Vang & Chung (No 6)
[2024] FedCFamC1F 604
•10 September 2024
FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA
(DIVISION 1)
Vang & Chung (No 6) [2024] FedCFamC1F 604
File number(s): SYC 1433 of 2020 Judgment of: HARPER J Date of judgment: 10 September 2024 Catchwords: FAMILY LAW – PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – Application in a Proceeding – Where the wife seeks leave to file an Application in a Proceeding – Where formal application is required from the wife – Where leave is refused – Where the wife seeks to re-agitate issues which have already been the subject of previous interlocutory determination or appeal – Where any discharge or variation of the orders pressed by the wife could undermine the efficacy of or conflict with the appellate process – Where an application agitating the same issues is an abuse of process – Where the orders pressed by the wife are dismissed.
FAMILY LAW – PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – Subpoenas – Where the wife issued five subpoenas – Where Notices of Objection were filed in relation to each of the subpoenas – Where objectors contended that subpoenas had no relevance, were an abuse of process and constitute a fishing expedition with no legitimate forensic purpose – Where objectors contended that some subpoenaed documents were privileged – Where privilege had not been waived – Party issuing impugned subpoena must demonstrate that documents sought have “apparent relevance” to an issue in proceedings – Where subpoena must reasonably particularise the documents it calls for – Where subpoena is impermissibly broad if it requires recipient to make judgments about issues or relevance – Objections to the subpoenas largely upheld and the subpoenas set aside.
Legislation: Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) s 79
Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules2021 (Cth) r 14.07
Cases cited: Brimaud v Honeysett Instant Print Pty Ltd (1988) 217 ALR 44
Commissioner for Railways v Small (1938) 38 SR NSW 564
Department of Planning, Industry and Environment v Blacktown City Council [2021] NSWCA 145
Fisher v Fisher (1986) 161 CLR 438; [1986] HCA 61
Gallo v Dawson (1990) 93 ALR 479; [1990] HCA 30
Hamilton v Oades (1989) 166 CLR 486; [1989] HCA 21
Joubert and Anor & Verhoeven and Anor [2020] FamCA 53
Kehoe & Seden (No 2) [2022] FedCFamC1F 346
Lin & Ruan (2021) FLC 94-024; [2021] FamCAFC 90
Liu v The Age Company Ltd (2016) 92 NSWLR 679; [2016] NSWCA 115
Loulach Developments Pty Ltd v Roads and Maritime Services (No 2) [2018] NSWSC 1465
Lucas Industries Ltd v Hewitt (1978) 18 ALR 555
Merhi & Merhi and Ors(No 3) [2018] FamCA 961
Paris King Investments Pty Ltd & 1 Ors v Michael Norman Rayhill & 2 Ors [2006] NSWSC 578
Sarto & Sarto (2022) 65 Fam LR 605; [2022] FedCFamC1A 16
Seven Network Ltd v News Ltd (No 5) (2005) 216 ALR 147; [2005] FCA 510
Stanford & Stanford (2012) 247 CLR 108; [2012] HCA 52
Vang & Chung (No 3) [2024] FedCFamC1F 101
Wei & Xia (No 5) (2023) 67 Fam LR 421; [2023] FedCFamC1F 679
X Pty Ltd & Merhi [2015] FamCA 622
Division: Division 1 First Instance Number of paragraphs: 73 Date of last submission/s: 26 August 2024 Date of hearing: 28 August 2024 Place: Sydney The Applicant: Litigant in person Counsel for the First Respondent: Ms Tabbernor Solicitor for the First Respondent: Broun Abrahams Burreket Counsel for the Second Respondent: Mr Rogan Solicitor for the Second Respondent: Mangioni Biggs & Co Counsel for the Non-Party Objectors: Ms Steinhoff Solicitor for the Non-Party Objectors: Clayton Utz ORDERS
SYC 1433 of 2020 FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA (DIVISION 1)
BETWEEN: MS VANG
Applicant
AND: MR CHUNG
First Respondent
MR D
Second Respondent
AC ACCOUNTANTS
Non-Party ObjectorY PTY LTD
Non-Party Objector
ORDER MADE BY:
HARPER J
DATE OF ORDER:
10 SEPTEMBER 2024
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The Application in a Proceeding filed by the Applicant Wife (“wife”) on 2 July 2024 and amended on 5 July 2024 is dismissed.
2.Order 1 of the orders of the Judicial Registrar made on 3 July 2024 is varied as follows:
(a)The schedule to the subpoena issued to Y Pty Ltd on 19 March 2024, other than paragraphs 10 and 11, be set aside;
(b)The subpoena issued by the wife to AC Accountants on 19 March 2024 be set aside;
(c)The schedule to the subpoena issued to AD Lawyers by the wife on 19 March 2024:
(i)other than paragraph 2; and
(ii)other than paragraph 3 read as limited to documents relating to mortgage number …69Q between the first and second respondents;
be set aside.
(d)Paragraph 2 of the schedule to the subpoena issued by the wife to AE Lawyers Pty Ltd (“AE Lawyers”) on 19 March 2024 be set aside.
(e)The subpoena issued by the wife to National Australia Bank on 19 March 2024 be set aside.
3.With respect to any documents produced in answer to the surviving paragraphs of the subpoenas issued to AD Lawyers and AE Lawyers as stipulated in Order 2:
(a)For a period of 14 days from the date of these orders:
(i)the second respondent shall have first access to, with such access to lapse thereafter;
(ii)the second respondent has liberty to attend the registry to identify any documents produced in respect of which he claims legal professional privilege, and isolate such documents in a separate envelope or electronic folder.
(b)No party other than the second respondent may have access to documents isolated pursuant to Order 3(a)(ii), pending further order of the Court.
4.Order 2 of the orders of the Judicial Registrar made on 3 July 2024 is set aside.
5.Upon the passing of 28 days from the date of these orders any document produced under a subpoena referred to in Order 2, except as required to be produced by the terms of Order 2, is to be forthwith returned by an officer of the Sydney Registry of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia to the Named Person or at their direction, destroyed.
6.The Application for Review filed by the wife on 5 July 2024 is otherwise dismissed.
7.All outstanding interlocutory applications are otherwise dismissed.
Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry in the Court’s records.
