“Vaq” v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs [2002] FCAFC 35
“Vaq” v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs [2002] FCA 170
NOTE: CHANGES TO THE MEDIUM NEUTRAL CITATION (MNC)
The Federal Court adopted a new medium neutral citation (FCAFC) for Full Court judgments effective from 1 January 2002. Single Judge judgments will not be affected and will retain the FCA medium neutral citation.
The transitional arrangements are as follows:
- All Full Court judgments delivered prior to 1 January 2002 will retain the FCA medium neutral citation.
- All Full Court judgments delivered between 1 January 2002 to 30 April 2002 have been assigned parallel medium neutral citations in both the FCA and FCAFC series.
- All Full Court judgments delivered from 1 May 2002 will contain the FCAFC medium neutral citation only.
FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
“Vaq” v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs [2002] FCA 170
“VAQ” v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
V 1118 OF 2001SUNDBERG, MARSHALL and WEINBERG JJ
27 FEBRUARY 2002
MELBOURNE
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
VICTORIA DISTRICT REGISTRY
V 1118 OF 2001
BETWEEN:
"VAQ"
APPELLANTAND:
MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
RESPONDENT
JUDGES:
SUNDBERG, MARSHALL and WEINBERG JJ
DATE OF ORDER:
27 FEBRUARY 2002
WHERE MADE:
MELBOURNE
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The appeal be dismissed.
2.The appellant pay the respondent’s costs of the appeal.
Note: Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
VICTORIA DISTRICT REGISTRY
V 1118 OF 2001
BETWEEN:
"VAQ"
APPELLANTAND:
MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
RESPONDENT
JUDGES:
SUNDBERG, MARSHALL and WEINBERG JJ
DATE:
27 FEBRUARY 2002
PLACE:
MELBOURNE
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
BACKGROUND
The question for decision in this appeal is whether the primary judge erred in holding that the appellant had not within the prescribed time applied to the Refugee Review Tribunal (“the Tribunal”) for review of the respondent’s refusal of his application for a protection visa. The appellant applied for a protection visa on 9 March 2001. A delegate of the respondent refused the application on 3 May 2001. The appellant was notified of the delegate’s decision and was taken to have received that notification no later than 10 May 2001. He made an application for review of the decision which was received by the Tribunal on 1 August 2001 (“the Application”). Section 412(1)(b) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (“the Act”) provides that:
“An application for review of an RRT ‑ reviewable decision must:
…
(b)be given to the Tribunal within the period prescribed, being a period ending not later than 28 days after the notification of the decision.”
On 17 August 2001 the Tribunal determined that it did not have jurisdiction to entertain the Application because it had been filed out of time and the Tribunal did not have power to extend the time for filing an application. On 23 August 2001 the appellant filed an application to the Court to review the Tribunal’s decision.
RESPONDENT’S MOTION
By…
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- Case
- [2002] FCAFC 35
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court was tasked with determining whether the primary judge correctly applied the Briginshaw standard of proof when assessing the evidence regarding the date on which the fax was received. The appellant claims that the evidence, specifically an affidavit by Ms Matic, was clear and definite, and could not be dismissed as indefinite testimony. The court examined whether the primary judge should have applied the Briginshaw principle, considering the seriousness of the allegation, the inherent unlikelihood of an occurrence, and the gravity of the consequences. The court found that the evidence was well-researched and supported by documentary evidence, including a letter from the appellant stating that they had not signed the Application until 31 July 2001. The court concluded that the primary judge would likely have reached the same decision even when applying the Briginshaw principle.
In conclusion, the court found that the Tribunal was correct in its determination that it did not have jurisdiction to entertain the appellant’s claim, regardless of the evidence in question. Therefore, the court dismissed the appeal with costs. The appellant was ordered to pay the respondent’s costs of the appeal. This decision highlights the importance of clear and definitive evidence in immigration and visa matters, particularly in relation to the timeliness of submissions to tribunals.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The appeal be dismissed.
2. The appellant pay the respondent’s costs of the appeal.
Background
Background to the litigation
Full text does not contain this section.
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Full text does not contain this section.
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Full text does not contain this section.