Valecom AG

Case

[2012] ATMO 101

5 November 2012


TRADE MARKS ACT 1995



DECISION OF A DELEGATE OF THE REGISTRAR OF TRADE MARKS WITH REASONS

Re:International Registration Designating Australia 1397335(35) – CLIP AND HIT - (International Registration Number 1057104) in the name of valecom AG.

Delegate: Alison Windsor
Representation: Holder:  Siobhan Ryan of Counsel instructed by Griffith Hack Patent and Trade Mark Attorneys of Melbourne.
Decision: 2012 ATMO 101
Ex parte:  provisional refusal under section 44 – cited trade marks not deceptively similar – grounds withdrawn and IRDA accepted for possible protection.

Background

  1. In this matter valecom AG (‘the Holder’) has applied under the provisions of the Trade Marks Regulations 1995 (‘the Regulations) for protection of an International Registration Designating Australia (‘IRDA’). Details of the IRDA as at its filing date are shown here:

    IRDA number:                    1397335
    International Registration:  1057104
    Filed on:  29 October 2010
    Convention priority:            22 June 2010, Switzerland

    Goods/services:  Class 16:  Printed matter, namely coupons, coupon booklets, coupon books

    Class 35:Distribution of advertising material, especially distributing coupons and coupon booklets, particularly by post, attached to a daily newspaper or periodical, or as a collective mailing;  providing services in the field of advertising, namely in marketing or brand management as well as advertising through the distribution of coupons and coupon booklets;  company management for others, namely coordinating the management and flows of goods;  advice in the field of company management and organization, advice in the field of distributing advertising material, coupons and coupon booklets, especially on attachments comprising coupons and coupon booklets, particularly in the field of sending out coupons and coupon booklets with daily newspapers or periodicals, in the fields of marketing and brand management as well as in the field of advice in company management and organization.

    Class 36:Providing coupons, discount stamps

    Trade Mark:  CLIP AND HIT (‘the Trade Mark’)

  2. The IRDA was examined and reported upon as required by regulation 17A.12. The examiner issued a provisional refusal (‘the refusal’) of the IRDA under regulation 17A.16 in respect of all the goods and services claimed. The refusal arose through the operation of regulation 17A.28 and section 44 of the Trade Marks Act 1995 (‘the Act’) based on the trade mark registrations which appear below:[1]

    [1] The complete goods and services specifications are set out in Annex 1 to this decision.

TM Number Priority date Class/es Trade Mark

611176

10 September 1993

16

988515

31 October 2003

9, 18, 25, 35, 38, 41

989991

20 February 2004

9, 18, 25, 35, 38, 41 HIT

1185605

9 July 2007

35 CLIP
  1. In addition, the Holder was informed that the IRDA did not comply with the requirements of section 27 and regulation 4.4 because the service specification in class 36 was ‘too vague for the purposes of classification’.

  2. Thence followed submissions and argument from the Holder’s Australian legal representatives and further reports in response from the examiner concerned.  During the course of these exchanges the Holder agreed to delete class 36 from the IRDA to overcome the matter related to section 27.  Classes 16 and 35 and the goods and services nominated within those two classes therefore remain within the IRDA.

  3. Also during the course of these exchanges the examiner agreed to withdraw registration 988515 as a ground for rejecting the IRDA.  However, the remaining three citations, namely registrations 611176, 989991 and 1185605, were maintained.

  4. After receiving the examiner’s fourth report maintaining the citations, the Holder asked to be heard.

  5. As a Delegate of the Registrar of Trade Marks I heard the matter in Canberra on 22 October 2012.  Siobhan Ryan of Counsel instructed by Griffith Hack, Patent and Trade Mark Attorneys of Melbourne, appeared for the Holder via telephone conference.