Note: This copy of the Court’s Reasons for judgment may be subject to review to remedy minor typographical or grammatical errors (r 10.14(b) Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth)), or to record a variation to the order pursuant to r 10.13 Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth).
Part XIVB of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) makes it an offence, except in very limited circumstances, to publish an account of proceedings that identify persons, associated persons, or witnesses involved in family law proceedings.
IT IS NOTED that publication of this judgment by this Court under the pseudonyms Vang & Chung has been approved pursuant to subsection 114Q(2) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth).
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
HARPER J:
These are property proceedings between the applicant wife, Ms Vang (“the wife”), the first respondent husband, Mr Chung (“the husband”), and the second respondent who is the father of the husband, Mr D (“the father”).
Some Procedural History
This matter has a lengthy procedural history, but relevantly on 15 September 2023, a senior judicial registrar of this Court made orders requiring the wife to seek leave to file any fresh interlocutory application. The wife did not appeal this order and it remains in force.
Since these proceedings were commenced in 2020, the wife has filed 11 interim applications, three Applications for Review, and six appeals.
The wife in her affidavit filed 2 July 2024 states that she did not become aware that she could not file as many interim applications as she pleased until September 2023. Since September 2023, the wife has filed a total of five applications in this matter, that is, after knowing, according to her own evidence, that restrictions had been placed upon her making applications without leave.
The background to the matter is set out in Vang & Chung (No 3) [2024] FedCFamC1F 101 (“Vang (No 3)”), delivered on 28 February 2024. It will be necessary to repeat some parts of that judgment for the purposes of the present determination. The orders in Vang (No 3) were followed by further procedural orders made on 4 March 2024.
The wife appealed the orders made on 28 February 2024 and 4 March 2024. Both appeals were consolidated and were heard on 25 June 2024. Judgment is reserved at the date of this judgment.
Background
The parties were in a relationship for about three years between 2015 and sometime before August 2018. There was no dispute the relationship was short. The parties married in 2017.
I repeat the factual matters in Vang (No 3) at [15]–[26] regarding two properties in Suburb F, H Street (“H Street”), which was purchased in 2012, before the parties had met and E Street (“E Street”):
15.The husband was also the registered proprietor of [H Street]. According to the husband, he was 21 years old in 2012, the purchase price of [H Street] was $20,000,000 and he had no capacity to pay such a large sum. At the time he had no assets and was working for [an industrial] company earning about $42,000 per annum. Rather his case is that his parents provided the entire purchase price and acquisition costs including stamp duty. The property was unencumbered, and his parents paid all costs associated with the property after acquisition. The wife’s evidence recorded statements alleged to have been made by the husband to her that he and his family were rich and well connected. He provided her with a copy of his curriculum vitae, apparently either before cohabitation or during the relationship, which claimed he was employed by a private [company] […] between 2010 and 2012.
16.At the time of the purchase of [H Street], the husband contends that the father told him that he had lent the money to him for the purchase and required it to be repaid. According to the wife’s own evidence, the husband told her either before or during cohabitation “[m]y father invested in Australia so he could then sponsor me to get permanent residency” (Wife’s affidavit filed 8 January 2024, paragraph 42) The wife tendered evidence which showed that the funds for the purchase price of [H Street] came from a company called [Y Pty Ltd], this was marked Exhibit “A”. The husband was a director of [Y Pty Ltd] between [mid] 2014 and [early] 2019. The father is now the sole director. There is no evidence that the husband was a director of [Y Pty Ltd] at the time [H Street] was acquired. The wife annexed an ASIC search of [Y Pty Ltd] dated 1 April 2022 to her affidavit filed 8 January 2024 (Annexure “A1”). It showed that the company has issued 100 fully paid shares all beneficially owned by [PP Group], which has a registered office in [Country RR]. There was no evidence of the shareholders or directors of [PP Group]. However, the ASIC search discloses that there has been no change in shareholdings of [Y Pty Ltd] since [mid] 2012 when a directors’ resolution of a small company “controlled by a foreign company” was registered.
17.For the purposes of this judgment, the evidence satisfies me that the husband generally acted in accordance with his parents’ wishes. Indeed, the wife seemed to accept this to be the case in her affidavit. Without finally determining the issue, for present purposes I accept he could not have provided the funds for the purchase of [H Street] in 2012. I am not persuaded the evidence supports a conclusion, even at an interlocutory stage, that the husband had any interest in or controlled [Y Pty Ltd] at the time [H Street] was acquired, as the wife seems to contend. I do not accept the husband “owned” [Y Pty Ltd]. On the contrary, the wife’s own evidence (above at [16]) supports an inference that [Y Pty Ltd] was and is owned by the father. The husband was 21 years’ old, and it is more likely he was earning modestly as he claims. For present purposes, I accept it is more likely that the funds to purchase [H Street] were provided by [Y Pty Ltd], which was likely owned and controlled by the father in 2012.
18.At the time [H Street] was sold the spouse parties were living in the property. The husband claimed the sale settled [in late] 2017, after separation. But this cannot be correct. The husband annexed to his affidavit a deposit slip and copy of a bank cheque showing that [over $21,000,000] was paid to the father personally, not [Y Pty Ltd], [in mid] 2017 (Husband’s affidavit filed 15 January 2024, Annexure “[MC]-2”). For the purposes of this judgment, I accept that the sale settled in or about [mid] 2017. More to the point, the husband gave evidence that he himself received no part of the sale proceeds. There was no evidence that he did. It is however part of the wife’s claim that the husband beneficially owned the sale proceeds of [over $21,000,000].
19.[E Street] was purchased in [mid] 2017 for [over $10,000,000] roughly contemporaneously with the settlement of the sale of [H Street]. According to the wife, the husband said to her in [mid] 2017 “I plan to buy a smaller house in [Suburb F] for us to live in when we are in Australia” (Wife’s affidavit filed 8 January 2024, paragraph 94). Settlement occurred in [late] 2017. The husband gave evidence that the purchase price and other acquisition costs totalling $11,800,000 were met by a loan from his father, as had happened with [H Street]. The husband’s case was that the wife was not aware of this purchase at the time. She claimed that the funds to purchase [E Street] came from the proceeds of sale of [H Street], which had been paid to the father. There was also no dispute that at settlement of the purchase a mortgage in favour of the father was registered on the title as dealing […69Q], on its face securing a loan of the purchase price advanced by the father. As discussed further below, the wife seeks to impugn the validity of the mortgage as a sham and to set it aside.
