Vannini v Campbelltown City Soccer & Social Club Inc No. Scciv-03-310

VANNINI V CAMPBELL CITY & SOCIAL CLUB INC
[2003] SASC 113
Magistrates Appeal (Civil)

LANDER J. This is an appeal from a decision of a Magistrate given in the civil jurisdiction of the Magistrates Court.
The appellant was the defendant in the Court below.
As its name indicates the respondent is an incorporated association which has been formed for the purpose of fielding soccer teams. The appellant was the marketing and membership co-ordinator of the respondent and a member of the management committee of the respondent, established under the respondent’s constitution and rules, and an officer of the respondent. It was common ground that the appellant owed the respondent statutory and fiduciary duties to act honestly in the exercise of his powers in the discharge of his duties, to use a reasonable degree of care and diligence in the exercise of those powers and duties and not to make improper use of his position as an officer to gain an advantage for himself or cause detriment to the respondent. So much was admitted on the pleadings. (See paras 3 of the Particular of Claim and Defence) The questions in this case were whether there had been a breach of these duties and, if so, the consequences.
The respondent claimed that the appellant had failed to account for various sums of money. First he had failed to account in relation to the sale of 150 boxes of chocolates. Secondly, he had failed to account to the respondent for sponsorship monies. Thirdly, he had received 25 pairs of shoes for and on behalf of the respondent and had failed to account for either the proceeds of the sale of those shoes or all of the shoes. Fourthly he had converted some goods which were owned by the respondent.
The respondent claimed an account of profits, damages in the sum of $14,450, a declaration that the shoes and other items were the property of the respondent and an order for delivery up of those shoes and property.
The appellant put the claims in issue and denied that he had received any funds on account of the respondent for which he had failed to account, or that he had received any goods on account of the respondent for which he had failed to account, or that he had converted any of the respondent’s goods. He denied that the respondent was entitled to any relief.
The Magistrate found that the appellant had failed to account for $6,870 being monies received by the appellant in relation to the chocolate drive. He found that the appellant had sold two pairs of shoes for $100 each and the proceeds from those sales had not been provided to the respondent. He found that a further nine pairs of shoes were unaccounted for. He allowed $50 in relation to each of those pairs of shoes, a total of $450.00.
He dismissed the other claims.
He allowed a further $350 being collection fees charged by the manufacturer of the chocolates to the respondent and paid by the respondent. Judgment was entered for the respondent for $7,870.
Originally the appellant’s notice of appeal consisted of only three grounds but at the hearing of this appeal the appellant sought and was granted leave to amend his notice of appeal to raise the following grounds:
“1.The learned Magistrate erred in finding that the defendant had not returned cheques and money received from the chocolate drive in that this finding was unsupported by any evidence.
1A.The learned trial Magistrate erred in finding that the defendant lied in his evidence that he returned monies and other property of the plaintiff to the club rooms and lied in his evidence on the issues set out in paragraph 23 of the Magistrate’s Reasons in that;
1A.1The findings were not necessary for the resolution of factual issues.
1A.2The findings are not supported by objective evidence.
1A.3No reasons, or inadequate reasons, are provided to support the findings.
2.The learned Magistrate erred in finding that the defendant had received 25 pairs of shoes in relation to the show promotion in that the documentary evidence established that 20 pairs of shoes only were obtained by the plaintiff.
3.The learned Magistrate erred in finding that the defendant was liable for the sum of $350.00 being collection fees in that there was not legal basis advanced, or found on which the defendant could be held liable.
4.The learned Magistrate erred in finding that the defendant was liable to the plaintiff in the sum of $6,870.00 in respect of the sale of chocolate in that no basis for such liability was identified or established.
5.If the learned Magistrate found that the defendant was liable in damages to the plaintiff in respect of the sale of chocolates, he erred in that:
5.1 He failed to assess damages.
5.2If he assessed damages, he erred in failing to consider the extent to which the plaintiff sustained loss.
5.3He wrongly found that the defendant had an obligation to ensure that all the chocolates were sold and all the monies therefore collected.
5.4He failed to consider whether the defendant had any statutory or fiduciary duty to the plaintiff after 9 April 2001.
6.The learned Magistrate erred in finding that the defendant was liable to the plaintiff in the sum of $450.00 for nine pairs of shoes assessed at $50.00 per pair in that:
6.1 No basis for such liability was identified or established.
6.2If the award was in damages, the learned Magistrate failed to assess damages.