    The Legislation

  6. The Regulations relevantly provide:

    17A.16Examination of IRDA — report to Holder

    (1)If, in the course of an examination of an IRDA, the Registrar reasonably believes that:

    (a)the IRDA is not in accordance with this Division; or

    (b)there are grounds under Subdivision 2 for rejecting it in whole or in part;

    the Registrar must send a report in accordance with rule 17 of the Common Regulations to the Holder through the intermediary of the International Bureau.

    (2)Such a report is a provisional refusal for the purposes of the Protocol.

    (3)The report must include:

    (a)notice of the date by which the Registrar must notify his or her final decision on examination to the International Bureau; and

    (b)notice that the Registrar is not required to consider any response by the Holder to the report unless the Holder has notified the Registrar, in writing, of the Holder’s address for service in Australia.

    Note   Under the Protocol, protection must be extended in Australia to a trade mark that is the subject of an IRDA at the end of 18 months after the International Bureau notifies the Trade Marks Office of the IRDA unless, before then, the International Bureau receives:

    (a)notification of a provisional or final refusal from the Trade Marks Office; or

    (b)notification of the possibility that oppositions may be filed after the 18‑month period.

    17A.28Grounds for rejecting IRDA

    (1)The grounds for rejecting an IRDA are the grounds set out in sections 39 to 44 of the Act, as affected by subregulation (2).

    (2)Sections 39 to 44 apply in relation to an IRDA as if:

    (a)a reference in those sections:

    (i)to an application for the registration of a trade mark were a reference to the IRDA; and

    (ii)to an applicant were a reference to the Holder of the IRDA; and

    (b)the reference in paragraph 41 (6) (a) to the filing date in respect of an application were a reference to the date of international registration or the date of recording, as applicable, in respect of the IRDA; and

    (c)each reference in subparagraphs 44 (1) (a) (i) and (2) (a) (i) to a trade mark registered by another person included a protected international trade mark held by another person;

    Registrar’s powers

  7. The Act provides the Registrar with certain powers which she may or must exercise according to the provisions of various sections of the legislation. However, the exercise of those powers is fettered by Section 203 of the Act which provides:

    Exercise of power by Registrar

    203 The Registrar may not exercise a power under this Act in any way that adversely affects a person applying for the exercise of that power without first giving that person a reasonable opportunity of being heard.

  8. Section 33 of the Act provides the Registrar with guidance in respect of her power to accept or reject an application/IRDA following its examination. This section provides:

    Application accepted or rejected

    33.(1) The Registrar must, after the examination, accept the application unless he or she is satisfied that:

    (a) the application has not been made in accordance with this Act; or
    (b) there are grounds for rejecting it.

    Note:  For the grounds on which an application may be rejected see Division 2.

    (2) The Registrar may accept the application subject to conditions or limitations.

    Note:  For limitations see section 6.

    (3) If the Registrar is satisfied that:

    (a) the application has not been made in accordance with this Act; or
    (b) there are grounds for rejecting it;

    the Registrar must reject the application.

    (4) The Registrar may not reject an application without giving the applicant an opportunity of being heard.

    Note:  For applicant see section 6.

  9. Subsection 33(4) makes it quite clear that when the Registrar has declined to accept the application (or indeed, threatened to reject it) at some stage during the examination process, and the Holder considers that it has been adversely affected by the Registrar’s actions, the Holder has the right to request a hearing.  

  10. The Holder has requested to be heard, and its representative has provided submissions in support of acceptance of the IRDA for eventual protection. I am now to decide whether the grounds for rejection which underlie the intended refusal should be maintained. I am in a similar position to that of the examiner in this respect in that I am to consider the grounds for rejection according to the accepted principles appropriate to section 44. I am likewise making my decision prior to any adversarial scrutiny of the application. However, unlike the examiner I do have the benefit of the verbal and written submissions provided by Ms Ryan at the hearing. I am also able to take advantage of a much longer timeframe in which to make my decision.

