Vanderkop v Harding and Harding No. DCCIV-99-949

VANDERKOP V HARDING AND HARDING
[2000] SADC 100

Judge Noblet
Civil

Claim, Defence, Issues

The plaintiff claims damages for injuries sustained by him as a result of being attacked by a dog owned by the defendants. The plaintiff relies upon section 66(1) of the Dog and Cat Management Act, 1995, which provides that “the keeper of a dog is liable in tort for injury, damage or loss caused by the dog”. The section goes on to say that it is not necessary for the plaintiff to establish negligence or knowledge of the dog’s vicious, dangerous or mischievous propensity. The liability of the keeper of a dog is subject to some qualifications set out in section 56(3). Counsel agree that none of those qualifications apply in this case and that the plaintiff’s claim is based upon strict liability. The question of forseeability therefore does not arise in this case in the manner that it might in other claims in negligence. Causation is the primary issue.
At the relevant time, the plaintiff was a postal delivery officer in the employ of Australia Post. On 7 October 1997, the plaintiff was delivering mail on a motor cycle in Coromandel Valley when the defendants’ dog attacked him, biting him on the right leg. As a result, the plaintiff received a laceration to his leg which was treated by Dr Sniatynskyj by stitching the wound, the application of a tetanus injection and antibiotics. The plaintiff claims that the wound subsequently became inflamed and painful and that he began suffering nightmares about the incident. He was prescribed further antibiotic treatment and tranquillisers and sent for a psychiatric assessment. He then received anti-depressant therapy and psychological counselling. The plaintiff claims to have developed a post traumatic distress disorder as a result of which he is incapacitated from carrying out his duties as a postal delivery officer.
In his rule 46.15 particulars, the plaintiff claims that he continues to suffer from symptoms of anxiety, he is unable to sleep and has re-occurring nightmares, he continually suffers from dizziness, headaches, poor concentration, nausea and fatigue and pain and discomfort in his right lower leg. He also claims that his medical condition has resulted in a loss of confidence and inability to return to his normal working capacity together with inability to participate in any social activities. He claims to have become withdrawn and reclusive.
In their defence, the defendants have denied that the plaintiff was attacked by their dog and, alternatively, say that if the plaintiff was attacked by the dog then the plaintiff’s own conduct caused or contributed to any injuries he sustained. However, at trial, the defendants admitted that the plaintiff had been attacked by their dog and did not rely upon the defence of contributory negligence (which defence would not have been available to them anyway - see Keeffe v McLean - Carr and Pacific Waste Management Pty Ltd (1992 - 1993) 169 LSJS 74 at 93). The defendants also claim that any injuries, loss or damage alleged to have been suffered by the plaintiff were caused or exacerbated by conduct of the plaintiff’s work colleagues for which the defendants are not responsible.
The main issues in this case are whether the plaintiff’s post traumatic stress disorder and associated problems are attributable solely to the attack by the defendants’ dog, or whether they are attributable to other factors that occurred before and/or after the dog attack, or whether they constitute some elements of each.