6.3If the award was in damages, the learned Magistrate erred in assessing damages in that he failed to consider and make findings as to the plaintiff’s loss.”
Grounds 1, 2 and 6 of appeal are against findings of fact even though Ground 6 suggests otherwise. The third ground of appeal raises a question of law and that is whether a party can be held liable in damages for collection fees charged by collection agencies in recovering a debt. Grounds 4 and 5 raise for consideration the assessment of the respondent’s loss if liability is established.
I can deal with the third ground quickly. The sum of $350 was charged by a collection agency, acting on behalf of Cadbury Schweppes, when it recovered the monies owing by the respondent to Cadbury Schweppes in relation to the chocolate drive.
In my opinion, the respondent was not liable to pay that amount to Cadbury Schweppes. In those circumstances it cannot pass on that “loss” to the appellant. Ground 3 must succeed.
Grounds 1, 2 and 6 require an examination of the evidence and a consideration of whether there is evidence to establish the findings.
In considering the evidence regard must be had to the Magistrate’s assessment of the credibility of witnesses. He accepted that all of the witnesses called by the respondent were truthful.
On the other hand, he said of the appellant:-
“I find that the defendant on the other hand was an unimpressive witness. He failed on numerous occasions to directly answer questions that were asked of him, he appeared to be evasive and was often aggressive. He avoided answering questions on so many occasions I gained the impression and formed a view that he did not wish to answer the questions asked of him. As to the content of his evidence I was not impressed with that either. I do not accept his evidence regarding the leaving behind of the box with contents including cash and cheques at the front desk of the office after hours. That assertion does not ring true. It is implausible that a business man and an experienced man such as he would have conducted himself in such a way. I reject the evidence out of hand. I find that the defendant was lying in relation to that issue. I find further that where there has been a conflict in the evidence between the witnesses for the plaintiff and the defendant as to issues in this matter I find that the evidence of the witnesses of the plaintiff is truthful evidence on the balance of probabilities. I find that the defendant did say to Miss Harris that he was keeping the money and that he would not return it. I do not accept the defendant’s assertion that he was not responsible for the monies collected from the chocolate drive, and although I accept that others may have collected some money it was his responsibility to receive that money from them, account for it and then hand it onto the treasurer. I do not accept and I find that the defendant is lying when he says that most of the money collected from the chocolate drive was in cheques. That is implausible and I say that it is manufactured evidence on his part. I also find as implausible and I reject his evidence that the cash and cheques that he subsequently left at the clubrooms had been sitting in his vehicle, including cash. I also find and reject his evidence that he had simply forgotten about the shoes that were stored in his possession until ordered to return them by a Court order. In relation to the number of shoes that were the subject of a promotion I accept Mr Cicoioppo’s evidence that there were 20 pairs of shoes initially at $200 a pair and that a further five pairs were obtained by the defendant, making the total number to 25 pairs. I accept his evidence that the number of shoes kept in the clubrooms was four. Exhibits tendered including receipts indicate that the cheques and money allegedly left at the clubrooms by the defendant were never handed over to the treasurer and I say that is so because this evidence is a falsehood on the part of the defendant.”
The Magistrate has found that the appellant was untruthful and his evidence implausible. He has based that finding not only upon the manner in which the appellant gave evidence but also upon the content of the evidence. Clearly enough the Magistrate has found the appellant to be an unsatisfactory witness whose evidence is inherently unreliable.
The findings are very strong. The finding that a party is a liar usually should only be made where it is necessary to be made and where there is clear evidence to support the finding. An adverse finding by a magistrate on credibility does not mean that an appeal court could not conclude that the magistrate was wrong if there was insufficient material to support the finding: State Rail Authority of New South Wales v Earthline Constructions Pty Ltd (1999) 160 ALR 588. This Court needs to assess the evidence for itself but in an assessment of that evidence this Court will bear in mind the advantage that the Magistrate had in seeing and hearing the witnesses give evidence, especially the appellant.
I have read the evidence and I have read the appellant’s evidence more than once.
The Magistrate was entitled, in my opinion, to find that the appellant, on numerous occasions, failed to directly answer questions. He was also entitled to find that the appellant was evasive and often aggressive.
