“Vaq” v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs

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“Vaq” v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs [2002] FCAFC 35

“Vaq” v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs [2002] FCA 170

NOTE: CHANGES TO THE MEDIUM NEUTRAL CITATION (MNC)

The Federal Court adopted a new medium neutral citation (FCAFC) for Full Court judgments effective from 1 January 2002.  Single Judge judgments will not be affected and will retain the FCA medium neutral citation.

The transitional arrangements are as follows:

  • All Full Court judgments delivered prior to 1 January 2002 will retain the FCA medium neutral citation.
  • All Full Court judgments delivered between 1 January 2002 to 30 April 2002 have been assigned parallel medium neutral citations in both the FCA and FCAFC series. 
  • All Full Court judgments delivered from 1 May 2002 will contain the FCAFC medium neutral citation only.

FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

“Vaq” v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs [2002] FCA 170

“VAQ” v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
V 1118 OF 2001

SUNDBERG, MARSHALL and WEINBERG JJ
27 FEBRUARY 2002
MELBOURNE


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

VICTORIA DISTRICT REGISTRY

V 1118  OF 2001

BETWEEN:

"VAQ"
APPELLANT

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
RESPONDENT

JUDGES:

SUNDBERG, MARSHALL and WEINBERG JJ

DATE OF ORDER:

27 FEBRUARY 2002

WHERE MADE:

MELBOURNE

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The appeal be dismissed.

2.The appellant pay the respondent’s costs of the appeal.

Note:    Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

VICTORIA DISTRICT REGISTRY

V 1118  OF 2001

BETWEEN:

"VAQ"
APPELLANT

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
RESPONDENT

JUDGES:

SUNDBERG, MARSHALL and WEINBERG JJ

DATE:

27 FEBRUARY 2002

PLACE:

MELBOURNE

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

BACKGROUND

  1. The question for decision in this appeal is whether the primary judge erred in holding that the appellant had not within the prescribed time applied to the Refugee Review Tribunal (“the Tribunal”) for review of the respondent’s refusal of his application for a protection visa. The appellant applied for a protection visa on 9 March 2001. A delegate of the respondent refused the application on 3 May 2001. The appellant was notified of the delegate’s decision and was taken to have received that notification no later than 10 May 2001. He made an application for review of the decision which was received by the Tribunal on 1 August 2001 (“the Application”). Section 412(1)(b) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (“the Act”) provides that:

    “An application for review of an RRT ‑ reviewable decision must:

    …

    (b)be given to the Tribunal within the period prescribed, being a period ending not later than 28 days after the notification of the decision.”

    On 17 August 2001 the Tribunal determined that it did not have jurisdiction to entertain the Application because it had been filed out of time and the Tribunal did not have power to extend the time for filing an application.  On 23 August 2001 the appellant filed an application to the Court to review the Tribunal’s decision.

    RESPONDENT’S MOTION

  2. By…

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Details
Case
[2002] FCAFC 35
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The appellant, “Vaq,” has brought an appeal against the Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs, seeking to overturn a decision that dismissed their application for a review of a visa refusal. The matter was heard in the Federal Court of Australia. The appellant argues that the Tribunal erred in its determination regarding the receipt of a fax on 12 May 2001, asserting that the primary judge should have assessed the evidence in accordance with the Briginshaw principle, which requires proof on the balance of probabilities. The appellant contends that the Tribunal’s conclusion that it did not have jurisdiction to entertain the claim should not have been made, given the evidence presented.

The court was tasked with determining whether the primary judge correctly applied the Briginshaw standard of proof when assessing the evidence regarding the date on which the fax was received. The appellant claims that the evidence, specifically an affidavit by Ms Matic, was clear and definite, and could not be dismissed as indefinite testimony. The court examined whether the primary judge should have applied the Briginshaw principle, considering the seriousness of the allegation, the inherent unlikelihood of an occurrence, and the gravity of the consequences. The court found that the evidence was well-researched and supported by documentary evidence, including a letter from the appellant stating that they had not signed the Application until 31 July 2001. The court concluded that the primary judge would likely have reached the same decision even when applying the Briginshaw principle.

In conclusion, the court found that the Tribunal was correct in its determination that it did not have jurisdiction to entertain the appellant’s claim, regardless of the evidence in question. Therefore, the court dismissed the appeal with costs. The appellant was ordered to pay the respondent’s costs of the appeal. This decision highlights the importance of clear and definitive evidence in immigration and visa matters, particularly in relation to the timeliness of submissions to tribunals.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal be dismissed.

2. The appellant pay the respondent’s costs of the appeal.

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Finally, the appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the Tribunal did not receive a fax from the appellant on 12 May 2001, as his Honour should have examined the evidence in light of the rule in Briginshaw v Briginshaw (1938) 60 CLR 336 and determined that the affidavit of Ms Matic was nothing more than “indefinite testimony”. In Briginshaw at s 362 Dixon J said:“reasonable satisfaction is not a state of mind that is attained or established independently of the nature and consequence of the fact or facts to be proved. The seriousness of an allegation made, the inherent unlikelihood of an occurrence of a given description, or the gravity of the consequences flowing from a particular finding are considerations which must affect the answer to the question whether the issue has been proved to the reasonable satisfaction of the tribunal. In such matters ‘reasonable satisfaction’ should not be produced by inexact proofs, indefinite testimony, or indirect inferences.”On the assumption that the Briginshaw principle is applicable to a case such as the present where all that is in question is the date on which an application was received by the Tribunal, we are satisfied that the evidence contained in Ms Matic’s affidavit was “clear and definite”, and could not be described as “nothing more than indefinite testimony”. It was well‑researched and supported by documentary evidence. Further, it is difficult to see how his Honour, had he positively directed himself in Briginshaw terms, could possibly have come to a different conclusion in the light of the letter from the appellant stating that he had not signed the Application until 31 July 2001.CONCLUSION The primary judge observed that if the evidence recorded in par 4 should not have been received, this was of no consequence because, with or without it, the Tribunal was plainly correct in determining that it did not have jurisdiction to entertain the appellant’s claim. We agree. The present case is thus not a convenient vehicle in which to decide whether the evidence should have been received. The appeal is dismissed with costs.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Full text does not contain this section.