United Workers Union v Chief Executive, Attorney-General's Department

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SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA

(Court of Appeal: Civil)

UNITED WORKERS UNION v CHIEF EXECUTIVE, ATTORNEY-GENERAL’S DEPARTMENT

[2025] SASCA 80

Judgment of the Court of Appeal  

(The Honourable President Livesey, the Honourable Justice Stanley and the Honourable Auxiliary Justice Bond)

17 July 2025

INDUSTRIAL LAW - SOUTH AUSTRALIA - APPEALS AND REFERENCES - TO SUPREME COURT

INDUSTRIAL LAW - SOUTH AUSTRALIA - SOUTH AUSTRALIAN EMPLOYMENT TRIBUNAL AND ITS PREDECESSORS - SETTLEMENT OF INDUSTRIAL DISPUTES - REFERRAL TO TRIBUNAL AND OTHER MATTERS

Application for permission to appeal against a decision of the Full Bench of the South Australian Employment Tribunal (the Tribunal).

In December 2018, the applicant Union notified the Tribunal of an industrial dispute under Chapter 2, Part 2 of the Fair Work Act 1994 (SA) concerning the operation of cl 15.3 of the “South Australian Public Sector Wages Parity Enterprise Agreement; Weekly Paid 2017” (the Enterprise Agreement) and requested the Tribunal’s assistance in resolving the dispute.

The parties agreed that the subject matter for the determination of the Tribunal would be the following two questions, and that the second question was necessary to answer only if the first question was answered in the affirmative:

1.Does clause 15.3 of the [Enterprise Agreement] apply to the contract between [MSS] and [the Minister] dated 10 December 2013 (‘the contract’);

2.If so, does clause 15.3 of the Enterprise Agreement require the [Chief Executive] to ensure that, under the terms of any renewal extension or replacement of the Contract, the employees of [MSS] must be paid no less favourably for the hours worked than as set out in the Enterprise Agreement (or its successor).

A member of the Tribunal answered the questions contrary to the way in which the applicant sought to have them answered and subsequently resolved the dispute.

The applicant then appealed to the Full Bench of the Tribunal, which dismissed the appeal.

The question arising in this case is whether permission to appeal should be given to enable arguments on a question of law to be advanced before the Court of Appeal in circumstances where those arguments were deliberately abandoned before the Full Bench.

Held (the Court) refusing permission to appeal with costs:

1.The applicant bears the burden of persuading the Court that the grant of permission to appeal sought is the course which best serves the interests of justice: see Draoui v Return to Work Corporation of South Australia [2024] SASC 128.

2.The fact that a deliberate decision was made by senior counsel before the Full Bench to abandon a legal argument that was run at trial sounds strongly against the Court granting permission to appeal.

3.The deliberate decision not to press before the Full Bench the arguments now sought to be pressed operates to deny the Court of Appeal the advantage of having specialist consideration of those arguments by the Full Bench of the Tribunal specifically created for that purpose.

4.The applicant has not demonstrated that the vindication of its arguments would justify giving affirmative answers…

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Details
Case
[2025] SASCA 80
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The United Workers Union sought permission to appeal to the Court of Appeal from a decision of the Full Bench of the South Australian Employment Tribunal. The dispute concerned the interpretation and application of clause 15 of an Enterprise Agreement, specifically relating to the outsourcing and contracting out of work performed by weekly paid employees. The Chief Executive of the Attorney-General's Department was the respondent.

The primary legal issue before the Court of Appeal was whether permission to appeal should be granted, given that the central point of contention had been abandoned before the Full Bench. The court was also required to consider the operation of clause 15 of the Enterprise Agreement, which contained provisions regarding the employer's agreement not to outsource, contract out, or privatise work, and to maintain wage parity commitments for outsourced or contracted work.

The Court of Appeal reasoned that permission to appeal should be refused because the specific legal point the Union wished to raise on appeal had been abandoned during proceedings before the Full Bench. The court noted that the Union had not disputed the Chief Executive's position that entering into an Enterprise Agreement did not bind the hands of Cabinet or Ministers regarding policy or procurement decisions, nor had it challenged the proposition that the Chief Executive did not bind the Crown as its agent. The court observed that the initial decision of the Tribunal at first instance had found that while there was an intention for clause 15.3 to apply to contracts for outsourced work, there was no evidence that the State Government, beyond the Chief Executive, agreed to be bound. Furthermore, the Tribunal found no evidence of actual detriment suffered by the Union or its members due to the outsourcing arrangements in question.