The appellant’s evidence was quite unsatisfactory. He was, as the Magistrate found, evasive, argumentative and aggressive. He deliberately refused to answer questions when one can infer he believed his answer, truthfully given, would not support his defences.
In my opinion, the Magistrate was quite entitled to reject his evidence for the reasons given by the Magistrate.
Moreover, this was a case where in some respects there was no grey area. In some matters if the appellant was telling the truth then the respondents’ witnesses must have been untruthful. On the other hand if the respondent’s witnesses were telling the truth then the appellant must have been untruthful.
On some matters there was no possibility of misunderstanding on the part of the witnesses. Nor on those same matters could it be said that the evidence was the product of a poor memory. I think on some matters the Magistrate was driven to a finding of untruthfulness. He was entitled to make that finding against the appellant.
In those circumstances the appellant faces a very difficult challenge of upsetting findings of fact in circumstances where it was open to the Magistrate to reject the appellant’s evidence in relation to those matters.
It seems to me to follow that if there was evidence to support those findings the Magistrate’s findings and conclusions cannot be successfully challenged. The examination of the evidence proceeds upon the assumption that the Magistrate was entitled to accept the respondent’s witnesses and entitled to reject the appellant’s evidence.
There were a number of facts which are either not in dispute or are only marginally relevant which I will mention so as to identify the background material upon which the respondent’s claims were based.
The appellant was elected to his position on 3 October 2000.
The club agreed, at its committee meeting on 12 March 2001, to conduct a fundraiser by having a chocolate drive. At that same meeting the respondent was given the responsibility of conducting the chocolate drive. The minutes of the meeting specifically record that the appellant would “control this drive”.
At or about the same time the respondent’s wife contacted Ms Elizabeth Harris, a sales consultant with Cadbury Confectionary, requesting information regarding Cadbury Fundraisers. The Club ordered 150 boxes each containing 20 packets of chocolate eggs which were delivered to the club on 13 March 2001. The cost of the chocolates was $5,999.40 which was invoiced to the club at the time of delivery of the chocolates.
It was a matter for the club to determine the price at which the chocolates were to be sold and a price of $3.00 per packet was discussed between the respondent’s wife and Ms Harris.
Three dollars was the agreed sum to purchase each packet of chocolate eggs. The chocolate eggs were circulated to members, parents and players with an accompanying letter. Twenty packets of chocolate eggs went with each box. They were told that the selling price was $3.00 per packet and they were asked when they had raised the $60 for each box, to place that sum in an envelope and give it to the team manager. The letter stated that all money had to be returned by no later than Friday 6 April.
The respondent also claimed that the appellant had the responsibility for selling a number of pairs of shoes to raise funds on behalf of the club.
There was dispute at trial over the number of pairs of shoes which had been delivered to the appellant for him to sell.
The appellant maintained that 20 pairs of shoes had been delivered to him whilst the respondent’s case was that he received 25 pairs. The Magistrate resolved the issue in favour of the respondent.
Mr Ciccocioppo was a past president of the club and was the sports director in 2001. His evidence was that the shoes were provided to the club by Bob Tattali of Best Bricks and Pavers. Mr Tattali originally provided 20 pairs of shoes on the condition that the name of his firm would appear on the senior teams guernseys. Each pair of shoes was valued at $200.
After the initial 20 pairs of shoes were delivered it was brought to the appellant’s attention that the minimum sponsorship required for a sponsor to be included on the team shirt was $5,000. Mr Tattali delivered a further five pairs of shoes so as to satisfy that requirement.
Mr Ciccocioppo’s evidence was that he and a Mr Rosetto each purchased a pair of shoes from the club for $100. Four pairs of shoes were kept at the club for display to any interested purchaser. The remaining pairs were delivered to the appellant. He said that the appellant returned ten pairs of shoes in 2002 pursuant to a court order.
His evidence was not supported by Mr Di Carlo, who said that 20 pairs of shoes had been provided to the club by way of sponsorship and that the appellant was responsible for selling them at $100 per pair. Mr Goldstone, who was the office manager at the time, also gave evidence that 20 pairs of shoes had been provided to the club by the sponsor and that they had been delivered to Mr Vannini. In cross examination, when it was pointed out to him that the respondent’s case was a claim in respect of 25 pairs of shoes, he adhered to his understanding that only 20 pairs of shoes were involved.
