’s outstanding loans used for the payment of her legal fees include the ANZ loan for $50,000 and not the loan of $100,000 from Mr [M], the loan amounts total $116,000 out of a total of $626,016 paid in legal fees. This left a balance of $510,016 which was met from the Court ordered payments earlier noted. Deducting the sum of $510,016 from the total payments of $633,500 left the sum of $123,484 to be added back to the asset pool, if the husband’s submission was accepted.
His Honour considered the submission advanced on behalf of the husband which was to the effect that any surplus funds over that required for the payment of legal fees should be added back because, since the wife had unsuccessfully made applications for interim spousal maintenance and had not pursued a claim for spousal maintenance during the trial, the excess funds could only be characterised as partial property settlement and should be added back into the asset pool.
The trial Judge said:
279. At the trial the husband did not seek to challenge the wife’s assertion that she was unable to work in the hospitality industry, where the wife had her previous work experience and training. Since July 2006, the wife has been limited to a disability pension from which to meet her day to day needs and what capital was available from the Court orders earlier noted. The wife’s disability pension, as disclosed in her Financial Statement filed on 12 May 2009 was $270 per week. Even allowing for the wife’s rent-free accommodation at the [H] property and the husband’s payment of the outgoings, the wife’s post-separation income from her disability pension was clearly insufficient to meet her reasonable living expenses. I was not satisfied, nor was it put to the wife at the trial, that she had the capacity to contribute in any significant way to her reasonable living expenses. Having concluded that there should be an addback to the asset pool of the funds paid by the wife in legal costs, I was not satisfied any additional amount from the funds received by the wife should be added back from the balance of $123,484. In my view, any amount in this region would represent a reasonable provision for the wife’s living expenses since the separation.
The evidence in the matter closed in March 2010 and submissions were made on 18 March 2010. Counsel for the husband told his Honour that there was an agreement between the parties that the amount of the wife’s paid legal fees was $635,000.
Before us, counsel for the husband said that when he received the wife’s written submissions he observed that, instead of the agreed figure for paid legal costs, something less was asserted, leaving $123,484 having been paid to the wife but not expended on legal fees. Clearly from the trial Judge’s reasons to which we have referred, the argument about the requirement to add back that excess to the pool was agitated before his Honour and, in the result, rejected.
The matter returned to court on 24 August 2011 when counsel for the husband sought leave to “file a response to the wife’s submissions”. Senior counsel for the wife opposed such leave, observing that the husband had been given leave to file submissions by the end April but had not done so. The application was refused.
It is against this background that the submissions for the husband must be considered.
It was argued:
3.2…on 22 May 2009 the wife was granted an Order for interim partial property settlement to be characterised pursuant to which she was paid $364,000.
3.3 Prior to May 1999 [sic], the wife had been paid advances of $269,500 from which she had paid $32,286 for non-legal expenses and $237,214 for legal fees.
3.4 Based on submissions made on behalf of the wife in March 2010, the learned trial judge concluded that from the advances paid to the wife she had used $123,484 for living expenses since separation. This sum was in addition to expenses paid directly by the husband.
3.5 It followed that, from $364,000 advanced in May 2009, the sum of $91,198 had been treated as living expenses with the consequence that between May 1999 [sic] and March 2010 the wife had incurred living expenses which averaged out at over $2,000 per week.
As we understand it, the following points were argued:
· The amount of money in excess of legal fees was expended at $2,000 per week and could not be regarded as “reasonable living expenses”.
· That money should properly be characterised as spousal maintenance to which the wife was not entitled. The wife had been unsuccessful in her earlier applications for spousal maintenance.
· As the question of “interim spousal maintenance had not been left open for review by the trial judge”, his Honour fell into error in not adding the excess back into the asset pool.
· The funds paid to the wife before the conclusion of the trial were for the purpose of paying her legal fees and for no other reason.
The clear terms of the orders that provided for part payments to the wife made before the trial do not support the husband’s assertions that they were for legal fees only. Although counsel argued that the “tenor” of the application for the interim property settlements was to meet legal expenses, the terms of the orders do not make that characterisation in respect of all of them.
The submission that the wife’s previous applications for spousal maintenance having been unsuccessful effectively prohibited a consideration of her circumstances and earning capacity in a different context is simply misconceived.
In Gabel & Yardley (2008) FLC 93-386, the Full Court said:
57. The legislative framework, and the authorities to which we have been referred, suggest that the Court’s power to make orders with respect to settlement of property is not necessarily exercisable at only one time, and can properly be exercised by a succession of orders until the power to make orders with respect to property is exhausted… It is thus potentially more instructive to focus on the nature and scope of the power conferred by section 79 of the Act and the nature and effect of orders made in the exercise of the power than upon attempts to categorise the kinds of orders which may be made pursuant to the power.
The Court continued:
69. As we have earlier explained, in our view the focus of our attention should be whether or not the power to make orders pursuant to section 79 has been exhausted. Unless it has, we see no basis in law or logic for concluding that further orders may not be made with respect to property the subject of earlier orders. There can be little doubt that the exercise of power under section 79 involves the exercise of discretion by reference to the provisions of Part VIII of the Act. It would be surprising if, in circumstances clearly involving less than such an exercise of discretion, orders made pursuant to the power conferred by section 79(6) of the Act could not be revisited and altered. Indeed, there may be cases where the Court could only exhaust the power conferred by section 79 in a “just and equitable” manner as required by section 79(2) of the Act by altering an earlier order with respect to the property of the parties or either of them as learned senior counsel for the wife submitted…
Clearly, in order to effect a just and equitable division of property between the parties, his Honour was obliged to consider the wife’s circumstances including her health and earning capacity. His Honour’s consideration of the surplus funds was in our view within the bounds of a reasonable exercise of discretion.
