Vanmaris v Roberts
[2022] WADC 80
•31 AUGUST 2022
JURISDICTION : DISTRICT COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
IN CIVIL
LOCATION: PERTH
CITATION: VANMARIS -v- ROBERTS [2022] WADC 80
CORAM: RUSSELL DCJ
HEARD: 21 JANUARY 2022
DELIVERED : 31 AUGUST 2022
FILE NO/S: APP 90 of 2020
BETWEEN: ASHA ELISE VANMARIS
Appellant
AND
DENI ROBERTS
Respondent
Catchwords:
Appeal - Criminal injuries compensation - Proved offence - Appeal on ground assessor's award manifestly excessive - Mental and nervous shock - Whether award of compensation should be reduced on account of victim's behaviour - Turns on own facts
Legislation:
Criminal Code Act Compilation Act 1913 (WA), s 301
Criminal Injuries Compensation Act 2003 (WA), s 3, s 12, s 18, s 30, s 31, s 41(a), s 41(b), s 42, s 48, s 56(2)
Result:
Assessor's award varied by reducing amount of compensation awarded
Representation:
Counsel:
| Appellant | : | Mr T F Percy QC & Mr C M Townsend |
| Respondent | : | Mr A Nolan |
| Amicus Curiae | : | Ms F E Negus |
Solicitors:
| Appellant | : | Timpano Legal |
| Respondent | : | Bradley Bayly Legal (Perth) |
| Amicus Curiae | : | State Solicitor for Western Australia |
Case(s) referred to in decision(s):
Attorney General for Western Australia v Her Honour Judge Schoombee [2012] WASCA 29
B v W (1989) 6 SR (WA) 79
Bodney v Assessor of Criminal Injuries Compensation [2000] WADC 214
Bull v Hobbs [2009] WADC 128
Cahill v Smith [2015] WADC 148
CME [2018] WADC 69
Crumby v Kuru (1995) 13 SR (WA) 331
DR v CD [2018] WADC 148
Fagan v The Crimes Compensation Tribunal (1982) 150 CLR 666
Guy v Hampson [2019] WADC 19
Hinchcliffe v Hinchcliffe [2010] WADC 78
Hogben v Darcy [2009] WADC 63
Houlahan v Pitchen [2009] WASCA 104
JY [2013] WADC 187
M v J and J v J (Unreported, WASC, Library No 920598, 19 November 1992)
Martin v Martin [2015] WADC 138
Planet Fisheries Pty Ltd v La Rosa (1968) 119 CLR 118
Re AK [2016] WADC 156
Re Dunne [2014] WADC 131
Re Farmer [2015] WADC 91
Re Piggott [2017] WADC 150
Re Richardson [2009] WADC 93
Re Utting [2011] WADC 10
RJE v Bandy (Unreported, WASC, Library No 1365, 31 May 1974)
Robertson v Baker [2014] WADC 14
S v Neumann (1995) 14 WAR 452
Selimoski [2012] WADC 30
Sweetman v Lilley [2021] WADC 74
Swinford [2021] WADC 82
TAW v NJS [2011] WADC 187
Taylor v Paindelli [2016] WADC 160
Underwood v Underwood [2018] WADC 13
Winiarczyk v Tsirigotis [2011] WASCA 97
RUSSELL DCJ:
Introduction
On 28 December 2018, the appellant, Asha Elise Vanmaris, was convicted after Trial in the Rockingham Magistrates Court[1] of the offence of unlawful wounding, contrary to s 301 of the Criminal Code Act Compilation Act 1913 (WA) (the offence).
[1] The trial was heard on 27 November 2018: Western Australia Police v Asha Vanmaris, PE 651595 of 2017 (Trial).
The victim of the offence was the respondent, Deni Roberts, who suffered a 3 cm laceration to her forehead requiring three stitches. That injury was sustained when the appellant struck the respondent with a stiletto shoe on 17 September 2017.
The appellant was fined $2,500, which was ordered to be paid to the respondent.
On 28 February 2019, the respondent filed an application pursuant to s 12 of the Criminal Injuries Compensation Act 2003 (WA) (CICA), for criminal injuries compensation in relation to the offence (the application), being a proved offence as defined in s 3 of the CICA.
On 9 December 2020, an assessor of criminal injuries compensation determined the application. The assessor awarded the respondent compensation in the amount of $27,033.25. That amount was made up of $23,500 for the respondent's injuries, $2,033.25 for the cost of reports and up to a maximum of $4,000 for future treatment expenses, less $2,500 being the amount of the fine paid to the respondent.[2]
[2] Amended Compensation Award dated 9 December 2020; Roberts [2021] WACIC 3.
The future treatment expenses of up to $4,000 were awarded subject to s 48 of the CICA.
The appellant appeals the assessor's decision on the ground the award is manifestly excessive in all the circumstances. The appellant accepts that some compensation is warranted for the respondent's physical injury, but in a lesser amount. The appellant also contends that the amount of compensation awarded should be reduced under s 41 of the CICA because the respondent contributed to her injury. This is disputed by the respondent.
The respondent claims an increased award to compensate her for psychological injuries she claims to have suffered in addition to the injuries referred to in the application.
For the following reasons, having considered the evidence and information filed in support of the application afresh and the further evidence adduced in the appeal:
1.Taking into account the injuries suffered by the respondent as a consequence of the commission of the offence, I consider that the amount awarded by the assessor of $23,500 is appropriate compensation for her non‑economic loss. I consider that is just in the circumstances and is fair, reasonable and proportionate bearing in mind the physical injury suffered by her, including her pain and suffering, the permanent scarring to her forehead and the mental and nervous shock suffered at the time of the commission of the offence and following it, as described at [93] of these reasons.
2.I am not satisfied that the respondent suffered any further, enduring psychological injury (mental and nervous shock) as a consequence of the offence, as claimed, so as to be compensable under the CICA.
3.Nor am I satisfied the amount of compensation awarded should be reduced under s 41 of the CICA because the respondent contributed directly or indirectly to her injury.
4.The total amount of compensation awarded by the assessor is varied by reducing it from $27,033.25 to $24,583.25. That amount is made up of $23,500 for non‑economic loss to compensate the respondent for her injury, $2,033.25 for report fees and $1,550 for future treatment expenses, less $2,500, being the amount of the court ordered fine already paid to the respondent.
5.Payment of the future treatment expenses awarded is to be subject to satisfaction of the requirements in s 48 of the CICA.
