Vang & Chung (No 13)

Case [2025] FedCFamC1F 233

FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA

(DIVISION 1)

Vang & Chung (No 13) [2025] FedCFamC1F 233

File number: SYC 1433 of 2020
Judgment of: CHRISTIE J
Date of judgment: 11 April 2025
Catchwords:

 FAMILY LAW - Property - Short marriage – Application by the wife for an adjustment of property interests - Where the marriage lasted two months - Where no compelling reasons exist to make a property adjustment as per s79(4) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) - Application refused.

FAMILY LAW- PROPERTY – Disputed asset pool – Where applicant wife claims that the husband is the beneficial owner of millions of dollars’ worth of tangible and intangible property in Australia and overseas - Where wife asserts that the husband has not made a full and frank disclosure - Where the court is not satisfied  of beneficial ownership - Where even if the Husband did own some or all of the assets, no adjustment would be warranted.

FAMILY LAW - PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE - Where applicant wife seeks a spouse maintenance claim despite leave being refused under s44(3) and appeal against refusal being dismissed. Application is dismissed.

FAMILY LAW - CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - Practice and Procedure- Where applicant wife asserts that her case requires intervention by the Attorney General - Where applicant therefore seeks adjournment of hearing - Where no evidence or specific claims are made to advance this proposition - Where adjournment application is opposed by all other parties -Adjournment application is refused.  
Legislation:

Australian Constitution

Family Law Act 1975 (Cth)

Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth)

Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021
Cases cited:

Amrit Lai Narain v Parnell (1986) 9 FCR 479

Ascot Investments Pty Ltd v Harper (1981) 148 CLR 337

Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v C G Berbatis Holdings Pty Ltd (1999) 167 ALR 303

Benson and Drury (2020) FLC 93-998

Bevan & Bevan (2013) FLC 93-545

Dietrich v The Queen (1992) 177 CLR 292

Keating & Keating (2019) FLC 93-894

Kennon & Kennon (1997) FLC 92-757

Luck v Secretary, Dept of Human Services [2017] FCA 540

Re Culleton (2017) 340 ALR 550

Re Finlayson; Ex parte Finlayson (1997) 72 ALJR 73

Stanford v Stanford (2017) 247 CLR 108

Trevi and Trevi (2018) FLC 93-858

Vang & Chung (No 3) (2024) FedCFamC1A 199

Vang and Chung (No 3) [2024] FedCFamC1F 101

Xuarez and Vitela [2017] FamCAFC 139
Division: Division 1 First Instance
Number of paragraphs: 192
Date of hearing: 17 – 21 March 2025
Place: Sydney
Applicant: Litigant in Person
Counsel for the First Respondent: Ms Tabbernor
Solicitor for the First Respondent: Broun Abrahams Burreket
Counsel for the Second Respondent: Mr Sulan SC with Mr Rogan
Solicitor for the Second Respondent: Mangioni Biggs + Co

ORDERS

SYC 1433 of 2020

FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA (DIVISION 1)
BETWEEN:

MS VANG

Applicant
AND:

MR CHUNG

First Respondent

MR D

Second Respondent

ORDER MADE BY:

CHRISTIE J

DATE OF ORDER:

11 APRIL 2025

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

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AGLC
Vang & Chung (No 13) [2025] FedCFamC1F 233
Case
[2025] FedCFamC1F 233
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Vang & Chung (No 13) involves a property adjustment application by Ms Vang, the wife, against her former husband, Mr Chung. The application was made to the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 1) in the context of a short marriage that lasted either two years and nine months or three years and six months, depending on the parties' differing accounts of the period of cohabitation. The primary issues before the court were whether to grant a property adjustment in favor of the wife and whether to allow the wife's application for spouse maintenance despite a previous refusal of leave to apply. Additionally, the court considered the wife's request for an adjournment of the hearing to allow the Attorney General to intervene in the proceedings.

The court dismissed Ms Vang’s application for property adjustment. It found that the marriage's short duration did not provide compelling reasons to adjust the property interests as per section 79(4) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth). The court was not convinced of the wife's claims regarding the beneficial ownership of millions of dollars’ worth of tangible and intangible property by the husband, either in Australia or overseas. The court reasoned that even if Mr Chung did own the disputed assets, no adjustment would be warranted. Furthermore, the application for spouse maintenance was dismissed as the wife had not obtained leave to apply for it, and the Full Court had previously upheld the refusal of such leave. The application for adjournment, which sought intervention by the Attorney General, was also dismissed due to the lack of evidence or specific claims to support the proposition.