The appellant’s evidence was that 20 pairs of shoes were provided by the sponsor and they were valued at $250 each. He said that two pairs of shoes were sold at $100 per pair. Eight pairs of shoes were left at the club and he took ten pairs of shoes. He said he returned all ten pairs of shoes in his possession following a court order.
The shoes therefore raise two issues. First as to the total number of pairs of shoes involved. Second as to the numbers that were provided to the appellant.
After the appellant was given these responsibilities a dispute arose between the appellant and the respondent in relation to the appellant’s son training with another club. The appellant’s dispute with the respondent arose sometime after 12 March and before 9 April.
The respondent sought a transfer fee to allow the appellant’s son to train with the other club. The appellant unsuccessfully objected. The appellant was clearly aggrieved with the respondent’s decision.
I agree with the Magistrate that it is irrelevant to determine whether the appellant was right or wrong about the position which he took.
The minutes of the management committee held on Monday 9 April record that another club had approached the respondent seeking to sign the appellant’s son but had advised the respondent that it was not prepared to pay for him. The minutes record that the other club’s approach was considered an insult to the player and the respondent and a loan fee of $300 or a purchase fee of $1,500 was required.
It was resolved:
“That the Club loan Michael Vannini to Metro Stars for a fee of $300 or Transfer him outright for a fee of $1500.00.”
The minutes also record that the appellant objected to the decision claiming that his son should receive special treatment “in view of all he had done for the club”.
The minutes further record:
“T Vannini refused to accept the decision of the Committee and walked out of the meeting threatening to ‘fix them all’. He also stated that he would ‘fix the Club and everyone here and make it all disappear’.”
The club’s reaction to the appellant’s threat is also recorded in the minutes:
“OD to send a letter to T Vannini requiring the return of all monies, property, keys, and stick (Volleverde shoes), within 7 days.
OD to contact Suburban Locksmiths to re-key the Club and change alarm codes.”
The minutes indicate the rancour which developed as a result of the Club’s decision .
Mr Goldstone said that the minutes of the meeting of 9 April failed to record that the appellant’s membership of that committee was cancelled at that meeting.
The locks were changed on 10 April at a cost to the respondent of $250.80.
Mr Di Carlo said that he arranged for a meeting with the appellant at the clubrooms on 23 April 2001. Also present at the meeting was Mr Ciccocioppo and Mr Tirimacco. The purpose of the meeting was to discuss collection of the chocolate monies and to convey to the appellant the management committee’s resolution that the appellant was not fit to be a member of the club and that the committee no longer wished to work with him.
On 3 May 2001, the appellant spoke to Mr Di Carlo and offered to conduct the club’s marketing function for a 10 per cent fee of all sponsorships negotiated in 2001. Mr Di Carlo wrote to the appellant sometime after 7 May 2001 advising him that the management committee had considered the proposal and had determined not to accept that offer.
Mr Di Carlo also wrote to the appellant on 21 May 2001 advising him that the management committee had determined that his membership of that committee and its sub-committee “is terminated forthwith”.
The tone of the letter suggests, contrary to the evidence of Mr Goldstone, that the committee’s decision to, as it were, expel the appellant was not made on 9 April but sometime later.
Not much turns on that. There is no doubt that after 9 April the appellant and respondent were in serious disagreement.

However notwithstanding that dispute the appellant still had control of the chocolate drive and had a number of pairs of shoes which had been donated by a sponsor.
Whatever the rights or wrongs of the dispute which arose on 9 April the appellant had a duty to account for any monies received on behalf of the club and to return any goods which were unsold. There can be no doubt about those propositions. The duty to account to the respondent for any monies received on behalf of the respondent and to account for any of the respondent’s goods arose by reason of the statutory and fiduciary duties owed by the appellant to the respondent, to act honestly in the exercise of his powers in the discharge of his duties, to use a reasonable degree of care and diligence in the exercise of those powers and duties and not to make improper use of his position as an officer to gain advantage for himself or cause detriment to the respondent.
It was the respondent’s case that the appellant failed to account for any funds collected by him in relation to the chocolate drive.
It was also the respondent’s case that the appellant had failed to account for nine pairs of shoes donated by Mr Tattali.
