VAJ v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

VAJ v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2002] FCA 1201

MIGRATION – refusal of protection visa by Refugee Review Tribunal – judicial review – alleged failure on part of Tribunal to consider particular aspect of applicant’s claim – whether jurisdictional error – privative clause decision – whether alleged error falls within Hickman principles – whether transgression of “inviolable limitation or restraint on power”

Migration Act 1958 (Cth) s 474(1)

R v Hickman; Ex parte Fox and Clinton (1945) 70 CLR 598 at 615-616 referred to
NAAV v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2002] FCAFC 228 at par [10] applied
R v Coldham; Ex parte The Australian Workers’ Union (1983) 153 CLR 415 at 419 referred to
SBAB v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2002] FCAFC 161 at [30] referred to
Ahvazi v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2002] FCA 279 referred to

VAJ v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AND INDIGENEOUS AFFAIRS
V1101 OF 2001

WEINBERG J
27 SEPTEMBER 2002
MELBOURNE

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

VICTORIA DISTRICT REGISTRY

V 1101 OF 2002

BETWEEN:

VAJ
APPLICANT

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AND INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS
RESPONDENT

JUDGE:

WEINBERG J

DATE OF ORDER:

27 SEPTEMBER 2002

WHERE MADE:

MELBOURNE

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.        The application be dismissed.

2.        The applicant pay the respondent’s costs.

Note:   Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

VICTORIA DISTRICT REGISTRY

V1101 OF 2002

BETWEEN:

VAJ
APPLICANT

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AND INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS
RESPONDENT

JUDGE:

WEINBERG J

DATE:

27 SEPTEMBE R2002

PLACE:

MELBOURNE

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

  1. This is an application for review of a decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal (“the RRT”) given on 19 September 2001. By that decision the RRT affirmed a prior decision of a delegate of the Minister on 27 July 2001 not to grant the applicant a protection visa. The applicant seeks review of that decision under s 475A of the Migration Act 1958 (“the Act”) and s 39B of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth). It is accepted that this application, having been instituted on 17 October 2001, is governed by the amendments to the Act which came into effect on 2 October 2001. The decision under review is a privative clause decision, and thus subject to s 474(1) of the Act which provides:

    “(1)     A privative clause decision:

    (a)is final and conclusive; and

    (b)must not be challenged, appealed against, reviewed, quashed or called in question in any court; and

    (c)is not subject to prohibition, mandamus, injunction, declaration or certiorari in any court on any account.”

    BACKGROUND

  2. The applicant, a citizen of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, arrived in Australia on 26 December 1980 on a three month visa.  After that visa had expired, he remained in Australia.  He was arrested in June 2001 by Immigration Officers. 

  3. On 26 June 2001 the applicant lodged an application for…

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Details
Case
[2002] FCA 1201
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The Federal Court of Australia was called upon to review a decision by the Refugee Review Tribunal (RRT) to deny the applicant, a citizen of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, a protection visa. The applicant arrived in Australia in 1980 on a temporary visa and overstayed its expiry. He subsequently applied for a protection visa, which was rejected by a delegate of the Minister and subsequently affirmed by the RRT. The court's task was to determine whether the RRT's decision could be reviewed despite the privative clause in the Migration Act 1958, which generally prevents such review.

The primary legal issue was whether the privative clause in the Migration Act precluded judicial review of the RRT's decision. The applicant argued that the RRT had misunderstood or misconceived his claim regarding the presence of paramilitary groups in his home country and their potential persecution of him due to his Slovak ethnicity. The court considered whether this potential error amounted to a jurisdictional error warranting review under the Judiciary Act 1903. The court also examined whether the privative clause could be overridden by principles derived from the High Court's decision in Hickman v. The Commonwealth (1945), which allows for limited judicial review in the presence of such clauses.

The court concluded that the privative clause in the Act was effective and precluded review of the RRT's decision. The principles from Hickman did not apply because the applicant's argument did not reveal a jurisdictional error, such as a misunderstanding or misapplication of the law. Instead, the applicant's argument concerned a perceived error in the RRT's interpretation of his specific circumstances, which did not fall within the scope of permissible review under the Act. Therefore, the court found that the RRT's decision was final and conclusive.

ORDERS:
1. The application for review be dismissed.
2. The applicant pay the respondent's costs.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The application be dismissed.