Issues to be determined
The issues to be determined in this appeal are:
1.What injury has the respondent suffered as a consequence of the commission of the offence? In particular, has the respondent suffered mental and nervous shock, as claimed in the appeal. It is not in dispute that she suffered the physical injury to her forehead.
2.If the respondent has suffered compensable injury, what is the appropriate compensation?
3.What loss, if any, has the respondent suffered as a consequence of such injury?
4.If the respondent has suffered compensable loss, what is the appropriate compensation?
5.Should the amount of any compensation award be reduced because the respondent contributed, directly or indirectly, to her injury?
General legal principles applicable to this appeal
The appeal
The appeal has been brought within the time required under the CICA, being within 21 days after the date of the assessor's decision.[3]
[3] CICA, s 55(3).
The court may confirm, vary or reverse the assessor's decision either in whole or in part.[4]
[4] CICA, s 56(2)(b).
An appeal under the CICA is a hearing de novo. There is no requirement for the appellant to demonstrate error on the part of the assessor.
Authorities conflict as to whether it is appropriate to have regard to the assessor's reasons. Earlier authorities suggest that it is.[5] More recently however, there are several authorities which hold that the appeal should be determined without regard to the assessor's reasons.[6]
[5] See for example, Crumby v Kuru (1995) 13 SR (WA) 331, 333; Hogben v Darcy [2009] WADC 63 [13]; Selimoski [2012] WADC 30 [17]; JY [2013] WADC 187 [5]; Re Dunne [2014] WADC 131 [34]; Re Farmer [2015] WADC 91 [13].]
[6]See for example, Re Piggott [2017] WADC 150 [10]; CME [2018] WADC 69 [10]; DR v CD [2018] WADC 148 [10] - [16]; Guy v Hampson [2019] WADC 19 [14]; Sweetman v Lilley[2021] WADC 74[9].
As I stated in Swinford,[7] I respectfully agree with the approach endorsed in those later authorities. That is, I should determine the appeal without regard to the assessor's reasons for decision. I reach that view and consider that is the appropriate approach because:
1.the appeal is a hearing de novo;
2.there is no requirement for the appellant to demonstrate error on the part of the assessor; and
3.I must decide the application for compensation afresh, without being fettered by the assessor's decision, solely on the evidence and information that was before the assessor, or any further evidence and information I receive in the appeal.[8]
Award and assessment of compensation
[7] Swinford [2021] WADC 82.
[8] CICA, s 56(1).
In the exercise of my discretion, I am empowered to make an award of compensation in an amount that I am satisfied is just for the injury and for any loss found to have been suffered by the victim of the offence.[9] The CICA defines the term 'satisfied' to mean 'satisfied on the balance of probabilities'.[10]
[9] CICA, s 30, s 56(2).
[10] CICA, s 3.
The maximum amount of compensation payable under the CICA for a single offence is $75,000.[11] The maximum is a jurisdictional limit and is not reserved for the worst cases.[12]
[11] CICA, s 31.
[12] S v Neumann (1995) 14 WAR 452, 463 (Murray J); TAW v NJS [2011] WADC 187 [21] (Bowden DCJ); Underwood v Underwood [2018] WADC 13 [19], [30] (Gething DCJ).
In assessing the amount of compensation, I must have regard solely to the injury suffered by the victim as a consequence of the commission of the offence. The amount of compensation is not to be fixed as punishment of an offender or as an expression of sympathy for the victim.[13]
[13] B v W (1989) 6 SR (WA) 79, 89.
I am required to apply the ordinary tortious principles for assessment of damages, taking into account the jurisdictional limitations and the definitions of 'injury' and 'loss' as defined by the CICA.[14]
[14] CICA, s 3, s 6; M v JandJ v J (Unreported, WASC, Library No 920598, 19 November 1992) (Scott J); RJE v Bandy (Unreported, WASC, Library No 1365, 31 May 1974) [3] (Burt J); Re Utting [2011] WADC 10 [6] (Braddock DCJ); Robertson v Baker [2014] WADC 14 [12] (Stone DCJ); Underwood v Underwood [113].
The applicant for compensation, must establish a causal relationship between the commission of the offence and the injury and loss for which the compensation is sought.[15]
[15] Fagan v The Crimes Compensation Tribunal (1982) 150 CLR 666, 673; S v Neumann (463) (Murray J); Attorney General for Western Australia v Her Honour Judge Schoombee [2012] WASCA 29 [21]; Re AK [2016] WADC 156 [71] (Schoombee DCJ); Martin v Martin [2015] WADC 138 [82] (Derrick DCJ).
The amount awarded by way of compensation for non-economic loss must be fair and reasonable and proportionate bearing in mind the injuries received by the victim.[16]
[16] Planet Fisheries Pty Ltd v La Rosa (1968) 119 CLR 118, 125 (Barwick CJ, Kitto & Menzies JJ); Houlahan v Pitchen [2009] WASCA 104 [107] (Newnes JA with whom Pulling & Miller JJA agreed); Winiarczyk v Tsirigotis [2011] WASCA 97 [71]; Underwood [117].
Evidence and information upon which the appeal is to be decided
Evidence and information before the assessor
The following evidence and information was before the assessor:
1.witness statement of the respondent dated 19 September 2017;[17]
[17] Criminal Injuries Compensation Award (File CIC 578 of 2019), assessor's papers (Assessor's Papers), page 24.
2.victim impact statement of the respondent dated 28 February 2019;[18]
[18] Assessor's Papers, page 29.
3.Western Australian Police Force (WAPOL) Information Report dated 29 January 2019;[19]
[19] Assessor's Papers, page 32.
4.photographs of the respondent's stitches to her forehead and the respondent's arm (undated);[20]
[20] Assessors Papers, pages 34 - 36.
5.photographs of the respondent's forehead scar taken in or about October 2020;[21]
[21] Assessor's Papers, page 38.
6.St John Ambulance Patient Care Record, case date 17 September 2017;[22]
[22] Assessor's Papers, page 52.
7.letter from Royal Perth Hospital Emergency Department Medical Officer, Alexander Hunt, dated 18 September 2017;[23]
[23] Assessor's Papers, page 54.
8.Royal Perth Hospital Emergency Department Adult Triage Nursing Assessment dated 17 September 2017;[24]
[24] Assessor's Papers, page 55.
9.report from plastic surgeon, Dr Paul S Quinn, dated 2 February 2019;[25]
[25] Assessor's Papers, page 57.