The appellant’s evidence was that he accounted for all monies which he received in relation to the chocolate drive. He said that he returned all of the pairs of shoes which were in his possession.
However the Magistrate did not believe him on either score. He accepted the respondent’s case which he was entitled to do.
In those circumstances he was entitled to find that the appellant had not fully accounted for the proceeds of the chocolate drive.
The Magistrate calculated the monies unaccounted for in relation to the chocolate drive by holding inferentially that if all of the chocolates had been sold a sum of $9,000 would have been raised. That sum is calculated finding that 150 boxes were ordered by the club. Each box contained 20 packets of chocolate eggs. The price per packet was $3.00.
The Magistrate found that $2,130 had been recovered by the respondent and in doing so he relied upon the evidence of Mr Tirimacco who was the treasurer of the club.
Mr Tirimacco was not present at the meeting held on 9 April. As at that date he had received no monies from anyone in relation to the chocolate drive.
After 9 April he received $2,130 from a number of persons. He issued receipts for each sum that he received. Those receipts were tendered (p15). The money totalled $2,130 and was deposited in the club bank account as it was received. He said he received no money from the respondent.
In my opinion, the Magistrate was entitled to accept the evidence of Mr Tirimacco, who was the best person to give that evidence on behalf of the respondent. It was his responsibility to account for any money received by the club and to issue the appropriate receipt.
The question is whether the Magistrate was entitled to conclude that the club had suffered a shortfall of the difference between the amount of $9,000 and $2,130.
The appellant contended that by assessing damages in this manner, the Magistrate “wrongly found that the defendant (appellant) had an obligation to ensure that all chocolates were sold and all the monies therefore collected”.
The respondent’s claim under this head was that the appellant had breached statutory and fiduciary duties owed to the respondent and failed to account to the respondent for the proceeds of the sale of the chocolates. I have already identified the statutory and fiduciary duties the appellant admits that he owed the respondent.
The appellant was under a statutory and fiduciary obligation to account to the respondent for any proceeds of the sale of chocolates received by him and for any chocolates returned to him. This obligation continued after the appellant’s expulsion from the board some time in April or May.
The Magistrate proceeded on the assumption that all chocolates were sold and that all proceeds, other than the $2,130 received by Mr Tirimacco, were returned to the appellant.
The appellant’s evidence was that he had raised something in the order of $3,000 which he returned to the club, together with approximately $1,000 made up of sponsorship and membership funds. This evidence was rejected by the Magistrate, and as I have said, the Magistrate was entitled to reject the evidence.
There was evidence that the appellant was still involved in the collection of chocolate monies after the meeting of 9 April. This is despite the fact that Mr Tirimacco started receiving proceeds from people other than the appellant at around that time.
According to Mr Tirimacco, whose evidence was accepted by the Magistrate, it was agreed at the conclusion of the meeting on 23 April, that Mr Vannini would complete his involvement in the chocolate drive despite his expulsion from the club.
Mr Frank Raschella, who was responsible for the administration of the junior teams in the soccer club, gave evidence that Mr Vannini continued to collect money at training nights after the meeting of 9 April. He had understood that the appellant was no longer to be involved, but ascertained from the committee that the appellant would be completing the chocolate drive “before he completely got out of the committee”.
Mr Di Carlo said that he had obtained a report from the appellant as to how much he had collected in respect of the chocolates. He said the appellant had indicated that he had raised approximately $4,000.
In late April Ms Harris, Cadbury’s sales representative, spoke to Mrs Vannini three times in respect of the debt outstanding to Cadburys.
In May 2001, whilst speaking to Mrs Vannini, Mrs Vannini said: “You need to speak to my husband”.
The telephone was taken up by a male person. Mrs Harris’ evidence was:
“I then explained to this person that the money was outstanding on behalf of Campbelltown City Soccer Club and did we have a problem, could they pay the money. This person was quite abusive, quite rude and said to me he wasn’t paying the money, if we wanted the money we could get fucked, he would see us in court.”
In a letter to the appellant dated 21 May 2001, Mr Di Carlo requested return of the chocolate monies and other club property. In a schedule attached to the letter, Mr Di Carlo claimed that the appellant had advised as at 6 April 2001 that over $4,000 had been collected from sellers. The claim for return of chocolate monies was expressed as being “up to $9,000”.