20.There was no dispute that the father in 2018 was, and remains, incarcerated in [Country YY]. He is difficult to contact. It was the husband’s evidence that his relationship with the father deteriorated in 2017 prior to this happening.
21.Since its purchase, the husband claimed that [E Street] has been rented and the rental income was used to meet the mortgage repayments. Between June 2020 and February 2021 the rent was paid into an account in his father’s name held at the National Australia Bank. Between February 2021 and November 2021 the rental income was received and held in the estate agent’s trust account. Since November 2021, the husband has been receiving the rent in an account held in his own name.
22.The rental income has been [over $20,000] per month since October 2022 pursuant to a residential tenancy agreement. The husband annexed a copy of this agreement to his affidavit (Annexure “[MC]-8”). It has some peculiarities. No tenant is named. The signature of the tenant is obscured. In any event, there was no dispute that the husband has been receiving the rental income and using it to meet his own expenses, including legal fees. Consequently, there was no dispute he has used the rental income as his own money since November 2021.
23.The husband claims he has made no repayments in accordance with the [E Street] mortgage since February 2021. Consequently, it has been in default for a considerable period.
24.[In] August 2023 the husband was served with a notice under s 57(2)(b) of the Real Property Act 1900 (NSW) on his father’s behalf by reason of the default in making mortgage payments and requiring repayment of the monies owing under the mortgage. The outstanding mortgage balance was said to be $14,864,805. The husband failed to make the required repayments and the father as mortgagee has exercised a statutory power of sale. [E Street] was sold at auction [in late] 2023 with a sale price of [over $14,000,000]. It sems clear that the sale price will be insufficient to discharge the secured debt in full. The wife did not seek to set aside the sale or challenge it as not a bona fide arms’ length sale.
25. Settlement of the sale of [E Street] is to take place [in mid] 2024.
26.The order made on 14 November 2023 and the subject of the wife’s appeal, mentioned above, provided for the release of 50 per cent of the net proceeds of sale of [E Street] to the mortgagee, the father, with such amount “not to exceed the amount of the loan owing and outstanding” to the father as mortgagee. In light of the sale price achieved [in late] 2023, there appears to be no possibility that 50 per cent of the net proceeds of sale will exceed the mortgage debt, and the balance will be held in trust by the solicitors of the father.
At [32]–[33] I further noted:
32.It is helpful at this point to set out in summary the wife’s claims which involve the father as the proposed second respondent. By her Points of Claim filed 12 February 2024, the wife alleges the husband was the beneficial owner of [H Street], provided the purchase price and was entitled to receive the entire proceeds of its sale. Alternatively, she alleges [Y Pty Ltd] was the beneficial owner, alter ego of the husband and therefore, again, [H Street] was beneficially owned by the husband. She then claims the purchase of [E Street] was funded in truth by the husband using the proceeds of the sale of [H Street], the mortgage executed in favour of the father was a sham, in that it purported to secure a non existent loan, and was intended to, or irrespective of intention was likely to, defeat orders of this Court. The wife claims declarations that the remaining sale proceeds of [E Street] are property of the husband and liable to adjustment orders pursuant to s 79 of the Act. She seeks further orders for the father to account for and pay into a controlled monies account the remaining proceeds from the sale of [H Street] pending further order of the Court.
33.It should also be noted here that the wife has not yet articulated her claim for final property adjustment pursuant to s 79 of the Act. She argued that until she has had further disclosure and received funds to undertake forensic investigations of the husband’s interests in [Country YY], [Country AB] and [Country RR] she cannot formulate her final relief.
I described the wife’s financial position, based on the evidence, as follows at [80]–[84]:
80.The wife has [an undergraduate and postgraduate qualification]. She is presently halfway through a [further qualification]. She has incurred substantial costs in completing her tertiary qualifications and says she has borrowed $250,000 from her mother. According to her evidence, the wife worked before and during the marriage and after separation, apart from a period between April and September 2020. Since September 2020 she was and still is employed as a [professional] in an Australian [company], the name of which she refuses to disclose. She receives a salary of $2436 per fortnight after tax.
81.The wife has suffered bouts of depression since 2017. She was diagnosed with a critical condition, which she did not name, in [late] 2022 which has required surgery and ongoing treatment, including ultrasounds.
82.The wife purchased a one-bedroom apartment in [Suburb K] in [early] 2021. The purchase price was $650,000 and she borrowed $130,000 from her mother to fund the purchase. She also borrowed $520,000 from the Commonwealth Bank of Australia at a fixed rate of 1.99 per cent which will apply until the end of 2024. The monthly repayments are $1,920, and the outstanding mortgage balance is $484,334. In her Financial Statement filed 8 January 2024 the wife claims the value of her [Suburb K] unit remains at $650,000.
83.The wife in her Financial Statement claims weekly expenses of $1,475 excluding any mortgage payments but including a number of discretionary items such as holidays and hobbies.
84.There is no care of a child involved. The wife has gainful employment and her evidence shows she has no incapacity for gainful employment.
Vang (No 3) determined the wife’s application for spousal maintenance, both periodic and lump sum, and partial property settlement and her application for orders restraining the father, as mortgagee, from dealing with the net proceeds of sale of E Street. That property was sold in mid-2024 and the net amount of $13,866,292.17 was placed into the trust account of the father’s solicitors. Pursuant to orders made on 14 November 2023, in anticipation of the settlement of the sale, the father was restrained from dealing with half of those proceeds or $6,933,146.09 (“restrained half”). However, he was not restrained from dealing with the balance, being the other half (“the unrestrained half”).
On 18 June 2024, notations to orders were made making clear the father was not restrained from dealing with the balance of the net proceeds, and the restraint upon dealing with the restrained half was extended pending determination of appeals filed by the wife or 4.00 pm on 25 June 2024. The matter was also listed for call over on 5 September 2024. Pursuant to an undertaking given by the father, he was further restrained from dealing with the restrained half until 4.00 pm on 5 September 2024.
On 5 July 2024, the wife filed an Amended Application in a Proceeding (“amended application”) seeking leave to bring the application itself, and for an assortment of orders including my recusal on the basis of apprehended bias, a stay of various orders pending the outcome of appeals, injunction, disclosure and the reopening of a number of finalised interim applications. I discuss the proposed orders sought in the amended application in more detail below.