10.WAPOL Incident Report and Running Sheet compiled 27 October 2020;[26]
[26] Assessor's Papers, pages 67 - 78.
11.witness statements of:
(a)Mitchell Miller dated 2 November 2017;[27]
[27] Assessor's Papers, page 140.
(b)Maddison Brown dated 22 February 2018;[28] and
[28] Assessor's Papers, page 146.
(c)Kyra Yuill dated 14 March 2018;[29]
12.statement of Royal Perth Hospital Emergency Department Medical Officer Alexander Hunt dated 12 November 2017;[30]
13.photographs of the respondent taken by Constable Bradley Oates[31] in Royal Perth Hospital on 17 September 2017;[32]
14.CCTV footage of 17 September 2017 incident;
15.transcript of the Trial on 27 November 2018 (Trial ts);
16.transcript of the delivery of judgment in the Trial on 28 December 2018 (Judgment ts); and
17.transcript of sentencing proceedings in relation to offence on 11 January 2019 (Sentencing ts).
Further evidence sought to be relied on in the appeal
[29] Assessor's Papers, page 153.
[30] Assessor's Papers, page 169.
[31] Assessor's Papers, page 162.
[32] Assessor's Papers, pages 171 - 173, 178 - 180.
Both the appellant and the respondent seek to rely on fresh evidence and information in the appeal.
The appellant seeks to rely on:
1.an affidavit of Asha Elise Vanmaris sworn 20 January 2021 (Vanmaris Affidavit) and annexures:
(a)'AEV-1', described as an article from relating to the respondent representing Western Australia for the Australasian Junior Drivers in Tasmania in 2018;
(b)'AEV-2', described as a copy of a Facebook post from Bunbury Trotting Club depicting the respondent as 2018/2019 Junior Driver of the Year;
(c)'AEV-3', described as an image described as depicting the respondent as ambassador of Team Teal in a fund raiser for Ovarian Cancer in 2021;
(d)'AEV-4', described as a copy of an article on the Gloucester Park web page, which the appellant describes as depicting the respondent in 2021 celebrating one of the biggest wins of her career as a harness horse racing driver;
(e)'AEV-5', described as a copy of a photograph described as depicting the respondent at an event with the appellant and her partner in 2021;
(f)'AEV-6', described as a copy of a photograph described as depicting the respondent at a 'Ladies in Pacing' event in 2021;
(g)'AEV-7', described as a summary of the respondent's driving statistics (drives, winners and places) and income from Harness.org.au for the years 2015/2016 to 2020/2021; and
2.a copy of an article from The West Australian newspaper with the head line 'What a night-mare!' published in January 2021.
The respondent seeks to rely on:
1.an affidavit of Deni Roberts sworn on 9 December 2021 (Roberts Affidavit) and annexure 'DR 1', described as a bundle of photographs taken of the respondent on 30 November 2021 depicting scarring on her forehead;
2.an affidavit of Andrew John Ponnambalam (Ponnambalam Affidavit) and annexures:
(a)'AJP 1', letter from the respondent's lawyers, Bradley Bayly Legal to Dr Singh dated 12 November 2021 requesting Dr Singh to provide a medico-legal report following review of the respondent;
(b)'AJP 2', report of Dr Singh dated 24 November 2021 (Singh Report); and
(c)'AJP 3', tax invoice from 360 Medico legal dated 14 December 2021 for $2,200 in relation to the respondent's consultation with Dr Singh and the Singh Report.
The court has a general discretion to receive and admit further evidence without a formal application being made to adduce fresh evidence in the appeal.[33] The court will ordinarily permit fresh evidence to be admitted unless there is some reason why it would be unjust to do so.[34]
[33] Underwood [36] (Gething DCJ); Cahill v Smith [2015] WADC 148 [8] (Wager DCJ).
[34] Underwood [37]; Taylor v Paindelli [2016] WADC 160 [7] (McCann DCJ); Hinchcliffe v Hinchcliffe [2010] WADC 78 [9] (Stevenson DCJ).
No objection has been made to the reception of the further evidence sought to be relied on by the respondent. Nor am I aware of any reason it should not be admitted or why it would be unjust to allow its admission. As such, I allow admission of that further evidence.
The respondent objected to the admission of evidence in the Vanmaris Affidavit insofar as it amounts to opinion evidence, commentary, or submission as to the extent or otherwise of the respondent's recovery, or the affect her injuries have had on her. Counsel for the respondent referred in particular to:
1.paragraph 7, in which Ms Vanmaris states:
Since the date of the incident, I have viewed the Respondent to have apparently made a full recovery, actively participating in the industry.
2.paragraph 9, in which Ms Vanmaris states:
From my knowledge, the Respondent appears to enjoy an active social life with members of the industry. I have seen her at various industry events.
3.paragraph 11, in which Ms Vanmaris states:
From my knowledge and observation the career of the Respondent, appears to have sustained no ill effects as a result of the incident in 2017, and whilst I cannot positively exclude the fact there might be some residual difficulties as a result of that incident, they are not such as would be apparent to the reasonable observer of her career of the past 5 years.
In summary, it was submitted on behalf of the respondent that the court should disregard opinions expressed by Ms Vanmaris on the basis there is no foundation for the opinion, nor the basis upon which Ms Vanmaris is qualified to give such evidence. Alternatively, the respondent submitted that very little weight ought to be given to that evidence.
Senior counsel for the appellant submitted that the statements made by Ms Vanmaris in her affidavit are not matters of opinion. Rather, they are admissible evidence of the appellant's observations of the respondent attending a number of social functions and racing events.
The respondent also objected to the admissibility of the newspaper article sought to be relied upon by the appellant to the extent it was relied on as an article referred to by Dr Singh in his report.[35] This was on the basis there is no evidence as to whether that is the article referred to by Dr Singh.
[35] Singh Report, page 4.
Senior Counsel for the appellant submitted that the article sought to be relied upon appears to be the only article published from the appellant's perspective about the matters referred to by Dr Singh in the Singh Report. That is, that the appellant successfully appealed the stewards barring her attending race events and to an article being written in the newspaper portraying the appellant in a favourable light, which Dr Singh states made the respondent doubt herself and her chances of proving she had been a victim in the assault.
Applications for compensation under the CICA are to be determined informally having regard to the requirements of justice and the CICA. In deciding a compensation application, an assessor is not bound by rules as to evidence, but may inform himself or herself in any manner he or she thinks fit.[36] The same applies to a judge of this court on appeal.