Consequently, the application for permission to appeal to the Court of Appeal was refused, and the Union was ordered to pay the costs of the Chief Executive.

Orders

Orders of the court

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

It may be noted that, by framing the dispute in the way it did, the Union did not seek to dispute the correctness of the Chief Executive’s suggestion that the Chief Executive could not, by entering into an Enterprise Agreement, tie the hands of Cabinet or of Ministers of the Crown in relation to political, policy or procurement decisions, and had not in fact purported to do so by cl 15.3. Nor did the Union seek to dispute the correctness of the Chief Executive’s reliance on the previous decision of the Full Court in Public Service Association (SA) Inc v South Australia for the proposition that the Chief Executive was not the agent of the Crown and neither did he or she bind the Crown in respect of employees covered by the Enterprise Agreement as the agent of the Crown. Rather, the Union seemed to rely on the two matters which the Chief Executive had accepted, as identified in the last two paragraphs of the quotation at [21](d) above.The decision of the Tribunal at first instance[5][5] United Workers’ Union (formerly United Voice) v Chief Executive, Department of Treasury and Finance (No 3) [2020] SAET 222. His Honour Deputy President Judge Rossi constituted the Tribunal at first instance. His Honour first recorded that in the course of the compulsory conciliation phase of the dispute resolution process at the Tribunal, the parties had agreed that the subject matter for referral and determination to the Tribunal would be two questions, the second question becoming necessary to answer only if the first question was answered in the affirmative:[6]1 Does clause 15.3 of the [Enterprise Agreement] apply to the contract between [MSS] and [the Minister] dated 10 December 2013 (‘the contract’);2 If so, does clause 15.3 of the Enterprise Agreement require the [Chief Executive] to ensure that, under the terms of any renewal extension or replacement of the Contract, the employees of [MSS] must be paid no less favourably for the hours worked than as set out in the Enterprise Agreement (or its successor).[6] United Workers’ Union (formerly United Voice) v Chief Executive, Department of Treasury and Finance (No 3) [2020] SAET 222, [3] (Rossi DPJ). His Honour’s judgment then proceeded to a discussion which concluded that the Tribunal had jurisdiction to construe cl 15.3 and to provide answers to the two questions put to it. In the course of that discussion his Honour noted the provisions of s 8 of the SAET Act at the time, namely:8—Jurisdiction to interpret awards and enterprise agreements(1) SAET has jurisdiction to interpret an award or enterprise agreement.(2) In exercising its interpretative jurisdiction—(a) SAET should have regard to any evidence that is reasonably available to it of what the author of the relevant part of the award or enterprise agreement, and the parties to the award or enterprise agreement, intended it to mean when it was drafted; and(b) if a common intention is ascertainable—give effect to that intention. Having reached that point Rossi DPJ essayed a summary of what he described as “the established principles of construction of enterprise agreements (and awards generally)”.[7] His Honour then proceeded to record and make findings concerning relevant background facts, as to which the following observations should be made:[7] United Workers’ Union (formerly United Voice) v Chief Executive, Department of Treasury and Finance (No 3) [2020] SAET 222, [13] (Rossi DPJ). (a)His Honour recited the various positions taken by the parties during the course of the negotiations between the Union and the Chief Executive which had led to the Enterprise Agreement. Amongst other things his Honour recorded evidence suggesting that at the time the Enterprise Agreement was entered into the Union and the Chief Executive (by its delegate) each had the subjective intention that cl 15.3 would have application to a contract (including any extension or renewal of an existing contract) between a Minister of the Crown and a contractor for the performance of outsourced work covered by the Enterprise Agreement. Nevertheless, his Honour found that there was “no evidence of the State Government agreeing that any manifestation of the Crown beyond the [Chief Executive], in the capacity of declared employer, being bound by the terms of the [Enterprise Agreement]”.[8] (b)Before his Honour, the Chief Executive had accepted that there had been contracts between the Minister and MSS for the provision of security services at SA Health sites dating back to 2013. His Honour found that the first contract commenced on 1 July 2013 and ended on 30 June 2016. Thereafter, there were annual extensions until 1 July 2018 when there was an extension to 30 September 2018, followed by a further extension to 30 November 2018 and then a further brief extension to 31 March 2019. (c)Rossi DPJ recorded that the Chief Executive had submitted and the Union had not challenged and that he found on the evidence that in entering into the contract with MSS prior to the Enterprise Agreement the Minister did not do so pursuant to any delegation from the Chief Executive and “was not acting in connection with public employment”.[9] His Honour later found:[10]In this matter there is an absence of evidence of actual detriment having been suffered to date by the [Union] or its members who are employees with the [Chief Executive] as the declared employer of those employees. In her affidavit, Ms Pnevmatikos referred to government sector members concerns about their job security if there were to be further outsourcing and privatisation. However, there was no evidence, in the context of the contracts between the Minister and MSS dating back to 2013, to indicate a change in the extent of outsourcing and privatisation or any other actual detriment suffered by the members of the [Union] employed by the [Chief Executive]. To the extent that further privatisation and outsourcing would occur in the absence of cl 15.3 applying to the new contract or that there has been or will be an actual impact upon the position of any member of the [Union] employed by the [Chief Executive] at the commencement of the [Enterprise Agreement] is, by reference to the evidence before the Commission, a matter of speculation.(d)His Honour found that the Minister had entered into a new contract with MSS for the provision of security services at public hospitals in South Australia and the new contract had operative effect from a starting date of 1 April 2019 and a completion date of 30 March 2024 (inclusive of two by one-year extension periods). The terms of that new contract did not include a term requiring that MSS pay its employees no less favourably for the hours worked than as set out in the Enterprise Agreement.(e)His Honour recited how the dispute between the Union and the Chief Executive arose, culminating in recording the position taken on behalf of the Chief Executive in the letter dated 31 October 2018.(f)His Honour found that neither the Minister nor the Deputy Chief Executive of SA Health were identified as parties to be bound by the Enterprise Agreement.[8] United Workers’ Union (formerly United Voice) v Chief Executive, Department of Treasury and Finance (No 3) [2020] SAET 222, [19] (Rossi DPJ). [9] United Workers’ Union (formerly United Voice) v Chief Executive, Department of Treasury and Finance (No 3) [2020] SAET 222, [21] (Rossi DPJ). [10] United Workers’ Union (formerly United Voice) v Chief Executive, Department of Treasury and Finance (No 3) [2020] SAET 222, [148] (Rossi DPJ).