Chronology of Events

In order to consider properly the possibility of the plaintiff’s psychiatric problems being attributable to events that occurred before the dog attack, it is necessary to look at some events that occurred at a much earlier time in the plaintiff’s life.
The plaintiff was born in Bandung, Indonesia, on 16 February 1948, when Indonesia was part of the Dutch East Indies. He and his parents came to Australia in 1954 when he was about six years of age. At the age of about 9 years he was attacked by an Alsatian dog and bitten on the right leg, right shoulder and the right side of his face. He did well at school and went on to study economics at Sydney University. He completed only two years of this course. His initial explanation of this in his evidence was that he took time off to go to Europe and visit his family and was away for about a year. Cross-examination revealed a more complicated series of events, to which I now turn.
When the plaintiff was about 19 or 20 years of age, he was looking for some part-time work to help fund his university studies. He saw an advertisement for a job as a kitchen hand at a restaurant in Kings Cross. He went to the restaurant and was told that the people concerned would like to speak to him later that night. He went to a unit to meet them that evening and he was attacked. He was reluctant to talk about the details. He said “It was a dark period in my life. It was not something or is not something that I want to choose to remember or want to remember. I didn’t see it as relevant to the dog attack. I still don’t see it as relevant to the dog attack, but if you ask me about it and you insist I talk about it, I will do my best to help you.” (t101). He went on to say “It’s very painful and it hurts, and it’s better forgotten”. He finally revealed that the cause of this black period in his life was that he was raped by the man whom he had hoped was going to offer him a job. Clearly this was an extremely traumatic experience. The plaintiff felt that he could not talk to anyone about it and he tried to escape from it. He simply couldn’t cope and that was the real reason why he went overseas. He stayed on a kibbutz in Israel for some time, where he picked oranges and generally “got his head together”. He initially felt depressed, with feelings of low self-esteem, worthlessness and suicidal ideation. He felt dirty and lost interest in sexual matters. His eating habits changed and he ate a lot less. He felt that he had no friends. He had recurring thoughts about what had happened to him and he had trouble keeping these thoughts out of his head. He said that there were triggers, like reading something in the newspaper, that brought the experience of the rape back into his head in the same way as there are now triggers that bring back memories of the dog attack. He said that in the 18 months following the rape, and for some time afterwards, he had nightmares about the rape and that he still does but now only very occasionally - perhaps a couple of times a year.
After spending about 18 months overseas, the plaintiff returned to Sydney, where he had little difficulty in finding a job. He was then in his early twenties. He was responsible for promoting and marketing chemicals for foodstuff, dyes, plastics and pharmaceuticals. During the course of this employment he was transferred to Adelaide. After about 12 years, he left this company and had about a year off. He then worked for another company where he specialised in technical sales of cryogenics. Apparently he was quite successful in this job and he was employed with the company for about 14 years.
In June 1993, during this period of employment, the plaintiff went to see Dr Sniatynskyj with regard to work related stress which he said he had had for 4 weeks. He told Dr Sniatynskyj that he felt anxious, had headaches, palpitations, diminished sex drive and that this had started after he received a letter from his employer saying that his performance was unsatisfactory. The letter apparently was intended as a “first warning”. The plaintiff said in evidence that the letter was dated 14 May 1993, but that he was unable to find it. He said that Dr Sniatynskyj did not prescribe anything, that Dr Sniatynskyj helped him to put everything in perspective (t125) and that he “got over it fairly quickly” without it effecting his work (t115). He did not see Dr Sniatynskyj again until the dog attack some 4 years later.