[36] CICA, s 18.
Whilst strict rules of evidence do not apply, I must still be satisfied that the evidence and information before me is relevant and reliable, and give appropriate weight to it.
Ms Vanmaris deposes in the Vanmaris Affidavit to:
1.being a licensed stable hand and owner and to having been involved in the harness racing industry since she was a child;[37]
2.having a good knowledge of the harness racing industry through attending city and country meetings and following developments in the industry through the industry magazine, TAB Radio, Sky Channel and the West Australian;[38]
3.having viewed the respondent actively participating in the industry;[39] and
4.having seen the respondent at various industry events and being regularly interviewed on Sky Racing, TAB Radio and in industry publications from time to time.[40]
[37] Vanmaris Affidavit, par 4.
[38] Vanmaris Affidavit, par 5.
[39] Vanmaris Affidavit, par 7.
[40] Vanmaris Affidavit, pars 9 and 10.
Ms Vanmaris goes on to give, and annex examples of articles or social media posts referring to the respondent's career achievements, industry related events attended or participated in by the respondent and a summary of the respondent's statistics and income in the period 2018 ‑ 2021.[41]
[41] Vanmaris Affidavit, par 12 and the annexures referred to.
I am satisfied that Ms Vanmaris has:
1.knowledge and experience in the racing industry;
2.attended social and other events in the industry at which she has observed the respondent to be in attendance; and
3.read articles relating to and has listened to or viewed media in which the respondent has been interviewed or featured regarding her involvement and achievements in racing.
I find that Ms Vanmaris' evidence about those matters she has personally observed is relevant and reliable. Though there is no evidence as to when the photographs posted on social media, and said to depict the respondent at certain events, were taken, there is no evidence to contradict her participation in industry related events. Counsel for the respondent stated that no issue is taken in relation to the respondent's race statistics and income in the period 2018 ‑ 2021. Though I note that there is no claim for loss of earnings, those statistics indicate that the respondent has continued to be involved in the racing industry since the incident on a regular basis and with increasing success. This is also confirmed in the Singh Report.
The following statements made in the Vanmaris Affidavit are inadmissible statements of opinion, which I cannot accept and give no weight to, as there is no evidence before me as to the basis upon which Ms Vanmaris is qualified to give such evidence:
1.the statement in paragraph 7 to the effect that the respondent has apparently made a full recovery; and
2.the statement in paragraph 11 that the respondent appears to have sustained no ill effects as a result of the incident in 2017.
As to the newspaper article, whilst there is no direct evidence that it is the article referred to by Dr Singh, it is consistent with what he says in the Singh Report. Of course, the article is not admissible as to the truth of what is stated in it. Ultimately, though the article appears to be of only marginal relevance, I do not consider it would be unjust to allow it to be admitted as fresh evidence or information in the appeal.
Accordingly, I allow admission of the further evidence and information sought to be relied upon by the appellant, other than that referred to in [39] above.
Findings of fact in relation to the offence
I find the following facts in relation to the offence, for the purpose of the appeal. My findings are based on the evidence and information that was before the assessor, including the evidence led at Trial and the magistrate's findings in relation to the offence.
On 17 September 2017, the respondent attended the Harness Horse of the Year Awards at the Pan Pacific Hotel in Perth with her partner, Mitchell Miller, and a group of others. The appellant and her partner were part of the group.
After the awards, the respondent, the appellant, their partners and others went to Crown Casino at Burswood. During the evening, the appellant, the respondent and others went to dinner at Silks restaurant. The respondent's partner, Mr Miller, did not go to dinner but stayed within the Crown entertainment precinct. During dinner, between about 7.15 pm and 9.30 pm there was a verbal argument or disagreement between the appellant and the respondent, which came to an end and did not escalate.
After the appellant and the respondent had left the dinner, there were two physical altercations involving the appellant and the respondent prior to the offence being committed. Both happened outside the casino at or close to a grassed area. The appellant and the respondent had both been drinking. The respondent's evidence was that she had 10 drinks between 12.30 pm, at the earlier awards event, and leaving dinner at about 9.30 pm, but she was not extremely drunk (to use her words) and could remember everything that happened.
The first physical altercation occurred after the respondent had left the restaurant and found her partner, Mr Miller, who the magistrate found was heavily affected by alcohol, which was evident from the CCTV footage. In the first altercation between the appellant and the respondent, the appellant grabbed the respondent by her upper arms on both sides in an attempt to stop the respondent from approaching Mr Miller, and the respondent pushed the appellant off her to get past her and go to him.
After that first altercation, the respondent went to Mr Miller. She was at the top of the hill with Mr Miller. There was then an altercation between the appellant's partner and Mr Miller and another man. The respondent tried to pull the men apart. The appellant ran up the hill and became involved in the altercation. The magistrate found that there was some pushing and shoving, and what he described as a 'scuffle', between the appellant and the respondent. This was captured on CCTV and was the second physical altercation between the appellant and the respondent before the offence of unlawful wounding by the appellant.
The respondent rejected defence counsel's suggestions in cross‑examination at Trial that she had hit the appellant in the face and bitten her on the arm during the altercation. The respondent agreed that she pushed the appellant and that she probably scratched her with her nail. She denied she was the aggressor or that she wanted to or had started a fight with the appellant. The magistrate found the respondent to be a credible and reliable witness.
In her evidence at Trial, the appellant said that (during the second altercation) the respondent had grabbed her by the hair, pulled it, pushed her, punched her in the head and pushed her head up against a wall. It was submitted that the appellant was acting in self‑defence. The magistrate rejected the appellant's evidence stating he did not find it to be credible or believable.
The magistrate found that during the 'scuffle' each of the appellant and respondent may have received a scratch.
The second altercation, or a substantial part of it, was captured on CCTV footage. The CCTV footage in evidence at Trial and that forms part of the evidence before me in this appeal, shows the following between 10.36 pm and 10.38 pm:[42]
1.At 10:36:00 pm, a group of people including the appellant are seated on a grassed area near some flag poles at the bottom of a hill.
2.At about the same time, three people are standing by a wall at the top of the hill. The three people include Mr Miller, another man and the respondent.
3.At 10:36:20 pm, a man (the appellant's partner) approaches the appellant and the group of people seated on the grass at the bottom of the hill. The appellant stands up and speaks to him, pointing at the group at the top of the hill.