On 5 July 2024, the wife also filed an Application for Review (“review application”) seeking amongst other things, a review of orders made by a judicial registrar setting aside five subpoenas on 3 July 2024.
On 25 July 2024, I listed the matter for mention where the two applications were set down for interim hearing on 28 August 2024, and the wife was granted a stay of the registrar’s orders subject of the review application pending further order of the Court.
On 5 September 2024, the proceedings were listed for final hearing to commence on 17 March 2025 with an estimate of 5 days. The father did not proffer an extension to his undertaking but an order was made in terms which mirrored the undertaking, to preserve the restrained half pending finalisation of the proceedings. The parties were advised that the final hearing would take place before another judge.
Wife’s Amended Application in a Proceeding filed 5 July 2024
A number of proposed orders in the amended application can be dealt with briefly. Orders 1, 2 and 3 became otiose by the date of hearing. Orders 8, 9 and 10 in summary seek that I recuse myself from further hearing in the proceedings and that the proceedings be assigned to a different judge. The wife made clear at the interim hearing that she did not press these orders at present, although she wished to reserve her position to press them at a later date. As noted the final hearing will take place before another judge so these proposed orders have become otiose.
This leaves for determination in this judgment, as I understand it, orders 4, 5, 6(1), 7, and 11‑19. Orders 11-19 relate to objections to subpoenas which I will return to later in these reasons. Orders 4, 5, 6(1), and 7 are, in summary, orders with respect to:
(a)Whether there should be an injunction against the father with respect to the unrestrained half of the E Street sale proceeds until final determination of the matter, or pending further order;
(b)Whether certain applications which have been determined should be re-opened, including an application for a stay pending appeal;
(c)Whether various other orders made by me should be stayed;
(d)That the husband pay into an interest bearing account the sum of $21,229,090, being the sale proceeds of H Street; and
(e)Orders with respect to disclosure and costs of some sort.
It should also be mentioned that the formulation of the orders by the wife was hard to follow. Some allowance should be made for the fact that she is self-represented and English is her second language. It was, however, tolerably clear that in summary the central objective of the wife’s application was to restrain the father from dealing with the unrestrained half, and to compel the husband to pay into a joint account in the spouse parties’ names the difference between $21,229,090 received on the sale of H Street in 2017 and over $10,000,000, being the purchase price of E Street, which difference she claims was dissipated by the husband after May 2017 (“the dissipated balance”).
The material relied upon by the wife was identified in her Case Outline filed on 26 August 2024. She enumerated some 45 documents, contrary to the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth) (“Rules"). This was refined at the interim hearing to reliance upon three affidavits filed on 2, 3 and 8 July 2024 respectively, as well as other documents which became exhibits and to which I have had regard. Her three affidavits ran to hundreds of pages and annexed copies of earlier affidavits, which she had filed for other applications. Despite the convoluted and disorganised manner in which this evidence was presented I have taken it into account.
As set out in his Case Outline filed on 26 August 2024, the husband relied upon his affidavit of 15 January 2024.
The father sought to rely upon an Application in a Proceeding and affidavit of the solicitor on record both filed on 8 April 2024, as well as an affidavit of the husband’s mother filed on 18 January 2024 and a number of notices of objections and costs submissions.
Leave to bring the Amended Application
The question of leave to bring the wife’s amended application is a question of discretion which is at large but must be exercised judicially. But it seems to me that the merit of the application, as well as the overall justice of the application are important considerations. For the reasons given below I am satisfied the wife’s application should be dismissed.
The first reason is that, plainly, the proposed orders regarding the unrestrained half seek to litigate the same issues which informed the orders made on 28 February 2024, which are the subject of appeal. Vang (No 3) determined an application which raised the same issues which the wife seeks to agitate in support of her amended application. This is doubly impermissible, on the one hand because any discharge or variation of those orders could undermine the efficacy of or conflict with the appellate process, and on the other an application agitating the same issues is an abuse of process.
The wife’s application seeks to vary or impose fresh interlocutory injunctive relief after Vang (No 3). The principle of finality applies to interlocutory decisions unless the applicant can demonstrate a material change of circumstances or the discovery of new material which could not reasonably have been put before the court on the hearing of the original application (Brimaud v Honeysett Instant Print Pty Ltd (1988) 217 ALR 44 at 46; Liu v The Age Company Ltd (2016) 92 NSWLR 679 at [199]; Joubert and Anor & Verhoeven and Anor [2020] FamCA 53 at [30]–[32]).
In Paris King Investments Pty Ltd & 1 Ors v Michael Norman Rayhill & 2 Ors [2006] NSWSC 578 at [14] Brereton J stated the principles as follows:
In my opinion, as outlined in Harrison Partners Construction Pty Ltd v Jevena Pty Ltd [2005] NSWSC 1225, [16]-[17], acknowledging that it is impossible to state a principle capable of universal application, nonetheless the general rule is that interlocutory relief is not to be reconsidered if all that is involved is a review on the same facts as prevailed when it was originally granted or declined or on facts which ought then reasonably have been in contemplation, but that if new facts have emerged which may affect the arguability of the case for final relief or the balance of convenience, then the grant of interlocutory relief may be reconsidered. If it were not so, it would be open to a defendant to make repeated applications for variation of an interlocutory injunction, requiring consideration of the matter de novo, for no stronger reason than dissatisfaction with the previous decision [Harrison Partners Construction Pty Ltd v Jevena Pty Ltd, [13]].
The wife did not adduce evidence to demonstrate any factors which would justify revisiting the existing interlocutory orders in accordance with these authorities. It was apparent from her submissions that the wife’s central argument was to the effect that I had failed to understand her evidence at earlier hearings and she hoped I would correct my past errors. She focussed strongly on her perception that she had an interest in the proceeds of H Street and E Street, by reason of having been married to the husband for about 18 months and, so she argued, this interest obviously should be protected.
She also appeared to believe that because she made the assertion that the loan by the father to the husband for the purchase of E Street was a “sham”, and the evidence to her mind put this beyond argument, I should accept this as a fact on an interlocutory basis. However, as pointed out above in the extract at [9], this question has already been considered by me, as were the issues of the ownership of the proceeds of sale of both H Street and E Street. The attempt to revisit the same issues in a further interlocutory application without demonstrating a material change of circumstances, constitutes an abuse of process. This is sufficient to dispose of her application for further interlocutory relief in relation to the unrestrained half.