The evidence clearly supports the finding that the appellant was involved in the drive after 9 April 2001. It also supports the finding that the appellant had collected moneys for which he had not accounted to the respondent. The appellant was then in breach of his statutory and fiduciary duties.
The respondent was entitled to an account of profits for the appellant’s breach of fiduciary duties. In the alternative it was entitled to equitable compensation: Nocturn v Lord Ashburton [1914] AC 932 at 956.
The Magistrate effectively proceeded to take an account or to the calculate the appropriate compensation.
The result indicates the Magistrate must have been of the opinion that all chocolates were in fact sold, and that any proceeds not received by the club were received by the appellant.
There was no evidence that all the chocolate was sold. The respondent did not deal directly with the club members who received the chocolates for sale. Many persons were needed to sell the chocolates. The plaintiff, in this case, did not need to call each and every person to whom chocolate was distributed for sale to give evidence that the chocolates were in fact sold, and that the proceeds were provided to the appellant.
The Magistrate had to conduct an inquiry to obtain a reasonable approximation of the assessment of profit: Warman International Ltd v Dwyer (1995) 182 CLR 544 at 558. However what is important is that the inquiry is into an account by the fiduciary in breach: Warman International Ltd v Dwyer at 558/559.
If the loss suffered by the respondent exceeded the profit made by the appellant the respondent was entitled to compensation for the loss: Warman International Ltd v Dwyer at 559.
In this case the loss suffered by the respondent was the money raised and chocolate unsold.
There was an evidential onus upon the appellant to establish what monies had been paid to him, what chocolate had been sold, what remained unsold and how the unsold chocolate had been accounted for.
The appellant knew who had been recruited to sell the chocolates. He knew who had accounted to him and for what amount. He would have known who had not sold the chocolates, if there were such persons, and if those persons had returned the chocolate to him.
Given the evidence to the effect that the appellant controlled the chocolate drive, it was reasonable to assume that chocolate sale proceeds not received by the club were received by the appellant.
The appellant could have called those people from whom he says money was not received to rebut the presumption that all chocolates were sold, and that he was the recipient of the proceeds.
This is a case where the respondent established that an officer who owed it statutory and fiduciary duties had breached these duties. Only the appellant knew what money he had received or what chocolate had not been sold and the whereabouts of these chocolates. The respondent proved the money it had received.
In the end the appellant’s obligation was to account for money received or chocolates returned because he was a person in a fiduciary relationship who was in breach of fiduciary duties arising out of that relationship: Chan v Zacharia (1984) 154 CLR 178 per Deane J at 198.
He failed to satisfy the Magistrate in that regard.
In my opinion, the Magistrate correctly assessed the loss to the club in respect of the chocolate drive.
The respondent’s claim in respect of the shoes is also not easy to resolve.
As I have already observed there is a disagreement between the club’s officers in relation to the number of shoes which were donated to the club for sale. In the end result, however, the Magistrate expressly accepted Mr Ciccocioppo’s evidence that there were originally 20 pairs of shoes which were supplemented by a further five pairs of shoes to allow the sponsor to qualify for recognition on the team’s shirts.
Moreover, the Magistrate accepted his evidence that two pairs were sold, four pairs were kept in the clubrooms and the remaining 19 pairs were held by the appellant. There was no dispute that ten pairs had been returned after an order made by the Court. So it followed he was of the opinion that the respondent was entitled to recover a sum of money to represent the missing shoes.
The Magistrate fixed a sum of $50 which, in the circumstances, was not unreasonable.
There was evidence, in my opinion, upon which the Magistrate could make the necessary findings which led to the conclusions to which I have referred.
He was entitled, as I have already said, to reject the appellant’s evidence for the reasons he gave.
In those circumstances the appeal must fail except as to the sum of $350 which, in my opinion, was never recoverable against the appellant because it was never payable by the respondent.
This matter was a straightforward matter of fact which, in my opinion, was appropriately addressed by the Magistrate.
For those reasons I would allow the appeal but only for the purpose of reducing the award by $350.
The orders of the Court will be:
1 Appeal allowed.
2The judgment in favour of the respondent in the sum of $7,870 is set aside.
3There will be judgment in favour of the respondent against the appellant in the sum of $7,520.
4 Otherwise the orders made by the Magistrate to stand.
I will hear the parties as to the costs of this appeal.

[2003] SASC 113

10 July 2003