United Workers' Union v GPC Asia Pacific Pty Ltd

[2025] FWC 2222

[2025] FWC 2222

FAIR WORK COMMISSION

DECISION

Fair Work Act 2009

s.437 - Application for a protected action ballot order

United Workers' Union
v

GPC Asia Pacific Pty Ltd

(B2025/1203 & B2025/1204)

DEPUTY PRESIDENT HAMPTON ADELAIDE, 31 JULY 2025

Proposed protected action ballot of employees of GPC Asia Pacific Pty Ltd

1. This matter concerns two applications by the United Workers’ Union (UWU or Applicant) made under s.437 of the Fair Work Act 2009 (Act) for protected action ballot orders (PABO) in relation to certain employees of GPC Asia Pacific Pty Ltd (GPC or Employer).

1. The two applications involve different bargaining processes for different proposed enterprise agreements. However, the circumstances are broadly similar and the nature of the issues arising for consideration by the Commission are largely the same. As a result, I have considered and determined each of the applications and these reasons apply to both.

1. On 30 July 2025, the Commission was advised that the Employer objected to each application. The objections raised in each matter were of a similar nature and were stated to be:

·  The applications contain incomplete and inaccurate information regarding the status of claims as well as key dates in the bargaining process;

·  It is GPC’s view that it has been bargaining in good faith;

·  GPC is concerned that the UWU are not attempting to reach an agreement; and

·  The applications for a PABO are premature.

1. I understand that the reference to “good faith” in the Employer’s position is to the good faith bargaining requirements set out in s.228 of the Act.

1. The UWU has maintained its applications and seeks that the orders be made in the proposed terms. The parties were given an opportunity to be further heard on each application but neither sought to do so.

1. In the circumstances, I dealt with the applications based on the respective materials that were before the Commission and did not hold a hearing.

1. The UWU relies upon the declarations of its relevant officials, Ben Hadziahmetovic, and Tom Rossiter. The Employer did not provide affirmed evidence; however, I have treated its summary of the bargaining events on face value.

1. Section 437 of the Act provides as follows:

437 Application for a protected action ballot order

Who may apply for a protected action ballot order

(1)A bargaining representative of an employee who will be covered by a proposed enterprise agreement, or 2 or more such bargaining representatives (acting jointly), may apply to the FWC for an order (a protected action ballot order) requiring a protected action ballot to be conducted to determine whether employees wish to engage in particular protected industrial action for the agreement.

(2) Subsection (1) does not apply if the proposed enterprise agreement is:

(a)a greenfields agreement; or

(b)a cooperative workplace agreement.

(2A) Subsection (1) does not apply unless there has been a notification time in relation to the proposed enterprise agreement.

Note: For notification time, see subsection 173(2). Protected industrial action cannot be taken until after bargaining has commenced (including where the scope of the proposed enterprise agreement is the only matter in dispute).

Matters to be specified in application

(3) The application must specify:

(a)the group or groups of employees who are to be balloted; and

(b)the question or questions to be put to the employees who are to be balloted, including the nature of the proposed industrial action; and

(c)the name of the person or entity that the applicant wishes to be the protected action ballot agent for the protected action ballot.

Note:The protected action ballot agent for the ballot must be an eligible protected action ballot agent unless there are exceptional circumstances: see section 444.

(5) A group of employees specified under paragraph (3)(a) is taken to include only employees who:

(a)will be covered by the proposed enterprise agreement; and

(b)either:

(i)are represented by a bargaining representative who is an applicant for the protected action ballot order; or

(ii)are bargaining representatives for themselves but are members of an employee organisation that is an applicant for the protected action ballot order.

Documents to accompany the application

(6) The application must be accompanied by any documents and other information prescribed by the regulations.

1. Section 443 of the Act provides:

“443 When the FWC must make a protected action ballot order

(1)The FWC must make a protected action ballot order in relation to a proposed enterprise agreement if:

(a)an application has been made under section 437; and

(b) the FWC is satisfied that each applicant has been, and is, genuinely trying to reach an agreement with the employer of the employees who are to be balloted.

(2)The FWC must not make a protected action ballot order in relation to a proposed enterprise agreement except in the circumstances referred to in subsection (1).

(3)A protected action ballot order must specify the following:

(a)the name of each applicant for the order;

(b)the group or groups of employees who are to be balloted;

(c)the date by which voting in the protected action ballot closes;

(d)the question or questions to be put to the employees who are to be balloted, including the nature of the proposed industrial action;

(e)the person or entity that the FWC decides, under subsection 444(1A), is to be the protected action ballot agent for the protected action ballot;

(f)the person (if any) that the FWC decides, under subsection 444(3), is to be the independent advisor for the ballot.