Together with the matters repeated above at [8], I repeat my conclusion in Vang (No 3) at [114]–[116]:
114.I have set out in broad terms above the property interests of the parties, as they appear at present from the evidence, and noting that no balance sheet was provided by either party. It is otherwise difficult to identify in any comprehensive way the parties’ property interests. I have also expressed the view that I am unable to make an interim finding that the husband has vast undisclosed assets in [Country YY], although he may have some unspecified shareholdings. The relationship was short. I accept the submission of the wife that she has a case based on contributions but it is difficult to discern their extent and detail.
115.But this simply exposes central problems in her property settlement claim. On any view the relationship lasted no longer than somewhere between two and three years. On the wife’s case, the husband made enormous initial contributions, in excess of $20 million. On her case his financial contributions during the relationship were also far greater than hers, taking account of [E Street]. Even if it be assumed in the wife’s favour that during the relationship the parties’ contributions were equal, where the marriage is relatively short, initial contributions can take on a critical importance (Anson & Meek (2017) FLC 93-816 at [181] (adopted by the Full Court in Grunseth & Wighton (2022) FLC 94-099 at [73]). A short marriage is also a factor which weighs in favour of an asset by asset approach to the property pool (Zagari & Habib [2010] FamCAFC 159 at [83]; Greer & Mackintosh [2013] FamCAFC 16 at [101]). This has some importance because although there is evidence of the husband’s shareholdings in [Country YY], it is dated after separation and there is no evidence the wife made any contribution to companies or shares in [Country YY] in which the husband has an interest. It is not self evident at this stage of the proceedings that it would be just and equitable to make any property adjustment order in favour of the wife.
116.Although, as already explained, the wife’s case to impugn the registered mortgage in favour of the husband’s father is not presently supported by the probabilities of the evidence, I do not conclude at this stage her allegations about the mortgage have no reasonable prospect of success. In any event, the present injunctive relief protects half the proceeds of sale of [E Street] pending final determination or further order. On the basis of the current evidence, it is difficult to see how this would not be sufficient to satisfy any property adjustment in favour of the wife at final hearing in light of the short relationship. If the wife’s claims about the proceeds of sale of [E Street] and the mortgage are not successful and the proceeds do not form part of the property pool, the pool in Australia is modest, including her own property. As a result, if an order for property adjustment was made now as claimed by the wife there is a risk it could not be recouped, in whole or in part if necessary, at final hearing. I am not persuaded the wife has established that it would be proper, just and equitable to make any interim property adjustment in her favour, at least at present. The wife’s application will be refused.
The wife repeated the claim that Y Pty Ltd was the “alter ego” of the husband, which I did not accept in Vang (No 3) (above at [8]). In Vang (No 3) I referred to this company as Y Pty Ltd. The wife has become convinced that the husband is the “shadow director” of PP Group, which owns all the shares in Y Pty Ltd, and pointed to a “report” from the Country RR company search, which she claimed proved this. However, this document was no more than a statutory record showing there was a change of directors in 2017. It demonstrated nothing about the shareholders or control of PP Group. Her own evidence showed the details of ownership could only be obtained by court order, which she does not have. The wife also repeated her allegation that the husband is the shadow director or controller of vast corporate assets in Country YY because his father is presently incarcerated, about which I was unable to make a finding in my earlier judgment (above at [29]).
Secondly, at the interim hearing when asked again to outline her claim on a final basis, the wife asserted an entitlement to 20 per cent of the total matrimonial property pool, which she then claimed was valued at one billion dollars. In explaining her case she said:
the key issue of my case is non-financial disclosure from the husband, and the husband continued to dispose the majority of the asset to the other parties, such as the company shares, to give it to the relatives for free. And it is far beyond asset pool.
(Transcript 28 August 2024, p.12 lines 33–36)
Thus she asserted that the husband controlled a vast pool of assets in which she had an “interest”, with such assets located in Country YY and possibly Country RR. She claimed he has failed to give adequate disclosure about this vast pool of assets. On this basis she claimed the restrained half, $6,933,146, was insufficient to protect her “interest” in the matrimonial assets, and orders should be made restraining the unrestrained half and repayment of the differential at an interlocutory stage.
It is true that if deliberate non-disclosure is established, the Court will not be unduly cautious in making findings in favour of the innocent party. If satisfied that the husband has undisclosed assets, the Court may make orders beyond the ascertained property or that all known assets should be awarded to the innocent party, on the basis that the party who refuses to disclose the assets is in fact hiding them (Wei & Xia (No 5) (2023) 67 Fam LR 421 at [170]–[175]).
But the wife’s characterisation of her claim betrays several misconceptions. It is clear that there is no community of ownership arising from marriage in Australian law and whether it is "just and equitable" to make an adjustment order pursuant to s 79 of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) (“the Act”) is not to be answered by assuming that the parties' rights to or interests in marital property are or should be different from those that exist at trial (Stanford & Stanford (2012) 247 CLR 108 at [38]–[39]). A right to claim for orders under s 79 is a right to enliven a judicial discretion to grant orders, and such orders “perform a dual function by creating and enforcing rights in one blow” (Fisher v Fisher (1986) 161 CLR 438 at 453). Thus it is trite law that a spouse party has no interest in the other spouse’s property before an adjustment order is made pursuant to s 79 (see e.g. Lin & Ruan (2021) FLC 94-024 at [41]; Sarto & Sarto (2022) 65 Fam LR 605 at [19]). It is clear the wife has no current proprietary interest in any assets of the husband. As made clear in Vang (No 3) (above at [29]) a global approach to the overall matrimonial pool of assets may not be appropriate where the relationship was so short.
But for present purposes, the wife did not articulate any convincing basis, nor did her evidence raise even a prima facie case with any fresh evidence which was not available for the application determined by Vang (No 3), either that the property pool was worth one billion dollars, beyond making the assertion, or that after a relationship of less than three years, which ended six years ago in August 2018, she was arguably entitled to 20 per cent of one billion dollars.