2. The applicant pay the respondent’s costs.

Background

Background to the litigation

This is an application for review of a decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal (“the RRT”) given on 19 September 2001. By that decision the RRT affirmed a prior decision of a delegate of the Minister on 27 July 2001 not to grant the applicant a protection visa. The applicant seeks review of that decision under s 475A of the Migration Act 1958 (“the Act”) and s 39B of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth). It is accepted that this application, having been instituted on 17 October 2001, is governed by the amendments to the Act which came into effect on 2 October 2001. The decision under review is a privative clause decision, and thus subject to s 474(1) of the Act which provides:“(1) A privative clause decision:(a)is final and conclusive; and(b)must not be challenged, appealed against, reviewed, quashed or called in question in any court; and(c)is not subject to prohibition, mandamus, injunction, declaration or certiorari in any court on any account.”BACKGROUND The applicant, a citizen of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, arrived in Australia on 26 December 1980 on a three month visa. After that visa had expired, he remained in Australia. He was arrested in June 2001 by Immigration Officers. On 26 June 2001 the applicant lodged an application for a protection (class XA) visa with the Department of Immigration and Multicultural Affairs. On 23 July 2001 he was interviewed in connection with his application. On 27 July 2002 the delegate determined that the applicant was not a person to whom Australia had protection obligations under the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (“the Convention”), as Amended by the 1967 Protocol, on the basis that the applicant did not face a “real chance of persecution upon return to Yugoslavia”. Article 1A(2) of the Convention provides that the term “refugee” shall apply to any person who:“… owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable, or owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return it”. On 2 August 2001 the applicant applied to the RRT for a review of the decision of the delegate to refuse a protection visa. On 10 September 2001 a hearing was conducted by the RRT. Written submissions were also received on behalf of the applicant. On 19 September 2001 the RRT gave its decision affirming the decision of the delegate under review. That lead to the institution by the applicant of this proceeding in this Court. THE APPLICANT’S CLAIMS The applicant was born in 1944 in Begec, Vojvodina, which is now in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. From an early age he lived in Ilok, which is in the Vukovar region, in what is now Croatia. The regions of Vojvodina and Ilok are close together and are separated by the Danube River which was formerly the border between the old states of the Federation of Serbia and Croatia respectively. It is now the border between the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and Croatia.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

WEINBERG J
Moreover, the respondent submitted that, there was nothing in the material before the RRT to suggest that any paramilitary groups might wish to harm the applicant because of his Slovak ethnicity. The applicant had not advanced any evidence to suggest that para-military forces were operating in the region of his birth. CONCLUSION Whatever the position might have been prior to the enactment of s 474(1) of the Act, it is now clear that the applicant can only succeed in his application for review if he can demonstrate that his case falls within the principles enunciated by Dixon J in Hickman (supra). Section 474(1) is in substantially the same terms as the provision in the World War II National Security Regulations considered by the High Court in Hickman. It is also in substantially the same terms as the privative clause in the industrial legislation considered by the High Court in the many cases set out in the judgment of Black CJ in NAAV v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2002] FCAFC 228 at par [10]. What is described as a “Hickman clause” will validate a decision under review provided that three conditions are fulfilled. These are:· the purported exercise is a bona fide attempt to exercise the power;· it relates to the subject matter of the legislation; and· it is reasonably capable of being referred to in the power. In substance the Hickman doctrine operates to reconcile apparently inconsistent statutory provisions, one of which seems to limit the powers of the decision maker and the other, the privative clause, seems to contemplate that the decision shall operate free from any restriction. The inconsistency is resolved by reading the two provisions together and giving effect to each. The Hickman clause is taken into account in ascertaining what the apparent restriction actually signifies. This is so that the court can determine whether the situation is one in which judicial review is available. The one limitation upon the scope of a Hickman clause, for which there appears to be substantial support, is that it cannot affect the operation of a provision which imposes “inviolable limitations or restraints” upon the jurisdiction or powers of a decision-maker: see R v Coldham; Ex parte The Australian Workers’ Union (1983) 153 CLR 415 at 419 per Mason ACJ and Brennan J. The only argument advanced on behalf of the applicant which could conceivably give rise to a jurisdictional error of a kind sufficient to warrant prerogative relief under s 39B was that the RRT had misunderstood or misconceived an aspect of his claim, and failed to deal with it: see SBAB v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2002] FCAFC 161 at [30]. The argument turned upon a particular question set out in the pro forma application for a protection (class XA) visa, and the applicant’s answer to that question. The applicant was asked whether he thought the Yugoslav authorities would protect him if he returned to that country, and if not, why not. His reply was “no”, because there were para-military groups acting independently of the authorities and outside their control and supervision. Those authorities had acted against ethnic minorities, including Slovaks and minority religions, and had participated in ethnic cleansing.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: WEINBERG J