(3A)For the purposes of paragraph (3)(c), the FWC must specify a date that will enable the protected action ballot to be conducted as expeditiously as practicable.

(5)If the FWC is satisfied, in relation to the proposed industrial action that is the subject of the protected action ballot, that there are exceptional circumstances justifying the period of written notice referred to in paragraph 414(2)(a) being longer than 3 working days or 120 hours (whichever is applicable), the protected action ballot order may specify a longer period of up to 7 working days.

Note: Under subsection 414(1), before a person engages in employee claim action for a proposed enterprise agreement, a bargaining representative of an employee who will be covered by the agreement must give written notice of the action to the employer of the employee.

1. I observe for completeness that there are other statutory requirements for a PABO to be issued that are not in issue in these matters. Further, most of the matters raised in the provisions above were also not in dispute.

1. The UWU must demonstrate that it has met (and where relevant continues to meet) all of these requirements. There is no dispute that the UWU was entitled to bring the applications, and valid applications have been made under s.437 of the Act. The substantive requirement that must be met is whether the UWU has been and is genuinely trying to reach an agreement with the Employer – s.443(1)(b) of the Act.

1. The evidence before the Commission demonstrates the history of the bargaining, the series of bargaining meetings that have been conducted and some more recent developments. I am not in a position to resolve the disputed detail of the facts of the bargaining; however, it is not presently necessary for me to do so. Accepting GPC’s position on face value, it is evident that bargaining has been progressing and although there is a dispute about the extent of progress, there have been matters agreed or withdrawn, with other claims outstanding.

1. I would be open to the suggestion that progress in bargaining for a new enterprise agreement in these matters remains possible without recourse to protected industrial action. However, for reasons set out below, this is not the test for a PABO to be issued and protected industrial action as part of bargaining, provided that the various statutory requirements have been met, is part of the scheme of the Act.

1. At least in part, GPC contend that the applications have been brought prematurely or are unnecessary. In this regard, a Full Bench of the Commission in Kuiper Australia Pty Ltd v The Australian Workers’ Union[1] (Kuiper) has relevantly stated:

“[31] That is not to suggest that whether a bargaining representative has been, and is, genuinely trying to reach agreement involves an assessment of whether the bargaining representative is “unduly rushing” to take protected industrial action. The Act expressly deals with when protected industrial action can be taken. Application for a protected action ballot order must not be made unless there has been a “notification time” (s 437(2A)) and cannot be made earlier than 30 days before the nominal expiry of an existing enterprise agreement (s 438(1)). Protected industrial action must not actually be organised or engaged in before the nominal expiry date of an existing agreement (s 413(6)) or if a suspension or termination order, Ministerial declaration or intractable bargaining declaration is in operation (s 413(7)). Otherwise, the Act does not dictate when a bargaining representative should seek a protected action ballot order.

[32] The Act contemplates that an application for a protected action ballot order can be made as soon as there has been a “notification time” so long as that date is not more than 30 days before the nominal expiry of an existing agreement. The requirement, in s 443(1)(b), that an applicant has been, and is, genuinely trying to reach agreement does not impose a further de facto time constraint on when protected industrial action can be taken by prescribing that bargaining must have developed to some minimum stage or level. The Act does not countenance such an approach.

[34] An allegation that an application for a protected action ballot order is premature does not, of itself, provide a basis for concluding that the applicant for the order has not been, or is not, genuinely trying to reach agreement. The Act envisages that protected action might be taken early in bargaining. The Commission must simply consider whether, in light of the circumstances operating at the time of its decision, the applicant has been, and is, genuinely seeking agreement. The reference to “premature applications” in Total Marine Services has been doubted or not followed in subsequent decisions, particularly JJ Richards (FWAFB), Farstad Shipping and Esso Australia Pty Ltd v Australian Manufacturing Workers’ Union [2015] FWCFB 210; (2015) 247 IR 5. Kuiper did not suggest we should follow the reasoning in the fourth and fifth sentences of paragraph [32] of Total Marine Services.”