The court's reasoning emphasized the necessity to adhere to the statutory requirements of the Family Law Act and the principles established by the High Court in Stanford v Stanford. It stressed that a property adjustment should only be made if it is just and equitable to do so, particularly given the short duration of the marriage. The court concluded that the statutory considerations and the legal guidance on property settlements did not support the wife’s claims for property adjustment or spouse maintenance. Consequently, the amended initiating application was dismissed, and specific orders were made regarding the release of trust account monies and the procedure for any future costs applications.

Orders

Orders of the court

SYC 1433 of 2020

FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA (DIVISION 1)

BETWEEN:

MS VANG

Applicant

AND:

MR CHUNG

First Respondent

MR D

Second Respondent

ORDER MADE BY:

CHRISTIE J

DATE OF ORDER:

11 APRIL 2025

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1. The Amended Initiating Application filed 7 March 2025 is dismissed.

2. The whole of the monies held in the trust account of Mangioni Biggs + Co (being 50% of the sale proceeds of E Street, Suburb F) be released to the second respondent, Mr D.

3. In the event that a party seeks their costs such party shall, within 14 days, file and serve:

(a) An affidavit setting out any further evidence relied upon for issue of costs; and

(b) Written submissions of no more than 5 pages identifying the material relied upon including as to any relevant filed schedule of costs.

4. In the event that a party opposes the making of such a costs order, such party shall file and serve within a further 14 days:

(a) An affidavit setting out any further evidence relied upon for issue of costs; and

(b) Written submissions of no more than 5 pages.

5. In the event that a party seeks to reply, then such party shall file and serve written submissions in reply of no more than 3 pages within a further 7 days.

6. In the event that costs are sought in accordance with Order 3, they will be determined without further oral hearing, unless a formal application for oral hearing is made.

Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry in the Court’s records.

Note: This copy of the Court’s Reasons for judgment may be subject to review to remedy minor typographical or grammatical errors (r 10.14(b) Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth)), or to record a variation to the order pursuant to r 10.13 Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth).

Part XIVB of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) makes it an offence, except in very limited circumstances, to publish an account of proceedings that identify persons, associated persons, or witnesses involved in family law proceedings.

Background

Background to the litigation

There is no matter involving the application or interpretation of the Constitution raised by the facts in this case and accordingly the adjournment was refused.BACKGROUND The parties do not agree about the length of their cohabitation. They married in 2017. The husband says the parties commenced living together in May 2015 and separated on 28 September 2017. The wife says the parties commenced living together in February 2015 and separated on 31 August 2018. The parties’ divorce became final in late 2019. On the husband’s case the relationship from the time the parties first lived together until separation lasted for two years and 9 months. On the wife’s three years and 6 months. Both parties’ evidence acknowledges that whatever the length of the cohabitation there were also significant periods during that time where the parties were in different countries. There are no children of the marriage. There is significant controversy as between the husband and wife about the identification, ownership and value of the assets of the parties or either of them. The second respondent is the husband’s father. He has had business interests in Australia and Country YY (“Country YY”). Since late 2018 he has been incarcerated in Country YY.CONSIDERATION It is necessary to address the wife’s application for spouse maintenance briefly. On 12 June 2023, for the first time, the applicant sought orders for spouse maintenance. She required leave to institute proceedings seeking spouse maintenance. On 28 February 2024 Harper J (Vang and Chung (No 3) [2024] FedCFamC1F 101) dismissed the application for leave on two bases. The Full Court (Vang & Chung (No 3) (2024) FedCFamC1A 199) subsequently considered the primary’s judge’s adjudication of the matter and concluded:[45] None of the seven grounds of appeal assert any error by the primary judge in his dismissal of the applicant’s application for spousal maintenance (including leave to apply therefor out of time). It follows that the applicant did not have leave to prosecute her application for spouse maintenance and advanced no submissions to support the conclusion that leave, having been previously refused, should now be granted. Accordingly, the application will be dismissed. Turning then to the relief which the wife seeks for property adjustment. In Bevan & Bevan (2013) FLC 93-545 at [65] the Full Court of the Family Court of Australia said, of the decision in Stanford v Stanford (2017) 247 CLR 108 that:the High Court’s decision serves to refocus attention on the obligation not to make an order adjusting property interests unless it is just and equitable to do so. In approaching the question of whether it is just and equitable to make a property settlement order, the High Court, in Stanford offered the following guidance:42. In many cases where an application is made for a property settlement order, the just and equitable requirement is readily satisfied by observing that, as the result of a choice made by one or both of the parties, the husband and wife are no longer living in a marital relationship. It will be just and equitable to make a property settlement order in such a case because there is not and will not thereafter be the common use of property by the husband and wife. No less importantly, the express and implicit assumptions that underpinned the existing property arrangements have been brought to an end by the voluntary severance of the mutuality of the marital relationship. That is, any express or implicit assumption that the parties may have made to the effect that existing arrangements of marital property interests were sufficient or appropriate during the continuance of their marital relationship is brought to an end with the ending of the marital relationship. And the assumption that any adjustment to those interests could be effected consensually as needed or desired is also brought to an end. Hence it will be just and equitable that the court make a property settlement order …(emphasis in original)