    Discussion and reasons

    Section 44 – identical etc trade marks

  11. Section 44 of the Act relevantly provides:

    Identical etc. trade marks

    44.(1) Subject to subsections (3) and (4), an application for the registration of a trade mark (applicant's trade mark) in respect of goods (applicant's goods) must be rejected if:

    (a) the applicant's trade mark is substantially identical with, or deceptively similar to:

    (i) a trade mark registered by another person in respect of similar goods or closely related services; or
    (ii) a trade mark whose registration in respect of similar goods or closely related services is being sought by another person; and

    (b) the priority date for the registration of the applicant's trade mark in respect of the applicant's goods is not earlier than the priority date for the registration of the other trade mark in respect of the similar goods or closely related services.

    Note 1:  For deceptively similar see section 10.

    Note 2:  For similar goods see subsection 14(1).
    Note 3:  For priority date see section 12.

    (2) Subject to subsections (3) and (4), an application for the registration of a trade mark (applicant's trade mark) in respect of services (applicant's services) must be rejected if:

    (a) it is substantially identical with, or deceptively similar to:

    (i) a trade mark registered by another person in respect of similar services or closely related goods; or
    (ii) a trade mark whose registration in respect of similar services or closely related goods is being sought by another person; and

    (b) the priority date for the registration of the applicant's trade mark in respect of the applicant's services is not earlier than the priority date for the registration of the other trade mark in respect of the similar services or closely related goods.

    Note 1: For deceptively similar see section 10.

    Note 2:  For similar services see subsection 14(2).
    Note 3:  For priority date see section 12.

  12. In her submissions at the hearing, Ms Ryan conceded that the cited trade marks all have priority dates earlier than that of the IRDA.  She also agreed that the cited trade marks are registered in relation to goods and/or services which are similar or are closely related to the goods and services of the IRDA.

  13. She also noted that during examination of the IRDA the Holder had been advised that the matter of substantial identity did not apply to the trade marks under consideration.  I am also satisfied, applying the generally accepted test in relation to that concept,[2] that the Trade Mark is not substantially identical to any of the three trade marks with which it is to be compared. 

    [2] See, for example, Shell Co. (Aust) Ltd v Esso Standard Oil (Aust) Ltd (1963) 109 CLR 407 at 414-415 per Windeyer J

  14. The remaining matter to be determined is whether the Trade Mark is deceptively similar to any of those of the cited registrations. 

  15. Section 10 provides a definition of the term ‘deceptively similar’ as follows:

    Definition of deceptively similar

    10. For the purposes of this Act, a trade mark is taken to be deceptively similar to another trade mark if it so nearly resembles that other trade mark that it is likely to deceive or cause confusion.

  16. The words ‘deceptively similar’ were discussed by French J in Registrar of Trade Marks v Woolworths[3] at paragraph 50:

    [3] [1999] FCAFC 1020; (1999) 45 IPR 411; [1999] AIPC 91-499

    In Southern Cross Refrigerating Co v Toowoomba Foundry Pty Ltd (1954) 91 CLR 592 at 594-5, which concerned the 1905 Act, Kitto J set out a number of propositions which have frequently been quoted and applied to the 1955 Act. The essential elements of those propositions continue to apply to the issue of deceptive similarity under the 1995 Act. Applied also to service marks and absent the imposition of an onus upon the applicant they may be restated as follows:

    (i) To show that a trade mark is deceptively similar to another it is necessary to show a real tangible danger of deception or confusion occurring. A mere possibility is not sufficient.

    (ii) A trade mark is likely to cause confusion if the result of its use will be that a number of persons are caused to wonder whether it might not be the case that the two products or closely related products and services come from the same source. It is enough if the ordinary person entertains a reasonable doubt.

    It may be interpolated that this is another way of expressing the proposition that the trade mark is likely to cause confusion if there is a real likelihood that some people will wonder or be left in doubt about whether the two sets of products or the products and services in question come from the same source.

