DISTRICT COURT OF QUEENSLAND
CITATION:
Usher v Palmer (No.2) [2023] QDC 16
PARTIES:
JONATHAN DAVID USHER
(plaintiff)
v
BEN ROBERT PALMER(defendant)
FILE NO/S:
2306/20
DIVISION:
Civil
PROCEEDING:
Application for costs
ORIGINATING COURT:
Brisbane District Court
DELIVERED ON:
17 February 2023
DELIVERED AT:
Roma
HEARING DATE:
Written submissions received 25 January 2023 and 30 January 2023.
JUDGE:
Byrne KC DCJ
ORDER:
The plaintiff is to pay the defendant’s costs of the proceeding, including all reserved costs, on the standard basis.
CATCHWORDS:
COSTS - PROCEDURE – UNIFORM CIVIL PROCEDURES RULES - offer to settle under Chapter 9, Part 5 of the UCPR - r 361 of the UCPR - s 40 of the Defamation Act 2005 - general principles and exercise of discretion – offer to settle must contain element of compromise – costs where claim was dismissed for want of prosecution – non-application of r 361 where the plaintiff is wholly unsuccessful– power to order indemnity costs where claim was dismissed for want of prosecution - conduct does not rise to a level to disqualify from partial indemnification - unreasonable offer does not amount to an offer
LEGISLATION:
Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999, Chapter 9, Part 5, r 361, r 681
Defamation Act 2005 s40
CASES:
Gramotnev v Queensland University of Technology (No. 2) [2018] QSC 81
Hazeldene’s Chicken Farm Pty Ltd v Victorian WorkCover Authority (No. 2) [2005] 13 VR 435
Jones v Millward [2005] 1 Qd R 498
Oshlack v Richmond River Council (1998) 193 CLR 72
Zoef v Nationwide News Pty Ltd(No. 2) [2017] NSWCA 2
COUNSEL:
Mr. R. Anderson KC for the plaintiff.
Mr. A. Nelson for the defendant.SOLICITORS:
The plaintiff appears for himself.
Australian Law Partners for the defendant.
Introduction
These reasons for judgement are concerned with the issue of costs consequent upon my earlier judgment in the substantive dispute, and should be read in light of that judgment. [1]
Further background
Unsurprisingly there had been correspondence between the parties, both before and after the commencement of proceedings, which variously contained what are said to be offers to settle the proceedings.
The concerns notice issued on 31 December 2017 contained minimum requirements to make amends, being a written apology, an unreserved retraction of the allegations, and compensation for costs incurred and for hurt, distress and embarrassment caused. Then, a letter from the plaintiff to the defendant dated 28 March 2018 offered to waive a right to claim, which was quantified at just over $392,000 plus aggravated damages to be assessed, in exchange for an unreserved written apology and an unreserved retraction of the allegations. Neither of these offers are of relevance to the present question.
On 5 February 2019, shortly after the Notice of Defence had been filed, the defendant’s then solicitor wrote a letter to the plaintiff’s solicitor headed “Offer to Settle” which indicated a willingness to consent to a discontinuance of the claim. The document was silent…
Keep reading for free
Create a free CaseChat account to read Usher v Palmer (No.2) and more:
- Read every judgment in full
- Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
- See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
- Download judgments as PDF or Word
One click creates your free account or signs you in.
By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.
- Case
- [2023] QDC 16
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court had to determine whether the rejection of the defendant's offers to settle justified the imposition of costs on an indemnity basis. The court also needed to assess if the offers made by the defendant qualified as "offers" under r 361 of the UCPR, and whether the plaintiff's conduct warranted indemnity costs. Additionally, the court examined the applicability of s 40 of the Defamation Act 2005.
The court reasoned that while the plaintiff's conduct in the applications warranted costs on the standard basis, the rejection of the offers was not unreasonable. The first offer was unclear and could be seen as a demand rather than an offer to settle. The subsequent offers were also demands, not genuine offers to settle. Therefore, the court concluded that the plaintiff's rejection of these offers did not warrant costs on the indemnity basis. It was further held that r 361 of the UCPR did not apply as the plaintiff was wholly unsuccessful. The court exercised its discretion under r 681 of the UCPR and found no grounds for ordering indemnity costs, given the plaintiff's conduct in the proceedings.
ORDERS:
The plaintiff is to pay the defendant’s costs of the proceeding, including all reserved costs, on the standard basis.
Orders
Orders of the court
The plaintiff is to pay the defendant’s costs of the proceeding, including all reserved costs, on the standard basis.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Full text does not contain this section.
Decision
Reasons for decision
Full text does not contain this section.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Finally, it is submitted that in the particular circumstances of this matter there are good grounds to order that there be no order as to costs, or otherwise costs should be ordered on the standard basis, but only from the time the offer was made.Consideration It is uncontentious that the defendant should receive his costs of the applications that were the subject of the primary judgment. I consider they should be paid on the standard basis. There was nothing in the plaintiff’s conduct in the applications that would warrant indemnity costs. The fact there had been no step taken in over two years was the basis of the application. This may, in certain circumstances, provide some support for an order for indemnity costs. However, given that there were matters in the plaintiff’s favour in those applications which are elucidated in the primary judgement, it is not appropriate they be paid on that indemnity basis. As to the costs of the balance of the proceeding generally, as the defendant does not press complaints about the plaintiff’s conduct of those proceedings, that need not be considered as a stand-alone basis for the award of indemnity costs. I accept that r 361 of the UCPR does not apply where the plaintiff has been wholly unsuccessful.[2] Accordingly, the discretion to be applied is that reflected in r 681 of the UCPR, and the criteria outlined in Hazeldene’s Chicken Farm Pty Ltd v Victorian WorkCover Authority (No. 2)[3] are a useful guide.[2]Gramotnev v Queensland University of Technology (No.2) [2018] QSC 81 and cases cited therein.[3][2005] 13 VR 435 [25]. I interpolate here that, if consideration of the point was necessary, I would have concluded that at least the second and third offers by the defendant would not have qualified as “offers” for the purposes of r 361 as they do not contain any aspect of compromise,[4] but in any event they would not have fallen for consideration given they were second and subsequent offers.[5][4]Jones v Millward [2005] 1 Qd R 498.[5]See r 361(4) of the UCPR. The first offer was made early in the litigation, but was not clear on its terms as it made no reference to costs. If it was intended that the plaintiff pay the defendant’s costs, it was a demand to capitulate. If that was not the intention, it was suggesting the plaintiff should discontinue proceedings that, although ultimately rising and falling on the credit assessment of all witnesses, had some prospects of success.[6] I also accept the plaintiff’s submissions that the limited nature of the defences pleaded meant that his prospects of success were not hindered by complicated or overly nuanced considerations.[6]Primary judgment at [30]. In any event, the terms of the offer were not clearly expressed, and the offer did not refer to it being relied on for the purposes of costs, whether on the standard or indemnity basis. It was not, in my view, imprudent to reject the first offer. As for the two later offers, I have already recorded my view that they were each demands to capitulate rather than offers to settle, as properly understood.