4.At about 10:36:26 pm, the appellant's partner can be seen running up the hill towards the group at the top of the hill. Very soon after, the appellant's partner reaches the group and instigates a physical altercation with Mr Miller and the other man.
5.At 10:36:38 pm, the respondent, who was seated, can be seen standing up and attempting to break up the fight.
6.At 10:36:42 pm, the appellant runs up the hill towards the group and becomes involved in the altercation. At 10:37:00 pm, the respondent can be seen pushing the appellant away and they begin pushing and shoving each other.
7.This appears to continue outside the view of the CCTV, until the respondent re-appears at 10:37:16 pm, approaches Mr Miller and, at 10:38:30 pm the respondent and Mr Miller leave the others and begin to walk together down the hill by themselves.
8.At 10:39:59 pm, the appellant is seen running down the hill holding something in her hand.
[42] The times referred to are those shown in the CCTV footage.
There was no CCTV footage in evidence of the specific incident in which the offence occurred. That is, there is no footage showing the appellant striking the respondent with her shoe.
The magistrate found that following the second altercation, referred to by the magistrate as 'the earlier scuffle', the respondent left with Mr Miller and walked down the hill. After a break of about two minutes, the appellant ran down the hill with a shoe in her hand. The appellant struck the respondent with her stiletto shoe. The respondent then ran away.
The magistrate found, as do I, that there was a clear break between the 'earlier scuffle' and the appellant running towards the respondent and striking her with her shoe.
The CCTV footage shows the respondent after the incident. She is visibly distressed, with blood on her face. An ambulance was called. She was placed on a stretcher, loaded into the ambulance and taken to Royal Perth Hospital where she received treatment.
The respondent sustained an approximately three-centimetre laceration to the right side of her forehead, which was sutured with three non‑absorbable stitches. The respondent's injuries and her claim for compensation in relation to them are addressed in further detail below.
What, if any, injury has the respondent suffered as a consequence of the commission of the offence?
Injury is defined in s 3 of the CICA to mean, relevantly, bodily harm, mental and nervous shock.
The injuries claimed to have been suffered in the application
In the application, the respondent stated that her claim was for bodily harm.[43]
[43] Assessor's Papers, page 21.
In her victim impact statement made in support of the application dated 28 February 2019, the respondent described suffering scratches on her arms, a laceration to her forehead and facial scarring as a result of the offence. She stated that she had known the appellant for 13 years through harness racing and that they knew a lot of the same people (both at work and socially) and had some friends in common.
She stated that following the assault she was embarrassed and concerned about what people might think about her getting into a fight with the appellant. She was worried people were talking about her behind her back and she was reluctant to go to work or see her friends. She said that for some time she was very nervous to go out even with her circle of friends as she was worried that the appellant or one of her friends would see her out and attack her again. She said that on the occasions she did go out she was hypervigilant and felt like she could not relax and enjoy herself.
As to the scarring, she describes it as being in the middle of her forehead. The photographs of the wound and the scar [44] show that it is between her eyebrow and hairline above her right eye.[45] The respondent described in her statement that having a scar on her face makes her feel self‑conscious and that she hates the way it looks. She wonders what people think of her and whether they wonder how she got it. She says it makes her look rough and she does not like that. She says that she tries to cover it up with makeup and would like to have plastic surgery to reduce the size and colour of the scar.
[44] Assessor's Papers, page 34.
[45] Assessor's Papers, page 38.
The respondent relies on the report of Dr Paul Quinn, plastic surgeon, dated 2 February 2019 (Quinn Report).[46] Dr Quinn saw the respondent on 19 November 2018, approximately 14 months after the assault. Dr Quinn states in the Quinn Report that, in his opinion:
1.The wound has healed unremarkably.
2.His findings on clinical examination are that the respondent had a 12 mm curvilinear flat scar approximately 1 ‑ 2 mm in diameter with very mild surrounding hypopigmentation. The zone of hypopigmentation extended for approximately a 5 mm radius. There was normal sensation and motor function to the frontalis muscle of her forehead. There is no significant asymmetry.
3.As to the treatment received at the time of the injury, the respondent had her forehead wound washed, debrided and sutured by doctors at the Royal Perth Hospital emergency department on 17 September 2017. The sutures were left in situ for five days and then removed on 22 September 2017. Once the wound was healed, the respondent commenced regular massage with Bio Oil.
4.At the date of his report (2 February 2019), there is no treatment currently available to remove the scar from the respondent's forehead completely. At that point in time, the scar appeared mature and relatively flat with no particular intervention necessary except for a possible scar revision so as to possibly narrow the scar and width by a very small margin. The scar is permanent.
5.It is not possible to reduce the length of the scar or to alter its direction to any significant extent. In his opinion, if scar revision were offered, the best outcome would be a 50% reduction in the width of the scar to approximately 0.5 ‑ 1 mm in transverse dimension. This treatment would be purely cosmetic in nature and would not provide any functional improvements. He is fairly convinced there would be some improvement to the appearance of the scar but doubts this would have any significant impact on the respondent's acceptance or opinion of its appearance.
[46] Assessor's Papers, pages 57 - 58.
As to the costs of the surgery, Dr Quinn estimated that the surgery fee would be in the region of $500 and the associated hospital fees for the procedure would be in the region of $1,000 if the surgery was undertaken using a local anaesthetic. Alternatively, if the respondent's surgery was performed under general anaesthetic, the anaesthetic fee would also be in the region of $500 and the associated hospital fees for the procedure would be in the region of $2,500. There would be further fees for silicon‑based dressings in the region of $50. There would be a minimal post‑surgical consultation fee, largely rebated by Medicare.
There is no evidence as to whether the costs of the surgery, if undertaken now, would be the same or as to any change to the estimate given by Dr Quinn in February 2019.
More recent photographs depicting the respondent's scar as at 30 November 2021 were filed in the appeal.[47] The scar is visible in the photographs but does not appear to be raised or to differ in colour to the respondent's surrounding skin.
Further injury claimed in the appeal
[47] Roberts Affidavit, annexure 'DR 1'.
In the appeal, the respondent invites the court to increase the award payable to her to compensate her for her injury to include psychological injuries she claims to have suffered in addition to the injuries referred to in the application.
The further mental and nervous shock the respondent claims to have suffered is post‑traumatic stress disorder and a period of anorexia nervosa.