    (iii) In considering whether there is a likelihood of deception or confusion all surrounding circumstances have to be taken into consideration. These include the circumstances in which the marks will be used, the circumstances in which the goods or services will be bought and sold and the character of the probable acquirers of the goods and services.

    (iv) The rights of the parties are to be determined as at the date of the application.

    (v) The question of deceptive similarity must be considered in respect of all goods or services coming within the specification in the application and in respect of which registration is desired, not only in respect of those goods or services on which it is proposed to immediately use the mark. The question is not limited to whether a particular use will give rise to deception or confusion. It must be based upon what the applicant can do if registration is obtained.

    In respect of the last proposition, Mason J observed in Berlei Hestia Industries Ltd v The Bali Company Inc [1973] HCA 43; (1973) 129 CLR 353 at 362:

    “...the question whether there is a likelihood of confusion is to be answered, not by reference to the manner in which the respondent has used its mark in the past, but by reference to the use to which it can properly put the mark. The issue is whether that use would give rise to a real danger of confusion.”

  17. It is well established that in order to assess deceptive similarity trade marks should not be compared side by side.  In Australian Woollen Mills v F S Walton & Co,[4] Dixon and McTiernan JJ said (at 658)

    But, in the end, it becomes a question of fact for the court to decide whether in fact there is such a reasonable probability of deception or confusion that the use of the new mark or title should be restrained. 

    In deciding this question, the marks ought not, of course, to be compared side by side. An attempt should be made to estimate the effect or impression produced on the mind of potential customers by the mark or device for which the protection of an injunction is sought. The impression or recollection which is carried away and retained is necessarily the basis of any mistaken belief that the challenged mark or device is the same. The effect of spoken description must be considered. If a mark is in fact or from its nature likely to be the source of some name or verbal description by which buyers will express their desire to have the goods, then similarities both of sound and of meaning may play an important part. The usual manner in which ordinary people behave must be the test of what confusion or deception may be expected. Potential buyers of goods are not to be          credited with any high perception or habitual caution. On the other hand, exceptional carelessness or stupidity may be disregarded. The course of business and the way in which the particular class of goods are sold gives, it may be said, the setting, and the habits and observation of men considered in the mass affords the standard. Evidence of actual cases of deception, if forthcoming, is of great weight.’

    [4] (1937) 58 CLR 641

  18. The comparison is to occur within the context of the services under consideration  see In Re Application by the Pianotist Co Ltd[5]  where Parker J said: 

    You must take the two words. You must judge of them, both by their look and by their sound. You must consider the goods to which they are to be applied. You must consider the nature and kind of customer who would be likely to buy those goods. In fact, you must consider all the surrounding circumstances; and you must further consider what is likely to happen if each of those trade marks is used in a normal way as a trade mark for the goods of the respective owners of the marks.

    [5] (1906) 1A IPR 379 at 380; 23 RPC 774 at 777,

  19. The trade marks must be considered in their entirety:

    One must bear in mind the points of resemblance and the points of dissimilarity, attaching fair weight and importance to all, but remembering that the ultimate solution is to be arrived at, not by adding up and comparing the results of such matters, but by judging the general effect of the respective wholes.[6]

    [6] Clarke v Sharp (1898) 15 RPC 141 at 146 (Ch D)

  20. I will consider each of the cited trade marks in turn and compare them with the Trade Mark.

    Trade mark registration 611176 -

  21. This trade mark consists of a strong visual image and it is difficult to adequately describe it without having the image on hand for reference.  Clear within the image are the letters ‘H’ and ‘i’, the ‘i’ with a small star in place of the usual dot.  There may be a letter ‘T’ following the letter ‘i’, but that is not at all certain in the images available from the trade marks register.  In any event, the overwhelming impressions created by this trade mark is of the letter ‘H’, the letters ‘Hi’ or the word ‘hi’. 