Later in 1993 the plaintiff received from his employer a performance appraisal report for the period from 1 September 1992 to 31 August 1993. It was signed by the plaintiff, and another person who appears to be an officer of the company, on 26 August 1993. On a scale of A to E, the plaintiff rated two Bs, one C-, one C, three C+, and one D. Even a D rating is said to mean “generally satisfactory performance but where most but not all tasks are completed at an acceptable standard”. The “employee’s comment” on the appraisal is “a fair and reasonable appraisal”. This suggests to me that he had recovered from the stress of the earlier letter by August 1993 and that he was reasonably happy with the appraisal.
In 1994 the plaintiff’s employer lost a major contract and began “downsizing”. The company was no longer involved in the area in which the plaintiff was working and he was retrenched in about September 1994. The plaintiff did not seem to be unduly stressed about the retrenchment. He received a “package”. He spent a year renovating his house.
Some time in 1995, the plaintiff saw an advertisement in the Blackwood Post Office inviting applications from people interested in working as part-time postal delivery officers. He applied for the job and was successful. Initially he worked about four hours a day, but this increased to about seven or eight hours per day as he was filling in for other people. The full-time employees were unhappy with the fact that part-time employees were working shifts which they believed should have been theirs as over-time. This hostility developed into some victimisation of the part-time employees. At one stage, the plaintiff went to the defence of a colleague who had suffered this type of victimisation and, from then on, the plaintiff was victimised even more frequently. The abuse included allegations of homosexuality and paedophilia, which were, of course, entirely without foundation. Obviously this caused the plaintiff some stress, but it seems that he managed to cope in his job. He did not seek medical advice at this time regarding any stress resulting from the victimisation and abuse.
On 7 October 1997, the plaintiff returned from some leave. On this day he received some particularly savage abuse with disgraceful and disgusting remarks such as “have you been fucking little boys” and “have you still got shit on the end of your dick”. The plaintiff tried to shut it out of his mind. He did not report this to more senior personnel because he thought there was no point - previous complaints had fallen on deaf ears.
Later that day, the plaintiff delivered mail on someone else’s round at Coromandel Valley and it was on this round that he was attacked by the defendants’ dog and immediately went to see Dr Sniatynskyj (see page 1).
The plaintiff saw Dr Sniatynskyj again on 9 October. According to Dr Sniatynskyj, the plaintiff seemed quite anxious and said he was suffering from nightmares since the attack by the dog, was having palpitations, difficulty in sleeping, waking up during the night feeling distressed, and disturbed in his sleep because of visions of seeing the dog coming at him.
On 13 October, he reported to Dr Sniatynskyj that he was upset and depressed and that he had been told that one of his co-workers had heard about the attack by the dog and thought it was a joke, which the plaintiff found particularly distressing. The plaintiff said he had insomnia and had even contemplated suicide. Dr Sniatynskyj prescribed an anxiolytic medication (Xanax) and referred him to Dr Czechowicz, a psychiatrist.
It must have been considered that psychiatric attention was required urgently, as Dr Czechowicz saw the plaintiff on the next day. Dr Czechowicz prescribed anti-depressant medication (paroxetine) and advised the plaintiff to see a psychologist for further counselling.
The plaintiff returned to work on about 13 November 1997. The harassment continued. The plaintiff’s immediate supervisor began bringing his dog to work, which was apparently not permitted. This happened about 6 times and caused additional anxiety to the plaintiff, who believed that bringing the dog to work was part of the systematic harassment of him. Then on 3 February 1998, the plaintiff came to work and sat at his desk and felt something brush against his right leg. He found a bull terrier under his desk, which had apparently been brought in by one of his fellow employees. Not surprisingly, the plaintiff felt extremely frightened by this incident.
A further potentially complicating factor is that in August 1998 Dr Morrissey diagnosed the plaintiff as suffering from endolymphatic hydrops, which is similar to Menier’s disease. The main symptoms were balance disturbance, hearing loss and ringing in the ears (tinnitus).