Mental and nervous shock must be more than a mere emotional reaction and be something of a more enduring character which may be described as an injury in both the legal sense and in common language.[48] This includes distress, horror, disgust and other similar adverse mental reactions, but excludes mere fright. Humiliation or anguish that may be suffered by such things as the reaction of the victim's family and friends, court proceedings or public attention are not injuries suffered as a consequence of the commission of the offence, but matters which have subsequently arisen and are not compensable.[49]
[48] S v Neumann, (461) (Murray J).
[49] Re Dunne [25] - [26] (Davis DCJ) and the authorities referred to.
A causal connection between the injury and the commission of the offence is required, which is primarily a question of fact. It is not, however, necessary for the offence to be the sole cause of the injury in order for that causal connection to be established.[50]
[50] Fagan v Crimes Compensation Tribunal (673) (Mason & Wilson JJ).
The respondent relies on the Singh Report[51] in support of her claim for compensation for her psychological injuries.
[51] Ponnambalam Affidavit, annexure 'AJP 2'.
In relation to her psychological injuries following the incident and insofar as her scarring is concerned, Dr Singh states (amongst other matters):[52]
… following the incident, [the respondent] was often anxious and fearful of going out in the event that she may come into contact with [the appellant] or her boyfriend. [The respondent] reports that it was very difficult for her to maintain any distance from [the appellant] seeing as they all belong in the racing industry and there was a high likelihood of running into her. This made her anxious and worried and, in particular, she was fearful of being assaulted again. At work she found it difficult to concentrate, trying to avoid [the appellant's] boyfriend, Chris, or his family. She had nightmares in the first few nights and struggled with being alone. She ruminated constantly that people were speaking negatively about her and found it difficult to go back to work. She avoided any social events which included people from the racing industry and this has meant that she has not attended any horse racing award evening since that day in September 2017.
Deni has aspirations to be a Driver in kart racing and had done very well in Western Australia, yet she is still concerned that the incident would have an impact on her reputation. She stated that the industry stewards had barred [the appellant] from attending any racing events for four months, however she successfully appealed this and there was an article written in the newspaper portraying [the appellant] in a favourable light. This made [the respondent] doubt herself and doubt her chances of proving that she was a victim in the assault. While she admits that she was intoxicated at the time and was involved in two scuffles before the assault, she does not believe that any of her actions warranted premeditated assault on her by [the appellant].
In terms of her physical injuries, this has been described in the report from her Plastic Surgeon and I will not go into great detail around this except to describe the psychological impact of said injury. The scar sustained by [the respondent] is on her forehead. It is a constant reminder of her assault. She believes that it is the first thing that people notice about her when they see her and that they presume she is someone of 'rough character'. This causes her to avoid meeting new people and has believed that people have acted differently towards her. She contemplated leaving and going interstate but worried about her career prospects. She did not drink for a year after the event and on one occasion following that she had two to three drinks at a barbecue with 15 people and developed a panic attack, becoming paranoid that the people around her were going to attack her. She could not go near the casino for three years and her only validation came with a guilty conviction of [the appellant] which occurred at the end of 2018.
[52] Singh Report, page 4.
Dr Singh states that following the offence, the respondent was advised to see a counsellor, however struggled to talk about the incident and has not undergone any counselling.
He describes the respondent as a 'clearly anxious' young woman who struggled to speak about her emotions. He considered that she had a tendency to minimise her symptoms and a clear predisposition to worry and to anxious rumination, which had been improving but worsened following the lodgement of the appeal.
Dr Singh states that following the conclusion of the criminal prosecution for the offence, the respondent's symptoms improved and the respondent started to regain confidence in herself, however, every time she saw the scar, she was reminded of the event and the life‑long implications for her in having to explain it to others.
He also states that, following the institution of the appeal, the respondent became 'highly distressed feeling as though she had to prove her innocence and started to relive the traumatic event.' He states that she feels the appeal is prolonging the distress associated with the event and that it has reactivated previous trauma symptoms such as hypervigilance, despondency and re‑experiencing phenomena through nightmares and flashbacks. He also refers (amongst other matters) to the respondent having avoided going to horse racing awards and attempting to avoid (as her work permitted) people associated with the event.
Dr Singh also refers to the respondent having developed an eating disorder for a period of at least three months following institution of the appeal.
In response to the specific questions asked of him by the respondent's lawyers, Dr Singh states, in essence, that in his opinion:
1.As a result of not having trauma counselling following the event and during the subsequent court case, the respondent remains at increased risk of future reactivation of the trauma symptoms he has described. He states this is evidenced by the worsening of her symptoms following the appeal against her compensation claim.
2.The respondent suffered post‑traumatic stress disorder following the incident, which had been improving until lodgement of the appeal, at which point she experienced a reactivation of her post‑traumatic stress disorder and subsequently the development of anorexia nervosa.
3.At the time of the incident, there was an impact on the respondent's relationship and her activities of daily living, but this has subsequently improved.
4.The respondent's capacity for work has not been affected, which is primarily due to her being highly ambitious and motivated to succeed and persisting even when distressed.
5.Without trauma processing there is a risk there would be a reactivation of the respondent's post‑traumatic stress disorder in the future. It is unclear whether that would affect her capacity to work but there is potential for it to do so.
6.The post‑traumatic stress disorder suffered by the respondent, which occurred following the incident, and which was subsequently reactivated following the appeal leading to the development of the respondent's anorexia nervosa, are causally related to the unlawful wounding on 17 September 2017 and, more recently, to the appeal lodged in December 2020.
7.Following the incident, the respondent:
(a)returned to work, persisting in difficult circumstances and in an environment where she was reminded of 'the traumatic event' and risked running into people related to the appellant;
(b)persisted in that environment determined to succeed in her chosen field; and
(c)was able to achieve an improvement in her distress following the guilty verdict against the appellant in 2018.
8.Despite her underlying resilience, the appeal relating to her compensation claim has led to reactivation of the respondent's post-traumatic stress disorder and an episode of an eating disorder.
9.The respondent's prognosis is good if this is resolved quickly and 'especially if her suffering and distress is not only recognised but compensated'.
Findings in relation to injury suffered as a consequence of the commission of the offence
Physical injury
It is not in dispute that the respondent suffered the physical injury to her forehead, being the approximately 3 cm laceration to her forehead as a result of being struck by the appellant with her stiletto shoe.
I make the following findings in relation to the physical injuries suffered by the respondent as a consequence of the commission of the offence.