  22. The Trade Mark consists of the expression CLIP AND HIT.  I can see no similarities in appearance or sound, nor is there any similarity in the idea of the trade marks.  Given that the cited trade mark does not clearly appear as the word ‘HIT’, the impression formed in the mind of the potential purchaser is unlikely to be one which could result in any kind of confusion occurring between these two trade marks.  This citation does not stand up to scrutiny at all.  The trade marks are not deceptively similar.

    Trade mark registration 989991 - HIT

  23. In respect of this cited trade mark, the Holder submitted the following:

    Registration no. 989991 for HIT word mark is a single word mark. It too is visually, aurally and conceptually different to CLIP AND HIT.

    Against this, the applicant’s mark CLIP AND HIT comprises three words, which together form a comprehensible phrase (albeit nonsensical in the context of the goods and services applied for). CLIP AND HIT sounds like an instruction or command; this characteristic informs the mark. The element “HIT” does not have a separate identity in this phrase, as for example the surname “Ballantyne” in “Ballantyne and Stewarts”, which could infringe a registration for “Ballantyne” because of the tendency to abbreviate such a name to the singular “Ballantyne’s”[7].

    On the contrary, CLIP AND HIT, is a “new and memorable corporate entity”[8]. As the Delegate said, in Bondi Icebergs Club Co-op Pty Ltd v Gilmour SpA[9], in relation to the comparison between ICEBERG and BONDI ICEBERGS:

    However, I think that the isolated assessment of what Bondi might mean is not at the core of the issue. What is at issue is how that element might affect the comparison of the applicant’s trade mark with ICEBERG simpliciter. 

    [7] George Ballantyne & Son Ltd v Ballantyne and Stewart & Co Ltd [1959] RPC 273

    [8] Bondi Icebergs Club Co-op Pty Ltd v Gilmour SPA (2008) 80 IPR 587 at [15]

    [9] Ibid at [14]

  1. I agree with the Holder’s assessment of the comparison being made here.  The Trade Mark consists of a three word expression, apparently meaningless in the context of the services offered, but nevertheless clearly an expression rather than three unconnected words.  The placing of the conjunction ‘and’ between the word ‘clip’ and the word ‘hit’ means that neither of those words stands out as the distinguishing feature of the Trade Mark.  Because the expression is essentially meaningless within the context of the services offered by both parties, there is nothing within the Trade Mark which suggests any relationship with the cited proprietor or with the trade mark HIT.  The two trade marks convey significantly different ideas and impressions and as a result there is little likelihood of any confusion occurring between them.  The two trade marks are not deceptively similar.

    Trade mark registration 1185605 - CLIP

  2. In respect of this citation, the Holder submitted the following:

    This application is in the category of cases referred to by the delegate in Pom Wonderful LLC v Trialia Foods Australia Pty Limited[10]:

    The mere fact that the respective marks may include a common element which they each share (and in this instance whether that common element is the prefix “POM” or the symbol of a heart) does not necessarily serve to render those marks deceptively similar. It is by now well-established that the appearance of the same element or component in two trade marks does not necessarily render one mark deceptively similar to the other mark. From the extensive range and dichotomy of decided cases which are available in this instance I would draw on the decisions of Harrods Limited’s Application (1935) 52 RPC 65 (“HYDE PARK” and “PARK DRIVE”), Enoch’s Application (1947) 64 RPC 119 (“VIVICILLIN” and “CYLLIN”), Conde Nast Publications Pty. Limited v. Taylor (1998) 41 IPR 505 (“EUROVOGUE” and “VOGUE”), Tran v. Meldrum (1999) 461 IPR 505 (“hot tuna” and “hot piranha”), Effem Foods Pty. Limited v. Star-Kist Foods Inc. (2000) 50 IPR 121 (“meaty bone” and “meaty bite”), C.A. Henschke &. Company v. Rosemount Estates Pty. Limited (2000) 52 IPR 42 (“HILL OF GRACE” and “HILL OF GOLD”, an infringement case but still usefully applicable) and Sara Lee Corporation v. Bali Blue Pty. Limited (2003) 59 IPR 619 (“BALI” and “BALI BLUE”) as being particularly apposite and helpful. Having regard to the present matter, it seems to me that the mere appearance of the commonly-shared element “POM” in the “Pomdelicious” applications is not in itself sufficient and that there must be established something more before the ground under S. 44 is able to be made out by the Opponent. (emphasis added)

