Van Rooy v County Court of Victoria

[2005] VSC 501

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF VICTORIA Not Restricted

AT MELBOURNE

PRACTICE COURT

No. 9701 of 2004
No. 9231 of 2005
No. 9232 of 2005
No. 9233 of 2005
No. 9234 of 2005
No. 9235 of 2005
No. 9236 of 2005
No. 9237 of 2005
No. 9238 of 2005

JOSEPHA VAN ROOY	Plaintiff
v
COUNTY COURT OF VICTORIA AND OTHERS	Defendants

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JUDGE:	HARPER J
WHERE HELD:	MELBOURNE
DATE OF HEARING:	14 DECEMBER 2005
DATE OF JUDGMENT:	14 DECEMBER 2005
CASE MAY BE CITED AS:	VAN ROOY v COUNTY COURT OF VICTORIA & ORS
MEDIUM NEUTRAL CITATION:	[2005] VSC 501

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PRACTICE & PROCEDURE – Application to strike out proceedings – Application granted.

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APPEARANCES:	Counsel	Solicitors
For the Plaintiff	Ms J. Van Rooy in person
For the Second Defendant	Ms K. Judd	Victorian Government Solicitor

HIS HONOUR:

1. This is an application in several different proceedings to strike out each proceeding pursuant to rule 23.01 of the Rules of the Supreme Court.  (The summons in each case appears to refer to rule 23.01 of the County Court Rules, but the numbering coincides and I am prepared to accept that the reference is to the Rules of the Supreme Court.)

1. The originating process which is the subject of the defendants' summons consists in each case of an originating motion which has been prepared by the first plaintiff herself, with perhaps some additional assistance.  It does not bear the stamp of a person who has any legal training.  Whether for that reason or for other reasons, the originating motion in each case is in my opinion incomprehensible.  It appears to have been issued pursuant to O.56 of the Rules of the Supreme Court.  It does not, however, set out with any clarity what error is said to have been made by the County Court in the relevant proceeding, but rather is unstructured, not based upon any logical progression of ideas that I can follow, and not a document which in my opinion informs the defendants of the case which the plaintiff seeks to make against them. 

1. It does refer to the fact that the County Court judge refused an application by the plaintiff to allow a McKenzie friend to appear for her.  That is not a matter in respect of which, in my opinion, judicial review should be allowed, and, even if I were wrong about that, it seems to me that in my discretion I should not allow judicial review based merely upon that complaint to move further ahead.

1. The other complaint which appears to be made by the originating motion is that the judge made orders or decisions which were in conflict with s.78B of the Judiciary Act 1903. Although I have listened very carefully to the lengthy argument put to me today by the plaintiff, I am not convinced, on the basis of her submissions, that the Judiciary Act 1903 is relevant to any issue between herself and the defendants.

1. Despite the care with which I have read the documents put before me, and with which I have listened to the plaintiff, I am unable to discern any viable issue upon which she could properly rely for prerogative relief.  The very confusing arguments put before me by the plaintiff seemed to be based upon the proposition that, although technically she may have been in breach of the law relating to road traffic, she was not in substantial breach of any law because the law upon which the prosecuting authorities relied is unconstitutional.  Seeking to put that argument at other times before other courts, she has, for one reason or another, not been heard on it. Indeed, she has not been given the opportunity to put to any court matters which, if accepted in her case, as apparently they have been in others, might lead to her charges, or some of them, being dismissed. 

1. As I understand it, certain of the persons who have been charged with like offences to that of the plaintiff and in like circumstances have had one or more of those charges dismissed. I do not fully understand the reasons for this, but whatever they may be, they appear to have nothing to do with the Judiciary Act, or with any other of the matters upon which the plaintiff now seeks to rely, or with whatever foundation the plaintiff puts forward for seeking prerogative relief. 

1. If it be the fact that the plaintiff has not put before the court material sufficient to have her case dealt with in the same way as the case of those defendants who, to the extent they have been successful, have succeeded, it seems to me that the fault lies not in the system but in the manner in which the plaintiff has sought to defend the charges brought against her.  I have not been told why she has not been represented by a legally qualified person, and I therefore do not know what reasons lie behind the fact that she represents herself.  The fact remains that the argument that she seeks to present is, if it has any validity, a complicated and legally difficult argument to present in the technical sense, albeit that it may be valid, but one which an unrepresented plaintiff is unlikely to be able to put to the court with an appropriate degree of legal substance behind the submissions.

1. In the meantime, the defendants have been faced with a plethora of proceedings which, if the plaintiff is allowed to proceed, will have no foreseeable end.  The courts have always acted upon the principle, amongst the other principles relevant to natural justice and the proper operation of a system of justice, that litigation must come to an end.  Those against whom proceedings are brought are entitled to expect that they will be told what case they have to meet and have it dealt with as efficiently and quickly as the system allows; and that, having been dealt with, that will be the end of the matter subject to any appeal.  That principle stands alongside the principle that parties have a right to be heard.  Both principles must be given effect.  The plaintiff has had the opportunity in the Magistrates' Court and in the County Court and now here to be heard.  Somehow, she has not been able, with all those opportunities, to be put the case which she says will sustain her arguments. 

1. The time, I think, for her to litigate the present controversy has come to an end.  The other principle, that there must be an end to litigation, seems to me to be the principle which in the present circumstances is paramount. 

1. In any event, I have a discretion whether or not to allow an application for prerogative relief to proceed.  In my opinion, the proper exercise of my discretion in this case is to rule that the matter should not proceed because, as the present originating motions do not in my view disclose a cause of action.  They are, rather, the initiators of proceedings that are vexatious and an abuse of the process of the court.

1. I therefore dismiss the several originating motions which are before me today.  There will be judgment for the defendants in each case.

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