SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA
(Court of Appeal: Civil)
UNITED WORKERS UNION v CHIEF EXECUTIVE, ATTORNEY-GENERAL’S DEPARTMENT
[2025] SASCA 80
Judgment of the Court of Appeal
(The Honourable President Livesey, the Honourable Justice Stanley and the Honourable Auxiliary Justice Bond)
17 July 2025
INDUSTRIAL LAW - SOUTH AUSTRALIA - APPEALS AND REFERENCES - TO SUPREME COURT
INDUSTRIAL LAW - SOUTH AUSTRALIA - SOUTH AUSTRALIAN EMPLOYMENT TRIBUNAL AND ITS PREDECESSORS - SETTLEMENT OF INDUSTRIAL DISPUTES - REFERRAL TO TRIBUNAL AND OTHER MATTERS
Application for permission to appeal against a decision of the Full Bench of the South Australian Employment Tribunal (the Tribunal).
In December 2018, the applicant Union notified the Tribunal of an industrial dispute under Chapter 2, Part 2 of the Fair Work Act 1994 (SA) concerning the operation of cl 15.3 of the “South Australian Public Sector Wages Parity Enterprise Agreement; Weekly Paid 2017” (the Enterprise Agreement) and requested the Tribunal’s assistance in resolving the dispute.
The parties agreed that the subject matter for the determination of the Tribunal would be the following two questions, and that the second question was necessary to answer only if the first question was answered in the affirmative:
1.Does clause 15.3 of the [Enterprise Agreement] apply to the contract between [MSS] and [the Minister] dated 10 December 2013 (‘the contract’);
2.If so, does clause 15.3 of the Enterprise Agreement require the [Chief Executive] to ensure that, under the terms of any renewal extension or replacement of the Contract, the employees of [MSS] must be paid no less favourably for the hours worked than as set out in the Enterprise Agreement (or its successor).
A member of the Tribunal answered the questions contrary to the way in which the applicant sought to have them answered and subsequently resolved the dispute.
The applicant then appealed to the Full Bench of the Tribunal, which dismissed the appeal.
The question arising in this case is whether permission to appeal should be given to enable arguments on a question of law to be advanced before the Court of Appeal in circumstances where those arguments were deliberately abandoned before the Full Bench.
Held (the Court) refusing permission to appeal with costs:
1.The applicant bears the burden of persuading the Court that the grant of permission to appeal sought is the course which best serves the interests of justice: see Draoui v Return to Work Corporation of South Australia [2024] SASC 128.
2.The fact that a deliberate decision was made by senior counsel before the Full Bench to abandon a legal argument that was run at trial sounds strongly against the Court granting permission to appeal.
3.The deliberate decision not to press before the Full Bench the arguments now sought to be pressed operates to deny the Court of Appeal the advantage of having specialist consideration of those arguments by the Full Bench of the Tribunal specifically created for that purpose.
4.The applicant has not demonstrated that the vindication of its arguments would justify giving affirmative answers…
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- Case
- [2025] SASCA 80
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The primary legal issue before the Court of Appeal was whether permission to appeal should be granted, given that the central point of contention had been abandoned before the Full Bench. The court was also required to consider the operation of clause 15 of the Enterprise Agreement, which contained provisions regarding the employer's agreement not to outsource, contract out, or privatise work, and to maintain wage parity commitments for outsourced or contracted work.
The Court of Appeal reasoned that permission to appeal should be refused because the specific legal point the Union wished to raise on appeal had been abandoned during proceedings before the Full Bench. The court noted that the Union had not disputed the Chief Executive's position that entering into an Enterprise Agreement did not bind the hands of Cabinet or Ministers regarding policy or procurement decisions, nor had it challenged the proposition that the Chief Executive did not bind the Crown as its agent. The court observed that the initial decision of the Tribunal at first instance had found that while there was an intention for clause 15.3 to apply to contracts for outsourced work, there was no evidence that the State Government, beyond the Chief Executive, agreed to be bound. Furthermore, the Tribunal found no evidence of actual detriment suffered by the Union or its members due to the outsourcing arrangements in question.
Consequently, the application for permission to appeal to the Court of Appeal was refused, and the Union was ordered to pay the costs of the Chief Executive.
Orders
Orders of the court
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The Union now seeks permission to commence an appeal to the Court of Appeal from the decision of the Full Bench. For the reasons which follow, and in circumstances where the point to be raised was abandoned before the Full Bench, the application for permission to appeal to the Court of Appeal should be refused, with costs. Preliminary observations concerning the operation of cl 15 of the Enterprise Agreement It will appear that the principal relevant clause of the Enterprise Agreement is cl 15. It will assist understanding of the nature of the industrial dispute, the decisions below, and the other parts of these reasons, if some preliminary observations are made concerning the operation of the clause. Clause 15 of the Enterprise Agreement was in these terms:15. SECURITY OF EMPLOYMENT15.1The Employer agrees that during the life of this Agreement, no further work performed by weekly paid employees covered by this Agreement will be outsourced, contracted out or privatised. Additionally, the Employer agrees not to enter into any arrangements to outsource, contract out or privatise work performed by weekly paid employees during the life of this Agreement, even if the operative date of such arrangement is after the nominal expiry date of this Agreement.15.2Where work is already outsourced or contracted out, the employer will maintain existing wages parity commitments between the Employer and the Contractor.15.3Any renewal, extension of or new contacts (of already outsourced or contracted out work) will be entered in to between the Employer and the Contractor on the basis that employees of the Contractor must be paid no less favourably for the hours worked as set out in the SA Government Wages Parity (Weekly Paid) Enterprise Agreement 2017 (or its successor).15.4Where agency labour/labour hire is utilised, the Employer must ensure that employees or contractors of the labour agency must be are paid no less favourably for the hours worked than as set out in the SA Government Wages Parity (Weekly Paid) Enterprise Agreement 2017 or its successor.15.5Where such arrangements have not been previously in place, the provisions of this clause will apply for new or extensions of existing contracts when entered in to between the employer and the labour hire provider.15.6If requested by a Union covered by this Agreement, the Employer will provide relevant information to the Union enabling the Union to assess whether this clause has been complied with, unless in confidence and subject to Clause 10.3(b). First, cl 15.1 expressed two important promises by the Employer. First, that there would be no further “outsourcing” (using the term in the compendious sense of outsourcing, contracting out or privatising) during the life of the Enterprise Agreement. Second, that the Employer would not during the life of the Enterprise Agreement enter into an arrangement for outsourcing even if the operative date of the outsourcing arrangement was outside the life of the Enterprise Agreement. The second promise can be seen as an anti-avoidance obligation in respect of the first promise.