    We would add Cooper Engineering Co Pty Ltd v Sigmund Pumps Ltd (1952) 86 CLR 536 at 538 (“RAIN KING” and “RAINMASTER”), Aldi Stores Ltd Partnership v Frito Lay Trading Co GmbH (2001) 54 IPR 344 (“CHEEZY TWISTS” and “TWISTIES”) and Trust Company Ltd v WW Australia Pty Ltd (2009) 85 IPR 452 (“WHITEWATER WORLD” and “WATERWORLD”).

    In each of these cases the tribunal saw past the common element and searched for the “something more” which, as in this case, was lacking. On the contrary, in this case, the commonality of the elements “HIT” or “CLIP” (as the case may be) is immediately negated by the effect of the conjunction “CLIP AND HIT” which is to transform the abstract words “hit” and “clip” into an imperative; thus making the new mark conceptually distinct, as well as visually and aurally different.

    [10] Pom Wonderful LLC v Trialia Foods Australia Pty Limited [10] [2009] ATMO 93 (18 November 2009) at [38]

  3. I consider that there is little more that I can add to these submissions as they set out the situation relevant to this case more than adequately.  While the word ‘clip’ may well be the initial word in the Trade Mark, it is no more the essential or distinguishing feature than is the word ‘hit’.  The Trade Mark consists of the expression CLIP AND HIT which is not susceptible to dissection into essential and non-essential features.  

  4. The likelihood of the Trade Mark being seen as related in any way to the cited proprietor is remote.  It is similarly a remote possibility that there would be any real and tangible danger of deception and confusion occurring between the trade marks in any commercial situation.  I do not find the Trade Mark and the cited registration deceptively similar.

    Decision

  5. I have found that none of the earlier dated registrations are deceptively similar to the Trade Mark. There are thus no grounds for refusing protection to this IRDA and I have accepted it for possible protection.

    Alison Windsor
    Hearing Officer
    Trade Marks Hearings
    5 November 2012

    Annex 1

    Goods/service specifications for cited trade mark registrations.

    611176           Class 16:  Printed publications and other printed matter

    988515Class 9:  Scientific, nautical, surveying, electric, electronic, photographic, cinematographic, optical, weighing, measuring, signalling, checking (supervision), life-saving and teaching apparatus and instruments; parts and fittings of the aforesaid goods; apparatus and instruments for recording, transmission and reproduction of sound and images; parts and fittings of the aforesaid goods; magnetic data carriers, recording discs; automatic machines and mechanisms for coin operated apparatus; cash register, talking machines; calculating machines, data processing equipment and computers; fire-extinguishing apparatus; pre-recorded media, pre-recorded and unrecorded audio cassettes, audio cassette tapes, video cassettes, video tapes, compact discs, digital video discs, CD ROMs, DVDs; sound and picture recordings in the form of films, cassettes, tapes, discs and filaments; computer software; computer discs; animated cartoons; handheld calculators, radios, cameras, mouse pads, audio cassette players, DVD players, cases for compact discs, video games cartridges; spectacles, sun glasses, spectacle cases, spectacle frames, decorative magnets; electronic publications; excluding computer software related to health care management

    Class 18:  Bags, athletic bags, school bags, duffle bags, beach bags, diaper bags, coin purses, fanny packs, key cases, vanity cases sold empty, suitcases, handbags, umbrellas, back packs, luggage, tote bags, synthetic fabric lunch bags, wallets; briefcases