Rather I am satisfied the assertion of a pool worth one billion dollars was an opportunistic submission made on the run to provide some justification for a claim to the entire proceeds of sale of H Street and in particular for a further injunction in respect of the unrestrained half of the proceeds of E Street, thereby justifying the interlocutory relief she sought. On the present state of the evidence the magnitude of her claim to final relief as articulated appears fanciful. The wife can pursue her contentions that the husband owned H Street beneficially at all times and the father’s loan to purchase E Street was a “sham” at final hearing. But even if she does so successfully, and even on a generous view of her evidence presented thus far, as pointed out in Vang (No 3), this would confirm the conclusion that the husband made enormous financial contributions, which, I repeat, raises the possibility that the wife may not be entitled to any property adjustment. Other than acknowledging its existence, I express no concluded view about this possibility here. But the point is that, when the protection of the existing interlocutory undertaking is considered, even assuming in the wife’s favour she could achieve an adjustment of 20 per cent of $21,229,090, being the proceeds of H Street, this entitlement would fall well short of $6,933,146.
It is relevant to observe also that the wife has now consumed an enormous amount of court resources pursuing poorly conceived claims with poor prospects of success. She mentioned both in her affidavits and oral submissions that she is now self-represented. Self-representation is a “misfortune, not a privilege” (Gallo v Dawson (1990) 93 ALR 479 at 481, cited many times). She has however been represented at times in the past. The fervour with which the wife has pursued her numerous interlocutory applications suggests she has garnered some experience in litigation. The consumption of court resources by the wife is disproportionate to the issues in the proceedings and evidently has been a result of her misconceived perception of the nature of her property adjustment claim as giving her an “interest” in the husband’s assets, and her refusal to accept the results of earlier interlocutory proceedings.
I am not satisfied the wife has shown any basis to impose additional, or reconsider any existing, interlocutory orders, as sought in her application, bearing in mind a further injunction was imposed on the restrained half by order made on 5 September 2024. I also point out here that the injunction upon the restrained half has been imposed without extracting an undertaking as to damages, which the wife refused to give when asked on 5 September 2024. This means her position at final hearing is protected in respect of the restrained half, without exposing her to the consequences of failure of her claims, if an undertaking as to damages had been given. Leave to bring the application for orders 4, 5, 6(1), and 7 will be refused, because there is no basis to grant leave to agitate an application which is an abuse of process and otherwise without merit. Her amended application will be dismissed.
Application for Review
On 5 July 2024, the wife filed an Application for Review of the orders made on 3 July 2024 by a judicial registrar setting aside five subpoenas issued by the wife. Two subpoenas were issued to the law firms AD Lawyers and AE Lawyers Pty Ltd (“AE Lawyers”). The other three were issued to the accounting firm AC Accountants, National Australia Bank Ltd (“NAB”), and Y Pty Ltd. The subpoenas were subject to ten Notices of Objection which were otherwise dismissed by the judicial registrar after setting aside the subpoenas.
There was some confusion about the date upon which Notices of Objection were filed and whether they were filed in accordance with the Rules. Some Notices of Objection were rejected for filing, according to the Court file. However, by Application in a Proceeding filed on 8 April 2024 Y Pty Ltd sought an order setting aside item 6(c) in the subpoena issued to AC Accountants, and on the same day the father filed an Application in a Proceeding seeking orders setting aside all five subpoenas identified in [39] above. Both applications sought costs beyond conduct money to comply with the subpoenas. The orders of the judicial registrar determined these applications.
The Application for Review seeks the following orders:
1. Seek the court to grant an urgent listings for this review.
2. Seek the court grant an order to revoke all orders related to the subpoenas on 4 July 2024 for further directions.
3. Seek the court consider the case currently has issues pending resolutions and outcomes for previous applications which linked to the subpoenas.
4. The review not listed before Justice Harper.
5. Grant me sufficient time to speak during listings.
(As per the original)
As pointed out earlier, the wife did not press any application for recusal at the hearing before me. Accordingly, orders 4 and 5 do not require further comment. Order 3 is incompetent or unnecessary. Thus order 2 is the order which requires determination, in that it seeks to set aside the orders of the judicial registrar setting aside the five subpoenas.
An application for review of a decision made by a judicial registrar proceeds as an original hearing and can receive evidence not before the registrar (r 14.07 of the Rules). Accordingly, the basis on which the registrar determined the setting aside of the subpoenas is of no relevance. This was made clear to the wife before me, but nonetheless and undeterred, she made consistent unnecessary mention of alleged flaws in the process before the registrar.
It is necessary therefore to determine the objections to the five identified subpoenas afresh. This requires determining whether the schedules to the subpoenas violate the requirements for validity.
For the benefit of the wife, I consider it desirable to set out the relevant principles at some length. I venture to repeat those principles as I stated them in Kehoe & Seden (No 2) [2022] FedCFamC1F 346 at [13]–[19]:
13.The principles applicable to setting aside a subpoena were comprehensively stated by McClelland J (as he then was) in Baumann and Ors & Rushbrooke and Anor [2016] FamCA 905 at [25]–[42] (“Baumann”). McClelland J pointed out the party issuing an impugned subpoena must demonstrate the documents sought have “apparent relevance” to an issue in the proceedings, although, unlike discovery, it is not enough for a party seeking to uphold a subpoena to show that the documents might lead to “a train of inquiry” which might assist his or her case: at [31] citing McMillan Incorporated v Bishopgate Investment Trust (1993) 4 All ER 998 at 1005; Mulley & Marney v Manifold (1959) 103 CLR 341 at 345; T & D [2006] FamCA 1560 at [6]. It is not legitimate to issue a subpoena on the basis of “an outside chance” that something useful might turn up in the documents (at [33] citing R v Ridgeway (1998) 72 SASR 73 at 101) or to issue a “fishing” subpoena with a view to determining whether the issuing party has a case at all (at [35] citing Unitingcare – Unifam Counselling & Mediation & Harkiss and Anor (2011) FLC 93-476 at 85,856; see also Botany Bay Instrumentation and Control Pty Ltd v Stewart [1984] 3 NSWLR 98 at 100 per Powell J).
14. ...
15.The contention that a subpoena is an abuse of process usually rests on the underlying assertion that it has no “legitimate forensic purpose”, for example, because it is “fishing”. The question of apparent relevance in turn often, if not usually, underpins debates about legitimate forensic purpose and allegations of “fishing”. The primary contention of the third parties was that the documents sought in the impugned paragraphs lacked any apparent relevance to the issues in the proceedings.