It was conceded by the husband that whether or not funds advanced were added back into the asset pool was a matter for the judge’s discretion. Given that there was no challenge to any of the findings of fact to which his Honour referred in determining not to add back those funds, the argument amounted to no more than a challenge to the exercise of the discretion. No error has been demonstrated.
Although not a ground of appeal, counsel for the husband sought to argue a denial of procedural fairness in relation to the surplus funds. He argued that during the trial the agreement between the parties was that, in effect, the wife had expended all of the money advanced to her as partial property settlements in the payment of her legal fees. Although counsel had the opportunity to make submissions to the trial Judge about the adding back of any surplus of funds over legal fees, he contended that he was denied procedural fairness by not having the opportunity to recall the wife for further cross-examination on how the surplus funds were disbursed to demonstrate that they could not properly be regarded as her reasonable living expenses.
First, senior counsel for the wife submitted that the husband’s analysis of the funds paid to the wife and her expenditure of them was incorrect. It was submitted that the wife’s evidence was that she borrowed money from time to time to pay her legal fees and when she received funds through court orders she repaid the borrowings and this situation continued from time to time. It was not conceded that there was in fact any surplus of funds over that paid to her by orders of the Court. Since counsel for the husband made no reference to any piece of transcript or evidence to support his analysis of the way in which the funds were paid to the wife and disbursed, we do not see the need for us to trawl through the evidence to determine whether his assertions can be made good.
Secondly, although counsel for the husband was able to make submissions to his Honour about how to treat the asserted surplus, he made no application to recall the wife to both question her about how the excess funds were spent and to demonstrate to the trial Judge that they were not “reasonable living expenses”. It can hardly found a complaint of denial of procedural fairness that a trial Judge denied counsel the opportunity to cross examine a witness when no application had been made nor the trial Judge alerted to the issue sought to be agitated.
The coup de grace to this complaint was the submission by counsel for the wife, which was that had the wife been challenged she could well have demonstrated amply that any surplus was indeed used for her reasonable living expenses.
This challenge to the trial Judge’s reasons fails.
The Add Back of the Loans to Mr W and Mr L
The third ground of challenge to the trial Judge’s reasons concern his treatment of asserted loans made by the husband to third parties.
The husband asserted in the trial that he had made loans in the order of $516,498 through C Pty Ltd to a Mr L and then Mr W. The husband said that he had made these advances as part of a scheme to set up an investment. The husband said that he commenced making payments in July 2001 and thereafter made payments at the direction of first Mr L and later Mr W.
His Honour said:
324. After having reviewed the husband’s evidence concerning the [L] and [W] loans, I am unable to rely upon it as an accurate account of what took place. The payments which allegedly started in 2001 were resumed by the husband in July 2004 when I accept there were significant problems in the marriage. Given that the husband had received no repayments of any capital or interest on the advances he made in 2001, I find it highly improbable that the husband would resume payments in July 2004 in respect of the same venture and continue to make payments for more than two years, notwithstanding the many more failed promises for repayment of the loans that were allegedly made.
He said:
329.…I am not satisfied, however, that the funds were paid out to Messrs [L] and [W] after July 2004 as the husband asserted nor am I satisfied that the funds were advanced by the husband for any legitimate purpose.
His Honour determined that the funds advanced from July 2004, which amounted to $399,549, be added back to the pool of assets of the parties.
The husband argued that in 2001 he “took a speculative risk” in advancing money to Mr L “in the hope of large profits from the development of a brick manufacturing business” and took a further risk by advancing more money to Mr W in 2004 to 2006, again in the hope of large financial returns. It was argued that while earlier speculation engaged in by the husband, for example in developing X had been successful, it was unfair to add back funds expended with the same expectation but which did not result in a successful outcome.
We reject this argument. As was conceded the determination as to what is added back into the asset pool is a matter for the exercise of the trial Judge’s discretion. No error in that exercise has been demonstrated.
Further, the submission misconceives his Honour’s reasoning. His Honour was not at all convinced that any money had in fact been paid to Mr L and then Mr W either in 2004 or before. This finding, also not the subject of challenge, is set out in his Honour’s reasons and supported by a series of facts determined by him, including that not one document concerning the building of the brickworks was produced nor did Mr L or Mr W give evidence.
The submission of the husband proceeds on the mistaken premise that the trial Judge accepted the husband’s evidence that there was a legitimate business proposition for which he advanced funds in 2001 and thus erred in not treating the post 2004 advances in the same way.
No error has been demonstrated.
It follows that the appeal will fail.
Costs
As is usual we sought submissions as to costs from the parties at the conclusion of the hearing. Counsel for the husband conceded that, if the appeal failed, it would be difficult to resist an order for costs in favour of the wife.
Senior counsel for the wife sought an order for indemnity costs on the appeal given the number of grounds, the large volume of material required to be considered and the nature of the grounds ultimately argued.
This is a matter in which the husband should bear the wife’s costs. Although there is force in some of the submissions made by senior counsel for the wife as to the nature of the costs to be awarded, we are not persuaded that this is an appropriate case for the award of indemnity costs.
I certify that the preceding sixty six (66) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for judgment of the Honourable Full Court (Bryant CJ, Thackray & Ainslie-Wallace JJ) delivered on 7 December 2012.
Associate:
Date: 7 December 2012
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