Medical Diagnosis

Dr Sniatynskyj is a general practitioner with a special interest in psychiatry. After graduating in medicine in 1974, he spent four years working as a psychiatric registrar at the Royal Adelaide and Glenside Hospitals.
Dr Sniatynskyj’s diagnosis was that the plaintiff suffered from post traumatic stress disorder with manifestation of anxiety and depression. The cause of these disorders was a combination of harassment in his place of work over a period of two years, particularly on the morning of 7 October 1997, and the attack by the dog later the same day. He placed very little emphasis on the rape that occurred about 27 years or more before the dog attack in 1997. He considered that the plaintiff may well have suffered from post traumatic stress disorder after the rape, but that he had fully recovered from that and was able to work in responsible positions for about 24 years. He had long since past the stage at which the rape significantly affected his personal, social and occupational functioning. The plaintiff was also able to cope initially with the harassment in the work place, although it made him very angry. Dr Sniatynskyj considered that it was the dog attack that suddenly caused everything to change in terms of all levels of the plaintiff’s functioning. Dr Sniatynskyj saw the plaintiff regularly over a period of three years. He addressed his mind to the possibility of schizophrenia, because Professor Goldney had suggested this as a possibility. However, he could not find any evidence of schizophrenia or any psychotic illness.
Dr Czechowicz qualified as a medical practitioner in 1964. He completed his specialisation in psychiatry in 1972. He has a great deal of experience in dealing with post traumatic stress disorder as a result of working with Vietnam war veterans at the Repatriation Hospital for the last 27 years.
Dr Czechowicz first saw the plaintiff on 14 October 1997, only two weeks after the dog attack. He diagnosed post traumatic stress disorder and subsequent major depression. When Dr Czechowicz saw the plaintiff again on 29 October 1997 he considered that the plaintiff had only partially improved. Then the incident with the bull terrier in February 1998 caused him to go “backwards to a significant degree”. In a report dated 19 April 1999, Dr Czechowicz expressed the view that the plaintiff still had major depression and clear signs of ongoing post traumatic stress disorder.
Dr Czechowicz was aware of, and took into account, the more serious dog attack on the plaintiff when he was about nine years old, the homosexual rape of the plaintiff, and the details of the systematic harassment of the plaintiff at work. His view was that the attack by the dog was the trigger for the post traumatic stress disorder but that the dog attack and the systematic harassment were “equally contributory” to this disorder.
The plaintiff tendered a report by Dr Lloyd, a psychiatrist who saw the plaintiff for one hour on 4 December 1997. I am not able to attach as much significance to the report of Dr Lloyd as I am with the reports and evidence of other psychiatrists, because he died before the trial and there has not been any cross-examination of him. Dr Lloyd also diagnosed post traumatic stress disorder. As to the cause of this he said: “The dog attack of 7/10/97 and the harassment at work both caused the condition to emerge. The harassment at work created a persistent state of hyper-arousal and tension. The dog attack then created the post traumatic stress disorder.”
Professor Goldney is a highly qualified and respected psychiatrist. He saw the plaintiff on 20 and 24 August 1998 and prepared a report dated 27 August 1998. In his report he expresses the view that the plaintiff “presents a challenging clinical dilemma. He has symptoms which are suggestive of several different psychiatric conditions, and in addition to that he is also consumed with anger about his perception of what occurred within the work place”. Professor Goldney was certain that childhood experiences predisposed him to the development of psychiatric illness in adult life. He concludes that “it is probable that his symptoms of emotional distress are sufficiently severe to warrant the diagnosis of a post traumatic stress disorder. It is further probable that this is a re-awakening of previous post traumatic stress symptoms induced by his early childhood experiences with two previous dog attacks [the reference to more than one previous dog attack is probably an error; only one previous attack was referred to in evidence]. It is also pertinent that Mr Vanderkop has a number of symptoms, including difficulty with his thoughts and unusual auditory phenomena, which could be part of a more long standing psychiatric illness which until now has not been recognised or treated. In addition Mr Vanderkop has significant conscious feelings of anger about what occurred.” Professor Goldney’s view was that the plaintiff’s condition was contributed to by the dog attack and also by “issues in his employment in general”, as well as his previous predisposition to experience emotional distress and pre-existing symptoms such as his difficulty with his thoughts and unusual auditory phenomena. He considered that the incidents occurring after 7 October 1998 had served to exacerbate and perpetuate the plaintiff’s condition.
Professor Goldney also raised the possibility of the plaintiff suffering from some type of psychotic condition. He placed considerable emphasis in this respect on what the plaintiff said to him about auditory hallucinations. With the greatest respect to Professor Goldney, I am unable to accept this part of his evidence. The plaintiff talked to Professor Goldney about ringing in his ears, which may simply have been tinnitus associated with his endolymphatic hydrops. The plaintiff was reluctant to talk to Professor Goldney about the noise in his ears, just as he was reluctant to talk to him about what had happened to him in Sydney when he was about 20 years of age. Professor Goldney asked the plaintiff “whether the phenomenon was similar to what it had been back at the University of Sydney at around the age of 20” and the plaintiff responded “the answer probably is yes”. In my opinion, Professor Goldney placed too much emphasis on the so-called auditory hallucinations, and on that answer given to him by the plaintiff and the possibility that this meant that the plaintiff was “hearing voices”. There is no evidence from the other doctors regarding the plaintiff hearing voices. It seems more likely to me that there was some confusion in the mind of the plaintiff about the question which compared the Sydney incident with the ringing in his ears, because I cannot see what the connection could be between having a ringing in his ears and being raped. There was no suggestion in the evidence that the plaintiff had any auditory hallucinations after and as a result of the rape.
I prefer the evidence of Dr Sniatynskyj and Dr Czechowicz to that of Professor Goldney. They had the advantage of seeing the plaintiff on a regular basis; Professor Goldney saw him only twice on successive days. They also had considerable input into various return to work programmes over quite a long period.