16.The concept of “apparent relevance” in relation to subpoenas is of long standing. In Trade Practices Commission v Arnotts Ltd (No 2) (1989) 88 ALR 90 at 103, Beaumont J used the expression in posing the question of whether the material sough[t] has “apparent relevance to the issues in the principle proceedings”. Numerous later cases have adopted the same or similar phraseology: Portal Software International Ltd v Bodsworth [2005] NSWSC 1115 at [20]–[24]; Lowery v Insurance Australia Ltd (2015) 90 NSWLR 320 at [12]; Baumann at [32] and [82] (“on the cards”); D v Australian Financial Security Authority [2017] NSWCA 50 at [56] (“sufficient apparent connection”). Re Force Corp Pty Ltd (in liq) [2018] NSWSC 896 at [22] and [24] explained “apparent relevance” as meaning something could “reasonably be expected” to “throw light” on some of the issues in the proceedings (see most recently in this Court Woodcock & Woodcock (2021) 64 Fam LR 489 at [48] (“Woodcock”).
17.The indeterminate boundaries of these verbal formulations are obvious, but it is recognised they have a wide embrace and often include documents about which the issuing party cannot have clear knowledge as to content or actual relevance. Recently, in Secretary of theDepartment of Planning, Industry and Environment v Blacktown City Council [2021] NSWCA 145 in the NSW Court of Appeal, Bell P (as he then was) observed at [57] that the apparent relevance of documents is “one of the reasons why medical and telephone records, for example, are frequently the subject of subpoenas, even though it will not be known or knowable ex ante whether or not the subpoenaed material, will, or is likely to, assist the party issuing the subpoena”. He held that to insist on such an added requirement is artificial because it would require an issuing party to be able to predict the contents of potentially relevant documents and would “unduly constrain the ability of litigants to investigate the facts”, citing the decision of Brereton J in A v Z (2007) 212 FLR 255 at 257. Therefore, so long as a subpoena can plausibly be seen to relate to an issue in the proceedings (or to “cast light” on such an issue), and the subpoena is not in other respects too vague or oppressive, it should not be set aside.
The reasons of Bell P (as he then was) in Secretary of the Department of Planning, Industry and Environment v Blacktown City Council [2021] NSWCA 145 (“Department of Planning, Industry and Environment v Blacktown City Council”) at [65], [80] also made two other relevant principles clear: first if it can be seen that the documents sought to be produced by way of subpoena will materially assist on an identified issue or there is a reasonable basis beyond speculation that it is likely the documents subpoenaed will so assist, such documents will have apparent relevance; secondly, documents which bear upon the cross examination of witnesses expected to be called in the proceedings will generally be apparently relevant and demonstrate a legitimate forensic purpose.
It has also been recognised that a subpoena is in the nature of an order of the Court made on an ex parte basis requiring the recipient to produce documents, and for that reason care must be taken not only in issuing subpoenas but also in drawing their terms (Merhi & Merhi and Ors(No 3) [2018] FamCA 961 at [26]). The terms of a subpoena are themselves an important aspect of determining apparent relevance as pointed out by Bell P in Department of Planning, Industry and Environment v Blacktown City Council at [68]–[69]:
68. …apparent relevance, however, should be able to be ascertained by an examination of the description or identification of the document or documents sought in the schedule to the subpoena in light of the issues in the case, as they present themselves on the pleadings, in particulars and/or in affidavits or witness statements if they have been filed or served at the time of the issue of the subpoena.
69.If the documents are apparently relevant and, provided that the terms of the subpoena are not unduly vague or the ambit of the subpoena is not such that it would be oppressive to comply with it, the subpoena should not be set aside…
The impact on the recipient is an important consideration. Subpoenas which are “seriously and unfairly burdensome, prejudicial or damaging” and “productive of serious and unjustified trouble and harassment” should be set aside (Hamilton v Oades (1989) 166 CLR 486 at 502; Seven Network Ltd v News Ltd (No 5) (2005) 216 ALR 147 at [12]).
Therefore the documents sought for production must be identified with reasonable particularity and a subpoena may be challenged on the basis its schedules are vaguely or oppressively worded, in the sense that the recipient, in order to comply with the subpoena, must determine for themselves which documents may fall within the subpoena, in other words whether documents have apparent relevance (Commissioner for Railways v Small (1938) 38 SR NSW 564 at 573; Loulach Developments Pty Ltd v Roads and Maritime Services (No 2) [2018] NSWSC 1465 at [5], [9]–[14]).
It is open to the Court to uphold subpoenas on the basis that the schedules are read down or amended (X Pty Ltd & Merhi [2015] FamCA 622 at [39] (“X Pty Ltd & Merhi”) following Lucas Industries Ltd v Hewitt (1978) 18 ALR 555 at [577]). But subpoenas should not, by and large, be utilised to seek production of material from third parties in circumstances where the relevant court’s discovery procedures have not been exhausted (X Pty Ltd & Merhi at [38]).
The wife argued that the five subpoenas are relevant to her factual assertions that the husband was the true owner of the proceeds of sale of H Street, that the loan between the husband and the father was a sham, to the determination of the beneficial owner of Y Pty Ltd, and more broadly that the issues, including those raised by her on appeal, cannot be resolved without such material being made available.
The basis of the objection to the subpoenas was that the time period was too broad, and the wording was vague, oppressive, lacked forensic purpose and required the recipient to determine what documents fell within the subpoena.
It is often necessary to examine each paragraph of the schedule to an impugned subpoena to determine objections. I will assume in the wife’s favour that the subpoenas may possibly capture some documents which have apparent relevance. However, here all the subpoena schedules suffer from the same or similar vices. This makes it unnecessary to discuss every paragraph in every schedule. The following discussion is not intended to be exhaustive and identifies examples which demonstrate the problems which lead to the conclusion that the wife’s application for review should be dismissed, except as otherwise specified.
Two general deficiencies, manifest in all the subpoenas, can frame the discussion. First, each subpoena seeks documents in widely drawn categories primarily for the period March 2011 to date. The wife did not establish why such a lengthy time frame was justified, particularly where there was no dispute the parties’ relationship existed for no more than a period from 2015 to 2018.
Second, the paragraphs in each schedule are too vaguely or oppressively worded, in the sense that the recipient, in order to comply with the subpoena, is required to determine for themselves which documents may have apparent relevance so as to fall within the subpoena.