After having been struck to the forehead by the appellant with the heel of a stiletto shoe, the respondent was taken by ambulance to the Royal Perth Hospital and received treatment for her injury. Her wound was washed, debrided and sutured by doctors at the Royal Perth Hospital emergency department on 17 September 2017. The sutures were removed five days later on 22 September 2017.
I find that the respondent would have suffered pain and suffering as a result of the injury she sustained to her forehead. She has also been left with a permanent scar between her eyebrow and hairline above her right eye.
Though it is not possible to reduce the length of the scar or alter its direction to any significant extent, the appearance of the scar can be improved with scar revision treatment, as described by Dr Quinn in the Quinn Report.
I find that the scratches to the respondent's forearms were not caused by the offence. Rather, they are likely to have been sustained during the earlier scuffle.
Psychological injury
As noted earlier, to be compensable under the CICA, psychological injury (mental and nervous shock) must be more than a mere emotional reaction. It must be something of a more enduring character. It includes distress, horror, disgust and other similar adverse mental reactions, but excludes mere fright. Humiliation or anguish that may be suffered by such things as the reaction of the victim's friends and family, court proceedings or public attention are not injuries suffered as a consequence of the commission of the offence.
I am satisfied that the respondent suffered some distress at the time of the commission of the offence, which was a vicious and violent attack. However, I am not satisfied that any continuing psychological injury of an enduring nature has been suffered by the respondent as a consequence of the commission of the offence. In particular, I am not satisfied that the post‑traumatic stress disorder or anorexia nervosa referred to by Dr Singh was suffered by the respondent as a consequence of the commission of the offence.
The respondent did not describe any psychological injuries of an enduring nature or of a compensable character in the application. In her victim impact statement dated 28 February 2019, the respondent described being embarrassed following the assault and concerned about what people might think about her getting into a fight with the appellant. She said she was worried people were talking about her behind her back and she was reluctant to go to work or see her friends. She said that for some time, she was nervous to go out, was hypervigilant and felt like she could not relax and enjoy herself. She described feeling self-conscious about how her scar looked.
There is no contemporaneous evidence of any ongoing or enduring psychological injury following the offence. Dr Singh did not see the respondent until 24 November 2021, and his report relies on the respondent's own self report of her symptoms at the time of and following the offence.
The opinion's expressed by Dr Singh in the Singh Report are stated in very general terms and lack specificity as to the severity and extent of psychological injury suffered. Nor am I satisfied that Dr Singh has adequately stated the basis for his opinion that she has suffered post‑traumatic stress disorder as a consequence of the offence itself.
Though, he refers to the respondent having suffered post-traumatic stress disorder following and, in his opinion, as a result of the incident that caused the respondent's physical injury, there is very little, if any evidence as to any continuing or enduring effect this has had on her.
He states that the respondent went straight back to work, did not undergo any counselling and that her psychological symptoms improved following the conclusion of the prosecution of the offence and conviction of the appellant. There is no evidence of any continuation of symptoms or the effect on the respondent of any ongoing symptoms until lodgement of the appeal.
No issue is taken by the respondent with the information about her race statistics and earnings in the period 2018 to 2021, from which I infer that, following the commission of the offence, she continued to work, participate in racing events and has had some success in her racing career.
Dr Singh attributes risk of future reactivation of trauma symptoms to the respondent not having had trauma counselling following the event. He also refers repeatedly to 'reactivation' of the respondent's post‑traumatic stress disorder and to the development of anorexia nervosa as being, in his opinion, consequences of the criminal injuries compensation appeal. He does not state in any detail or give the basis for his opinion that the respondent had suffered post-traumatic stress disorder as a consequence of the commission of the offence itself.
I am satisfied that the respondent suffered mental and nervous shock at the time of the commission of the offence and immediately following it. However, I am not satisfied on the evidence before me that the respondent has suffered any further, enduring psychological injury as a consequence of the offence itself, as claimed. There is evidence she was distressed at the time, and I accept she would have been shocked and that for some time after the incident she felt nervous when going out. However this did not continue.
Any embarrassment, humiliation, anguish or loss of confidence suffered by the respondent as a result of the reaction or potential reactions of others because of the offence, are not injuries of an enduring nature suffered as a consequence of the commission of the offence, and are not compensable under the CICA.
Further, any psychological injuries caused as a consequence of the court proceedings or criminal injuries compensation appeal are not compensable as an injury suffered as a consequence of the commission of the offence.
What is the appropriate compensation for the injury suffered by the respondent?
Taking into account the injuries suffered by the respondent as a consequence of the commission of the offence, I consider that the amount awarded by the assessor of $23,500 is appropriate compensation for her non-economic loss. I consider that is just in the circumstances and is fair, reasonable and proportionate bearing in mind the physical injury suffered by her, including her pain and suffering, the permanent scarring to her forehead and the mental and nervous shock suffered at the time of the commission of the offence and following it, as described at [93] above.
This also recognises that though the scarring may be improved if the respondent decides to undergo the scar revision treatment, it will stay with the respondent for the rest of her life.
What loss, if any, has the respondent suffered as a consequence of her injury?
In addition to compensation for her injuries, the respondent claims for loss suffered as a consequence of her injuries.
The term 'loss' is defined in s 6(2) of the CICA, in the case of a victim who is injured, as meaning, relevantly:
(a)expenses actually and reasonably incurred by or on behalf of the victim -
(i)that arise directly from - or
(ii)that arise in obtaining any report from a health professional or a counsellor in relation to,
the injury suffered by the victim; or
(b)expenses that are likely to be reasonably incurred by or on behalf of the victim for treatment the victim is likely to need as a direct consequence of the injury suffered by the victim; or
(c)loss of earnings suffered by the victim as a direct consequence of the injury suffered by the victim …
The respondent claims the cost of obtaining medical reports and future treatment expenses. She does not claim for any loss of earnings.
Report fees
The respondent claims report fees incurred as follows:
No.
Report
Date
Amount
1
GP Superclinic @ Railway Workshops
26.06.2018
$ 77.00
2
St John Ambulance Western Australia
02.07.2018
$ 110.00
3
Dr Paul Quinn
19.11.2018
$ 400.00
4
Dr Paul Quinn (Quinn Report)
23.01.2019
$1,633.25
5
Dr Urvashnee Singh (Singh Report)
24.11.2021
$2,200.00
TOTAL
$4,420.25
I am satisfied that the respondent has incurred each of those fees.