    Class 25:  Clothing; footwear; headgear; swimwear; masquerade and Halloween costumes and masks; babies napkins

    Class: 35:  Services of advertising, distributing of prospectuses and samples; business management; business administration; computer-based and telecommunication-based retail services featuring clothing, toys, collectibles, music, jewellery, souvenir items and videos, including such services involving catalogues; retail store services featuring clothing, toys, collectibles, music, jewellery, souvenir items and videos; assistance and consultancy for the establishment and management of retail stores

    989991:Class 9:  Scientific, nautical, surveying, electric, electronic, photographic, cinematographic, optical, weighing, measuring, signalling, checking (supervision), life-saving and teaching apparatus and instruments; parts and fittings of the aforesaid goods; apparatus and instruments for recording, transmission and reproduction of sound and images; parts and fittings of the aforesaid goods; magnetic data carriers, recording discs; automatic vending machines and mechanisms for coin operated apparatus; cash register, talking machines; calculating machines, data processing equipment and computers; fire-extinguishing apparatus; pre-recorded media, pre-recorded and unrecorded audio cassettes, audio cassette tapes, video cassettes, video tapes, compact discs, digital video discs, CD ROMs, DVDs; sound and picture recordings in the form of films, cassettes, tapes, discs and filaments; computer software; computer discs; animated cartoons; handheld calculators, radios, cameras, mouse pads, audio cassette players, DVD players, cases for compact discs, video game cartridges; spectacles, sun glasses, spectacle cases, spectacle frames, decorative magnets; electronic publications; excluding all the following goods being solar cells, solar cell modules being solar panels for electricity generation, photovoltaic modules (PV modules) including photovoltaic modules integrated with roofing, generators including photovoltaic generators consisting of solar cell modules, electric collectors and power conditioners

    Class 18:  Bags, athletic bags, school bags, duffle bags, beach bags, diaper bags, coin purses, fanny packs, key cases, vanity cases sold empty, suitcases, handbags, umbrellas, back packs, luggage, tote bags, synthetic fabric lunch bags, wallets; briefcases

    Class 25:  Clothing; footwear; headgear; swimwear; masquerade and halloween costumes and masks; babies napkins

    Class 35:  Services of advertising, distribution of prospectuses and samples; business management; business administration; computer based and telecommunication-based retail services featuring clothing, toys, collectibles, music, jewellery, souvenir items and videos, including such services involving catalogues; retail store services featuring clothing, toys, collectibles, music, jewellery, souvenir items and videos; assistance and consultancy for the establishment and management of retail stores

    Class 38:  Telecommunication services; broadcasting services, radio broadcasting, music broadcasting; terrestrial, cable or satellite broadcasting of radio, television, teletext or of data; transmission of radio or television programmes; transmission of data; message services included in this class; computer aided transmission of messages, data and images; services relating to communications by computer terminals; news agency services; information and advisory services, all relating to the aforesaid services

    Class 41:  Education and entertainment services; providing of training; sporting and cultural activities; production, presentation, distribution and rental of radio and television programmes, videos and motion picture films; television, motion picture film and video entertainment services; movie studio, video studio and television studio services; distribution of audio and audio-visual programming; publication services, also online; organisation of competitions; provision of information relating to entertainment and/or education, also online; club services; activities and games accessible through the Internet; stage shows, fan clubs, amusement parks; day nursery, kindergarten and primary schools; live performances and personal appearances by a costumed character; provision of online electronic publications

    1185605:        Class 35: Promotion (advertising) of business; provision of advertising space; advertising services provided over the Internet; compilation of directories for publishing on the Internet; compilation and provision of online directories; online advertising on a computer network; online data processing services; online promotion on a computer network; providing information, including online, about advertising, business management and administration and office functions; computerised database management; computerised file management; data management; database management; electronic storage of data (computerised file management)


Areas of Law

  • Intellectual Property

Legal Concepts

  • Statutory Construction

  • Appeal

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