Y Pty Ltd
Paragraphs 2, 3, 4 and 5 of the subpoena to Y Pty Ltd illustrate its deficiencies:
2.All financial statements, balance sheets, income statements, tax returns, schedule of assets, depreciation schedules, business activity statements of [Y Pty Ltd] for the period from 30 March 2011 to date.
3.Details of all shareholders of [Y Pty Ltd] including any share transfer forms, share registers and details of any beneficial owner of such shares for the period 30 March 2011 to date.
4.Details of all shareholders of [PP Group] for the period 30 March 2011 to date.
5.All correspondence and other documents from anyone, not limited to but including [Mr D] born […] 1962 (‘[Mr D]’), [Ms T] and [Y Pty Ltd], that delegate authority to [Mr Chung] born […] 1988 (‘[Mr Chung]’) for the period 30 March 2011 to date.
As mentioned, the wife seeks documents in relation to the provision of funds in 2012 concerning the purchase of H Street, in relation to the allegedly sham loan in 2017 made by the father for the purchase of E Street, and to support the contention that Y Pty Ltd was and is the “alter ego” of the husband. It can be seen that paragraph 2 is clearly too wide and would require the production of many documents which could have no apparent relevance over a 13 year period, even if some apparently relevant documents were captured as well. The recipient would have to spend the time assessing what has apparent relevance and what does not. The breadth of the details of shareholders sought in paragraphs 3 and 4 would plainly result in details of individuals and entities which have nothing to do with the wife’s claims. There is no conceivable basis upon which the category “All correspondence and other documents from anyone…” from March 2011 to date in paragraph 5 could possibly be justified, and it is plainly too vague and too wide. In relation to all the paragraphs of the subpoena the recipient would be put to the expense and difficulty of determining what documents would fall within those paragraphs. The requirement to answer these paragraphs would impose a cost of production which is disproportionate to the apparent potential evidentiary value of any of the documents sought which may have apparent relevance.
Paragraphs 6, 7, 8 and 9 seek minutes of “any meeting” of Y Pty Ltd signed by the husband or his father, any documents relating to “any trust…and/or loan agreements” to which the husband or the father are parties or beneficiaries and all documents relating to the appointment of the husband as a director of Y Pty Ltd. In my view these paragraphs are too widely expressed and suffer from the same defects identified in [57] above.
Paragraphs 10 and 11 are in a different category because they are confined to documents relating to the purchase and sale of H Street, and E Street. In my view, those paragraphs are permissible.
In other respects I will set aside the subpoena to Y Pty Ltd.
AC Accountants
The schedule to the subpoena is plagued by similar problems to the Y Pty Ltd subpoena. For example, paragraph 2 seeks “All documents from anyone” not limited to but including the father, two individuals called Mr V and Ms SS and Y Pty Ltd “that delegate authority to “the husband or the father” from 30 March 2011 to date. The reference to documents “from anyone” demonstrates this paragraph would plainly capture numerous documents which could have no relevance to the issues in the proceedings. The recipient would be presented with the near impossible task of determining what documents from whom were within the subpoena. The relevance of Mr V and Ms SS is unknown.
Paragraphs 3–6 are in the following terms:
3.All documents from [Mr Chung] or [Mr D] to anyone, not limited to but including [Mr D], [Mr V], [Ms SS] and [Y Pty Ltd] from 30 March 2011 to date.
4.All documents and file notes that relate to any trust, deed whether formal or informal or a self managed superfund relating to [Mr Chung] and/or [Mr D] from 30 March 2011 to date.
5.All documents and file notes that relate to any dealings between [Mr Chung], [Mr D], [Y Pty Ltd] and AF Pty Ltd, from 30 March 2011 to date.
6.All documents including but not limited to financial statements, balance sheets, income statements, tax returns, schedule of assets, depreciation schedules, business activity statements and correspondence between [AC Accountants] in respect of the following entities / individuals:
a. [Y Pty Ltd];
b. [Mr Chung]; and
c. [Mr D]
from 30 March 2011 to date
Paragraph 3 is vitiated by the same problems as paragraph 2.
Buried in the wife’s evidence was a schedule which appeared to show she had some negotiations directed to confining or refining the range of documents sought in the AC Accountants subpoena. However, no proposals along these lines were pursued by the wife before me. In any event, the content of the schedule demonstrated that the wife’s purpose in issuing the subpoena was to trawl minutely through dealings of the husband, AC Accountants and other named individuals since March 2011. In light of the way her case is articulated, the schedule to the subpoena suffered the same defects identified above at [57]–[58], it constituted “fishing", and should be set aside.
AD Lawyers and AE Lawyers
These subpoenas seek a wide range of documents. Both recipients are firms of solicitors. The father sought first access to any document produced and made a claim of legal professional privilege.
Paragraph 2 of the schedule to the subpoena issued to AD Lawyers seeks documents relating to the purchase and sale of H Street and E Street. I consider the documents sought in this paragraph have apparent relevance and the paragraph is not too widely expressed.
Paragraph 3 of the schedule to the subpoena issued to AD Lawyers seeks documents relating to the father’s mortgage number …69Q and any other loans between the husband and the father “and any other person but not limited to [Ms SS] and [Mr V]”. If this paragraph is read down in accordance with authority, and limited to documents relating to mortgage number …69Q it is permissible in my view. Otherwise the paragraph is too wide, and will otherwise be set side.
Paragraph 3 to the schedule to the subpoena issued to AE Lawyers is permissible because it seeks documents limited to the sale of E Street and mortgage number …69Q.
The remaining paragraphs in both subpoenas are too wide and suffer from the same defects identified above at [57]–[58].
To the extent documents are produced in answer to the paragraphs which have survived objection, the father should have first access to enable any documents in respect of which privilege is claimed to be identified and isolated in a sealed envelope.
National Australia Bank
The categories of documents sought from the NAB are extremely wide and suffer the same defects identified above at [57]–[58]. The subpoena should be set aside.
CONCLUSION
My conclusions about the subpoenas, and the limited requirement for production, make it unnecessary to express a view on the argument that the costs of compliance would be too onerous.
For the reasons given the orders set out at the commencement of this judgment should be made.
I certify that the preceding seventy-three (73) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of the Honourable Justice Harper. Associate:
Dated: 10 September 2024
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