Causation

I accept the diagnosis of post traumatic stress disorder and depression. I do not consider that it has been established that the plaintiff suffers from any psychotic condition. I am unable to find that the plaintiff’s concern about the letter he received from his employer in May 1993, or his retrenchment in the following year, or his endolymphatic hydrops, had any influence on the post traumatic stress disorder and depression that followed the dog attack. I do not consider that the rape of the plaintiff played any significant part in the psychiatric conditions from which the plaintiff suffered after the dog attack. I note that the defendants claim that any post traumatic stress disorder from which the plaintiff suffered as a result of the dog attack was merely a temporary aggravation that will soon sink back into its proper prospective, whereas they rely upon post traumatic stress disorder as a result of the plaintiff being raped as still relevant after about 27 years. I accept that the plaintiff probably recovered from most of the rape-induced ongoing stress from which he was suffering within about two years after the rape. For the next 24 years or so, he was able to function perfectly well in all areas. He was even able to cope reasonably well with the systematic harassment and abuse which he suffered in his place of employment for about two years before the dog attack. Even the disgusting remarks made to him on the morning of the day of the dog attack did not have such an affect on him that he was unable to continue with his work that day. However, after the dog attack, he was unable to cope with this sort of harassment and abuse. Clearly the disgraceful behaviour of the plaintiff’s workmates at the Blackwood Post Office, and the inexplicable failure of senior employees at the Post Office to do something about it, played some part in the plaintiff’s psychiatric illness. However, a comparison of the plaintiff’s behaviour before and after the dog attack, and his ability to function reasonably well before the attack but not after, convinces me that it was the dog attack that was the main cause of his psychiatric problems.
The plaintiff having established a breach of duty in terms of section 66 of the Dog and Cat Management Act 1995, the onus shifts to the defendants to satisfy me that any other factors or causes should result in a reduction in the damages that would have been appropriate for the dog attack alone (see McGhee v National Coal Board (1972) 3 All ER 1008 at 102; Chappel v Hart (1998) 156 ALR 517 per Kirby J at 548).
In Purkess v Crittenden (1965) 114 CLR 164 at 168, Barwick CJ and Kitto and Taylor JJ said:
“.... Where a plaintiff has, by direct or circumstantial evidence, made out a prima facie case that incapacity has resulted from the defendant’s negligence, the onus of adducing evidence that his incapacity is wholly or partly the result of some pre-existing condition or that incapacity, either total or partial, would, in any event, have resulted from a pre-existing condition, rests upon the defendant”.
As to the incapacity of the plaintiff in this case being wholly or partly the result of some pre-existing condition, the only pre-existing condition I am able to accept is the stress resulting from the harassment and abuse from the plaintiff’s fellow employees. But the question that then arises is whether any damages to which the plaintiff is entitled should be reduced by reason of that factor.
In Watts v Rake (1960) 108 CLR 158, the plaintiff established that, before being severely injured in a motor vehicle accident, the plaintiff had been able to lead an active life, both in work and in physical recreation and that, although he was not without some disabilities, his enjoyment of life was not impaired much, if at all. (That seems to me to be a fairly apt description of the plaintiff in the present case before the dog attack). The defendant in that case argued that the plaintiff was predisposed to at least some of the arthritic and other conditions which had seriously and rapidly developed as a result of the accident; secondly, that part of the plaintiff’s present condition was traceable to causes other than the accident, and thirdly, that if there had been no accident the defendant would eventually and prematurely have been incapacitated by “the seeds of disability within him”. Dixon CJ dealt with these submissions as follows:
“Now as to the first answer, it may at once be said that it is no answer. If the injury proves more serious in his incidents and its consequences because of the injured man’s condition, that does nothing but increase the damages the defendant must pay. To sever the remaining leg of a one-legged man or put out the eye of a one-eyed man is to do a far more serious injury than it would have been had the injured man possessed two legs or two eyes. .... As to the second and third of these answers, there is undoubtedly a presumptio hominis in the plaintiff’s favour which any tribunal of fact should insist that the defendant should overcome. If the disabilities of the plaintiff can be disentangled and one or more traced to causes which the injuries he sustained through the accident play no part, it is the defendant who should be required to do the disentangling and to exclude the operation of the accident as a contributory cause. If it be the case that at some future date the plaintiff would in any event have reached his present pitiable state, the defendant should be called upon to prove that satisfactorily and moreover to show the period at the close of which it would have occurred.”
Windeyer J, who was one of the three judges in Watts (above), sought to explain this passage in Purkess (above):
“In a personal injury case the ultimate burden is on the plaintiff to establish the extent of his injuries caused by the conduct of the defendant. If when the tort occurred the plaintiff was suffering from a progressive disease which, even if he had not been tortiously hurt, would certainly and within some reasonably predictable time have disabled him in the same way as the tort did, then the defendant’s conduct has merely hastened the inevitable, and damages must be measured accordingly. But a plaintiff, tortiously injured, who suffers thereafter in a way in which he had not previously suffered, may in the absence of any countervailing evidence rely upon the prima facie conclusion that for his disabilities and sufferings the defendant is responsible. .... The evidence may not show that the conduct of the defendant did more than accelerate misfortune. But of course, it will not avail the defendant to show that, but for the plaintiff being in some way ailing when he was hurt, his injuries would have been less serious than they were. A tortfeasor gets no allowance because of the frailty of his victim. .... a defendant is not relieved of responsibility for the consequences of his conduct because the plaintiff would not have suffered as he did unless other contributory factors had existed. The ordinary conclusion when a man suffers a hurt is that all the consequences that follow it are attributable to the events that immediately caused it. If it be suggested that this is not so, that some of the apparent consequences are not causally related to it, then some material is required to support that suggestion. It is in this sense and at this stage that a burden of adducing evidence is upon the defendant.” (at pages 170 -171).
I am by no means satisfied that the plaintiff in this case “would in any event have reached his present pitiable state” because of causes in respect of which the dog attack played no part. I find that he is entitled to damages for the injuries, physical and otherwise, that followed as a result of the dog attack, without diminution by reason of any pre-existing propensity caused by the harassment and abuse from his fellow employees.