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Full text does not contain this section.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The second respondent is the husband’s father. He has had business interests in Australia and Country YY (“Country YY”). Since late 2018 he has been incarcerated in Country YY.CONSIDERATION It is necessary to address the wife’s application for spouse maintenance briefly. On 12 June 2023, for the first time, the applicant sought orders for spouse maintenance. She required leave to institute proceedings seeking spouse maintenance. On 28 February 2024 Harper J (Vang and Chung (No 3) [2024] FedCFamC1F 101) dismissed the application for leave on two bases. The Full Court (Vang & Chung (No 3) (2024) FedCFamC1A 199) subsequently considered the primary’s judge’s adjudication of the matter and concluded:[45] None of the seven grounds of appeal assert any error by the primary judge in his dismissal of the applicant’s application for spousal maintenance (including leave to apply therefor out of time). It follows that the applicant did not have leave to prosecute her application for spouse maintenance and advanced no submissions to support the conclusion that leave, having been previously refused, should now be granted. Accordingly, the application will be dismissed. Turning then to the relief which the wife seeks for property adjustment. In Bevan & Bevan (2013) FLC 93-545 at [65] the Full Court of the Family Court of Australia said, of the decision in Stanford v Stanford (2017) 247 CLR 108 that:the High Court’s decision serves to refocus attention on the obligation not to make an order adjusting property interests unless it is just and equitable to do so. In approaching the question of whether it is just and equitable to make a property settlement order, the High Court, in Stanford offered the following guidance:42. In many cases where an application is made for a property settlement order, the just and equitable requirement is readily satisfied by observing that, as the result of a choice made by one or both of the parties, the husband and wife are no longer living in a marital relationship. It will be just and equitable to make a property settlement order in such a case because there is not and will not thereafter be the common use of property by the husband and wife. No less importantly, the express and implicit assumptions that underpinned the existing property arrangements have been brought to an end by the voluntary severance of the mutuality of the marital relationship. That is, any express or implicit assumption that the parties may have made to the effect that existing arrangements of marital property interests were sufficient or appropriate during the continuance of their marital relationship is brought to an end with the ending of the marital relationship. And the assumption that any adjustment to those interests could be effected consensually as needed or desired is also brought to an end. Hence it will be just and equitable that the court make a property settlement order …(emphasis in original) I propose to approach consideration of the competing applications in this matter with reference to the statutory considerations set out in section 79 of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) (“the Act”) and the distillation of the guidance offered by the High Court in the decision of the Full Court in Bevan & Bevan (2013) FLC 93-545 at [73]: 1. Determination of a just and equitable outcome of an application for property settlement begins with the identification of existing property interests (as determined by common law and equity);2. The discretion conferred by the statute must be exercised in accordance with legal principles and must not proceed on an assumption that the parties’ interests in the property are or should be different from those determined by common law and equity; 3. A determination that a party has a right to a division of property fixed by reference only to the matters in s 79(4), and without separate consideration of s 79(2), would erroneously conflate what are distinct statutory requirements.(as per original)Identification of existing property interests