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The Union now seeks permission to commence an appeal to the Court of Appeal from the decision of the Full Bench. For the reasons which follow, and in circumstances where the point to be raised was abandoned before the Full Bench, the application for permission to appeal to the Court of Appeal should be refused, with costs. Preliminary observations concerning the operation of cl 15 of the Enterprise Agreement It will appear that the principal relevant clause of the Enterprise Agreement is cl 15. It will assist understanding of the nature of the industrial dispute, the decisions below, and the other parts of these reasons, if some preliminary observations are made concerning the operation of the clause. Clause 15 of the Enterprise Agreement was in these terms:15. SECURITY OF EMPLOYMENT15.1The Employer agrees that during the life of this Agreement, no further work performed by weekly paid employees covered by this Agreement will be outsourced, contracted out or privatised. Additionally, the Employer agrees not to enter into any arrangements to outsource, contract out or privatise work performed by weekly paid employees during the life of this Agreement, even if the operative date of such arrangement is after the nominal expiry date of this Agreement.15.2Where work is already outsourced or contracted out, the employer will maintain existing wages parity commitments between the Employer and the Contractor.15.3Any renewal, extension of or new contacts (of already outsourced or contracted out work) will be entered in to between the Employer and the Contractor on the basis that employees of the Contractor must be paid no less favourably for the hours worked as set out in the SA Government Wages Parity (Weekly Paid) Enterprise Agreement 2017 (or its successor).15.4Where agency labour/labour hire is utilised, the Employer must ensure that employees or contractors of the labour agency must be are paid no less favourably for the hours worked than as set out in the SA Government Wages Parity (Weekly Paid) Enterprise Agreement 2017 or its successor.15.5Where such arrangements have not been previously in place, the provisions of this clause will apply for new or extensions of existing contracts when entered in to between the employer and the labour hire provider.15.6If requested by a Union covered by this Agreement, the Employer will provide relevant information to the Union enabling the Union to assess whether this clause has been complied with, unless in confidence and subject to Clause 10.3(b). First, cl 15.1 expressed two important promises by the Employer. First, that there would be no further “outsourcing” (using the term in the compendious sense of outsourcing, contracting out or privatising) during the life of the Enterprise Agreement. Second, that the Employer would not during the life of the Enterprise Agreement enter into an arrangement for outsourcing even if the operative date of the outsourcing arrangement was outside the life of the Enterprise Agreement. The second promise can be seen as an anti-avoidance obligation in respect of the first promise.