Damages

The plaintiff is entitled to be compensated for pain and suffering, both physical and psychiatric, and loss of amenities of life. The physical consequences of the dog attack were neither very serious nor very long lasting, and it is likely that the plaintiff had recovered from them at least by about the end of 1997. The psychiatric consequences have proved to be both serious and long lasting, although some of the symptoms have diminished over the past two and a half years or so. I think there was some exaggeration by the plaintiff regarding his present symptoms, both in his rule 46.15 particulars (dated 7 February 2000) and in his evidence, although this exaggeration may itself be connected with his psychiatric illness.
It is possible that while he has been consulting solicitors about his claim, seeing psychiatrists for the preparation of reports and attending court for the hearing of his claim, it has been difficult for him to put out of his mind the consequences of the dog attack. It may be that his condition will improve once these proceedings have been finalised. Professor Goldney expressed the view that “until these medico-legal issues are finalised they will tend to perpetuate his condition”.
While he was working at the post office, and before the dog attack, the plaintiff enjoyed a great many social and other pursuits. He was a member of clubs involved in chess, bicycle riding and cars. He enjoyed playing chess and he use to ride his bike for 100 - 200 kms per week. He played a lot of tennis and did a lot of swimming. He was considering that at some future time he might look for more satisfying employment, perhaps in the sales area in which he had worked for such a long time. He even considered the possibility of resuming his University studies. Most of the social and sporting activities have ceased or diminished since the dog attack. He finds it hard to concentrate and feels that he has not yet returned to normal social functioning. He and his wife occasionally go out with friends and sometimes go out to see a film. They go for walks in the area where they live, but the plaintiff is always wary about confronting a dog.
I award the sum of $12,000 for non-economic loss, of which I would apportion $9000 to the past and $3000 to the future.
As to medical expenses, I accept that $7,996.33 has been paid by Australia Post and that these expenses were reasonably incurred in relation to the plaintiff’s illness. I also accept that $1,156 is still owing and payable to Dr Czechowicz. I accept the plaintiff’s estimate that he has spent about $600 in travel expenses associated with his medical treatment. I award $9,750 for past medical treatment and associated travel. Assessment of this item for the future is much more difficult, because of the uncertainty as to when the plaintiff’s illness will resolve. However, it is highly likely, in my view, that the medical and associated expenses for the future will be considerably less than in the past. I award $2,500 for future medication, medical treatment and associated travel.
During the period from the dog attack until 4 March 1999, the plaintiff was either not working or was working reduced hours. However, during the whole of this period, Australia Post paid or made up the salary that the plaintiff would have earned but for the dog attack if he had been performing the same duties. This amounted to $20,961.21. I am told that if an award of damages is made, this amount will be totally refundable by the plaintiff to Australia Post. Since 4 March 1999, the plaintiff has used up all his available sick leave (valued at $2,059) and has then been employed by Australia Post on shorter hours at 75% of the salary that he would otherwise have been earning, which amounts to a loss of about $100 per week for a total of about $8000. For past economic loss I award the sum of $31,000.
In relation to future economic loss, counsel for the plaintiff claimed that the plaintiff has lost the chance of being able to go back into a sales job. Apart from the plaintiff mentioning that he had considered this, there is very little to suggest that this might have happened. The plaintiff is now aged 52 years and he has not undertaken any sales work since 1994. Since that date he has been content to undertake work for which his salary was considerably less than that which he might have earned as a sales person.
Again, determination of an appropriate award of damages for future economic loss is extremely difficult. It seems unlikely that Australia Post will continue to employ the plaintiff, but this may depend upon the outcome of other proceedings in another court. If Australia Post does continue to employ him, it is likely to be on the present basis of 75% of his previous salary. It is impossible to say how long this might continue. The plaintiff’s psychiatric disorder might have implications on his earning capacity for only a short time, or it might continue for some years. Even if the plaintiff becomes well enough to get back into the work force again, he is likely to find it very difficult to obtain employment at his age with a history of psychiatric illness, and that is at least partly a consequence of the dog attack. I must make allowance for contingencies and the vicissitudes of life and the possibility, although I consider it to be rather remote, that some other non-tortious act might precipitate a post traumatic stress disorder anyway. All in all, the award of damages for future economic loss must involve wielding a very broad axe. I award the sum of $45,000. There will therefore be judgment for the plaintiff for $100,250 as set out in the table below.

PAST	FUTURE	TOTAL
NON-ECONOMIC LOSS Pain and Suffering etc.	$9,000	$3,000	$12,000
ECONOMIC LOSS Medication, Medical Treatment and Associated Travel	9,750	2,500	12,250
Loss of Earnings	31,000	31,000
Loss of Earning Capacity	45,000	45,000
$49,750	$50,500	$100,250

I shall hear counsel as to interest and costs.

[2000] SADC 100

7 September 2000