IN THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Office of the Registry
Sydney No S176 of 2009
B e t w e e n -
MONICA VARAS
Applicant
and
FAIRFIELD CITY COUNCIL
Respondent
Application for special leave to appeal
GUMMOW J
HEYDON J
TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS
AT SYDNEY ON FRIDAY, 12 FEBRUARY 2010, AT 2.03 PM
Copyright in the High Court of Australia
MR A.R. MOSES, SC: May it please the Court, I appear with my learned friends, MR P.D. KEYZER and MS K. EDWARDS, for the applicant. (instructed by Haywards Solicitors)
MS K.L. EASTMAN: If your Honours please, I appear with my learned friend, MS E. BISHOP, for the respondent. (instructed by Leigh Virtue & Associates)
GUMMOW J: Yes, Mr Moses.
MR MOSES: Thank you. Your Honours, the special leave questions are crystallised at page 109 of the application book. The central contention is that the respondent’s actions in this case were unlawful by virtue of section 15(2) of the Disability Discrimination Act, the text of which is set out at page 30 of the application book, and that the case raises issues of public importance that require the resolution of the case by this Court.
In essence, the respondent imputed a disability to the applicant, being a histrionic personality disorder, a psychiatric disorder for the purposes of section 4(g) and (k) of the Disability Discrimination Act, the text of which is set out at page 29 of the application book. As a result of imputing that disability to the applicant, the respondent directed the applicant to attend a psychiatric assessment for the purposes of deciding whether she should be medically retired or her employment terminated for cause because of conduct which is summarised, and if I could take the Bench to this ‑ ‑ ‑
GUMMOW J: Just a minute. Section 5 is pretty important in this structure, is it not? We looked at that before, I think.
MR MOSES: Section 5, your Honour, is relevant to the comparator question which is the third issue which we raise in respect of the matter as well.
GUMMOW J: But that has been repealed, has it not? Is there a new section 5?
MR MOSES: It has been amended, your Honour. The legislature has amended section 5(1) of that Act to delete the words “the same” from the reference to whether or not a person has been treated in a matter different than what they would have treated a person without a disability.
GUMMOW J: Sorry, section 5(1)?
MR MOSES: Section 5(1) has been amended. It now reads:
For the purposes of this Act, a person (the discriminator) discriminates against another person (the aggrieved person) on the ground of a disability of the aggrieved person if, because of the disability, the discriminator treats, or proposes to treat, the aggrieved person less favourably than the discriminator would treat a person without the disability in circumstances that are not material different.
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- Case
- [2010] HCATrans 18
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The primary legal issue before the Court was whether the Council's refusal of the development application was affected by jurisdictional error. Specifically, the Court had to determine if the Council had failed to take into account a relevant consideration or had taken into account an irrelevant consideration when making its decision, thereby vitiating the decision-making process.
The Court, comprising Gummow and Heydon JJ, analysed the Council's reasons for refusal and the relevant planning instruments. Their Honours found that the Council had indeed taken into account irrelevant considerations, namely concerns about traffic congestion that were not supported by evidence and were outside the scope of the planning controls applicable to the development. The Court affirmed the principle that a decision-maker must confine its considerations to those matters which the relevant legislation or planning instrument requires it to consider.
The Court concluded that the Council's decision was affected by jurisdictional error and accordingly made orders setting aside the Council's refusal of the development application.
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