I am also satisfied that the reports of Dr Quinn relate to the injury suffered by the respondent, which I have found is compensable under the CICA and I award the amount of $2,033.25 in respect of the fees for those reports.
In my view, the cost of obtaining the reports numbered 1 and 2 in the table above are not compensable under the CICA. Nor is the report fee incurred in relation to the Singh Report in light of my findings about the psychological injuries claimed in addition to the injuries referred to in the application.
Future treatment expenses
The respondent claims the following future treatment expenses:
1.$1,500 - $3,500 for scar revision treatment as recommended by Dr Quinn.
2.Post-operative silicon‑based dressing at a cost of approximately $50.
3.$5,000 - $10,000 in respect of 20 - 40 future psychological counselling sessions at a cost of $250 per session as recommended by Dr Singh.
The respondent also claims a 'modest' (unquantified) allowance for the costs of her travel to and from treatment providers.
I am satisfied that the respondent should be compensated for the cost of any future treatment expenses she incurs in undergoing the scar revision treatment recommended by Dr Quinn. Such is treatment that the respondent is likely to require as a direct consequence of the injury suffered by her. I will award the lesser figure estimated by Dr Quinn of $500 and the associated hospital fees of $1,000 if the surgery is undertaken using a local anaesthetic, and an allowance of $50 for the silicon‑based dressing.
There is no evidence of any change to the estimated cost of that treatment. As such, the amount I award for future treatment expenses for the scar revision treatment is $1,550. Payment of that amount will be subject to satisfaction of the requirements in s 48 of the CICA.
I do not make any award for psychological counselling as I am not satisfied there is any enduring psychological injury as a consequence of the commission of the offence itself. Nor do I make any award for travel expenses.
What is the appropriate compensation for the loss suffered by the respondent?
The appropriate compensation for the loss suffered by the respondent is therefore $3,583.25, being:
1.$2,033.25 in respect of report fees; and
2.$1,550 for the scar revision treatment, payment of which is subject to the requirements of s 48 of the CICA.
Should the amount of any compensation award be reduced because the respondent contributed, directly or indirectly, to her injury?
In deciding whether or not to make a compensation award, or the amount of the award, s 41 of the CICA requires the court to have regard to any behaviour, condition, attitude, or disposition of the victim that contributed, directly or indirectly, to the victim's injury.[53] If the court finds there was such a contribution, if it thinks it is just to do so, it may refuse to make a compensation award or reduce the amount of the award.[54] Relevantly, the following principles apply in this regard:
1.Whether or not the victim's behaviour, condition, attitude, or disposition will preclude or reduce any award of compensation is a matter of fact and degree to be determined in light of the particular circumstances.[55]
2.The words 'if he or she thinks it is just to do so' in s 41(b) of the CICA require the court to consider all the circumstances and to make a judgment ensuring that justice is done in the case. It is a discretion and must be exercised according to law, taking account of the purpose of the legislation and the requirements of the CICA.[56]
3.The behaviour of the victim leading up to and contributing to the commission of the offence may be taken into account although such may not be sufficient to establish a defence of provocation or self-defence at law.[57]
[53] CICA, s 41(a).
[54] CICA, s 41(b).
[55] Underwood [139]; Re Richardson [2009] WADC 93 [81] (Yeats DCJ); Bodney v Assessor of Criminal Injuries Compensation [2000] WADC 214; (2000) 24 SR (WA) 299 [27] ‑ [29] (Groves DCJ).
[56] Re Richardson [81] (Yeats DCJ).
[57] Bodney v Assessor of Criminal Injuries Compensation [8], [9] (Groves DCJ); Bull v Hobbs [2009] WADC 128 [21].
The appellant submits, in effect, that even though there was a break in time and provocation was not applicable, the respondent's attitude, behaviour or disposition was such that it indirectly contributed to her injury. As such, it is submitted that the amount of compensation awarded should be reduced as provided by s 41 of the CICA.
The respondent submits, in effect, that (as found by the magistrate) there was a clear break between the 'earlier scuffle' and the offending which resulted in the respondent's injury, the respondent did not contribute to her injury and the amount of compensation should not be reduced under s 41 of the CICA.
The injuries sustained by the respondent the subject of the application and this appeal, were clearly sustained as a result of the appellant's act of striking the respondent to the forehead with a stiletto shoe. After the earlier scuffle, the respondent and her partner had walked away from where the appellant was. After a period of 90 seconds to 2 minutes, the appellant took off her shoes, ran down the hill to where the respondent then was, raised her arm and struck the respondent, hitting her in the forehead with the heel of her stiletto shoe.
Though the time that elapsed between the initial scuffle and the offending conduct of the appellant was short, the two incidents were separate and distinct. The magistrate rejected that it was one, ongoing action or chain of events, and found (as I do) that there was a clear break between the two incidents.
I am not satisfied, in the circumstances, that the respondent did anything before or during the earlier scuffle, or subsequently, such that any behaviour, condition, attitude or disposition of the respondent contributed directly or indirectly to her injury.
As such, the amount of the compensation awarded to the respondent for her injury and loss should not be, and is not, reduced.
Conclusion and orders
For the reasons stated above, having considered the application for compensation afresh on the evidence and information that was before the assessor and adduced in the appeal, I have decided that the total amount of compensation to be awarded to the respondent for her injury and loss is $24,583.25. That amount is made up as follows:
1. Compensation for the respondent's injury $ 23,500.00 2. Report fees $ 2,033.25 3. Future treatment expenses
(payment of which is subject to satisfaction of the requirements in CICA, s 48)
$ 1,550.00 Sub-total: $ 27,083.25 Less $2,500, being the amount of the court ordered fine already paid to the respondent - $ 2,500.00 TOTAL:
$
24,583.25
I therefore vary the award of the assessor by reducing the amount of the award from $27,033.25 to $24,583.25.
Orders
Subject to hearing from the parties in relation to the final form of the orders, I will make the following orders:
1.The appeal is allowed in part.
2.The award made by the assessor of criminal injuries compensation on 9 December 2020 is varied by reducing the amount of compensation to the respondent in respect of her application under s 12 of the Criminal Injuries Compensation Act 2003 (Act) from $27,033.25 to $24,583.25.
3.Payment of the amount of $1,550 awarded for future expenses is subject to the requirements of s 48 of the Act.
I certify that the preceding paragraph(s) comprise the reasons for decision of the District Court of Western Australia.
LDB
Associate to Judge Russell
31 AUGUST 2022