1. The approach required as to whether a party has been, and is, genuinely trying to reach an agreement has also previously been summarised, in effect, by the Full Bench in Esso Australia Pty Ltd v “Automotive, Food, Metals, Engineering, Printing and Kindred Industries Union” known as the Australian Manufacturing Workers’ Union (AMWU); Communications, Electrical, Electronic, Energy, Information, Postal, Plumbing and Allied Services Union of Australia; The Australian Workers’ Union.[2] This includes, as relevant to these matters:

·  While there is a relationship between the good faith bargaining requirements in s.228 of the Act and the concept of genuinely trying to reach an agreement, it would be wrong to conflate these terms. A party may not meet a particular good faith bargaining requirement but may nevertheless be genuinely trying to reach an agreement.[3]

·  The concept of genuinely trying to reach an agreement involves a finding of fact applied by reference to the circumstances of the particular negotiations. It is not useful to formulate any alternative test or criteria for applying the statutory test because it is the words of s.443 which must be applied. In the course of examining all of the circumstances it may be relevant to consider related matters but ultimately the test in s.443 must be applied.[4] The Commission should have regard to all of the relevant facts and circumstances of the particular case.[5]

·  It is not appropriate or possible to establish rigid rules for the required point of negotiations that must be reached. All the relevant circumstances must be assessed to establish whether the applicant has met the test or not. This will frequently involve considering the extent of progress in negotiations and the steps taken in order to try and reach an agreement.[6]

·  The reference to the Commission being ‘satisfied’ means that whether or not the requisite circumstance exists is a discretionary decision. Section 443(1)(b) directs attention to the conduct of the applicant union. The expression ‘has been, and is’, imports temporal considerations. The Commission’s attention is thereby directed to the applicant’s prior conduct at the time the application for a protected action ballot order is determined. Given the context the reference to ‘an agreement’ is plainly a reference to an enterprise agreement within the meaning of Part 2-4 of the Act.[7]

1. The expression “genuinely trying” has also been taken to be concerned with the genuineness or authenticity of the trying; that is, the efforts, by the applicant to reach the stated goal, being an enterprise agreement that meets the requirements of the Act.[8]

1. In these cases, the evidence before the Commission generally supports the notion that the UWU has been and is genuinely trying to reach an agreement with GPC. It has also meaningfully engaged and continues to engage with the bargaining process with the genuine objective of reaching an agreement. It also remains committed to negotiating a new enterprise agreement with the Employer and its actions confirm that it is doing so genuinely. I accept that GPC has also been bargaining in good faith and that progress in negotiations has been and is likely to continue.

1. To the extent that GPC faintly raises the notion that the UWU may not be meeting the good faith bargaining requirements of the Act,[9] this has not been made out. In any event, I have taken into account the concerns that are directly relevant to the determination of the present matters, where supported by any evidence.[10] In that regard, I observe that there is no requirement that the bargaining be exhausted before an application of this kind is made. Further, a PABO application does not stop the bargaining and the good faith bargaining obligations remain, including that the parties must continue to bargain.

1. I find that the UWU has met the requirements of s.443(1)(b) of the Act.

1. On the basis of the material before me, I am also satisfied that there is a notification time[11] in relation to the proposed agreements and that all of the requirements in s.443 of the Act have been met, including those not in contest and not expressly dealt with in this decision. On that basis, and given that s.443(2) does not apply, I was obliged by the Act to issue each Order.

1. The ballots are to be conducted by Fair Vote Services Pty Ltd (Fair Vote). Fair Vote has been approved as an eligible protected action ballot agent under s.468A of the Act and consequently is authorised to conduct the ballots.

1. For the purposes of s.443(3)(c) of the Act, the Commission has determined that the date by which voting is to close in each matter is 15 August 2025.[12] This also establishes the ballot period for the purpose of s.448A(2) of the Act.

1. An Order for each matter has been separately issued in PR790179 and PR790182.

1. These matters will be assigned to another Member of the Commission to conduct the respective s.448A compulsory conciliation conferences. That Member will issue an Order requiring the attendance of all bargaining representatives in the proposed enterprise agreement at the conference. It is likely that Directions will also be issued to ensure that the parties attend the conferences ready to conduct meaningful negotiations.

DEPUTY PRESIDENT

[1] [2024] FWCFB 378.

[2] [2015] FWCFB 210.

[3] Ibid at [18].

[4] Ibid at [34] - drawing upon Total Marine Services Pty Ltd v The Maritime Union of Australia[2009] FWAFB 368 (Total Marine).

[5] Ibid at [57].

[6] Ibid at [35] - but qualifying a further statement made in Total Marine.

[7] Ibid at [54].

[8] J.J. Richards & Sons Pty Ltd v Transport Workers’ Union of Australia[2010] FWAFB 9963 at [89] and Kuiper at [26] to [30].

[9] Section 228 of the Act.

[10] Noting that the two concepts are related but should not be conflated.

[11] Required by s.437(2A) of the Act.

[12] This is, in effect, 10 working days from the making of the Order and was the period sought in each application.

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